The Prince (Byerley)/Chapter 19
CHAP. XIX.
That it is necessary to avoid being hated and despised.
I have separately treated of the principal qualities with which a prince should be endowed. To abridge the subject, I will comprehend all the others under this general title; viz. that a prince ought sedulously to avoid every thing which may cause him to be hated or despised.
Nothing, in my opinion, renders a prince so odious as the violation of the right of property, and not shewing a due regard to the honour of married women. Subjects are always content with a prince who does not injure either their property or their honour; and then, he has only to contend with the pretensions of a few ambitious persons, whom he can easily circumvent.
A prince whose conduct is light, inconstant, pusillanimous, irresolute, and effeminate, is sure to be despised: these are defects which he ought to shun as he would so many rocks, and earnestly endeavour to shew courage, gravity, energy, and magnificence in all his actions. His decisions in matters betweem individuals should be irrevocable, so that none should dare to think of deceiving him, nor to make him change his opinion. He will by these means conciliate the esteem of his subjects, and prevent any attempts to subvert his authority. He will also have less to dread from external enemies, because they will be cautious how they attack a prince revered by his subjects; for those who govern have always two kinds of enemies, external and internal. The first he will repel with good friends and good troops; and as to the others, who does not know that a prince who has good soldiers has always friends? Besides, internal peace can only be interrupted by conspiracies, which are only dangerous when they are encouraged and supported by foreign powers. The latter, however, dare not stir if the prince conforms to the rules I have laid down, and follows the example of Nabis the tyrant of Sparta.
As to his subjects, if all is quiet without his dominions, a prince has nothing to dread but secret conspiracies, which he may sport with, or even prevent, by shunning, as I have before observed, every thing that can cause him to be hated or despised. Besides.conspiracies are seldom formed but against princes whose ruin and death would be agreeable to the people; without which, men would not expose themselves to the dangers inseparable from such machinations.
History is filled with conspiracies; but how few of them have been crowned with success? No one conspires singly, and those with whom they divide the dangers of the enterprise are the discontented, who frequently denounce the conspirators and frustrate their designs, in the hope of a large renuneration from him against whom they complain. Those with whom you are obliged to associate in a conspiracy are placed between the temptation of a considerable reward and the dread of a great danger; so that to keep the secret it must either be entrusted to a very extraordinary friend or an irreconcileable enemy of the prince.
But to place the question in the simplest point of view: on the part of the conspirators there is nothing but fear, jealousy, and suspicion, whilst the prince has the advantage of the splendor and majesty of the government, the laws, customs, and his particular friends, without speaking of the affection which the people naturally feel for those who govern them. So that conspirators have to dread a failure both before and after the execution of their designs, since, the people being against them, they have no resource left. I could, in proof of what I say, adduce a thousand facts recorded in history, but I will only give one which occurred in the last century.
Hannibal Bentivoglio, the grandfather of the reigning Prince of Bologna, had been killed by the Canneschi; so that not one of his family were living but John Bentivoglio, who was then an infant in the cradle. The people rose against the conspirators, and massacred the whole family of the murderers; and still more strongly to shew their attachment to the house of Bentivoglio, as there was none left who could supply the place of Hannibal, the Bolonese applied to the government of Florence for a natural son of the prince, whose death they had just avenged, who lived in that city under the name of an artisan who passed for his father, and confided to him the direction of affairs till John Bentivoglio should be of age to govern.
A prince has therefore little to fear from conspiracies when he possesses the affections of the people; but he has no resource left, if this support should fail him. Content the people and manage the nobles, and you have the maxim of wise governors.
France holds the first rank amongst well governed states. One of the wisest institutions they have is unquestionably that of the parliaments, whose object is to watch over the security of the government and the liberties of the people. The founders of this institution were aware, on the one hand, of the insolence and ambition of the nobles, and, on the other, of the excess to which the people are apt to be transported against them, and endeavoured to restrain both, but without the intervention of the king, who never could have taken part with the people without discontenting the nobles, nor favour those without exciting the hatred of the people. To this end, they have instituted an authority which, without the interference of the king, may favour the people and repress the insolence of the nobles. It must be confessed that nothing is more likely to give consistency to the government, and assure the tranquillity of the people. By which princes ought to learn to reserve to themselves the distribution of favours and employments, and to leave to the magistrates the care of decreeing punishments, and generally the.disposal of all things likely to excite discontent.
