Theologico-Political Treatise 1862/Chapter 15
THEOLOGY DOES NOT ASSIST REASON, NOR DOES REASON AID THEOLOGY. OF THE GROUNDS OF OUR BELIEF IN THE AUTHORITY OF THE SACRED SCRIPTURES.
They who do not know how to distinguish between philosophy and theology dispute whether Scripture should be aidant to reason or reason helpful to Scripture; that is to say, whether the sense of Scripture ought to be made to harmonize with reason, or reason be made to bend to Scripture. Of these two views one is taken by the sceptics, who deny the certainty of reason, the other by the dogmatists. That both grossly err, however, is apparent from what has already been said. And, indeed, whether one opinion or the other be adopted, either reason or Scripture must of necessity be abused. We have shown that Scripture does not teach philosophy, but piety; and that the whole contents of the Bible are accommodated to the capacity and preconceived opinions of the vulgar. He, consequently, who would make Scripture harmonize with philosophy will have to fasten many things on the prophets which they did not imagine even in their dreams, and will often have to interpret their meaning much amiss. He, on the other hand, who attempts to make reason and philosophy the hand-maids of theology will find himself forced to recognize the prejudices of the vulgar of old as divine things, and with these to fill and obscure his understanding; so that both — this with, and that without, reason — will seem to rave.
The first among the Pharisees who openly maintained that Scripture should be harmonized with reason was Maimonides (whose opinion we have reviewed in Chapter VII., and refuted by many arguments), and although he enjoyed a great reputation among them as a writer, still the greater number of his co-religionists disagree with him in this, and cast themselves at the feet of a certain Rabbi Judah Alpakhar,[1] who, anxious to avoid the error of Maimonides, falls into another opposed to it. This Rabbi maintained that reason ought to be aidant, and, indeed, subordinate, to Scripture. He does not think that anything in Scripture is to be understood metaphorically because the literal sense is repugnant to reason, but only because it is at variance with Scripture itself, i.e. with precepts or dogmas elsewhere clearly expressed. He therefore lays it down as an universal rule, that whatever Scripture teaches dogmatically, and affirms in express words, is, on its sole authority, to be received as absolutely true; that no dogma is to be found in the Bible which directly contradicts another, but only seems to do so inferentially, the manner of speaking in Scripture often appearing to suppose something contrary to that which is taught in fact; and for this reason only are such texts to be interpreted as metaphorical. For example, Scripture teaches clearly that God is One (Deut. vi. 4). Nowhere is it found directly affirming that there are several Gods; though there are many places in which God speaks of himself, and where the prophets speak of God, in the plural number. Here a peculiar manner of speaking only is to be supposed; the purpose of the language not being to declare that there are several Gods. Wherefore all such passages are to be explained metaphorically; to wit, not because it is repugnant to reason to suppose that there are more Gods than one, but because Scripture itself directly affirms that there is only one God. So, also, because Scripture directly affirms (as our Rabbi thinks) that God is incorporeal (Deut. iv. 15), are we, on the authority of this passage alone, and not of reason, to be held to believe that God is without body, and consequently, on the sole authority of Scripture, are all the passages in which God is spoken of as having hands, feet, back parts, &c., to be explained metaphorically, the mere mode of speaking in these making it appear as though God were corporeal.
Such is the opinion of this writer, who, inasmuch as he desires to explain the Scriptures by the Scriptures, I much commend; but I am astonished that a man endowed with reason himself should seek to destroy it. It is true, indeed, that Scripture is to be interpreted by Scripture so long as the question is of the sense of the language, and the meaning of the prophets; but, having found the true sense, it is then indispensable that judgment and reason be summoned to approve of the conclusions attained. But if reason when opposed to Scripture is nevertheless to be completely subjected to it, I ask whether this is to be done knowingly, or ignorantly and as if stricken with mental blindness? If blindly, then indeed we act foolishly and without judgment; but if knowingly, then do we accept on the sole authority of reason that Scripture, which, to be consistent, we should reject when it is opposed to reason. And I ask, who can receive or adopt into his mind anything against which reason rebels? For what is it mentally to deny anything, but that reason disclaims it? And, truly, I cannot sufficiently express my amazement that there should be found men in the world eager to disparage reason, and to subject this greatest of gifts, this divine light, to the dead letter which human malice may have corrupted; who think it no sin to speak against the mind of man, this table on which the true covenant of God is writ, to call it corrupt, and blind, and lost; but who esteem it the greatest wickedness to call in question the mere sign and symbol of the Word of God! These persons, forsooth, think it pious and proper to trust nothing to their own judgment, but impious and reprehensible to doubt of the good faith and judgment of those who have transmitted the Sacred Books of the Jews to us! But this is sheer folly, not piety. And I ask, What are they anxious about? What do they fear? That faith and religion are not to be vindicated unless men agree to ignore all experience and bid adieu to reason? If they do indeed think so, they rather fear than trust the Scriptures. But far "from us be the thought that religion and piety should be subordinated to reason, or reason be subjected to religion, and that each may not assert its own right, pursue its own course in perfect concord with the other. Of this point, however, I shall speak by and by; for here I have, above all things, to examine the rule laid down by this Rabbi Alpakhar.
