Threats to U.S. Networks/Section 5C

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Threats to U.S. Networks: Oversight of Chinese Government-Owned Carriers
by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
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​C. China Unicom and China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited

China United Network Communications Group Company Limited ("China Unicom") is considered the seventh largest mobile operator in the world based on number of subscribers.[1] According to its most recent 20-F filing with the SEC, China Unicom served approximately 318 million mobile subscribers worldwide as of December 31, 2019 and a reported revenue of nearly $42 billion.[2]

China Unicom's origins date back to 1994, when its predecessor company was founded by the Chinese government to compete with China Mobile, China's incumbent wireless provider.[3] In 2008, among other restructuring efforts, China. Unicom's predecessor company merged with China Network Communications ​Group Corporation ("China Netcom").[4] China Unicom was the resulting company.[5]

China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited ("CUA") is China Unicom's American subsidiary and largest international affiliate.[6] CUA has operated in the United States since 2002, when it was granted its international Section 214 authorization.[7] Team Telecom, however, has never required CUA to enter into a security agreement, meaning it has not engaged CUA since its establishment.[8] Yet, CUA shares many characteristics with CTA and China Mobile USA, including government ownership, relationship to its parent entity, similar services and infrastructure across the United States, and partnerships with major U.S. carriers.[9]

1. The FCC Approved CUA's Section 214 Application in Two Weeks after Team Telecom Raised No Concerns

CUA applied for Section 214 authorization in July 2002 to provide facilities-based and resale services between the United States and all permissible international points, including China.[10] In mid-August 2002, consistent with its standard practice, the FCC asked Team Telecom to review the application for any ​national security or law enforcement risks.[11] The FCC's referral noted that CUA's ultimate parent company was a state-owned enterprise.[12] The FCC asked that Team Telecom relay any concerns by September 3, 2002 "because [the FCC was] prepared to take action on the [ ] application[ ]."[13]

Neither the FCC nor Team Telecom had any record of Team Telecom raising concerns about the application. On September 13, 2002, the FCC issued a public notice formally accepting CUA's application for filing.[14] Because Team Telecom raised no concerns about the application, the FCC granted the application two weeks later.[15]

2. Team Telecom Has Never Engaged in Post-Authorization Oversight of CUA

Team Telecom never entered into a security agreement with CUA, despite CUA having filed pro forma notices with the FCC giving Team Telecom the opportunity to request such an agreement. For example, CUA filed notices in 2008 and 2009 regarding organizational changes associated with the Chinese government's restructuring of the Chinese telecom industry, China Unicom's merger with China Netcom, and changes to the company name.[16] More recently, in ​2017, CUA filed a pro forma notice of transfer of control, when China Unicom Global Limited became the direct owner of CUA following a restructuring of the parent companies.[17] When questioned by Subcommittee staff, Team Telecom officials stated they were not aware of the 2017 filing and could not explain why it did not prompt a security review by Team Telecom.[18] One Team Telecom official noted that the U.S. government's understanding of the risks posed by Chinese state-owned entities evolved over time and that Team Telecom believed the appropriate sequencing was to complete review of China Mobile USA's application before assessing Chinese state-owned carriers with existing authorizations.[19]

Because no security agreement exists between Team Telecom and CUA, Team Telecom is not "directly in privity"[20] with the company and has no insight into its operations.[21] CUA representatives confirmed that it has not engaged with Team Telecom in the nearly 20 years since obtaining Section 214 authorization.[22] Team Telecom officials acknowledged that, without a security agreement, they have no ability to engage CUA.[23] One official suggested that Team Telecom could ​proactively reach out to CUA and ask questions, but CUA might be unwilling to comply.[24] CUA representatives informed the Subcommittee that the company would engage in discussions with Team Telecom if approached.[25] It has also recently publicly expressed that it "would be willing to engage in discussions with the [FCC] and the other relevant U.S. government agencies regarding . . . an agreement that would be acceptable to resolve any national security concerns."[26]

3. CUA Shares Characteristics Highlighted by Team Telecom about China Mobile USA and CTA

CUA has been providing international telecommunications services pursuant to Section 214 authorizations granted nearly 20 years ago with no oversight by Team Telecom.[27] Nevertheless, CUA and its operations share some similar characteristics with China Mobile USA and CTA.[28] CUA is ultimately majority-owned by the Chinese government, it provides a range of telecommunications services in the United States and can expand those services without further FCC approval, and it has established relationships with major U.S. carriers.

