Theologico-Political Treatise 1862/Chapter 17

by Benedictus de Spinoza

INDIVIDUAL RIGHT IS NEVER WHOLLY ABANDONED TO THE RULING POWER IN A STATE. OF THE HEBREW REPUBLIC IN DIFFERENT PERIODS OP ITS EXISTENCE, AND OF THE CAUSES OF ITS DECLINE AND FALL.

The idea developed in the preceding chapter concerning the right of the supreme power in a state over all, and of the natural rights of individuals transferred to it, although agreeing in many respects with experience, still remains entirely theoretical in various particulars. Theory and practice, however, may here be brought to assimilate very closely. No one, for example, could ever so completely transfer his power, and consequently his rights, to another as to cease himself from feeling as a man; nor was there ever any sovereign power in the world that could dispose absolutely, and at its will and pleasure, of everything belonging to the state and the people. In vain were a subject commanded to hate him who had done him service, to love him who had done him an injury, to feel no offence at unworthy usage, not to desire escape from solicitude about his personal safety, and many other things of the same kind, which follow of necessity from the constitution of human nature. So much I think is clearly demonstrated by experience; for never have men so entirely abandoned their rights, so effectually ceded these to another, that they themselves came no longer to be considered and feared by him to whom they were confided, and who by this confidence was raised to the sovereign power in the state; so true is it that despotic rulers have mostly lived in as much fear of their subjects, though stripped of their rights, as of foreign enemies. Would men indeed so completely divest themselves of their natural rights, as thenceforward to have no will or choice left save as he or they who held the supreme power commanded, then truly might governors rule tyrannically and cruelly with impunity. But I think that no man in his senses would ever consent to strip himself of all natural right and power: every one, under all circumstances, must still reserve something of these, which consequently will not depend on another, but belong to himself in peculiar.

To have a proper understanding of the extent of the right and power of the highest authority in a state, it must however be observed that the right of a ruler does not exactly consist in this, — that he can force subjects through fear to obey his commands, but in this absolutely, — that his commands are obeyed. For it is not the reason or motive for the obedience yielded, but the obedience itself, which gives the sovereign authority its right and power of command. Whether subjects obey from fear of punishment or hope of reward, from love of their country, or moved by any other affection or impulse, they still resolve of their own proper motion to obey, and in so doing act in conformity with the decrees or commands of the highest power in the state. Whatever a subject does, consequently, that harmonizes with the commands of the sovereign power, whether he be moved by love or driven by fear, or disposed by love and fear at once, or by respect, a feeling composed of fear and admiration, or, in short, by any other motive, he then acts not of his own right alone, but by the right also of the supreme power. This position is greatly confirmed by the fact that obedience bears reference to an internal mental condition rather than to an outward act; so that he is truly most under the authority of another who obeys all his commands with hearty good will; as he bears the most absolute sway who reigns in the hearts of his subjects, and he who is greatly feared by his subjects is a tyrant in his state,- and mostly lives in dread of those over whom he is set. Then, although it is impossible to command the mind like the tongue, still are the minds of subjects in some sense under the control of the sovereign power, which can generally and in various ways bring it to pass that the great majority of those over whom it exercises authority shall like, dislike, and do whatever it desires. And although this takes place by no direct command of the supreme power, it is nevertheless very commonly done, as experience proves, by the influence of its authority. Wherefore, without any violence to their reason, we conceive men believing, loving, hating, despising, &c., on the sole authority of their rulers, without themselves having been primarily moved by any feeling of love, hate, or contempt.

Now although in this way we perceive the right and authority of a government to be sufficiently ample, still it never happens that so much power is given as to enable those who hold it to assert an absolute and arbitrary right, to all they desire. This I think I have already demonstrated with sufficient clearness. But to show in what way and by what means a state might be established that should prove permanent I have said does not fall within the scope of my present undertaking. Still, that I may attain the end I have in view, I shall here indicate what was formerly taught in this direction by divine revelation to Moses; and then I shall pass in rapid review the history and successes of the Jews, in order that we may gather from these what may be allowed by rulers to subjects for the sake of adding to the security and extending the power of the state.