I repeat that a prince ought to shew consideration for the nobles, but without attracting the hatred of the people. It may perhaps be objected to me, that several Roman emperors lost both life and empire, though their conduct was replete with wisdom, talents, and courage. In answer to this objection, I think I have a right to examine the character of some of these emperors, such as Marcus the philosopher, Commodus his son, Pertinax, Julian, Severus, Antoninus, Caracalla his son, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. This examination will naturally lead me to unfold the causes of their downfall, and to justify what I have before said in this chapter, respecting the conduct that princes ought to adopt.
It is in the first place necessary to obsetve, that the Roman emperors had not only to restrain the ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people, but they had also to contend with the cruelty and avarice of the soldiery. Several of these princes perished by being shipwrecked on this latter rock, so much the more difficult to avoid, as they could not satify the avidity of the troops without discontenting the people, who sighed for peace as much as the others panted for war. So that the former wished for a pacific prince, and the soldiers for one who delighted in war, who was ambitious, cruel, and insolent, not certainly with respect to themselves, but opposed to the people, that they might have double pay, and be able to satiate their avarice and cruelty. Now of those Roman Emperors to whom nature had refused this odious character, or who were not able to assume it, most of them perished miserably from their want of power to keep the people and the legions in check. Thus the greater part of them, particularly those who were new princes, despairing of being able to reconcile interests totally opposite, determined to take part with the troops, troubling themselves but little about the discontents of the people; and this conduct was the safest, for in the alternative of excițing the hatred of the greater or lesser number, (it is necessary to chuse the strongest. This was the reason why those of the Cæsars who raised themselves to empire, having occasion for extraordinary favour to maintain their power, attached themselves to the legions in preference to the people, and they never failed, but for want of knowing how to preserve their affection.
Marcus the philosopher, Pertinax and Alexander, who were princes commendable by their clemency, their love of justice, and the simplicity of their manners, all perished except the first, who lived and died honoured, because, having arrived at empire by hereditary right, he was under no obligation either to the troops or to the people; which joined to his other qualities rendered him dear to all, and facilitated to him the means of restraining them within the bounds of duty. But. Pertinax being desirous to subject the legions (against whose inclination also he had been elected emperor) to a very different and more severe discipline than had been observed by his predecessor Commodus, perished a few months after his elevation, a victim of their hatred, and perhaps also of the contempt which his great age inspired; and it is here to be remarked that hatred is acquired as well by doing good as by doing evil. Thus, as I have said before, a prince is often compelled to be wicked in order to maintain his power. For when the party whom he thought he stood in need of, is corrupt, whether it be the people, the nobles, or the troops, he must at all events content them, and from that moment renounce doing good.
But let us speak of Alexander, whose clemency has been so much praised by historians, but who was nevertheless despised on account of his effeminacy, and because he suffered himself to be governed by his mother. The army conspired against this prince, who was so good and so humane, that in the course of a reign of fourteen years not one person was put to death without a tiral. He was however. sacrificod by his soldiers. On the other hand, Commodus, Severus, Caracalla, and Maximinus, having indulged themselves in all kinds of excess to satisfy the avarice and cruelty of the troops, had not a much happier fate; with the exception of Severus, who reigned peaceably, though to satisfy the cupidity of the troops he oppressed the people; but he was possessed of excellent qualities, which gained him at once the affection of the soldiers and the admiration of the people. Now, as he raised himself to empire from a private station, and may for that reason serve as a model for those who may hereafter be in the same situation, I think it necessary to say a few words on the subject of his assuming by turns the qualties of the two animals of which I have before spoken. Severus, knówing the cowardice of the Emperor Julian, persuaded the army which he commanded in Illyria that it was necessary to march to Rome, in order to avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been massacred by the Prætorian guard. It was under this pretence, and without any idea being entertained that he aimed at empire, that this general arrived in Italy, before any one had intelligence of his departure from Illyria. He entered Rome, and the intimidated senate named him emperor, and put Julian to death. But he had still two obstacles to surmount before he became master of the whole empire. Pescennius Niger, and Albinus, one of whom commanded in Asia, and the other in the western part of the empire, were both his competitors. The first of these had even been proclaimed emperor by his own legions. Severus perceiving that he could not without danger attack both at the same time, determined to march against Niger, and to deceive Albinus by an offer to share with him the government: which Albinus without hesitation accepted. But he had no sooner vanquished and put Pescennius Niger to death, and pacified the eastern district, than on his return to Rome he complained bitterly of Albinus's ingratitude, whom he did not hesitate to accuse of having attempted his life; which obliged him, he said, to pass the Alps in order to punish him for so unworthy an acknowledgement of his benefits. Severus arrived in Gaul, and Albinus lost at once the empire and his life.