CUA is ultimately majority owned by the Chinese government. China Unicom is a state-owned entity that is ultimately owned by SASAC.[29] SASAC currently owns approximately 98 percent of China Unicom.[30] Over time, China Unicom has added additional ownership layers, including holding companies jointly owned by ​public shareholders.[31] CUA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of China Unicom Global Limited, which is wholly-owned by China Unicom (Hong Kong) Limited.[32] Through multiple intervening holding companies, China Unicom owns approximately 52.1 percent of China Unicom Hong Kong.[33] Thus, China Unicom and the Chinese government-through intermediary companies-own CUA. The diagram below depicts the relevant ownership structure:

[34]

CUA's parent company influences CUA's operations and has access to U.S. customer records. China Unicom Global ("CUG"), which is based in Hong Kong, plays an important role in CUA's operations. It appoints CUA's management team, sets CUA's budget, and provides support for technical solutions, among other ​items.[35] CUA also consults with its parent company before establishing any point of presence in the United States.[36]

CUG also manages CUA's U.S. customer records. According to a CUA representative, customer records are stored on servers in Hong Kong and maintained by CUG.[37] CUA and CUG have signed a confidentiality agreement that governs access to the records and also establishes procedures to protect customer proprietary network information.[38] Access to U.S. records is governed by this agreement, which includes requiring those seeking access to have a business justification; however, CUA representatives suggested that CUG decides what constitutes a sufficient justification.[39] When questioned about this arrangement, CUA representatives explained that it is necessary for CUG to have access to all customer records given the nature of the international services provided by CUG's subsidiaries.[40] The representatives described this treatment as "common among international carriers."[41] They also indicated that, for enterprise customers, the information shared between affiliates is that which is necessary for provisioning and customer service.[42] For mobile virtual network operator ("MVNO") services, CUA chooses to use a service platform in Hong Kong because "the subscriber base does not warrant a standalone U.S. platform."[43]

CUA also informed the Subcommittee that its parent company monitors CUA's network operations to ensure that the global network is performing consistently.[44] CUA also leverages CUG's network operations center, located in Hong Kong, for technical support.[45] CUA engineers manage CUA's U.S.-based network equipment; however, representatives confirmed that CUG can remotely configure CUA's network equipment.[46]

​CUA provides a range of communications services in the United States with its Section 214 authorizations. Like CTA, CUA is an international common carrier authorized to provide facilities-based and resale-based services.[47] Under its Section 214 authorizations, CUA may provide "international basic switched, private line, data, television and business services" directly through its own facilities or by reselling the services of any other authorized common carrier.[48] CUA informed the Subcommittee that it primarily resells the services of U.S. carriers, given that it does not own transmission infrastructure within the United States.[49]

CUA offers "reliable end-to-end global integrated telecommunication services and solutions" and "provides personal customers with premium voice and mobility services."[50] CUA advertises that it provides a range of services, including global connectivity services, global internet access, cloud, video conferencing, and content and security services.[51] As highlighted by Team Telecom in connection with CTA, some of these services are regulated by Section 214 and others are not.[52] For example, CUA operates as a MVNO, reselling mobile services of major U.S. providers to retail customers.[53] CUA's retail customers are primarily Chinese speaking individuals visiting or living in the United States.[54] CUA offers a "one-card-multiple-number" service that provides customers in the United States with a Chinese telephone number so that individuals in China can call the Chinese number to reach the U.S. customer without paying international toll charges.[55] U.S. customers in the United States can also use the service to call China using a local number.[56]

​CUA also provides a range of business data services, including international private lines and lease circuits.[57] According to CUG's website, private lines provide customers "end to end dedicated and permanent digital point to point connectivity between two regions."[58] CUA also provides end-to-end connectivity through international Ethernet connections and multi-protocol label switching ("MPLS") VPN.[59] MPLS VPN is either "built on the IP carrier network" or uses a "series of virtual switches leased to" customers to allow them to securely transmit data, such as internal data, voices, images and videos, between different locations.[60]

CUA's primary business line is broadband internet services for customers in both the United States and China.[61] CUG "ha[s] direct connection[s] to major [internet service providers] in many countries makes [sic] Internet access faster and minimizes distance delays."[62] CUA informed the Subcommittee that it peers with 26 IP partners for the exchange of internet traffic.[63] CUA also provides data center, and cloud computing services,[64] for which Section 214 authorization is not needed.[65]

