Translation:Shulchan Aruch/Even ha-Ezer/17

Paragraph 1- A married woman is included in the prohibition of prohibited women and marriage to her would not take effect. When is this true? Where she is certainly married. If she was uncertainly married or uncertainly divorced, however, the marriage would take effect out of doubt and a get would be required from both husbands. The same applies to rabbinical disqualifications on a get, in that if another came and married her she would need a get from both of them; the first husband would be rabbinically required to give a get and the second would be biblically required.

Paragraph 2- If a married woman went ahead and accepted a marriage transaction in front of her husband, she is married to the second man. If a woman tells her husband in his presence that he divorced her, she would be believed, because there is a presumption that a woman would not be brazen in front of her husband. There are those who say her believability is only with respect to the fact that the marriage takes effect and she would need a get. She would not be believed, however, to marry another person. There are those who add that today where there is much brazenness and promiscuity, she would only be believed as a stringency because the presumption that a woman is not brazen has been weakened. This that we say that a woman is not brazen to say she is divorced in front of her husband is only where there is nobody supporting her. If there is someone supporting her, however, she would certainly be brazen. If she married someone else outside the presence of her husband, even if when her husband now comes she says to his face that he divorced her, she would not be believed, because since she was already married she would certainly be brazen so as not to make herself a harlot. There are those who say that even if she did not yet marry someone else, but just had kiddushin performed outside her husband’s presence, and her husband later comes and she says to his face that he divorced her, she would not be believed. There are those who say that if there was quarreling between them and she had demanded her kesubah, she would not be believed to say he divorced her, even in his presence. There are those who say that in any situation where she is believed to remarry she is believed to collect her kesubah. There are those who say she is not believed with respect to the monetary issues at all, as was discussed above.

Paragraph 3- If a woman’s husband went overseas, and they testified that he died, even if was a solo witness or the witness was a slave, maidservant, woman or relative, she would be permitted to remarry. Even hearsay or a woman hearing from another woman, slave, maidservant or relative would be valid for such a testimony. Witnesses that are rabbinically disqualified from testifying would be valid for such testimony, but those that are biblically disqualified would not be valid. If they mention it in passing, the testimony is valid. The same applies to a gentile or Jew who is an apostate with respect to idol worship and all other laws of the Torah, and if he mentions it matter-of-fact he would be believed. If a witness did not come in the aforementioned manner but a rumor emerged in the city that the husband died, we would not allow his wife to remarry.

Paragraph 4- Everyone has believability with respect to this kind of testimony, except for five women who are presumed to hate each other and thus cannot testify that the other’s husband died because she may intend to prohibit the woman to her husband and he is actually still alive. The following are those women: (1) a woman’s mother-in-law, even if she is not currently her mother-in-law but is her yavam’s mother, (2) a woman’s mother-in-law’s daughter, (3) a woman’s co-wife, (4) a woman’s husband’s brother’s wife, and (5) a woman’s husband’s daughter. Likewise, she cannot testify for them.

Paragraph 5- We already said that if a witness says he heard so-and-so died, even if he heard it from a woman who heard it from a slave, it is valid for testimony for the woman, and we would allow her to marry on that basis. Even if the witness does not say who he heard it from, but just says that he heard it, it is valid, and we are not concerned that the original witness was disqualified. If the witness, woman or slave says, however, that so-and-so died and he saw him dead, we would ask the witness how he saw and how he knows. If he testifies something indicative of death, he would be believed. If he testifies something where only most people die, we would not allow his wife to marry, because we do not testify on a person that he died except where they saw that he certainly died and there is no uncertainty. If one heard the sounds of those wailing over someone as being among the dead, and they eulogized him, we would allow his wife to marry. Thus, we should object to women eulogizing based on evidence that indicate the person died until we know with certainly that he died. Likewise, his wife would be prohibited from eulogizing him or wearing black so long as there is no valid testimony allowing her to remarry. Likewise, no court should give a woman a testimony-letter where witnesses testified in front of them unless that testimony is sufficient to allow her to remarry, except if they wrote explicitly the reason that they are not permitting her to marry on the basis of this testimony, because we are afraid of a pitfall that may occur from a non-expert court.

Paragraph 6- In a period of persecution, we would permit woman to marry on the basis of the testimony of those who have repented, who testify as to what they saw during the persecution, notwithstanding the fact that they were compelled to become apostates. We do not rely on the testimony of low-life apostates that have repented, but not completely, except if they testify in passing or where it is known that they testified without any trickery or twisting. Everything depends on the context of the witness and the perception of the judges.

Paragraph 7- If an individual comes and says he killed someone, we would allow the victim’s wife to marry because a person does not have the power to make himself wicked and we parse his words. The same applies where a gentile says in passing that he killed so-and-so, and we would allow the victim’s wife to marry.

Paragraph 8- If a solo witness tells a woman privately that her husband died, she no longer requires his testimony. Rather, she can come to court and say her husband died. If that witness whom she cites comes and says he never said the husband died, however, the woman would not be believed. The court is not required to send for the witness, even if he is in the city. Rather, we rely on hearsay in the first instance.

Paragraph 9- If one witness says a man died, and another says he was murdered, although they contradict each other, because they each admit the man is no longer alive the wife may remarry.

Paragraph 10- If a sound emerged saying “so and so died,” and they went after the sound but did not find anyone, we would allow his wife to remarry. If they heard this sound in a field, pit or ruin we would not allow a woman to remarry because we are concerned the sound was that of a demon since the sound emerged in a place where demons are common.

Paragraph 11- If they found written in a document, “so-and-so the son of so-and-so died,” or “was murdered,” his wife may remarry, even if the document is not verified. According to the Rambam they must know that it was the text of a Jew, and it is in fact appropriate to be stringent on this. Even if they know it is the text of a Jew, if it is possible to say that it was only written because a rumor emerged that he died, such as where he drowned in water that had no end or something similar, we would not allow the wife to remarry on this basis of this text, because we are concerned the author wrote it based on the rumor that emerged.

Paragraph 12- If one became mute and they checked him in the way we check for divorce, and we discover that he is sane, and he writes that so-and-so the son of so-and-so has died, we would rely on his writing and would allow the wife to marry.

Paragraph 13- When is the foregoing true that hearsay is valid with respect to testimony to allow a woman to marry? Where the witness heard from a sane individual that so-and-so died, such as a slave or maidservant. If the witness heard it from someone who is insane or a minor, however, he cannot testify, and we would not rely on their words. If one heard children saying, “we are now coming from the eulogy of so-and-so, with such-and-such eulogizers, so-and-so the scholar and so-and-so escorted the deceased, and they did such-and-such with the bed,” one may testify on the basis of these words or anything similar, and we would allow the wife to marry. This is only true where it is immediate, such as where they say they are returning now from so-and-so’s eulogy etc. If it is not immediate, however, the testimony would not be effective at all. Even when the minors later become adults they cannot testify as to what they saw while they were minors.

Paragraph 14- We already mentioned that we can allow a woman to marry on the basis of a gentile who testifies in passing. How so? If he said in passing, “woe is so-and-so who died, he was so pleasant and good to me” or he says in passing “when I was going on the road and so-and-so who was going with us died and we were perplexed how quickly he died” or something similar where we see his intention to testify, he would be believed. If a Jew heard a gentile testifying in passing, the Jew who heard from him may testify and we would allow the wife to marry on that basis. Similarly, if the gentile said “so-and-so died” in passing, even if he did not say anything else that is still considered in passing. There are those who are stringent. When is this true? Where there was no rationale for the testimony. If there was a rationale, however, such as where the gentile tells another do such and such so I do not kill you like I killed so-and-so, that is not considered in passing because his intention is just to instill fear. The same is true in a situation where there is reason to be concerned they trained him to testify, and we would not rely on him. Likewise, if one heard a gentile court saying we killed so-and-so, they would not be believed because they use lies to embolden themselves. The same applies to anything similar. There are those who say that secular courts are never believed, even if they say that someone was killed by someone else under the law. This is only true with respect to the courts. With respect to other gentiles who testify in passing and say a Jew was tried by a secular court, however, they would be believed.

