The Philosophical Review/Volume 1/Summary: Richl - Beiträge zur Logik - Page 1
All our cognitions and experiences and mental convictions are expressed in the form of sentences. The logical elements of an assertion must be distinguished from the grammatical construction of a sentence. A concept without any special sign could not be maintained in consciousness, it would be pressed out of consciousness by sensible presentations. A concept is as such abstract: this is its essential character, from which its other characteristics, especially its generality, are dependent. The generality essential to a concept as such must not be confused with indeterminateness. Generality belongs to the form of the concept, not to its content. The formation of concepts rests on the possibility of distinction. Concepts stand in many ways in relation to each other, or they are brought by their objects into such relations; thus, a concept may be represented by other conceptions, and this is called definition. There are no absolutely simple or indefinable concepts. A concept is equal to its definition, or to the totality of its definitions. Definitions are no assertions, although they have the form of assertions; an assertion goes outside the realm of presentation and thought. There are two kinds of assertions: one is formed through the connection of our perceptions, and the other through the connection of our conceptions, i.e. judgments and "conceptual sentences." It is speech which makes it possible for us to distinguish our conceptional from our perceptional presentations. Judgment in its real meaning is the reference of a mental content to a reality lying beyond this act — as Mr. Bradley brings out (Principles of Logic).