That the safety of the commonwealth mainly depends on the faith of subjects, on their courage and constancy of purpose in carrying out the orders of the ruling powers, is sufficiently proved both by reason and experience. But it is not so readily seen by what means subjects are to be induced to repose unswerving faith and trust in their rulers. All alike, rulers and ruled, are men, indisposed to labour, greatly disposed to sensual indulgence. They who have had much experience of the fickle and uncertain temper of the multitude have almost despaired of humanity; for men are not governed by reason and the higher sentiments, but by appetite and affection alone. Always inconsiderate, they are easily led by their greediness and their love of indulgence; arrogant, each thinks that he alone knows all, and desires to arrange everything in his own way; selfish, he judges this and that to be just or unjust, right or wrong, as he believes it to square or not to square with what he thinks his interest; vainglorious, he despises his equals, and refuses to be guided by them; envious, he grudges to others greater honour and better fortune than fall to himself; vindictive, he desires evil to others and rejoices when it happens, — but enough, it is needless to go further; for all know full well what crime and wickedness discontent with the present and desire of change have produced; what blind rage and the prospect of escape from hateful poverty have led mankind to do, and how entirely mere personal considerations engage and influence men's minds. To foresee and forestall disturbance in a state from such causes, to leave no room for disorder to creep in, so to arrange matters that every one, whatever his temper and disposition, shall prefer the public good to his private advantage, this is the task undertaken, this the work to be achieved by the patriot ruler. From sheer necessity much has mostly been done to secure these great ends; matters, however, I think have scarcely yet been so satisfactorily arranged but that governments have still been in even greater danger from their own citizens than from foreign foes, and have feared unfriends at home fully as much as enemies abroad. Of the truth of this position let the great Roman .Republic supply the proof. Invincible by enemies from without, it was often vanquished and miserably oppressed by its own citizens, never more cruelly perhaps than in the civil war of Vespasian against Vitellius (vide Tacitus, Histor. lib. iv.). Alexander, again, as we learn from Quintus Curtius (lib. viii.), was less eager for fame among his enemies than for the good report of those he ruled over; for he thought his power more at the mercy of his subjects than of hostile nations, and upon one occasion when anxious about his position he entreated his friends in this wise, — "Do you but preserve me from domestic intrigue and privy conspiracy, and I can meet the dangers of the battlefield without fear." Philip held himself safer in the fight than in the theatre: he had often escaped the hands of open enemies, but from the hands of his own people hostile, he thought there could be no escape. And, indeed, if the fate of despotic rulers be inquired into, it will be found that more have fallen by the hands of their subjects than of their enemies (vide Qu. Curtius, lib. x. § 6). For this reason, and to make themselves more secure, we see that kings in times gone by who usurped their state have often endeavoured to persuade the world that they derived their origin from the immortal gods. They presumed that if they could but make their subjects regard them not as equals, as mortals like themselves, but as gods, they would more readily suffer themselves to be ruled, and prove more submissive in all things. Thus Augustus Caesar persuaded the Roman people that he was descended from Æneas, the son of Venus, and was therefore to be ranked among the divinities; he consequently ordered that temples should be raised in his honour, that his bust, in the guise of one of the gods, should be there enshrined, and that divine honours should be paid to him by a body of priests attached to his service (Tacit. Annal. lib. i.). Alexander, for his part, ordered that he should be saluted as the son of Jove. But this appears to have been done from policy, not from vanity, as is proved by his answer to Hermolaus: "It was enough to move laughter," he is reported to have said himself, "when Hermolaus wished me to rebel against Jupiter, by whose oracle I had been acknowledged. Is the decision of the gods in my power? Jove himself had saluted me by the name of son; and after the deeds I had done it surely was not amiss in me to accept the title. I would that the Indians also believed me to be a god; for reputation does much in war, and falsehood believed will often stand instead of truth" (Qu. Curtius, lib. viii. § 8). In these few words does the great conqueror show his own sense of the divinity that was imputed to him by the ignorant populace, and at the same time indicate his reasons for suffering himself to be addressed as a god. Cleon, in his oration, defends what had been done. After sounding the praises of Alexander extravagantly, he has recourse to all his art in persuading the Macedonians to support the king in his enterprise, and thus passes on to the advantages of the course he advocates: "The Persians," he says, "worship their kings as God, not from piety only, but also led by policy to do so, for majesty is the guardian of state security. He would," he continues, "prostrate himself upon the bare ground as the king passed to his meals, and the by-standers, and especially all prudent persons, would do the same" (Qu. Curtius, lib. viii. § 5). But the Macedonians were sharper-witted than Cleon thought, and not to be won in this way. Nor indeed are any above the rank of mere barbarians to be so openly deceived or seduced into submitting from respectable subjects to be made slaves of, useless to themselves. It is not so difficult however to persuade many persons that royalty is something sacred; that kings are God's vice-gerents on earth; that they reign by the grace of God, not by the suffrage and consent of man, and are upheld and protected by a special providence. Many other devices of the same sort have been imagined by monarchs for the security of their persons and the increase of their authority; but these I pass by, and proceed to what I have said I had particularly in view, viz. the things to these ends that were taught to Moses by divine revelation.

We have already seen in Chapter V. that after their exodus from Egypt the Jews were bound by the laws of no other nation, but were free to institute new laws of their own, whilst at the same time they assumed the right to invade and occupy such territories as suited their wishes or convenience. For after their escape from the intolerable Egyptian oppression, when they were bound by no compact to any authority, but had resumed their natural rights, and every one was in a condition to consider whether he should keep these to himself or cede them to another, they by the advice of Moses, in whom all at that time had implicit confidence, resolved to transfer their natural rights to no mere man, but to yield them wholly to Jehovah alone. This, without long deliberation, but with one accord and with much clamour, they engaged to do, promising implicit obedience to all God's commandments, and engaging to acknowledge no law but that which he by his divine revelation should constitute as right. Now this engagement of the Jews to Jehovah, or this transference of their rights to him, was effected in the same way as we have above conceived it to be accomplished in ordinary society, when men resolve to cede their natural rights to a sovereign ruler or ruling power. The Jews, in fact, gave up their natural rights to Jehovah in terms of an express agreement (vide Exodus xxiv. 7), voluntarily binding themselves by an oath to the faithful observance of its terms on their part, not compelled by force nor terrified by threats to do so. And then, in order that the agreement might be duly ratified and determined, Jehovah took no measures with them until they had had proofs of his wonderful power, by which alone they had hitherto been led and preserved, and by which alone they could hope to be protected in time to come (Exod. xix. 4, 5). For it was the belief that they could be saved by the protecting might of Jehovah alone, which led them to transfer to him the whole of that natural right of self-defence which they perhaps had previously believed they possessed of themselves, and with this the whole of their other natural rights. Jehovah alone, therefore, was sovereign over the Jews, and was properly entitled their king, as the Jewish empire was rightly called the kingdom of God. By an extension of this idea the enemies of the Jews were regarded as the enemies of God; and the citizen who attempted to usurp the supreme power was guilty in the act of treason to the rights of the realm, to the divine majesty, to the authority and decrees of Jehovah.

In the Hebrew state, consequently, the civil polity and religion, which consists essentially, as we have shown, in obedience to God, were one and the same. The dogmas of the Jewish religion were not doctrines, but declared rights and commandments; piety was accounted justice, impiety was injustice and crime; he who fell off from the state religion ceased to be a citizen, and for this cause alone was looked upon as an enemy; as he who died for his religion was held to have died for his country, and between civil right and religious profession no distinction whatever was made. On these grounds the ancient Hebrew state might truly be called a theocracy: its subjects were bound by no law save that revealed by God. All however was rather based on opinion than on reality; for the ancient Hebrews did in fact retain in their own hands the absolute right of ruling, as I shall immediately show by an analysis of the way and manner in which their state was administered.