To provide these services, CUA has established 11 points of presence—five on the East coast, five on the West coast, and one in the Midwest.[66] The points of presence consist of CUA-owned routers installed in colocation facilities leased from third-parties.[67] China Unicom also advertises that it operates points of presence across the world, specifically mentioning the locations in Los Angeles, New York, and San Jose, which "provide . . . for customer and partner network interconnections."[68] In fact, China Unicom promotes its international MPLS VPN ​service, noting that through its "international network and comprehensive worldwide partnerships, [its] global MPLS VPN service allows customers to gain access to extensive international network infrastructure, in-country facilities and committed services [,] and support resources."[69]

CUA has built relationships with major U.S. carriers. CUA does not own transmission networks in the United States.[70] It leases transmission circuits from major U.S. carriers for data capacity between CUA's points of presence, as well as between those points of presence and CUA's end customers.[71] Through these connections, CUA ensures that its U.S.-based customers can connect between the United States and China, or other international points.[72] CUA informed the Subcommittee that its U.S. carrier partners operate the same way to reach U.S. customers in China. For example, a U.S. carrier with customers in mainland China would lease network capacity in China from China Unicom to connect to the U.S. carrier's end-customer.[73]

CUA has established relationships with AT&T, Verizon, and Century Link, among other U.S. carriers.[74] These relationships include the provision of network or other retail services.[75] Verizon maintains an interconnection agreement and peering arrangement with CUA, as well as separate agreements with its Chinese parent companies.[76] AT&T sells voice and data transport services, which CUA uses to provide services to its customers in the United States.[77] Although it did not specify the particular services sold to CUA, Century Link informed the Subcommittee that it has limited commercial relationships with all of the Chinese carriers, which include selling network services, circuits, or collocation services.[78] ​These services allow CUA to deliver traffic from a CUA point of presence through. CenturyLink's network to a CUA customer located in the United States.[79]

Neither Verizon, AT&T, nor CenturyLink maintains any mitigation or other agreement focused on network security with CUA.[80] As noted above, however, the U.S. carriers employ security measures that apply regardless of whether an interconnection agreement exists.[81]

*****

On April 24, 2020, the FCC issued an order requiring CUA to demonstrate why its Section 214 authorizations should not be revoked.[82] CUA responded to the order on June 1, 2020.[83]CUA argued that it has complied with FCC regulations and provided quality services to its customers for over two decades.[84] Further, CUA stressed that it is subject to U.S. corporate laws and has "demonstrated willingness to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement agencies when asked."[85] CUA also argued that the federal government has not highlighted any CUA activity that might endanger national security, aside from partial and indirect ownership by the Chinese government.[86] The latter, according to CUA, is not a sufficient basis for revocation.[87] Finally, CUA detailed why it is not subject to exploitation, influence, or control by the Chinese government.[88] The FCC is evaluating the information CUA submitted and considering whether to revoke its authorizations.

Similarly, in anticipation of this report being released, CUA submitted a letter to the Subcommittee seeking to distinguish CUA from "other, similar companies in the market in terms of shareholding structure, corporate governance, ​and other areas."[89] In the letter, CUA reiterated many of the points made in its response to the FCC's show cause order. This includes that CUA has complied with U.S. laws, has never been accused of criminal conduct or violation of FCC regulations, and is not subject to the exploitation, influence, or control of the Chinese government.[90] The letter also details CUG's and China Unicom Hong Kong's independence and describes recent actions taken by CUA to strengthen its corporate governance and compliance program.[91]

  1. ↑ The ranking is based on number of subscribers as of January 2019. See Abayomi Jegede, Top 10 Largest Mobile Networks in the World by Subscribers, The Daily Records (Jan. 1, 2019), http://www.thedailyrecords.com/2018-2019-2020-2021/world-famous-top-10-list/highest-selling-brands-products-companies-reviews/best-largest-mobile-networks-world-by-subscribers-telecom-companies-revenue/12837/.
  2. ↑ China Unicom (Hong Kong) Ltd. Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(D) of the Sec. Exch. Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2019 (Form 20-F), Comm. File No. 1-15028, at 2, 27 (filed Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.chinaunicom.com.hk/en/ir/reports/2019_20f.pdf [hereinafter China Unicom FY2019 Form 20-F].
  3. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020).
  4. ↑ China Unicom FY2019 Form 20-F, supra note 434, at 21-22. The Chinese government established China Netcom in 1999 to serve as the incumbent wireline provider in Northern China. However, by 2008, the Chinese government determined that China Netcom was too small to enjoy a competitive advantage and merged it with China Unicom. Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020).
  5. ↑ Company Profile, China Unicom Group, https://www.chinaunicomglobal.com/us/company. See also Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020).
  6. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020).
  7. ↑ CUA was initially established under the name China Unicom USA LLC. It converted from an LLC to a corporation in 2003. The company's name was officially changed to CUA following China Unicom's merger with China Netcom. See Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020); Letter from Squire Patton Boggs, counsel to CUA, to the Subcommittee (Apr. 29, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  8. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020); Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Apr. 3, 2020); Briefing with the Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 7, 2020); Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 1, 2019).
  9. ↑ In discussions with the Subcommittee, CUA stressed that it also differs significantly from China Mobile USA and CTA with respect to shareholding structure, corporate governance, and history of compliance with the U.S. government. It further noted that there are many government-owned telecommunications carriers operating in the United States with operations and infrastructure similar to CUA. See Email from Squire Patton Boggs, counsel to CUA, to the Subcommittee (June 3, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  10. ↑ See Int'l Bureau Selected Applications Listing, File No. ITC-214-20020724-00427, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, https://licensing.fcc.gov/cgi-bin/ws.exe/prod/ib/forms/reports/swr031b.hts?q_set=V_SITE_ANTENNA_FREQ.file_numberC/File+Number/%3D/ITC2142002072400427&prepare=&column=V_SITE_ANTENNA_FREQ.file_numberC/File+Number (listing a filing date of July 24, 2002). As noted above, at the time of the application, the company was named China Unicom USA LLC. See supra note 439.
  11. ↑ See FCC-PSI-000213-14.
  12. ↑ See id.
  13. ↑ See id.
  14. ↑ See Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Public Notice—International Applications Accepted for Filing, Rep. No. TEL-00575S, at 2 (Sept. 13, 2002).
  15. ↑ See Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Public Notice—International Authorizations Granted, Rep. No. TEL-00581, DA No. 02-2500, 17 FCC Red 19181, 19182 (Oct. 3, 2002) (listing the "date of action" authorizing the application as September 27, 2002—14 days after FCC's acceptance of filing public notice). China Netcom (USA) Operations Limited also applied for Section 214 authorization in 2002 to serve as a facilities based carrier. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Public Notice—International Applications Accepted for Filing, Rep. No. TEL-00568S, at 2 (Aug. 28, 2002). The FCC referred the application to Team Telecom, see FCC-PSI-000227-28, but Team Telecom never raised any concerns about the application. The FCC approved the application two weeks after accepting it for filing. See Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Public Notice—International Authorizations Granted, Rep. No. TEL-00576, DA 02-2234, 17 FCC Red 16825, 16826 (Sept. 12, 2002) (listing the "date of action" authorizing China Netcom's application as September 11, 2002—14 days after acceptance of filing). As part of a government-organized restructuring, effective January 1, 2009, China Netcom, China Netcom USA's parent company, was merged with and into China Unicom. As part of the merger, China Netcom USA was merged into CUA, effective August 31, 2009, and China Netcom USA's Section 214 authorization was assigned to CUA. See Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Public Notice—International Authorizations Granted, Rep. No. TEL-01391, DA 09-2218, 24 FCC Red 12611, 12613 (Oct. 15, 2009) ("Notification filed September 30, 2009 of the pro forma assignment of international section 214 authorization, ITC-214-20020728-00361, held by China Netcom (USA) Operations Limited ('China Netcom USA') to China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited, effective August 31, 2009."). As a result, CUA currently holds two international Section 214 authorizations.
