The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Offner - Ueber die Grundformen der Vorstellungsverbindung
When, in so-called association by similarity, a presentation is recalled through the recurrence in consciousness of one or more of its elements, both the recurring and the associated presentation being now together in consciousness, what was at first association through the common element becomes finally association by simultaneity. There are thus two stages of 'association by similarity.' These do not usually overlap, but rather association by contiguity, including both simultaneous and successive, tends to take the place of association through the common element. Against this reduction of association by similarity to association by contiguity, it is objected that while the above analysis may answer for complex presentation groups, the presentation of a single object can be reproduced only by similarity. And Höffding asserts that every contiguous association presupposes association by similarity, or at least immediate recognition. But closer examination of the nature of immediate recognition renders this proposition doubtful. It is unintelligible that pure similarity should occasion the knowledge that a presentation has been in consciousness before. And, as a matter of fact, there is in every case of associative reproduction an indefinite but incontestible feeling of difference between the present and the earlier sensation that prevents the fusion of the two. When the stimuli are the same, the difference-element is due to the fact that there exists no isolated sensation, and to the change in Geflihlston accompanying the heightened ease due to repetition. The latter would, however, be scarcely marked enough on the second recurrence to afford aid, and Lehmann's experiments show that confusion in the recognition of sensations is not obviated by the more frequent repetition of one of them. Pathological observation shows also that learning anew what has been completely forgotten may be much easier than the first acquirement without being accompanied by a gleam of recognition. And when the intensity of Gefühlston depends on quantity, as in smell and taste, the change due to former functioning would not make itself felt. Moreover, a change in Gefühlston cannot of itself constitute a bond of associative reproduction. There must be already in some other way the idea that the accented sensation is not a first but a repeated experience. This idea, which forms the essence of every recognition, then joins itself by simultaneity to the peculiar Gefühlston, and every future association is founded on contiguity. With every presentation there are accompanying activities, which, owing to feeble excitation, insufficient attention, or other cause, either remain below the threshold of consciousness, or, under favorable conditions, become distinct elements. These it is which, setting themselves in antithesis to those of the present presentation, aid in distinguishing between this and the earlier one. But as in the case of Gefühlston due to repetition, the peculiar accent accompanying the wavering back and forth of these elements over the threshold of consciousness cannot of itself produce recognition of a past presentation. Again, there must be the idea that this mark is attached to presentations which have entered consciousness before. And this last is given through the simple reproduction of contiguous elements. Immediate recognition arises only after mediate apprehension of a presentation as known, accompanied by the peculiar coloring which distinguishes it from that sensation as belonging to the past. But although immediate recognition is thus a complex association-process, it is explained by reference to the one principle of contiguous association in its two phases.