Inasmuch as the Hebrews ceded their natural rights to no one among themselves, but all equally, as in a democracy, transferred these to Jehovah, and with one voice proclaimed that whatsoever God commanded without an express mediator, that they would do, it follows that by this arrangement all remained individually equal, — with like title to consult God, to receive and interpret laws, — in a word, to share in the administration of affairs. For this reason it was that all at first approached Jehovah of themselves that they might know his commands. But in their earliest interview the people were so much alarmed, and heard the voice of God speaking with such terror and amazement, that they thought the end of all things had come. Full of their fears, therefore, they besought Moses anew, saying, "Behold, the Lord our God hath showed us his glory and his greatness, and we have heard his voice out of the midst of the fire; we have seen this day that God doth talk with man, and he liveth. Now, therefore, why should we die? for this great fire will consume us; if we hear the voice of the Lord our God any more, then we shall die. … Go thou near and hear all that the Lord God shall say, and speak thou unto us all that the Lord God shall speak unto thee, and we will hear it and do it" (vide Deut. v. 24 et seq., and xviii. 15 et seq.). By this it is obvious that the Israelites annulled their first covenant with Jehovah; they transferred their title to consult him immediately, and to interpret his commandments for themselves, to Moses, who accordingly became the sole giver and expounder of the divine law, and consequently the supreme judge of the people, over whom no one else had authority. Moses, in fact, now stood to the children of Israel in the place of Jehovah; he alone possessed the supreme authority; he alone enjoyed the privilege of consulting Jehovah, of delivering the divine responses to the nation, and of enforcing obedience to these. The people had now engaged to be obedient, not to what God commanded them immediately to do, but to what God commanded Moses should be done. Moses, I have said, stood alone in his high authority; for if any one in his life-time presumed to prophesy aught in the name of God, although a true prophet, still he was accounted guilty, and a usurper of the supreme power (vide Numb, xi., xii.);^[1] and here it is worthy of remark, that although the people had elected Moses, they could not of right elect a successor to him. For in transferring their right of consulting God to Moses, and promising unconditionally to receive him instead of the divine oracle, they plainly lost their title to do so. He whom Moses chose they were bound to receive as elected by God. Had Moses chosen a successor, one who, like himself, possessed the whole administrative power — the right of consulting God in the tabernacle, and consequently the right of instituting and abrogating laws, of resolving on war and making peace, of sending ambassadors, of appointing judges, of choosing a successor, and of administering all the offices that appertain to a sovereign ruler — then the constitution of the state would have been purely monarchical. Nor would there have been any difference, in fact, save that a monarchy is usually said to be governed by the grace or will of God, which is not conspicuously manifested, whilst the Hebrew monarchy under Moses was ruled and governed, or was ordered to be ruled and governed, in a certain way by the decrees of God immediately and openly revealed to him. This difference, however, does not lessen the right and authority of the ruler in any respect; on the contrary, it rather increases them. In other matters, and particularly as regards the people, whether in a monarchy as usually constituted, or in that of the Jewish nation, they are alike subject in each, and uninformed of the divine decree; for in each all depends on the will of the monarch; and what is right or wrong is what he decrees to be one or other; nor are the people, because they believe that the sovereign commands nothing that is not revealed to him by God or by the command of God, the less, but, on the contrary, the more under the hand of authority. Moses, however, as said, chose no successor, but left the state to be so administered by those who came after him that it could neither rightly be called a democracy, an aristocracy, nor a monarchy, but a theocracy. For the right of interpreting the laws and of communicating the decrees of God was confided to one, and the right and authority of administering the affairs of the state was confided to another (vide Numb. xxvii. 21). To make this matter more plain, I shall here give a succinct account of the whole administration of affairs in the ancient Hebrew state.

First, the people were commanded to build a house which should be, as it were, the palace of Jehovah, that is, of the sovereign power of the state; and this was to be done, not at the cost of any one, or of any number, but of the whole people, in order that the building in which God was to be consulted should be a common right or property. The Levites were the chosen administrators within this royal hall of audience, and Aaron, the brother of Moses, was made the chief among them, the second in authority as it were from Jehovah, the king, and Aaron's sons were to be regarded as his legitimate successors. Aaron, therefore, or the chief priest, as nearest to God, was the highest interpreter of the divine laws, the deliverer to the people of the responses of the divine oracle, and the intercessor with God for the nation. Now, had an officer with such powers possessed an equal right of civil command, there would have been nothing wanting to constitute him an absolute monarch. Of this right of civil command, however, the priest of the temple was deprived; indeed, the whole tribe of Levi was forbidden to take any part in the common affairs of life (to say nothing of the civil administration), whereby they might earn a livelihood; it was ordained that they should be maintained by the rest of the community, in order, as it was said, that they might be held in the higher honour by the multitude, as being solely devoted to the service of Jehovah.

Next, the militia, chosen indifferently from the remaining twelve tribes, were commanded to invade the territory of the Canaanites, and to divide these into twelve parts for allotment among themselves. For this business twelve chiefs were selected, one from each tribe, to whom, along with Joshua the captain and Eleazar the high priest, was given authority to divide the land of Canaan into twelve equal parts, and to distribute these by lot. Joshua, again, was chosen commander-in-chief of the militia or armed force, and to him alone was conceded the right in new or untried circumstances of consulting Jehovah; but he was to do so, not as Moses had done, alone in his tent or in the tabernacle, but by the medium of the chief priest, by whom only the answers of God were to be received. Once received, however, Joshua had absolute authority to proclaim the decrees of God, and to enforce obedience to them. He had also the right to advance and distinguish those whom he chose and as many as he chose, from among the militia, to send ambassadors, &c., — in a word, the whole of the war administration lay with Joshua, as commander-in-chief of the army. No one, however, could legitimately succeed to this important office; nor could a successor be chosen in any other way than immediately by God, when the necessities of the nation seemed to require the appointment. Otherwise, all affairs of peace and war were administered by the chiefs of the tribes, as I shall immediately show.

Lastly, all males from the age of twenty to sixty were required to take arms, so that the army was the people, the people were the army, which swore fealty to no commander or high priest, but to their religion, or their God, Jehovah. The army, consequently, was called the host or ranks of God, and God himself among the ancient Hebrews was styled the Lord of Hosts. This was the reason why the ark of the covenant was always borne in the midst of the army during great battles, on the issue of which depended the fate of the nation for good or for evil. In the presence, as it were, of their king and ruler, it was presumed that the people would bear themselves with greater bravery, and put forth all their strength.

From the ordinances delivered by Moses to his successors we gather that he chose functionaries or administrators, not rulers of the state. He gave to no one the right of consulting God alone, and in such places as he pleased; and, consequently, he gave to no one the authority which he himself possessed of ordaining and abrogating laws, of decreeing peace or war, of electing ministers of the temple as well as of the state, which are all acts belonging to one who holds supreme or sovereign authority. The chief priest himself had the right, indeed, of interpreting the laws, and of delivering the responses of Jehovah; not, however, as Moses had done, whensoever he chose, but only when asked to do so by the commander-in-chief of the host, the supreme council of the state, or those in authority. On the other hand, the commander-in-chief of the host and the council could consult God when they chose; but they could only receive the answers he deigned from the high priest; wherefore, the sayings of God in the mouth of the high priest were not commandments, as they were in the mouth of Moses, but only responses delivered to Joshua and the council; however, they at length acquired the force of commandments and decrees. The chief priest, who received the responses of God immediately, had neither any military nor any civil authority; and they, on the contrary, who possessed lands of right could not of right institute laws. Again, the chief priests, both Aaron and his son Eleazar, were elected by Moses; Moses being dead, however, no one possessed the right of electing a pontiff, but the son legitimately succeeded the father in his office. The commander of the army was also chosen by Moses, and not by the high priest. The chief command was first assumed by Joshua in virtue of a title delivered immediately by Moses; but after the death of Joshua the high priest elected no one in his place; nor did the chiefs of the tribes consult God anew concerning a commander; each chief in the militia of his own tribe, and those of the tribes all together, met in council on the military affairs of the nation, they having resumed the right of supreme command which had been conferred on Joshua. It is obvious, indeed, that there was no necessity for a commander-in-chief, except when the different tribes had to combine their forces against a common enemy; a state of things which happened most remarkably under Joshua, when the several tribes had not yet determinate settlements, and all territory was held by common right. But when the whole of the tribes had become possessed of lands by right of successful war, and things were no longer held in common, there was no need of a general commander-in-chief, inasmuch as the tribes now stood to each other in the relation of confederates rather than of fellow-citizens, — they were so at least in respect of territorial divisions; in respect of God and religion, indeed, they were still fellow-citizens; but in regard to any right which one tribe had over another, they were strictly confederates, almost in the same manner (if abstraction be made of the common temple) as the members of the high and mighty confederation of the estates of the Netherlands. For a partition of a common thing is but an arrangement whereby each participant henceforth holds his own share distinctly and alone, the others interested ceding the rights they formerly had over that part to the possessor. For this reason did Moses choose chiefs of tribes; in order that after the division of the country each chief might have the particular care of the portion of territory belonging to his tribe and its immediate affairs, viz. the privilege of consulting Jehovah on the concerns of the tribe by the medium of the high priest, of commanding its militia, of founding and fortifying towns, of establishing judges in each city, of attacking the enemies of the tribe, and of administering all its concerns absolutely and without control, both in peace and in war. Nor was the chief to acknowledge any judge except Jehovah, or him whom the Lord God sent expressly as a prophet. Any chief who fell away from Jehovah was to be regarded by the rest of the tribe no longer as one of themselves, but as an enemy who had broken faith with them, and was to be dealt with accordingly. Instances in point are recorded in Scripture. Thus, after the death of Joshua, the children of Israel themselves, and not the new commander-in-chief, consulted Jehovah, and having been informed that Judah should first invade the territories of the Canaanites, this tribe entered into an agreement with Simeon to unite their forces and make war in common on the enemy, without including the other tribes in their arrangements, but leaving each of these to make war single-handed on the inhabitants of its allotment (Judges i. 1 et seq.). This was accordingly done, and with success; but instead of exterminating all, old and young, who stood in their way, according to orders, these tribes took the remnants of the original population under their protection, and received as subjects as many as chose to submit; an act of clemency for which they were afterwards severely censured by an angel sent by Jehovah for the purpose. In the narrow and selfish policy of Judah and Simeon the other tribes seem to have found no cause of offence. But against Benjamin, which had offended the whole Jewish people, and so loosened the bonds of good understanding that none of the confederates could again feel sure of hospitality among them, a war of extermination was raised; and after three battles Benjamin was finally defeated, and the whole tribe, innocent and guilty alike, involved in indiscriminate slaughter, — a deed that gave rise to late but unavailing repentance.

What has just been said of the rights of each particular tribe is sufficiently confirmed by these examples. But some may here ask by whom the chiefs of the different tribes were chosen? On this point, however, I regret that I am unable to gather anything certain from Scripture. I conjecture, nevertheless, that as the tribes were divided into families, whose heads were chosen from the elders of these, he who was senior among the elders succeeded of right to the place of chief. Thus Moses chose seventy coadjutors from among the elders, who with himself formed a supreme council; and they who had the administration of affairs after the death of Joshua are called Elders in Scripture. Lastly, nothing is more frequent among the Hebrews than by the title Elders to imply Judges.

These particulars I think worthy of attention, though I am aware that they give nothing in the way of certainty to my conjecture. Let it suffice for me to show that no one after the death of Moses united in his single person all the functions of supreme ruler; for as the whole authority of the state did not rest with any one man, nor with a single council, nor with the people collectively, but some things were confided to one tribe, others to other tribes, and others still were administered of equal right by the rest, it follows, most obviously, that the constitution of the Hebrew state from the death of Moses was neither monarchical, nor aristocratic, nor democratic, but, as I have said, it was theocratic; 1. because the royal palace was a temple, and in their common interest in this alone were the whole of the tribes constituted fellow-citizens; 2. because all the citizens were required to swear fealty to the Lord God their judge, to whom alone they promised absolute obedience in all things; and because the commander-in-chief of the nation, when there was occasion for such an officer, was chosen, not by themselves, but by Jehovah. This Moses expressly declares in the name of God in Deuteronomy (xix. 15), and the fact itself is testified to by the election of Gideon, Samson, and Samuel; so that there is no reason to doubt but that the other faithful leaders were also chosen in the same way, although this does not appear in their histories.

