The rise and fall of the Emperor Maximilian/Chapter II
CHAPTER II.
The War begun—The Repulse at Puebla, and its Causes—General Marquez—Condition of Mexico—Arrival of General Forey—His Delays and Mismanagement—Protracted Siege and Capture of Puebla—Triumphal Entry of French into Mexico
NOW commences the second phase of the French expedition. Now we leave the domain of diplomacy and politics to enter upon the field of war. Here also mistakes were made, and they were followed by disastrous consequences. After the rupture of the convention of La Soledad, the French troops, reinforced by 3,500 men brought by General de Lorencez, commenced hostilities. The line of the Chiquihuite had not been repassed, as the convention of La Soledad had stipulated. This violation of the promise which had been given formed but an unhappy beginning, and produced a deplorable effect. A civilised people, who made it their boast that they were about to teach a nation which was almost barbarous a respect for justice and for plighted faith, commenced by thus treading under foot a solemn promise. It was a double error. Besides diminishing the prestige of our force, we became the first to open the door of treason. Moreover, the Mexicans imagined, and vied with one another in repeating in their bragging language, that the French had been afraid to give up to them the pass of the Chiquihuite, 'a formidable position that we should not have been able to pass a second time if it had been defended by the noble sons of Cortes.' To anyone who knew anything about it it was plain that they were under an illusion. The way through the pass was armed with a few cast-iron cannon and some guns of position, which were difficult to manœuvre; they enfiladed but badly the winding-road which opened up from the sea, and the pass might be easily turned by means of the neighbouring heights; so it is a matter of certainty that the resistance would not have been of long duration. But, at all events, it would have been preferable to suffer some loss, even at the risk of delaying the succour to the sick men left at Orizaba, than to allow it to be thought that we had broken our word. Good right, on this occasion too, seemed to be on the Mexican side, who did not fail to make the most of our neglect of treaties among the population generally.
We shall not attempt here to describe the military operations commenced under such unhappy auspices, which resulted in such a painful issue, on May 5, 1862, under the walls of Puebla; but we must say that our government committed a series of errors which attest a complete ignorance on their part of the country in which they were waging war, as well as a strange forgetfulness of the feeling in our own country which had given rise to the allied invasion.
General de Lorencez was commissioned to open a campaign of this sort at the head of a force which was ridiculous for its insufficiency. The responsibility of his non-success is to be justly traced back to the government, who had neglected to follow out the rules of the simplest foresight. The laurels so rapidly gathered in China by a few fortunate battalions had no doubt caused them to hope for a fresh harvest of glory in Mexico. It needed all the heroism that a handful of men could show, that the check experienced under the forts of Guadelupe and Loreto did not result in a complete disaster, and impartial history will loudly declare that General de Lorencez's retreat across thirty leagues of troubled country, inundated as it was, and affording every facility for ambuscade—intimidating by the bold bearing of his little column Carbajal's numerous cavalry which crowned the cerros, without daring to come down, and bringing back his wounded and stores safe to Orizaba, stands at the head of all noble feats of arms. Two mistakes were made by the military authorities, who had misunderstood the great principles of the war. In the first place, they were bound to see how matters stood before they placed themselves at the entrance of Puebla, into which they thought they could enter as into a friendly city; but it received them, when they were a short distance off, with a running fire; subsequently, it was a measure of necessity that they should make themselves sure, in a military point of view, of Borrego, which commanded the town of Orizaba, in which they had to seek a refuge after the retreat.
But the defeat at Puebla was principally caused by the complete ignorance which M. Saligny, who was armed with extensive powers, and marched with the army, showed as to all that concerned the place and its inhabitants. The general, deceived by the assertions of an ill-informed diplomacy, pushed straight on, convinced that the streets of Puebla were adorned with triumphal arches in honour of our soldier-liberators. The disappointment was a cruel one, and it ought to have been foreseen. Could the refugee party, who had for years been growing old as exiles from their country, be expected to give the necessary information? Besides, we had taken for our ally General Marquez, well known in Mexico for his cruelty, who, in obedience to the orders of President Miramon, and in opposition to the authority of Juarez, was guilty of having broken open, by means of his soldiers, the official seal and treasure-coffers of the English legation, in order to take away seven millions of francs which were therein deposited; he was guilty, too, of having shot the wounded, both our countrymen and foreigners, who were lying in the hospitals at Tacubaya. His flag went before ours, and it was saluted by the country as it well deserved. Marquez had invited the invasion. Was it thus that we should have offered ourselves as liberators to the Mexicans, who were full of hatred to Marquez—an energetic soldier certainly, but who combined with his military qualities the instincts of an executioner? The late siege of Mexico, which this general was defending about three weeks ago, was marked by excesses which, as the unfortunate Maximilian himself confessed, were a dishonour to the imperial cause. But we henceforth suffered the consequences of our errors. General Marquez was naturally our indispensable ally, as it was he who, since 1861, had held in his hands the threads of the Franco-Mexican intrigue.
Mexico is like a country cursed by God; there the words 'my country' excite no vibration of sympathy. It is divided into two parties, the clerical and the liberal party, without reckoning the bands of every colour who plunder the towns and hold travellers to ransom in the name of God and liberty. There are, doubtless, in both parties honourable individuals, who groan over the civil wars and decadence of their country. Whilst five millions of Indians were working and suffering, the clerical party desired to retain the property they had acquired at the expense of the general prosperity; and the liberals wished to enrich themselves and to attain to honours. Both parties were to blame; but the liberals, faithful to the constitution, have not incurred the shame of having betrayed their native land to a foreigner. Allow even that this is the sole merit of President Juarez, still it is from this that he derives his power. It is with this power that France has had to deal; and it is this merit which will give to Juarez, when before the tribunal of history, the benefit of extenuating circumstances.
Whilst General de Lorencez, shut up in Orizaba during the winter of 1862, was suffering a thousand privations, and was resisting with his little force all the efforts of the enemy, General Forey set sail for Vera Cruz with 30,000 fresh troops. On the arrival of the new expeditionary force, General de Lorencez returned to France, carrying with him the sincere regrets of his soldiers. The commander-in-chief, at the beginning of October, fixed his head-quarters at Orizaba.
Everyone hoped to come to blows with the enemy at once, and the campaign might thus have soon come to an end. November, December, January, and February were the months which were most favourable to military operations on the lofty plateaus which divide Orizaba from Mexico. Although 5,000 combatants had failed in the undertaking, a force of 35,000 men, full of enthusiasm, and eager to avenge an unexpected check, ought to have easily taken Puebla (an unfortified town), and also the forts belonging to it, which, for want of time, had not been rendered formidable by any defensive works. The fleet, to the lot of which had fallen the difficult and thankless task of conveying the troops and warlike stores, had been found inadequate to bringing the necessary stock of provisions. It was therefore essential that the little corps of General Lorencez, which was well acquainted with the resources and localities of the district, should have ascended without delay on to the plateau of San Andres, which was rich in maize and cattle. The regiments which had just disembarked should have closely followed, and would thus have escaped the unhealthy action of the 'hot grounds.' A constant supply of food would have been thus assured for the various columns converging on Puebla by the routes of Tehuacan, Palmar, and Perote. The French army would have entered Mexico, as it were, at a bound, without any great loss, and without plundering, or allowing others to plunder, the country, to which the sudden war must have already proved sufficiently hurtful.
All the anticipations of the army, which was impatient to begin operations, were destined to be deceived. General Forey's proceedings were so slow that he gave the Juarists time to prepare their defence, to raise the Indians en masse, to muster the contingents which were farthest removed from the centre of the territory, to ravage for their own benefit the haciendas on the high plateaus, to burn the provisions which they could not carry away, and, finally, to shelter Puebla behind a double barrier of ramparts and cannon.
Five long months were thus spent in marches and counter-marches full of fatigue, until in April 1863 the French army advanced, but at a slow pace, impoverishing the country by its prolonged stay, and redoubling the confidence of the liberals by the excess of its precautions.
Thus, when we ascended the Cumbres, the enemy had cleared everything off before our columns on the plateau of Anahuac. The country was devastated, and almost barren. The hot climate had decimated our forces, and it was necessary to ask the United States and Havannah to supply the corn requisite both for man and beast. Considerable sums of money were devoted by the commissariat to the purchase of mules, which they sought for far and wide, whilst at that very time they abounded at our outposts; and a portion of a large quantity of oats, imported from New York, remained, for want of means of transport to the plains, standing on the quays at Vera Cruz, and inundated by sea water, until the time came when, finding them quite useless, it was decided to reship them to France, where they arrived considerably damaged. A plan for remounting our soldiers was also attempted at Tampico, and each horse brought back to Vera Cruz by our African troopers, after estimating all the expenses, cost, on an average, 25,000 francs. It is true that the operation also cost us a gunboat, 'La France,' which was lost on the bar of the river. Such were the fruits of procrastination.
At last the ville des anges appeared before our eyes as a sort of promised land. It was thought necessary to commence a siege in all due form. The same system which had hitherto prevailed in the management of military operations was applied to the investment of the town. All idea of an assault was scouted, which certainly might have been attempted against the Mexicans if some entrenchments had been thrown up to aid the approach, and if the attack had been made at first on the town only, and the forts of Guadelupe and Loreto had been left to fall through famine. Subsequently, the capture of the Penitencier gave us for an instant the key of the town, for the assailants had pushed on as far as the quadres, from which they could easily have reached the cathedral, which served as a residence for General Ortega. The besieged, driven to close quarters, gave way, and fell into panicstricken confusion. The command was given to retire, and to abandon the positions already taken, the maintenance of which appeared too much out of order or too perilous. And, after this sanguinary evening, the French were compelled to be content with attacking and capturing blocks of houses every night in succession, which were dearly bought, and were then lost and taken again; proceeding in this methodical way, and being stopped at some prearranged limit, as if to check the enthusiasm of the troops, they thus clearly indicated to the enemies the point that would be attacked the next day, always allowing them eighteen hours' respite to double their lines of barricade, and to pierce loop-holes, through which, sheltered and invisible, they could shoot down our soldiers, advancing full-fronted in the darkness.
Thanks to this system—condemned by all military men distinguished for their experience—this dreadful siege lasted three days longer than that of Saragossa; and but for the fortunate attack on the fort of Totimehuacan, causing the fall of the town, preparations must have been made to undergo the rains of winter in front of the entrenchments of Puebla. The cerro San Juan, where the French head-quarters were fixed, had been already covered with wooden barracks and mud huts intended for the troops. The inadequacy of our cannon was not noticed until after the siege had commenced, and it became necessary to send the Commandant Bruat to procure rifled guns of large calibre from the fleet.
After the capitulation of Puebla, the march on Mexico would certainly have been put off but for the interposition of the generals of division. This mere wantonness would have had the effect of causing another siege, for Mexico was surrounded with works which they were beginning to arm. Being attacked suddenly, the capital made no resistance.
If General Forey, by the rapidity of his movements, had avoided the siege of Puebla, the aspect of things in Mexico might perhaps have changed. In consequence of our delay, the spirit of resistance had been developed in the republic, and there had been time to gain over all the provinces which subsequently pronounced for the presidential authority. The state capitals, which became so many hot-beds of insurrection, would have remained tranquil for want of any mutual concert between them, and France, entering Mexico dominantly at the beginning of 1863, would have been at perfect liberty to openly ally herself to the Southern Secessionists, who would have thereby gained ground.
In spite of the flowers and fireworks which were scattered in the path of General Forey on his entering Mexico, the enthusiasm was only factitious. The point that ought to have been the first thing to strike an observant commander was the fact that Juarez had not been expelled by the population of the capital. The chief of the state had yielded to force, but without compromise. In his retreat, he took with him the republican power, but he never allowed it to slip from his hands. He was brought down, but he never abdicated. He had all the pertinacity of a sense of right. This was for five years the secret of the old Indian's power, either in inactivity or in resistance, as he fell back from village to village, and never met with either traitor or assassin on his road.