The Prince (Byerley)/Chapter 2
CHAP. II.
Of Hereditary Principalities.
I shall not here speak of republics, having treated that subject amply enough in my Essay on Livy. I shall confine myself to principalities only ; and in following the divisions which I have already laid down, I shall consider how these kind of states ought to be governed, and how preserved.
I will first premise that hereditary states, accustomed to be governed by a line of princes, are more easily maintained than such as are new. In fact, it is only necessary for an hereditary prince not to exceed the limits of those orders and measures established by his predecessors, and merely act as the exigencies of events may obviously require: Thus, by the rational exercise of common faculties, he will always be able to maintain himself with credit in hils states, at least he can only be deprived of them by a force infinitely superior to his own, and even in this case, he may very easily re-establish himself on the first reverse of his adversary's fortune. We have for example, in Italy the Duke of Ferrara, who only resisted, the Venetians in 1484, and Pope Julius the Second in 1510, because he was the ancient sovereign of the duchy. The natural prince having the least occasion or necessity to irritate his subjects, he of consequence will be the most beloved by them; hence, if some extraordinary vices do not excite their hatred, it is natural that they should feel an inclination and regard for him. It is in the antiquity and the long duration of a government that the remembrance or occasion of a change is lost, for every change produces an increasing inclination for a new one.