These matters premised, it is time that we saw what influence this constitution of the state had in securing moderation on the part both of rulers and the ruled, so that these were not rebels and those were not tyrants.

They who rule, or possess authority, whatever iniquity they perpetrate, still strive to give their acts a colour of justice, and endeavour to persuade the people that all they do is well and honestly done; and in this they easily enough succeed, when the entire interpretation of the laws lies with them. For it is not doubtful but that rulers derive the greater part of the power they possess to enforce their wishes, and to do what their appetites dispose them to do, from themselves if they are sole interpreters of the laws; as, on the other hand, they lose the greater part of their arbitrary power if the right of interpreting the laws lies with another, and the administration of the law is at the same time so public that no one is in doubt about what is done. Now from the constitution of the ancient Hebrew state it is manifest that a principal cause of maladministration was taken from the ruler by the interpretation of the law being confided to the Levites alone (Deut. xxi. 5), who had no share with the rest of the tribes in the general administration of affairs, but derived their whole income, or subsistence, and social position from the impartial interpretation of the laws. And then the whole people were commanded to assemble in a certain place every seven years, to be instructed by the high priest in the laws of their country, every man being ordered in addition to read and re-read with his utmost attention the Book of the Law. (Deut. xxxi. 9, and vi. 7.) The chiefs therefore for their own sakes, and if they wished to be honoured of the people, were bound to be careful that everything was done according to the prescribed forms familiarly known to all; for by this alone could they hope to be reverenced as vicegerents of God, and ministers of his supreme authority.

By opposite conduct they could not escape the hatred of the people, which is usually theological, i.e. unmitigated, in its character. To this end, to restrain within proper bounds the unbridled lusts of their chiefs, there was this important circumstance in addition, viz. that the militia was composed of the people at large, no one from the age of twenty to sixty being exempt from service, and the chiefs were not authorized to have in the ranks any foreign mercenaries. This, I say, was of the greatest moment, for it is certain that princes can only play the tyrant and oppress the people by means of a soldiery kept in pay by themselves, and they dread nothing more than the freedom of the citizen soldier, by whose bravery and endurance, and willing expenditure of his blood, the liberty and glory of the state have been achieved. On this account it was that Alexander, about to engage in the second war against Darius, laid to heart the counsel of Parmenio received through Polyspercon, and began to mingle foreign elements largely with his native army. Quintus Curtius informs us (lib. iv. 3, 13) that Alexander, having shortly before had occasion to censure Parmenio sharply, could not venture to reprimand him again, nor to trench on the liberties of the Macedonians, which he greatly disliked, until after he had raised the numbers of his mercenaries by means of prisoners drafted into his service much beyond the strength of his Macedonian troops. Then only did he venture to show the haughtiness of his disposition, hitherto repressed and kept within bounds by the privileges of the better class of Macedonian citizen soldiers. If, therefore, we see the freedom of the citizen controlling chiefs and princes who are wont to arrogate to themselves the whole credit of victories won in states where the human element alone is considered, how much more must it have availed in the Hebrew state, where the soldiers fought not for the honour of their chief but for the glory of the Lord, and only engaged in battle when the favourable answer of Jehovah had been received!

We are further to consider that as the chiefs of the Jewish tribes were bound together by the tie of religion alone, any one who showed signs of backsliding, or who actually fell away from his faith, was held an enemy by all the rest, and lawfully coerced and put down.

Still further, there was the fear of a new prophet springing up; for any one of pure life, showing by certain accredited signs that he was possessed of the gift of prophecy, by this alone proclaimed his title to the highest command; in the same way precisely as Moses had been chosen chief, the supremacy accruing in the name of God revealed to him immediately, not as with the chiefs of tribes by the medium of the nigh priest, who consulted and proclaimed the will of Jehovah. And there can be no question of the ease with which a prophet could carry the people with him when they were oppressed, and by trifling signs persuade them to whatsoever he chose; as, on the other hand, if the administration were properly conducted, the chiefs could always arrange matters so that the prophet remained answerable to them, and at their mercy. For they had the power of inquiring whether he were of blameless life and conversation or not, whether the signs he showed were certain and sufficient, and, finally, whether what he proclaimed in the name of God harmonized with the accredited doctrine and known laws of the nation; and in case the signs were not sufficient, or the doctrine propounded were new, the chiefs had the power to condemn the false or reputed false prophet to death. On the other hand, the prophet approved by the chiefs was received on their authority and testimony alone.

4. It is to be observed, 4thly, that the chief did not stand higher in respect of rank than the rest of the nobility, but that the administration of affairs was intrusted to him solely by reason of his age and his virtuous life.

5. Lastly, it is to be noted that the chiefs, and the militia generally, could not be held as more disposed to war than inclined to peace; for the militia, as has been said, was entirely composed of the citizens or people; and the affairs both of peace and war were administered by the same men: he who in camp was a soldier, in the city was a burgher; the leader in the field was judge in the hall of justice; the commander-in-chief of the host was chief in the state. No one therefore could wish for war for the sake of war, but rather for the sake of peace, and the maintenance of the common liberties; and the chief was especially careful to avoid the proposition of all novelties, in order not to place himself in opposition to the high priest, or make his own dignity as civil ruler clash with the dignity that belonged to the chief of the national religion. So much for the means and motives that tended to keep the chiefs within the bounds of their authority.

