The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Fraser - Visualization as a Chief Source of the Psychology of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume
Just as men of different nationalities speak in different verbal languages, so do different types of individuals think in different thought-languages. In one type the characteristic thought-stuff may be visual, in another auditory, in another motor. The object of this paper is to offer a description and estimation of the sensationalist psychology in its first presentation by Hobbes, its development by Locke and Berkeley, and its culmination in the scepticism of Hume in which an attempt will be made (1) to maintain that the predominating element in the thought of these men was Visualization, and (2) on the basis of this fact to offer a new criticism of the psychology of Sensationalism. A large number of quotations are given from the works of each of the above-mentioned philosophers, which show their dependence on visual images. What Hume cannot visualize he will not admit as belonging to thought or consciousness at all, but considers as "illusion." This scepticism is not the consistent outcome of sensationalism, but of visualization. It results from being built on one side only of a many-sided foundation. The larger portions of our conscious life which we are liable to recognize as conscious are those which manage to translate themselves into visual terms. On this account the largest part of the content of consciousness is lost to view; all its finer connections and beautiful continuity remain, concealed in the anæsthetic senses, outside the primary consciousness. It is obvious that what is needed for a more complete view of consciousness is a more equal emphasizing and more harmonious development of the senses.