He, as I have said, would have us, without question asked, embrace as true, or reject as false, all that Scripture affirms or denies; and, again, he maintains that Scripture never in express words contradicts affirmatively or negatively in one place what it affirms or denies in another. How rashly both of these assertions are made no one who has inquired can be ignorant. For, passing by the fact, which he has not noticed, that Scripture is made up of many books, written at different times for different generations of men by different authors, I say the Rabbi Alpakhar ventures the statement he makes entirely on his own authority, Scripture saying nothing of the kind; that he ought to show all the places which are only inferentially contradictory to be susceptible of a ready metaphorical explanation from the nature of the language, or by reason of the place where they occur; and, lastly, that he should be held bound to prove that Scripture has reached us wholly uncorrupted.
Now I ask, in the first place, whether we are to be compelled to embrace as true, or reject as false, all that Scripture contains which is repugnant to reason? Perhaps, however, he might here reply, that Scripture contains nothing that is repugnant to reason. I, on my part, insist that in Scripture it is expressly affirmed and taught that God is jealous (ex. gr. in the Decalogue itself; in Exodus iv. 14; in Deuteronomy iv. 24, and in many other places); and I say this is repugnant to reason. Nevertheless, the Rabbi Judas Alpakhar would have us receive the assertion as true — ay, and if we can find anything in Scripture which implies that God is not jealous, this would have to be explained metaphorically, and held to mean nothing of the sort. Again, Scripture says expressly that God descended on Mount Sinai (Exod. xix. 20 et seq.), ascribes to him other motions in space, and nowhere expressly teaches that God does not move; this, therefore, would have to be received by all as true; and because Solomon says that God is infinite — that the heaven of heavens cannot contain him (1 Kings viii. 27), — although he does not affirm expressly, though it follows by inference, that God does not move, this must necessarily be so explained that it shall appear not to take away the faculty of locomotion from God. So, also, heaven would have to be assumed as God's dwelling-place and throne, because it is expressly affirmed so to be in Scripture. In the same way, there are very many expressions in conformity with the opinions of the prophets and the vulgar which reason and philosophy, but not Scripture, declare to be false or mistaken, although all must be supposed to have been true in the opinion of their authors, by whom reason and philosophy were little regarded.
Our Rabbi, in conclusion, affirms falsely that one passage contradicts another by inference only, not directly. Thus Moses affirms directly that "God is fire" (Deut. iv. 24), and he as directly denies that God has any resemblance to visible things (Ib. iv. 12); now, did our Rabbi rule, this would not be to deny directly, but only by inference, that God was fire; let us concede therefore that God is fire — but no, let us rather escape from such stuff, lest with him we seem to talk idly, and proceed to other more pregnant instances for his confutation. Thus, Samuel in one passage (1 Sam. xv. 29) denies that God ever "lies or repents;" and Jeremiah in another (Jer. xviii. 8, 10) affirms that God repents him of the good and evil he intended. What? are not these two texts directly opposed to each other? Which of the two would our Rabbi explain metaphorically? Both are universal, both are contradictory; what one positively affirms, the other as positively denies. In obedience to his own rule, therefore, he would be bound at once to adopt each as true, and again to reject each as false. And, then, what signifies it that one place contradicts another not directly, but only by consequence, if the consequence be clear, and the circumstances of the place, and the nature of the subject, will not bear a metaphorical interpretation? And that there are many such passages in the Bible has been amply shown in more than one chapter of this treatise — in the Second Chapter, for example, where the diverse and contradictory opinions of the prophets were presented, in Chapters IX. and X., where, in especial, the striking, contradictions that occur in the several histories were discussed, so that I have no occasion to repeat myself or to quote further instances in order to show what absurdities follow from the rule of interpretation suggested by the author quoted, or the erroneousness and inconsiderateness of his opinions. Wherefore we declare the views as well of this writer, as of Maimonides, to be untenable, and maintain unshaken the position, that theology is neither subject or subordinate to reason, nor reason subject to theology, but that each reigns supreme in its own proper sphere; the sphere of reason being truth and knowledge, whilst that of theology is piety and obedience; the power of reason not extending so far as to be able to determine that men by obedience only, without any knowledge of things, may be saved; whilst theology asks nothing, prescribes nothing, but obedience, and neither wills nor avails aught against reason. For the dogmas of faith, as we have shown in the preceding chapter, are determined by theology only in so far as is requisite for obedience; but the definite comprehension of these, as regards their truth, &c., it leaves to the decision of reason, which indeed is the light of the soul; that without which nothing is conceived but dreams and vain fancies.