Let us now proceed to inquire into the means whereby the people were kept obedient. And here we have not far to search, for the fundamental principles of the Hebrew commonwealth proclaim them clearly, the most superficial study sufficing to show that these were all calculated to engender such a love of their country in the minds of the citizens that everything the most difficult seems easy in contrast with the idea of hoping to excite treasonable feelings among such a people. For after they had transferred their rights to Jehovah, and satisfied themselves that their empire was the empire of the Lord God, that they themselves were the sons of God, and all other nations his enemies, on which account they cherished the most inveterate hatred against them, — and that this feeling was held laudable and pious may be seen in Psalm cxxxix. 21, 22,^[2] especially, — the Jews, as a people, could have a greater abhorrence of nothing than to swear fealty to the foreigner; neither could they conceive any wickedness so great, nor any act so worthy of execration, as betrayal of their country, in other words, of the kingdom of the God they adored. The Jews even held it sinful to dwell beyond the boundaries of their country, conceiving that the worship of God could be performed nowhere but in their native land; the soil they trod at home was alone holy, the rest of the earth was impure and accursed. Wherefore, David thus complains when brought before Saul, because he had been forced to dwell for a time in exile: "If those that moved thee against me be men, let them be accursed, for they have hindered me from walking in the heritage of God, but said to me, Begone, and worship other gods." And this was the reason — and it is worthy of especial notice — why no Hebrew citizen was ever condemned to exile; he who had committed a crime deserved punishment indeed, but he was not to be made an outcast and infamous. The love of the ancient Hebrew for his country, therefore, was not simple love; it was piety, it was religion, which, as well as contempt and hatred of other nations, was cherished by the daily religious service, and so fostered that it became a second nature. For the daily worship of the Jews was not merely different from, but was opposed to, that of every other people, whereby they became altogether singular and distinct from other nations. From the daily denunciations of the heathen, a persistent hatred of them was necessarily engendered; and nothing takes firmer hold of the mind than a feeling of this kind; for it is a hate sprung of the highest devotion, believed to be peculiarly pious and entirely acceptable to God; and then there was not wanting that most common cause of aggravated dislike, namely, a hearty reciprocation of the uneasy feeling of hatred; for nations bated and contemned always return the compliment paid them with interest.

Now the vast influence which such conditions as these, — freedom of civil government, love of the people for their common country, absolute dominion asserted over subjugated tribes or nations, hatred of these not only allowed, but enjoined and held praiseworthy, the habit of accounting every foreign people enemies as matter of course, singularity of rites and customs, &c. — the vast influence, I say, which these various particulars exerted, in producing that wonderful constancy which distinguished the ancient Hebrew in enduring and in daring when the interests of his country were at stake, is demonstrated both by reason and experience. Never, whilst Jerusalem stood the holy city of the children of Israel, would they quietly endure the rule of the stranger, so that Jerusalem came to be designated the rebellious city (vide Ezra iv. 12-15). The Jews of the second empire, indeed, which was but a shadow of the first, when the high priests had usurped the seats of the leaders, were not subdued by the Romans without the greatest difficulty, a fact which Tacitus attests when he says, — "Vespasian had brought the Jewish war to an end, with the exception of the siege of Jerusalem, which was found a work of great and long-continued difficulty, by reason rather of the stubbornness of the people and the strength of their superstition than any abundance of provisions and other necessaries which they possessed as means of holding out." (Histor. lib. ii.)

But besides these things, the worth of which is matter of opinion only, there was something else in the Hebrew state altogether peculiar, and of the most enduring character, by which the people must have felt themselves withheld in the most powerful manner from all thought of revolt or secession, namely, the consideration of advantage, or interest, which is the pith and marrow, the life and soul of all human action; and this, I opine, had a very prominent place in the constitution of the Jewish commonwealth. Nowhere else in the ancient world did the citizens hold their possessions by so secure a tenure as in Jewry, where the meanest subject possessed a portion of land of the same extent as the greatest chief, and each was proprietor in perpetuity of his portion; for were any one compelled by poverty to sell his inheritance, on the return of the year of jubilee he must needs be put again in possession, restitution must be made; the law, in short, was definite that no man could be forced to alienate his land. And then, poverty could have been more tolerable nowhere than in the ancient Hebrew state, where neighbourly charity was practised without stint, as an act of piety towards God their king, and as a means of rendering him propitious. The Hebrew citizen, therefore, within the limits of the state could scarcely find himself otherwise than well and comfortable, although abroad he was open to the most unworthy usage, and to every insult and indignity. The feeling, indeed, that he had no equal abroad, that he had God alone for a master at home, that charity towards and love of his fellow-citizen was true piety, contributed not a little to the general hatred entertained by other nations for the Jew; and the reciprocation of this on his part, whilst it proved a powerful motive for keeping him in his own country, was another reason for-shunning all causes of contention and avoiding civil war. In addition to this there was the discipline of perfect obedience in which the Jew was educated. All his actions to the minutest tittle were regulated by the prescriptions of the law; he was not at liberty to plough as he pleased; he could only do so at certain seasons, in certain years even, and with the same sort of cattle in the yoke; neither could he sow or reap, save at times and seasons foreordained, — in short, the life of the ancient Hebrew was a ceaseless round of obedience and observance, to which habit must have given the air of freedom rather than of constraint; whence also it followed that no one craved things forbidden, but only those that were commanded; and, to conclude, at certain seasons of the year the Jew was held bound to give himself up to ease and enjoyment, and this not to satisfy his own inclination, but to show hearty obedience to the commands of Jehovah. Three times in the course of every year the Jew was the guest of Jehovah (Deut. xvi.); the seventh day of every week was a day of rest on which he did no kind of work; and besides this sabbath, other times were indicated, on which merriment and conviviality were not merely permitted, but positively enjoined; nor do I imagine that anything could have been devised more calculated to incline men's minds to general obedience than this especial ordinance; for nothing takes such strong hold of the mind as the joy and gladness that spring from devotion, that is, from love and admiration joined. Nor was the Jew liable to be wearied and disgusted by repetition and familiarity, for the days of festival only recurred occasionally, and the services appropriate to each were different. To these various considerations must be added that extreme reverence for the Temple which distinguished the Jew, engendered by the peculiarities of his religious rites, as well as by the ceremonies he was bound to observe, and which were always most religiously observed before venturing to present himself within the sacred precincts; even at the present day it is never without the greatest horror that the Jew reads of the wickedness of Manasseh, who dared to set up an idol in the temple of the Lord. Nor was the popular reverence for the volume of the law preserved within the innermost sanctuary any less. In such a state of things, popular discontent and distaste were never to be feared; for no one dared to form or express any opinion of his own on divine matters; all alike were held bound to give unreasoning assent and obedience to whatever was commanded by divine authority, as received in responses within the temple, or as written and contained in the laws established by God. Thus, briefly, but I trust satisfactorily, have I explained the grand features of the Jewish Polity.