If we attentively examine the conduct of this emperor, we shall perceive how difficult it must be to unite in so great perfection the power of the lion and the cunning of the fox. He well knew bow to make himself feared and respected by his troops as well as by the people; but we shall not be astonished to see a private individual maintain so difficult a post, if we recollect that it was by commanding esteem and admiration that he disarmed the hatred which his rapacity would otherwise have excited.
Antoņinus (Caracalla his son) possessed also many excellent qualities, which made him dear to the legions and respected by the people; he was a warrior, an indefatigable enemy of effeminacy and high living, which rendered him the idol of the army; but then he carried his ferocity to such a pitch, that not only the people but the soldiery, and even his. own officers, bore him an irreconcileable hatred. He perished.by the hand of a centurion; a feeble vengeance for all the blood he had caused to be shed in Rome and in Alexandria, where none of the inhabitants escaped from carnage.
Upon which I must observe that it is with difficulty princes can be guarded against such attempts. Their lives are at the mercy of every one that fears not death; but as these attempts are very rare, princes should not be very uneasy about them. They ought however to avoid giving any grievous offence to those who are constantly about their persons. This was peculiarly the error of Antoninus, who retained among his body guard a centurion whose brother he had put to an ignominious death, and to whom he was continually making menaces which cost him his life.
As to Commodus, he might easily have maintained his power had he trod in the steps of his father, to whom ałone he was indebted for the empire: but as he was cruel, brutal, and avaricious, the discipline which prevailed in the army soon gave way to the most unbridled licentiousness; he had also rendered himself contemptible to the army by his want of attention to his own dignity, not being even ashamed of descending into the arena, and there combating with the gladiators: he fell a sacrifice to a conspiracy provoked by the hatred and contempt which he had excited by his meanness, his avarice, and his ferocity. I have, nọw, to speak only of Maximinus.
The legions having rid themselves of Alexander, whom they thought too effeminate, made choice of Maximinus, who was a great warrior; but he becoming odious and contemptible, soon lost both life and empire. The meanness of his birth (he was known to have been a Thracian shepherd), the great delay he made in appearing at Rome to take possession of the empire, but more than all, the cruelties that he committed by his lieutenants, both in the capital and in the rest of the empire, rendered him so vile and odious, that Africa, afterwards the senate, the Roman people, and all Italy, conspíred against him, and were seconded by his own army, who, disgusted with his cruelties and fatigued with the length of the siege of Aquileia, put him to death with so much the less dread, as they saw he was universally detested.
I will not mention either Heliogabalus, or Macrinus, or Julian, who died covered with opprobrium. But I shall in conclusion add that princes of the present day have no occasion to be so attentive to the humour of their troops, because they form not, as at Rome, an independent body, as a power in the government, and are not therefore at any time to be dreaded, provided they are treated with a suitable degree of respect. At Rome, the most essential policy was to content the soldiery; but in our modern states it is the people whose affection is the most important to be obtained, as being the strongest and most powerful. I except only those of Turkey and Egypt. We know that the Grand Signior is obliged to keep on foot an army of twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry, which constitute the strength and security of his government, and it is consequently of the highest importance to him to conciliate their affections. It is the same with respect to the Soldan of Egypt, whose troops have, as we may say, the power in their own hands, and he is consequently obliged therefore to treat them with considerable delicacy, and to humour them frequently at the expence of the people, from whom he has nothing to fear. This government resembles not any other, unless it is perhaps the Roman Pontificate. It cannot properly be called either hereditary or new, since, at the Soldan's death, it is not his children who reign, but he who is elected by those who have a right to do so; on the other hand, the institution is of too long a standing to entitle us to regard it as a new government. Thus, the prince who is elected does not experience more trouble in procuring himself to be acknowledged than the Pope at Rome.
To return however to my subject, I say, that if we examine it attentively, it will be seen that the Roman emperors, whose unfortunate fate has been objected to me, have chiefly perished by having made themselves odious and contemptible. This is the reason why several of them experienced, whether good or bad, a fate so different from those in whose steps they endeavoured to tread. It was thus that Alexander and Pertinax who had elevated themselves were destroyed by attempting to tread in the steps of Marcus, who came to the empire by hereditary right, and who had thereforé no obligation either to the people or the legions. Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus, wete severally sacrificed by wishing to regulate their conduct by that of Severus, to whom they were far from equal in talent. A new prince should therefore conduct himself differently from Marcus and Severus; but he may learn from the first how to elevate himself, and from the other by what means he may maintain that elevation,