The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Review: Hammond - On the Notion of Virtue in the Dialogues of Plato

by Thomas Davidson (1840-1900)

On the Notion of Virtue in the Dialogues of Plato, with Particular Reference to those of the First Period and to the Third and Fourth Books of the Republic. Inaugural Dissertation presented to the University of Leipzig for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. By William A. Hammond, M.A. Boston, Ginn & Co., 1892.—pp. 54.

In order to judge this dissertation fairly, one must bear in mind the purpose for which it was written. It is a graduation essay, taking, to some extent, the place of an examination paper. Such essays, in Germany at least, are not expected to be models of method or style, but merely to show that their writers know how to bring together all the best accessible knowledge upon a given subject, and to draw from it such conclusions as it fairly warrants.

Had this dissertation come to me without the appended Vita, I should unhesitatingly have attributed it to a German having a very imperfect knowledge of English. Its style is distinctly un-English, inelegant, and not seldom ungrammatical. Its method is German, painstaking, exhaustive, but not lucid or incisive. It does not hold the attention of the reader, or lead him naturally up to a bird's-eye view of the subject.

Apart from these defects of style and method, the dissertation deserves the no small praise of having achieved its purpose. It brings out clearly Plato's notion of ethics, showing that they are naturalistic and eudæmonistic, conceding the form of the virtuous life to be harmony, inner and outer, and its aim to be happiness, individual and social. Rosmini expressed this by saying that Plato's ethical ideal was the "unity of human perfection." In such a system, the "will of God" and its correlates, "righteousness" and "sin," have no place; the "categorical imperative" is unknown.

From an historical point of view, the most interesting point in Plato's ethical system is one of which Dr. Hammond has taken no notice, and which, indeed, did not lie within the scope of his undertaking. By showing that his institutional ethics, embodied in the state, is correlated with "idiopsychological ethics" manifested in the individual, Plato took the first step towards shifting the ethical centre of gravity from the outward social order to the inner individual conscience, and thus started a movement which broke up ancient institutions and transformed human life. This movement was continued by Aristotle, greatly accelerated by the Stoics and Epicureans, and consummated in Christianity, which completely detaches the individual, as far as his moral relations are concerned, from the State, and places him, solum coram Solo, face to face with the source of the moral law. It is in contrast with Christian ethics that the system of Plato exhibits its character most clearly. The Platonic ethics aim at a harmony, the conditions of which can be learnt only through knowledge and insight, hence the fundamental virtue is Wisdom (σοφία); Christian ethics aim at the inspiration of the Holy Spirit; hence the fundamental Christian virtue is faith ripening, through hope, into love. It is needless to say that one of the chief efforts of modern ethical thinking, as well as of modern civilization, has been to reconcile these two points of view.

To refer to one or two minor details: When Dr. Hammond (p. 132) says: "Philosophical ethics is possible only when investigated [sic] in perfect freedom, uninfluenced by tradition, religion, or other like causes," he asserts something that is by no means obvious, and the contrary might equally well be asserted. All depends upon what use is made of tradition and religion. A system of ethics which should disregard these would be dialectical and empty, to use a phrase of Aristotle's.

Dr. Hammond's attempt to show the interrelation of Plato's four cardinal virtues is acute and interesting; but one may doubt whether it is entirely correct.

		Cardinal Virtue.	Faculty in the Individual.	Class in the State.	Nation Characterized.
		σοφία	λογιστικόν	ἄρχοντες or ἐπιστήμονες φιλόσοποι	Hellenes
		ἀνδρεία	θυμοειδές	ἐπίκουροι or ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς	Scythians, Thracians, and Northerners
		σωφροσύνη	λογιστικόν θυμοειδές ἐπιθυμητικόν	ἄρχοντες ἐπίκουροι χρηματιστικοί
		δικαιοσύνη	λογιστικόν θυμοειδές ἐπιθυμητικόν	ἄρχοντες ἐπίκουροι χρηματιστικοί

^[1]

^[2]

^[3]

It seems to me that we might express their relation thus:

(1) σοφία, the virtue of the λογιστικόν, informing the θυμοειδές, gives rise to ἀνδρεία.

(2) ἀνδρεία, the virtue of the θυμοειδές (as informed by σοφία) informing the ἐπιθυμητικόν, gives rise to σωφροσύνη.

(3) When these three virtues reach their full manifestation, and are in complete harmony, the result is δικαιοσύνη.

In conclusion, I cannot help expressing the wish that the practice of writing theses of this sort may become common in our universities. If ever it does so, it will undoubtedly adapt itself to the American mind, with its clearness, rapidity, and demand for available results.

Thomas Davidson.

1. 1. The rational element has for its ally the spirited element. 2. Both the spirited and concupiscent elements are subject to the rule of the rational part. 3. The harmonious working of all parts in the matter of the rule of reason is σωφροσύνη.
2. In the function of the several parts of the soul no distinction is made; in each case the function is τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. In this respect all of the elements are on equal footing with regard to the virtue δικαιοσύνη.
3. Δικαιοσύνη is in this case purely a virtue of the individual parts, quite as much as σοφία or ἀνδρεία, while σωφροσύνη is a harmony of the entire soul arising out of δικαιοσύνη.