The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Marshall - The Field of Æsthetics Psychologically Considered

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The Philosophical Review Volume 1 (1892)
edited by Jacob Gould Schurman
Summary: Marshall - The Field of Æsthetics Psychologically Considered by Anonymous
2658233The Philosophical Review Volume 1 — Summary: Marshall - The Field of Æsthetics Psychologically Considered1892Anonymous
The Field of Æsthetics Psychologically Considered, I. H. R. Marshall. Mind, I, 3, pp. 358-379.

Æsthetic theory has gained little of fundamental importance from the discussions by philosophers in the past. This is not because æsthetic problems have been neglected by the best thinkers, but rather because they have looked upon them as secondary issues. Non-hedonistic æsthetic theories have, from a psychological point of view, resulted in failure. Hedonic the æsthetic psychosis certainly is. Whether this hedonic quality is of great moment, is a question to be determined. M. agrees that associations which are pleasurable are important elements in an æsthetic effect; but if the associationist means that æsthetic effect is determined altogether by pleasure-revivals, he cannot follow, for presentation pleasures certainly have much to do with the effects of beauty. If, on the other hand, the associationist means to identify hedonic phenomena and æsthetic phenomena, we are at once met with the objection that, while æsthetic states of mind are pleasurable, not all pleasurable states are allowed to pass for æsthetic. What are the bounds of the æsthetic within the hedonic field? Kant distinguishes the agreeable from the beautiful by the supposed presence of sense pleasure in the former, and the absence of the same in the latter. This distinction cannot be accepted. Eye and ear sensations are obvious exceptions; but if it be admitted that one set of senses can produce æsthetic effects, the whole contention fails, and a close examination shows clearly that the rest of the senses may act in the same manner in the make-up of æsthetic complexes. Pleasures of the typical emotions are also of great moment in æsthetics, but they do not stand alone, as some have held. 'Association' by itself can, of course, give no account of distinctively æsthetic effect. Recognized, as well as unrecognized, usefulness seems to be an element. The distinction between the 'higher' and the 'lower' pleasures is illusory. It is the man who has grown to be capable of appreciating new ethical standards, and who has lost his pleasure in the old, who makes a distinction between pleasures of higher and lower grade. This by no means shows that what was pleasurable in his undeveloped or uncultivated state was not æsthetic for him at that time. Nor does it show that ethical standards are unimportant for æsthetics. What is 'immoral' is painful. But the mass of æsthetic effects are made up of elements entirely unmoral.