I have still to inquire into the causes whence it came that the Jews so often departed from their law, why they were so frequently subdued, and how their empire was at last totally overthrown. Some one will probably say here, that it was because of the obstinacy and stiffneckedness of the people. But this is puerile, for why were the Jews more stubborn than other nations? Was it from their nature? Nature, however, does not create a nation, but only individuals, who are only associated into nations by specialities of language, of laws, and of manners; and diversities in laws and manners can only arise because each nation has a genius of its own, is peculiarly circumstanced, and entertains certain singular prejudices. If, therefore, it were necessary to concede that the Jews had proved themselves more rebellious than the rest of mankind, this must be imputed to some vice in their laws, or in their manners and customs. Now this is true, in fact; and had God willed that the Hebrew nation should have lasted longer as a power upon earth, he would have established their rights and laws on another basis, and instituted a different rule of administration. What, indeed, can we say but that the Jews began to excite the anger of their God against them, not, as Jeremiah says (xxxii. 31), from the time when the foundations of Jerusalem were laid, but from the first promulgation of the laws which governed them. To this Ezekiel bears witness when he says (xx. 25), "Wherefore, I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live, and I polluted them in their own gifts, in that they caused to pass through the fire all that openeth the womb, that I might make them desolate, to the end that they might know that I am Jehovah." To understand these words, and the cause of the subversion of the Jewish dominion, aright, it is to be observed that the intention at first was to make over the whole of the sacred offices to the firstborn of all the tribes, and not to the Levites in peculiar (Numb, viii. 17); but, subsequently, when all but the Levites had bowed down and worshipped the golden calf, the first-born at large were rejected as defiled, and the Levites chosen in their stead (Deut. x. 8), a change on which the more I reflect the more disposed I am to break out in the words of Tacitus, and to say that at this time God's purpose was not to protect but to punish the children of Israel. Nor can I sufficiently express my amazement that such rage should have been found in the divine mind; or that laws, which always imply a purpose to secure the honour, safety, and general well-being of a nation, should have been delivered by Jehovah with an intension to revenge himself upon the Jewish people, whereby law ceases to be law, i.e. a means to the safety of the state and the individuals composing it, but rather appears as a snare, as a code of pains and penalties for sins induced. For all the gifts which the people were required to bestow on the priests and Levites in order that the first-born might be redeemed, a money price being set on every head rescued from the fire,^[3] and, finally, the exclusive institution of the Levites to the priesthood, were so many memorials of the persistent defilement and rejection of the people at large. The Levites, too, must always have found something to find fault with among the mass of the nation. Among so many thousands there were doubtless occasional heretical theologians discovered, men with peculiar views [always objects of suspicion to a priesthood], and, on the other hand, the people must have been not indisposed to watch narrowly the lives and conversation of the Levites, who after all were mere men, and, as always happens, to impute the failings or improper conduct of one among them to the whole body; whence continual discontent and complainings. Moreover, there was the hardship of maintaining a set of men, unseen and in idleness, and not related to the rest of the nation by blood, especially in times when grain was dear. What wonder, then, if in seasons of leisure, when miracles had ceased, and there were no men of mark and likelihood as leaders, that the popular mind, fretful and grudging as it mostly is, began to feel weary of a worship, divine indeed in itself, but to them become an object of suspicion through its ministers, and their own nothingness in its offices, — what wonder, I say, if the people desired some change in their religious system, and that their leaders, always intent on keeping the supreme command in their own hands, gave way to the people in this, in order to secure them to themselves and detach them from the priesthood, yielded a ready ear to their complaints, and favoured the introduction of new forms of religious worship? Had the state been constituted in conformity with what was the original intention, all the tribes would have been confirmed in equal rights and honours for ever, and everything would have gone on smoothly and securely. For who would have felt inclined to question the sacred rights of his blood relations? who have been found indisposed to contribute to the support of his near kindred, his parents, his brothers? who to dispute their interpretation of the law, or to look for other than true responses through them from the oracle of God? The several tribes would certainly have felt themselves much more closely united, had all been held alike in every respect, had all especially had equal rights in the administration of the religious system of the nation. There would even have been nothing to fear had the election of the Levites to the sacred function had any other ground than anger and revenge. But, as we have seen, the Jews had aroused the anger of their God, who, to repeat the words of Ezekiel, polluted them in their own gifts, causing them to pass their firstborn through the fire to make them desolate.^[4] These surmises are amply confirmed by the facts of Jewish history: as soon as the people began to have a little leisure in the wilderness, many, and these not men of the common order, were found to complain of the preference shown the Levites, and from this to hint that Moses did not deliver his decrees from the divine dictation, but of his own arbitrary fancy: had he not preferred his own tribe to all the others, and given the office of high priest as an eternal inheritance to his brother? Wherefore the people approached Moses tumultuously, insisting that all were alike holy, and that he himself was raised against right over the heads of all. Nor could Moses appease the multitude on this occasion by any ordinary means; he was forced to have recourse to a miracle in sign of his own trustworthiness, whereby all the discontented were exterminated. But this only led to a new rebellion of the whole people, who believed that they had been destroyed by no judgment of Jehovah, but by the device of Moses. Nor was the tumult allayed till a terrible pestilence had so broken the spirit of the nation that they who survived would rather they had died than been spared. It might be said, therefore, that the rebellion ceased, rather than that concord was restored, as Scripture itself testifies, for Jehovah, whilst he predicts to Moses that after his death the people would fall away from the worship of the true God, proceeds to say, "For I know their imagination which they go about even now, before I have brought them into the land which I sware." And immediately afterwards Moses himself says to the people, "For I know thy rebellion and thy stiff neck; behold, while I am yet alive with you this day ye have been rebellious against the Lord, and how much more after my death" (Deut. xxxi. 21, 27). And all this, indeed, happened, as is well known. Whence proceeded great changes, great licence in all things, luxury and idleness, whereby everything began to go from bad to worse, until after the nation had been several times subdued and enslaved, they entirely broke with the divine institution, and clamoured for an earthly king, desiring a royal palace, not the temple, as the seat of their government, and that the several tribes should continue to be fellow-citizens or subjects in their respect for the sovereign, not for the divine law and high priest of Jehovah. But out of this were engendered abundant materials for new seditions, from whence ensued at length the collapse and fall of the Hebrew dominion. For what can sovereigns bear less than a precarious tenure of authority, and an imperium in imperio? They who from a private station were first chosen to fill the throne might be content with the degree of dignity and power to which they had been raised; but when their sons had attained to the same eminence by right of succession, everything must have begun to change. The whole mind of the prince was then given to centring all power in himself, which for the most part he had not, so long as the right of legislation lay, not with the civil ruler, but with the high priest, who was at once the guardian of the law deposited in the ark of the temple, and its interpreter to the people. The first kings among the Jews were bound by the laws like subjects, not raised above them; neither could they legally abrogate old, nor institute new, laws having equal authority with the old. Again, as the law of the Levites forbade kings equally with subjects, as unclean and profane, to meddle with sacred things, and further, as the whole security of the kingly power virtually depended on the pleasure of another, viz. the high priest, who was regarded as a prophet, it is obvious that there was a power in the state greater than that of the king, who therefore, and necessarily, reigned precariously. Of this we have evidence on several occasions. With what freedom, for instance, does Samuel the priest address and order Saul the king, and how readily for a single transgression does he transfer the kingdom from Saul to David! It was to get the better of this state of things that the kings consented to rear temples to other gods, where there should no longer be Levite priests to be propitiated and consulted, and then they sought out those who prophesied in the name of God, that they might have prophets of their own to oppose to the true prophets of Jehovah. With all their striving, however, they never completely attained their wishes. For the prophets of Jehovah, prepared for all contingencies, were ever on the look-out for favourable times; they had still their eye on the successor in power, whose authority is always precarious whilst the memory of the former king endures. They could easily then, on their sacred authority, induce an inconsiderate or a piously-disposed and virtuous king to vindicate the divine right to the chief authority, or at all events to a share of it. But the prophets could never effect much in this way, for although they might get rid of a tyrant from among them, there were still causes at work why they only obtained a new one at the cost, perchance, of the life of many of the people. Whence came no end of discord and dissension and civil war, whilst the causes why violence was done to the right divine always remained the same, and indeed could not be removed, save with the total destruction of the empire.

