The Prince (Byerley)/Chapter 12
CHAP. XII.
Of the different Kind of Military Establishments, and of Mercenary Troops.
Having treated in detail of the different kinds of political states which I proposed to investigate, and enquired into the causes of their decline as well as their prosperity, and also the means by which many of them have been acquired or preserved, it remains for me only to speak of the different kinds of military forces, whether for the purposes of attack or defence.
I have already said, that princes, who wish their power to be durable, should fix it on solid bases. Now the principal foundations of states, whether ancient, modern, or mixed, are good laws and good troops; but as good laws can never be had without good troops, and as these two elements of political power cannot be separated, it will be sufficient that I confine myself to one of them.
Troops which serve for the defence of a state are either national, foreign, or mixed. Those of the second class, whether they serve as auxiliaries, ar as mercenaries, are useless and dangerous; and the prince who has a reliance on such soldiers will never be safe, because they are always ambitious, disunited, unfaithful, and undisciplined. Brave amongst friends, but cowardly in the face of an enemy, and neither fear God nor keep faith with man; so that the prince who employs thent can only retard his fall by delaying to put their valour to the proof, and in short they plunder the ștate in time of peace as much as the enemy does in time of war. How, indeed, should it be otherwise? This kind of troops can never serve a state but for the sake of pay, which is never so high as to induce them tơ purchase it by the sacrifice of their lives; they are willing enough to serve in time of peace, but the moment war is declared it is impossible to keep them to their colours.
It is a matter easily proved, since Italy world not at this instant have been ruined had, she not played confidence in mercenary troops, who at first indeed rendered some services, but who shewed the extent of their bravery on the appearance of an enemy. Thus Charles VIII. King of France, conquered Italy with a piece of chalk[1] and those were right who said that our sins yere the cause of it. It was, indeed, our errors that produced this misfortune, or rather the fault of those princes who did so, and have suffered for it. To płace this natter in a clearer light, I must observe that the commanders of these troops, whether good or bad officers, are not to be trusted. In the first place, because they cannot effect their own elevation but by oppressing the prince who employs them, or others against his will; in doing the latter they must hasten the ruin of the state they serve so ill.
I may perhaps be told that every other commander with arms in his hand will do the same. To which I answer, that the state making war is either a monarchy or a republic. In the first case, a prince ought to put himself at the head of his armies; in the second, a republic ought to confer the command of her troops on one of her own citizens. If he should not be equal to it, she should nominate another; and if he is a great general, she should take especial care that he cannot exceed his orders.
It is certain that both republics and other states may of themselves effect great achievements, and that mercenary soldiers must inevitably injure both; and as to republics, I wil add, that they are better guarded ağainst the oppression of him who commands their armies, when instead of foreign mercenaries they employ national troops. Rome and Spata by these means maintained their liberties for several ages, and the Swiss woulk not at this moment be so free but from being themselves so well armed.
The Carthaginians and Thebans are striking examples of the truth of what I have advanced as to the danger of employing foreign troops, The first, though their generals were chosen from their own citizens, had nearly fallen a prey to the tyranny of foreign mercenaries, at the conclusion of their first war against the Romans: and as to the Thebans, it is well known that Philip of Macedon, having on the death of Epaminondas obtained the command of their troops, had no sooner conquered their enemies than he deprived them of their liberties.
Jane II. Queen of Naples, when abandoned by Sforzą who commanded her troops, was, in order to preserve her states, compelled to throw herself into the arms of the King of Arragon; and did not Francis Sforza, son of the former, after having defeated the Venetians at Caravaggio, unite with them for the purpose of oppressing the Milanese, who had on the death of their Duke Philip confided to him the command of their troops?