  16. ↑ See, e.g., Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Public Notice—International Authorizations Granted, Rep. No. TEL-01331, DA 08-2650, 23 FCC Red 17386, 17387 (Dec. 4, 2008) (File No. ITC-T/C-20081114-00499 & ITC-T/C-20081114-00500 referencing a restructuring of ownership interests as a result of China Unicom's merger with China Netcom); Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Public Notice—International Authorizations Granted, Rep. No. TEL-01351, DA 09-677, 24 FCC Red 3644, 3647 (Mar. 26, 2009) (File No. ITC-T/C-20090204-00082 & ITC-T/C-20090204-00083 referencing restructuring involving China Netcom's merger with China Unicom); Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Public Notice—International Authorizations Granted, Rep. No. TEL-01391, DA 09-2218, 24 FCC Red 12611, 12613 (Oct. 15, 2009) (File No. ITC-ASG-20090930-00433 referencing assignment of China Netcom USA's authorization to CUA); Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Public Notice—International Authorizations Granted, Report No. TEL-01396, DA 09-2406, 24 FCC Red 13706, 13708 (Nov. 12, 2009) (File No. ITC-214-20020724-00427 referencing that "[b]y letter filed September 30, 2009, Applicant notified the Commission that it changed its name from China Unicom USA Corporation to China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited (China Unicom Americas), effective August 31, 2009"). Typically, the FCC does not request that Team Telecom review these pro forma notices. FCC Proposed Executive Branch Review Reform, supra note 154, at ¶ 47.
  17. ↑ See China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited, Notification of Pro Forma Transfer of Control of Section 214 Authority, File No. ITC-T/C-20170301-00025, Attach. 1 (filed Mar. 1, 2017), https://fcc.report/IBFS/ITC-T-C-20170301-00025 (unofficial website); Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Public Notice—International Authorizations Granted, Rep. No. TEL-01840, DA 17-297, 32 FCC Red 2087, 2094 (Mar. 30, 2017). The restructuring "did not change the ultimate ownership or control of [China Unicom Americas] as the [Chinese] government continues to maintain ownership and control over [China Unicom Americas] and will continue to do so." See China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited, Notification of Pro Forma Transfer of Control of Section 214 Authority, File No. ITC-T/C-20170301-00025, Attach. 1 (filed Mar. 1, 2017), https://fcc.report/IBFS/ITC-T-C-20170301-00025 (unofficial website).
  18. ↑ Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Apr. 3, 2020); Briefing with the Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 7, 2020). Officials noted that the FCC does not refer pro forma notices to Team Telecom, see Email from the Dep't of Homeland Sec. to the Subcommittee (June 4, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee); yet, it was a similar notice from CTA that led to its 2007 security agreement.
  19. ↑ Briefing with the Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 7, 2020); Email from the Dep't of Homeland Sec. to the Subcommittee (June 4, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  20. ↑ Briefing with the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 1, 2019).
  21. ↑ Id.; Briefing with the Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 7, 2020).
  22. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020).
  23. ↑ Briefing with the Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 7, 2020).
  24. ↑ Id.
  25. ↑ See Email from Squire Patton Boggs, counsel to CUA, to the Subcommittee (June 3, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  26. ↑ In the Matter of China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited, Response to Order to Show Cause, GN Docket No. 20-110, at 15 (June 1, 2020), http://licensing.fcc.gov/cgi-bin/ws.exe/prod/ib/forms/reports/related_filing.hts?f_key=-32708&f_number=ITC2142002072800361.
  27. ↑ CUA stressed to the Subcommittee that, as a U.S. company, it is subject to U.S. corporate laws, has a good record of compliance with its FCC regulatory obligations, and is willing to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement agencies when asked. See Email from Squire Patton Boggs, counsel to CUA, to the Subcommittee (June 3, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  28. ↑ As noted above, CUA explained to the Subcommittee that it also differs significantly from China Mobile USA and CTA with respect to shareholding structure, corporate governance, and history of compliance with the U.S. government. It further noted that there are many government-owned telecommunications carriers operating in the United States with operations and infrastructure similar to CUA. See Email from Squire Patton Boggs, counsel to CUA, to the Subcommittee (June 3, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  29. ↑ See China Unicom FY2019 Form 20-F, supra note 434, at 72 (indicating that the ultimate controlling shareholder is Unicom Group, which is controlled by SASAC); Company Profile, China Unicom, https://www.chinaunicom.com.hk/en/about/profile.php; Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020); China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited, Notification of Pro Forma Transfer of Control of Section 214 Authority, File No. ITC-T/C-20170301-00025, Attach. 1 (filed Mar. 1, 2017), https://fcc.report/IBFS/ITC-T-C-20170301-00025 (unofficial website).
  30. ↑ In the Matter of China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited, Response to Order to Show Cause, GN Docket No. 20-110, at 18 (June 1, 2020), http://licensing.fcc.gov/cgi-bin/ws.exe/prod/ib/forms/reports/related_filing.hts?f_key=-32708&f_number=ITC2142002072800361.
  31. ↑ Id. at 32. See also Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020).
  32. ↑ See generally China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited, Notification of Pro Forma Transfer of Control of Section 214 Authority, File No. ITC-T/C-20170301-00025, Attach. 1 (filed Mar. 1, 2017), https://fcc.report/IBFS/ITC-T-C-20170301-00025 (unofficial website).
  33. ↑ In the Matter of China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited, Response to Order to Show Cause, GN Docket No. 20-110, at 18 (June 1, 2020), http://licensing.fcc.gov/cgi-bin/ws.exe/prod/ib/forms/reports/related_filing.hts?f_key=-32708&f_number=ITC2142002072800361.
  34. ↑ The diagram is based on information from the following: China Unicom FY2019 Form 20-F, supra note 434; Company Profile, China Unicom, https://www.chinaunicom.com.hk/en/about/profile.php; Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020); In the Matter of China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited, Response to Order to Show Cause, GN Docket No. 20-110, at Exhibit 2 (June 1, 2020), http://licensing.fcc.gov/cgi-bin/ws.exe/prod/ib/forms/reports/related_filing.hts?f_key=-32708&f_number=ITC2142002072800361.
  35. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020). See also In the Matter of China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited, Response to Order to Show Cause, GN Docket No. 20-110, at 20 (June 1, 2020), http://licensing.fcc.gov/cgi-bin/ws.exe/prod/ib/forms/reports/related_filing.hts?f_key=-32708&f_number=ITC2142002072800361.
  36. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020).
  37. ↑ Id.
  38. ↑ Id. See also Email from Squire Patton Boggs, counsel to CUA, to the Subcommittee (June 3, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  39. ↑ Email from Squire Patton Boggs, counsel to CUA, to the Subcommittee (June 3, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee); Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020).
  40. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020).
  41. ↑ Id.
  42. ↑ Email from Squire Patton Boggs, counsel to CUA, to the Subcommittee (June 3, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  43. ↑ Id.
  44. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020).
  45. ↑ Id.
  46. ↑ Letter from Squire Patton Boggs, counsel to CUA, to the Subcommittee (Apr. 29, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  47. ↑ See Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Public Notice—International Authorizations Granted, Rep. No. TEL-00581, DA 02-2500, 17 FCC Red 19181, 19182 (Oct. 3, 2002). See also Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Public Notice—International Authorizations Granted, Rep. No. TEL-00576, DA 02-2234, 17 FCC Red 16825, 16826 (Sept. 12, 2002) (China Netcom USA's 2002 authorization). China Netcom USA's authorization was subsequently assigned to CUA. See Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Public Notice—International Authorizations Granted, Rep. No. TEL-01391, DA 09-2218, 24 FCC Red 12611, 12613 (Oct. 15, 2009).
  48. ↑ 47 C.F.R. § 63.22(d) (facilities-based international common carrier); 47 C.F.R. § 63.23(c) (resale-based international common carrier).
  49. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020).
  50. ↑ About—China Unicom Americas, LinkedIn, https://www.linkedin.com/company/china-unicom-americas.
  51. ↑ Id.
  52. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020); Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 7-9 (Apr. 9, 2020).
  53. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020).
  54. ↑ Id.
  55. ↑ Id.; Email from Squire Patton Boggs, counsel to CUA, to the Subcommittee (June 3, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  56. ↑ Email from Squire Patton Boggs, counsel to CUA, to the Subcommittee (June 3, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  57. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020). See also Customer Solutions, China Unicom Global, at 15, https://www.chinaunicomglobal.com/group1/M00/00/08/CngaWFoofQOAfarRAPYieoOnUf8345.pdf.
