The Unpopular History of the United States by Uncle Sam Himself/Chapter 5
V
WHAT THE SHORT-TERM MILITIA DID
It was like pulling hen’s teeth to secure the short-term militiamen. Now we shall see what they accomplished while actually in service. And let me say again, over and over, that I mean to cast no slur upon those individual men; what they did was common to short-term untrained recruits in all countries, at all times, among all peoples.
In 1775 Washington had 17,000 men under his command, 14,500 of whom were fit for duty. The effective redcoats did not exceed 6,500, yet the Father of His Country, with twice their force, dared not hazard an attack. Why? Because Washington was himself a soldier, and knew better. Although having great advantage in quantity he was over-matched in quality. The British were trained and disciplined and organized—a compact force; the Americans scarcely hung together as a mob. Bear in mind, that one group of men may be the lowest of cutthroats and plunderers—yet be soldiers. Another group, inspired by lofty purposes and highest ideals, may be no more than a mob. It is not patriotism—nor courage, but discipline and training, that marks the distinction which Washington so wisely recognized.
On account of short enlistments and the irresistible homeward tendency of recruits, Revolutionary leaders were repeatedly forced to give battle under adverse circumstances—before the terms of their men expired and left them minus an army. This caused the disaster at Quebec. Impatient militiamen refused to remain and take the fortress by siege, so the gallant General Montgomery risked a premature assault, lost his own life, had sixty Americans killed, and three or four hundred captured.
During 1775 the Colonies maintained at public expense 37,623 men, a force which from want of supplies and organization spent the year in a state of demoralizing inactivity.
The campaign of 1776 opened under heart-breaking conditions. General Washington had entered the conflict with the buoyant hope that his patriotic countrymen would swell the armies of freedom. On January 14th, he wrote:
“Search the volumes of history and I much question whether a case similar to ours is to be found, namely, to maintain a post against the flower of the British troops for six months together, without powder, and then to have one army disbanded and another to be raised within the same distance of a reënforced enemy. The same desire to retire into the chimney corner seized the troops from New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts so soon as their time expired, as had wrought upon those of Connecticut, notwithstanding many of them made a tender of their services to continue until the line could be sufficiently strengthened. We are now left with a good deal less than half-raised regiments, and about 5,000 militia, who only stand engaged to the middle of this month, when according to custom they will retire, whether the necessity for their staying be ever so urgent.”
What a sickening picture of the steadfast Washington watching Freedom’s army dwindle away before his very eyes, shifting and changing like the sands of the desert. Believe me, my son. Father was having a batch of trouble with the children.
Cordially as Washington detested the bounty, which he regarded as the twin brother of desertion, he was now forced to waive all objections, nay, even to urge that $20 or $30 be paid to “engage men to enlist until January next.”
Hold still, my son, drive a peg down, right here, and hitch to this idea: I am speaking of raw militia and not of trained men. Plenty of these recruits—raw as green persimmons to begin with—joined the standard of liberty from the noblest motives. They were brave fellows, with good sand in their craw and could stand punishment—individually. Yet the individual must be trained to make a soldier—or a hoss doctor or anything else—I don’t care a thrip how smart he is. Understand me, I’m not posted on military matters myself. When somebody chases me up a tree I call on George Washington. George says:
“To bring men to be well acquainted with the duties of a soldier requires time. To bring them under proper discipline and subordination, not only requires time, but is a work of great difficulty; and in this army, where there is so little distinction between officers and soldiers, it requires an uncommon degree of attention. Men who are familiarized with danger meet it without shrinking; whereas troops unused to service, often apprehend danger where no danger is.”