And here I take occasion to say that by theology I understand revelation, in so far as it shows the aim which Scripture has in view (namely, the way and manner of obedience, or the principles of true piety and true belief); in other words, that which is properly called the word of God, and which consists not in any certain number of books called sacred (vide Chap. XII). Theology, in this sense, if its precepts and rules of life be regarded, will be found to agree with reason; and, if its end and aim be kept in view, to differ in nothing from what reason dictates; so that it is of universal application, common to all. In so far as the body of Scripture is concerned, we have already shown in Chapter VII. that its meaning was to be ascertained from its history solely, not from the general history of nature, which is the foundation of philosophy alone. Nor ought we to be discouraged if, after having investigated the true meaning of Scripture in this way, we find it here and there in contradiction with reason; for, whatever of this sort may be found in the Bible, or that man without detriment to charity may ignore, that we certainly know does not touch theology or the Word of God, so that on these matters every one may think as he pleases without sin. Let us conclude definitively, therefore, that neither is Scripture to be made to conform to reason, nor is reason to be subjected to Scripture.
But since the very foundation of theology, viz. that man is blessed or saved by obedience alone, cannot be demonstrated by reason to be either true or false, we may be asked reproachfully wherefore we believe in it? If we embrace it without reason, like blind men, we therein act foolishly, and without discretion. If, on the contrary, we seek to determine this foundation by reason, theology thereby becomes a part of philosophy, and not to be severed from it. To these suggestions, however, I reply that I have shown definitively that this fundamental dogma of theology is not to be investigated by means of the natural understanding; at all events, that no one has yet been found who could demonstrate it in this way, and that revelation therefore became essentially necessary. We may use our judgment, nevertheless, in order that what is revealed may be embraced with moral certainty at least. I say, with moral certainty, for we cannot look to have any higher assurance than had the prophets, to whom the revelation we possess was first made, and whose assurance was moral only, as has been shown in Chapter II. of this Treatise.
I think, therefore, that they err egregiously who seek to prove the authority of Scripture by means of mathematical formulas or demonstrations. For the authority for the Bible rests on the authority of the prophets, so that it can be supported by no more powerful arguments than those by which the prophets of old were wont to persuade the people of their title to be heard; our own assurance of the same can indeed rest on no other foundation but that on which the prophets rested their assurance and authority. Now we have found the whole certainty of the prophets to repose on these three things: 1. A clear and lively imagination; 2. Signs or miracles; 3. lastly and chiefly, A mind disposed to justice and goodness. The prophets built on no other foundations than are supplied by these, and so could not demonstrate their authority by any other means, either when in former times they addressed the multitude by word of mouth, or hold intercourse with us now in written characters. As to the first principle — viz. that they imagined vividly, this could only be known to the prophets themselves; so that our whole certainty of revelation must and ought to rest on the remaining two, viz. signs and doctrine. And this was expressly taught by Moses, for he bids the people obey the prophet who shows a true sign in the name of God; whilst he orders the false prophet, although he prophesies in the name of God, to be put to death (Deut. xxviii.). He also condemns him to death who seduces the people from the true religion, although he should confirm his discourse by signs and portents (Deut. xiii.). Whence it follows that the true is to be distinguished from the false prophet by doctrine and miracle together: he who shows doctrine and miracle Moses declares to be a true prophet, and him the people are ordered to believe without fear of being led astray; as they, again, are declared to be false prophets and worthy of death who prophesy falsely, though they speak in the name of God, or who teach false gods, though they work miracles.
