The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Contents
| Introduction | 4 |
| Pre‑conflict strategy and planning | 5 |
| The UK decision to support US military action | 6 |
| UK policy before 9/11 | 6 |
| The impact of 9/11 | 10 |
| Decision to take the UN route | 16 |
| Negotiation of resolution 1441 | 19 |
| The prospect of military action | 21 |
| The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widens | 24 |
| The end of the UN route | 30 |
| Why Iraq? Why now? | 40 |
| Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat? | 40 |
| The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military action in Iraq | 47 |
| The UK’s relationship with the US | 51 |
| Decision‑making | 54 |
| Collective responsibility | 55 |
| Advice on the legal basis for military action | 62 |
| The timing of Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the interpretation of resolution 1441 | 63 |
| Lord Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March 2003 | 65 |
| Lord Goldsmith’s arrival at a “better view” | 66 |
| The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003 | 66 |
| Lord Goldsmith’s Written Answer of 17 March 2003 | 67 |
| Cabinet, 17 March 2003 | 68 |
| Weapons of mass destruction | 69 |
| Iraq WMD assessments, pre‑July 2002 | 69 |
| Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002 | 72 |
| Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003 | 75 |
| The search for WMD | 77 |
| Planning for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq | 78 |
| The failure to plan or prepare for known risks | 78 |
| The planning process and decision‑making | 81 |
| The post‑conflict period | 86 |
| Occupation | 86 |
| Looting in Basra | 86 |
| Looting in Baghdad | 88 |
| UK influence on post‑invasion strategy: resolution 1483 | 89 |
| UK influence on the Coalition Provisional Authority | 90 |
| A decline in security | 93 |
| The turning point | 96 |
| Transition | 97 |
| UK influence on US strategy post‑CPA | 97 |
| Planning for withdrawal | 97 |
| The impact of Afghanistan | 99 |
| Iraqiisation | 101 |
| Preparation for withdrawal | 103 |
| A major divergence in strategy | 103 |
| A possible civil war | 104 |
| Force Level Review | 107 |
| The beginning of the end | 108 |
| Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? | 109 |
| Key findings | 111 |
| Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002 | 111 |
| Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of evil” to Crawford | 111 |
| Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002 | 112 |
| Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September 2002 | 112 |
| Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 – the negotiation of resolution 1441 | 113 |
| Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003 | 113 |
| Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003 | 114 |
| Iraq WMD assessments, pre‑July 2002 | 115 |
| Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002 | 116 |
| Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003 | 117 |
| The search for WMD | 117 |
| Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003 | 119 |
| Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq | 120 |
| Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003 | 121 |
| Military equipment (pre‑conflict) | 122 |
| Planning for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq | 122 |
| The invasion | 123 |
| The post‑conflict period | 123 |
| Reconstruction | 124 |
| De‑Ba’athification | 125 |
| Security Sector Reform | 125 |
| Resources | 126 |
| Military equipment (post‑conflict) | 126 |
| Civilian personnel | 127 |
| Service Personnel | 127 |
| Civilian casualties | 128 |
| Lessons | 129 |
| The decision to go to war | 129 |
| Weapons of mass destruction | 130 |
| The invasion of Iraq | 133 |
| The post‑conflict period | 134 |
| Reconstruction | 135 |
| De‑Ba’athification | 137 |
| Security Sector Reform | 138 |
| Resources | 138 |
| Military equipment (post‑conflict) | 139 |
| Civilian personnel | 140 |
| Timeline of events | 141 |
This work is licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0 (OGL v.3).
- You are free to:
- copy, publish, distribute and transmit the Information;
- adapt the Information;
- exploit the Information commercially and non-commercially for example, by combining it with other Information, or by including it in your own product or application.
- You must, where you do any of the above:
- acknowledge the source of the Information in your product or application by including or linking to any attribution statement specified by the Information Provider(s) and, where possible, provide a link to this licence;
- If the Information Provider does not provide a specific attribution statement, you must use the following:
- Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse