The Writings of Carl Schurz/To President McKinley, June 1st, 1898
TO PRESIDENT McKINLEY
My last letter having remained unanswered, I must conclude that you have thought it best not to respond to the suggestion therein submitted to you. Profoundly convinced as I am of the great importance of having the good opinion of foreign nations on our side in this war, and anxious to do all I can to that end wherever I may have opportunity—although as you may conclude from the enclosed clipping it is uphill work—will you bear with me if I return to the charge and pray you to read all I wish to say on this subject, although it may try your patience? I am now preparing a letter, instead of the interview mentioned in my last, which I intend to send over to Germany for publication in a few days.
It can hardly be denied that in our case a strict and outspoken adherence to our original declaration as to the object of the war will be for us the only honorable and thus also the most advantageous policy. If we turn this war, which was heralded to the world as a war of humanity, in any sense into a war of conquest, we shall forever forfeit the confidence of mankind, and we shall be met with general distrust in our international relations under circumstances which will make that distrust especially troublesome and dangerous.
If, on the other hand, we keep our word, annex none of the Spanish colonies we may occupy, make Cuba, and, as the case maybe, Porto Rico independent, and dispose of the Philippines—assuming that we get control of them and find it impossible to return them to Spain—to some Power that is not likely to excite especial jealousy, such as Holland or Belgium, we shall not only command the esteem and confidence of mankind in a much higher degree than ever before; we shall not only be able to get coaling-stations and naval depots wherever we may want them, but we shall qualify ourselves for that position which is most congenial to our democratic institutions; which we can maintain without extravagant armaments; which will not involve us in any burdensome political responsibilities, and which in the commercial point of view will, particularly in case of war among foreign nations, be infinitely more profitable than any other possibly can be—I mean the position of the great neutral Power of the world.
The policy I am advocating is, therefore, not a merely idealistic one. It suits this Republic best morally as well as materially. It is best calculated to preserve our free institutions intact, and it will give us eventually by far the greatest expansion of trade at the smallest risk, while other nations are fighting for such expansion. Such conflicts on a large scale we may witness before long. Let us hope that they will not come before we are out of this war and that this Republic may have the privilege of witnessing them from the vantage ground of the strong neutral. Occupying that ground we shall not need alliances in order to profit from the opening of new avenues of commerce. Of course, the idea of an “Anglo-American understanding” appeals strongly to my sympathy. But I would much rather see this Republic maintain the attitude of an independent and powerful neutral than depend upon any alliance for the safety of its possessions, however magnificent these may appear.
We cannot, in my humble opinion, follow a policy of annexing outlying territories without forfeiting these advantages, without becoming involved in foreign quarrels, without losing the free hand and the immense benefits of the neutral position, and without endangering the moral vitality of our Republic. Nothing will, it seems to me, be more apt to keep us in the right way than the constantly and emphatically reiterated declaration by our Government that this is a war of humanity and that it will not be permitted to fall from the high level of the original purpose.
It might be objected that you cannot predict or forestall what Congress may do when the time comes for making peace. I think you can. If during the war you constantly keep before the popular conscience, as well as before the world abroad, the original declaration that this is a war for the independence of Cuba and not for conquest—it being an incontestable fact that if the war had been announced as a war of conquest the American people would most certainly not have consented to it—you will form and lead public opinion, you will neutralize the wild talk about “imperial policies” now going on, and you will by the irresistible moral force of simple honesty and good faith effectually determine the action of Congress beforehand. And I am sure public sentiment will be overwhelmingly on your side.
Last week I journeyed to St. Louis and back. At St. Louis and on the way I saw quite a number of respectable persons, conversations with whom convinced me that the war, while it has a certain surface popularity, is beneath that surface as unpopular in the West as it is in New York. At St. Louis I met Colonel Leighton, the president of the National Sound-Money League, who told me that he had recently made an extensive journey with Mr. Stuyvesant Fish, the president of the Illinois Central Railroad; that they had visited several cities, especially Southern, and talked with a great many people, and that, while all were loyally supporting the Government, they had not met a single person who did not privately curse this war.
Now, I venture this prophecy: We may expect our Navy some time to annihilate the Spanish fleet in the West Indies. The Powers will then probably exercise a strong pressure on Spain to induce her to make an end of it by offering us the independence of Cuba and perhaps some war indemnity. Spain is not unlikely to do this. If then, the Administration, instead of treating upon that basis, prolongs the war for the purpose of securing some territorial conquest, the Democrats will no doubt be clever enough to take advantage of the peace sentiment of the country, and, Bryanism and all that notwithstanding, they will overwhelm the Republicans at the polls on the issue of “Free Cuba and peace” as against “More war for conquest.”
To this prediction I will add another. The longer you hesitate to make an end of the imperialistic noise by keeping before the public by constant and emphatic assertion the original announcement that this is a war for the independence of Cuba, which cannot honorably be turned into a war of conquest, the more difficult you will find it to do the right thing for the country and to guide and save the Republican party when the opportunity for peace comes.
Pardon me for intruding so much upon your attention. This is so grave a crisis that my anxiety for the future of the Republic would not suffer me to be silent.
Let me congratulate you upon the appointment of Mr. Oscar Straus. It is a fine thing.