We therefore only feel ourselves bound to believe Scripture, or the prophets, on the ground of their doctrine confirmed by signs. For since we find the prophets commending charity and justice above all things, and aiming at nothing else, it is impossible to imagine that they spoke of evil purpose. They certainly taught of upright mind, and to make men blessed through faith and obedience. And, inasmuch as they confirmed this excellent doctrine by signs in addition, we satisfy ourselves that they spoke not idly, that they did not rave whilst they prophesied; a conclusion in which we are the more confirmed when we find that they taught no moral precept which does not agree entirely with reason; for it is not little that the word of God, as spoken by the prophets, entirely agrees with the very word of God speaking in us. And on this point, I say, we have the same assurance from the Bible which the Jews of old had from the mouths of their prophets; for, as we have shown above (Chap. XII.), in so far as doctrine and the chief elements of their history are concerned, the Scriptures have come down to us unchanged. This position we assume as the ground of the whole of our Theology and Scripture belief; and although it is not susceptible of a mathematical demonstration, still it may be acknowledged with the entire concurrence of reason and understanding. For it were mere folly to refuse to receive that which has been confirmed by the testimony of so many prophets; which is a source of so much comfort to weaker souls; from which such good results ensue to the commonwealth; and which moreover can be believed without danger or detriment to any, on the sole ground that it is not susceptible of mathematical demonstration. As if, indeed, in the sagest conduct of life we admit nothing as true which might be called in question on any pretext of doubt; or as if most of our doings were not sufficiently, and some of them wholly, uncertain.
I confess, indeed, that they who think philosophy and theology mutually contradictory and subversive, who maintain that each ought to be expelled from the other's domain, and that one or other is to be bid adieu to, they, I say, do not without good reason endeavour to lay a solid foundation for theology, and even strive to find a mathematical demonstration of its principles. But who, save a desperate and insane person, would rashly choose to bid good-bye to reason, to despise the arts and sciences, and to deny the certainty of rational conclusions? At the same time, it is impossible absolutely to excuse those who call reason to their aid in rebutting reason, and who strive by means certain to make it seem uncertain. When they seek by mathematical demonstrations to show the truth and authority of theology, indeed, and to take away the authority of reason and the natural understanding, they only bring theology under the dominion of reason, and seem plainly to suppose that the authority of theology would be without lustre unless illumined by the natural light of reason. On the other hand, if they boast that they acquiesce entirely in the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit and call reason to their aid, for no other cause than on account of unbelievers, and with a view to convincing them, still no credit were to be given to their assertions, as we could easily show that they only speak from passion or vain-gloriousness. For from the preceding chapter it follows conclusively, that the Holy Spirit gives no testimony save through good works; wherefore Paul himself in his Epistle to the Galatians calls these "fruit of the Holy Spirit" (Gal. v. 22), and this is nothing, in truth, but that contentment and acquiescence of heart and understanding which spring from good deeds done. Of the verity and certainty of things, however, which are solely matters of speculation, no spirit save reason supplies any testimony, reason, which, as we have already shown, asserts the empire of truth for itself. If, therefore, any one declares himself possessed of any spirit but that which gives him certainty of truth, he boasts idly, and speaks from the promptings of his feelings only; or else he seeks refuge in sacred things from the fear he has of being exposed by philosophers and held up to public contempt; but in vain, for at what shrine shall he be well received who assails the majesty of reason?
But I make an end of this discussion, for I seem to myself to have made out my case, which was to show how philosophy was distinct from theology, and that wherein each principally consisted; that neither was subordinate, but that each held sway in its own sphere without prejudice to the other; finally, as occasion presented itself, I have shown the absurdities, inconveniences, and evils that have followed from confounding these two elements, and not keeping each entirely distinct from the other. Before proceeding to another part of my subject, I desire again and distinctly to express my opinion of the value and necessity of the Sacred Scriptures to man. These I estimate very highly; for as we do not perceive by the light we bring with us into the world that simple obedience is the way of life, whilst revelation alone by the singular grace of God teaches this, which we could not learn by our reason, it follows that the Scriptures have been a great source of comfort to mankind: all without exception may obey, but there are very few indeed who, under the guidance of reason, could attain to habits of virtue; so that without Scripture we might despair of the well-doing of almost all mankind.
Notes[edit]
- ↑ I remember formerly to have read the letter of R. J. Alpakhar, in which the matters quoted are contained among the letters addressed to Maimonides.