It may perhaps be said, that the Florențines and Venetians have solely aggrandised their respective ștates by means of the foreign soldiers they had in their pay, and that their generals have always served them well, without any one of them having raised himself to the sovereignty. To which I answer, that the Florentines have been extremely fortunate; for those of their generals whose ambition they had cause to dread either were not conquerors, or encountered obstacles, or carried their views elsewhere. In the first class may be placed John Acuto, whose fidelity was in consequence never put to the proof. Every one must however perceive that, if. he had conquered, the Florentines would have been at his mercy.
If Braccio and Sforza attempted nothing against the state they served, it was because that, being rivals, they mutually watched each other. It įs well known that the so of the latter turned his ambition against Lombardy, and Braccio against the ecclesiastical state and the kingdom of Naples. But let us advert to what we have lately seen.
The Florentineş conferred the command of their troops on Paul Vitelli, a very prudent man, and who was from a private station raised to this post, in consequence of the great reputation he had acquired. If he had taken Pisa, the liberties of the Florentines, or their political existence, must have had an end, for he had only to pass into the service of their enemies to complete their detruction.
As to the Venetians, they have never been indebted for their success to any but their own arms, that is to say, in a maritime warfare: for the epocha of their declension is thạt in whịch thẹy came desirous to fight by land, and to adopt the manners and customs of the other states of Itały.
They had however but little to fear from the ambition of their generals whilst their possessions by land were inconsiderable, because they were still sustained by the splendor of their ancient power; but they perceived their error in extending them when by the superior conduct of Carmignola they had defeated the Duke of Milan; for perceiving that he was a man of great abilities, but that he sought to prolong the war, they rightly judged that they could not expect to conquer contrary to the will of this general; on the other hand, not being ablé to dismiss him from his command without losing what they had gained by his valour, they made choice of having him assassinated.
The Venetians have since that timie had for their generals Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto de St. Severino, and the Count of Pitigliano, from whom they had to fear more loss than gain; as happened to them in the affair of Vaifa, when they buried the fruit of eight hundred years of labour and difficulty. The successes which they obtained by their military forces were słow and feeble, but their defeats were sudden and almost miraculous.
Since these examples have led me to speak of Italy; and the melancholy experience she has had of the danger of employing foreign troops, I will resume the consideration of affairs from their source, in order that the knowledge of their origin and progress may serve to prevent, at least, the most disastrous effects. We should, in the first place, recollect that when the empire had lost the power and consideration it had till then enjoyed in Italy, and that the authority of the pope had there become permanent, that country was divided into several states.
The greater part of the large cities took up arms against the nobles, who, supported by the emperor, made them groan under the most cruel oppression. The pope seconded their enterprises, and thereby increased his temporál power.
The others fell under the domination of their citizens: so that Italy became subjected to the church and to a few republics. The ecclesiastical princes, strangers to the art of war, were the first to employ mercenary soldiets. Alberigo da Como, born in Romagnia, was the first who brought this kind of military force into high credit: It was in his school, that Sforza and Braccio, who were then the arbiters of Italy, were formed: To those have succeeded all these who have till the present moment commanded armies in this country.
To their brilliant exploits! we owe Italy being invaded by Charles VIII. ravaged and plundered by Lewis XII. oppressed by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Swiss. The chiefs of these military forces began by laying aside the infantry, at first, to render themselves more necessary, and afterwards, because having no states, and subsisting only by their industry, they could undertake nothing with a small body of infantry, nor could they support one more considerable. They found therefore that cavalry was more profitable, a small number of which enabled them to live with honour. They did not deem more than two thousand foot soldiers necessary in an army of twenty thousand men. In addition to this, that they might render their trade less painful, and above all less perilous, they mutually agreed not to kill each other in their skirmishes,[2], but content themselves with making prisoners, whom they sent back again without ransom. They never made an assault by night, and the besieged on their part equally abstained during the night from making a sortie; they never encamped but in the spring, nor did they even make intrenchments in their camp. So whimsical a discipline, invented to escape fear and danger, reduced Italy to a state of slavery, and lost her the high consideration she had till then enjoyed.