  58. ↑ See Customer Solutions, China Unicom Global, at 15, https://www.chinaunicomglobal.com/group1/M00/00/08/CngaWF00fQOAfarRAPYieoOnUf8345.pdf.
  59. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020). In its recommendation to revoke CTA's authorizations, Team Telecom described MPLS VPN services as falling into a "regulatory gray area." Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 7-9 (Apr. 9, 2020).
  60. ↑ See MPLS VPN, China Unicom Global, https://www.chinaunicomglobal.com/hk/mplsvpn.
  61. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020).
  62. ↑ See Customer Solutions, China Unicom Global, at 25, https://www.chinaunicomglobal.com/group1/M00/00/08/CngaWF00fQOAfarRAPYieoOnUf8345.pdf.
  63. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020); Email from Squire Patton Boggs, counsel to CUA, to the Subcommittee (June 3, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  64. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020). CUA resells the services of a data center provider. It does not own, control, or manage the data center itself. Id.
  65. ↑ Executive Branch Recommendation re CTA, supra note 56, at 10.
  66. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020). The points of presence are located in (1) Seattle, WA; (2) Hillsboro, OR; (3) Palo Alto, CA; (4) San Jose, CA; (5) Los Angeles, CA; (6) Dallas, TX; (7) Reston, VA; (8) Ashburn, VA; (9) Chicago, IL; (10) New York, NY; and (11) Miami, FL.
  67. ↑ Id. The routers are used for CUA's 3 IP data networks. Id.
  68. ↑ See Customer Solutions, China Unicom Global, at 17, https://www.chinaunicomglobal.com/group1/M00/00/08/CngaWF00fQOAfarRAPYieoOnUf8345.pdf.
  69. ↑ See id. at 19.
  70. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020).
  71. ↑ Id.; Email from Squire Patton Boggs, counsel to CUA, to the Subcommittee (June 3, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  72. ↑ Briefing with Verizon (Sept. 4, 2019); Briefing with AT&T (Sept. 17, 2019); Briefing with CenturyLink (Sept. 10, 2019).
  73. ↑ Briefing with China Unicom Americas (Apr. 16, 2020); Email from Squire Patton Boggs, counsel to CUA, to the Subcommittee (June 3, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  74. ↑ Briefing with Verizon (Sept. 4, 2019); Briefing with AT&T (Sept. 17, 2019); Briefing with CenturyLink (Sept. 10, 2019).
  75. ↑ Briefing with Verizon (Sept. 4, 2019); Briefing with AT&T (Sept. 17, 2019); Briefing with CenturyLink (Sept. 10, 2019).
  76. ↑ Briefing with Verizon (Sept. 4, 2019).
  77. ↑ Briefing with AT&T (Sept. 17, 2019). As with CTA, AT&T representatives told the Subcommittee that the revenue generated by its agreements with CUA is relatively small, particularly when compared to similar agreements with other large international carriers. For example, similar arrangements with other large international carriers generate up to 36 to 62 times as much revenue as arrangements with the Chinese state-owned carriers discussed in this report. Id.; Email from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, counsel to AT&T, to the Subcommittee (June 2, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  78. ↑ Briefing with CenturyLink (Sept. 10, 2019).
  79. ↑ Id. CenturyLink purchases the same network services from the Chinese carriers in China, to allow CenturyLink to deliver traffic to a CenturyLink customer based in China. Id.
  80. ↑ See Briefing with Verizon (Sept. 4, 2019); Briefing with CenturyLink (Sept. 10, 2019); Briefing with AT&T (Sept. 17, 2019). Verizon representatives indicated that the company's contractual agreements with CUA are substantially identical to those it maintains with other carriers. Teleconference with Verizon (June 2, 2020).
  81. ↑ Briefing with Verizon (Sept. 4, 2019); Briefing with CenturyLink (Sept. 10, 2019); Briefing with AT&T (Sept. 17, 2019); Teleconference with Verizon (June 2, 2020); Email from CenturyLink to the Subcommittee (June 2, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee); Email from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, counsel to AT&T, to the Subcommittee (June 2, 2020) (on file with the Subcommittee).
  82. ↑ See In the Matter of China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited, Order to Show Cause, DA 20-449 (Apr. 24, 2020), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-20-449A1.pdf.
  83. ↑ See In the Matter of China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited, Response to Order to Show Cause, GN Docket No. 20-110 (June 1, 2020), http://licensing.fcc.gov/cgi-bin/ws.exe/prod/ib/forms/reports/related_filing.hts?f_key=-32708&f_number=ITC2142002072800361.
  84. ↑ Id. at i.
  85. ↑ Id. at ii.
  86. ↑ Id. at ii, 2.
  87. ↑ Id. at 9-10.
  88. ↑ Id. at 30-32.
  89. ↑ Letter from Squire Patton Boggs to Rob Portman, Chairman, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, and Tom Carper, Ranking Member, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations (June 3, 2020).
  90. ↑ Id.
  91. ↑ Id.
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