We have now seen how religion came to be introduced into the Hebrew commonwealth, and in what way this empire might have been eternal if the rightful anger of the lawgiver had suffered it to continue. But as this was not permitted, the Jewish empire necessarily came to an end at last. And here I speak of the first empire only; for the second was scarcely a shadow of the first, the state being then governed by the laws of the Persians, whose subjects the Jews had now become; and when they had regained their liberty the priests usurped the right of election to the sovereign authority, and so ruled absolutely; whence the great anxiety shown by the priesthood at once to rule and exercise the pontificate. But it is not important to say more of the second or restored Jewish empire. Whether the first, as we conceive it capable of indefinite duration, were worthy of imitation, or whether it were pious to attempt as far as possible to imitate it, will appear in the following chapter. For the present I would only beg attention to the conclusion which I derive from all that has just been said, viz. that divine right, or right founded on religion, is based on the covenant made between Jehovah and the children of Israel, without which there had been nothing but natural right; consequently that the Jews were religiously bound to one another only, and that the dispensation under which they lived has no bearing upon other nations who were not parties to the agreement.

Notes

1. In this passage two men are said to have begun prophesying in the camp, whom Joshua proposed to arrest. Now he would not have done so had every Hebrew possessed the right of communicating the commands of God to the people without the permission of Moses. Moses, however, saw fit to leave these men unmolested, and he even spoke reproachfully to Joshua for having advised him to use his sovereign authority at a time when this authority had become such a burthen to him that he would rather have died than gone on to exercise it alone. "Enviest thou for my sake?" says Moses to Joshua. "Would God that all the Lord's people were prophets, and the Lord would put his spirit upon them." That is to say: would to heaven that the right to consult God, and, insomuch, the authority of government, was relegated to the hands of the people! Joshua, therefore, made no mistake in regard to the rights of Moses, but in regard to the occasion or season for the exercise of these rights, and this was the reason why Moses spoke reproachfully to him; precisely as at a later period David did to Abishai, when recommended by him to put Shimei to death, though guilty of treason (vide 2 Samuel xix. 22, 23).
2. "Do I not hate them, O Lord, that hate thee? … I hate them with a perfect hatred: I count them mine enemies." — Ed.
3. There can be no question of the redemption clauses in the thirteenth chapter of Exodus being interpolations. In verse 12, Jehovah's claim to every male that opened the matrix among men, and the firstlings of beasts, is absolute; in verse 13 there is question of redemption. In verse 15 the reasons for this requisition of Jehovah are given, and they plainly admit of no exception, so that the last clause of this verse must also have been interpolated. Any redemption is obviously inconsistent with the text of Ezekiel quoted above. See further, Numb. iii. 13. — Ed.
4. Is it possible that such words could ever have proceeded from the Supreme, supposing him for a moment invested with personality, and making use of human speech? Has this text been duly considered by those who maintain that the Hebrew Scriptures are the very word of God? — Ed.