Paragraph 15- If a gentile initially testified in passing, and then was later directly asked about what occurred and they interrogated him until he described the entire incident, he is believed and the woman can testify on the basis of his testimony. If they initially asked him “where is our friend,” however, and he said he died, that is not called in passing. This is only true where they asked the gentile himself. If they asked another gentile or they were searching in the city for the Jew and the word got out and the gentile comes and says in passing that he died, however, although he was next to the other gentile who was asked directly, it is still considered in passing. If Jews were speaking to each other, and a gentile comes and inquires what they are talking about and they said they are discussing whether this Jew is alive or dead, and the gentile tells them he is dead, that is not called in passing. If it was uncertain whether testimony was given in passing, we would not allow the woman to marry because we are stringent in the case of a biblical uncertainty. Likewise, in any case where there is a disagreement on these matters, we would be stringent. There are those who say that this that we said if they initially asked the gentile then it is not considered in passing, is only where a Jew asked him. If a gentile asked him and he responds, however, that is considered in passing, so long as he was not asked in the presence of a Jew. If a Jew asked the gentile, and the gentile responds that he is dead and provides compelling evidence, although it is not considered in passing and the woman cannot marry, if she went ahead and married on the basis of a scholar who permitted it, she would not be required to get divorced if there is compelling evidence that the husband died.

Paragraph 16- If a gentile testifies in passing about what another gentile testified in passing, we would allow the woman to marry on the basis of such testimony. Even if he does not say explicitly that the first gentile testified in passing, we can be lenient where it is uncertain and say it was certainly in passing.

Paragraph 17- If a gentile and Jew left us to go to another location, and the gentile returns and says the Jew that went with him had died, we would allow his wife to marry, even if the gentile does not know the man. There are those who say the gentile needs to say he buried him. This only applies in this kind of case, where he does not mention the name of the deceased and he is not familiar with him. If he is familiar with him, however, we would not need the burial testimony to be in passing. This ruling is indeed how the custom has spread. Even in a situation where there are those who say “I buried him” is required, it does not mean that literally. Rather, any testimony where the implication is that he certainly died, and is not just an assumption, would be effective. Likewise, if ten individuals were transferred from place to place while tied in chains, carried on camels or anything similar, and the gentile says in passing that these 10 men who went from such-and-such place to such-and-such place and were carrying such and such had died, their wives may marry. There are those who say the gentile must say he buried them.

Paragraph 18- If an individual comes and tells us that a court or people had told him that when he goes to such and such place he should tell them that Yitzchak ben Michoel had died, and the agent that comes with this message does not know who that is, because we are aware who that person is, his wife may remarry. We do not say that perhaps there is another Yitzchak ben Michoel that died. This assumes that place did not have two people established with the name Yitzchak ben Michoel or, if two people were established with that name, we are aware that one is still alive. There are those who say that this is only where the witness mentions the deceased’s city. If he does not mention his city, however, his testimony would not be effective, notwithstanding the fact that we know one with that name who had disappeared and even though he mentioned his name. There are those who are lenient. There are those who say that in a situation where the witness only mentions the deceased’s name, he must mention his city. If he mentions the deceased’s name and his father’s name, however, he does not have to mention the deceased’s city. In a situation where there is other evidence that this is the deceased, one can be lenient and rely on the opinion that the city-name is not required.

Paragraph 19- If a Jew said “a Jewish man who was with us in such-and-such place, and who had such-and-such appearance and such-and-such identifying marks,” we do not evaluate and say it is so-and-so, until the witness says it was so-and-so and he is familiar with the deceased’s name and city. If a witness said that someone left us from such-and-such city and died, however, we would investigate that city and if only one person left from it, his wife may remarry. The same applies to a gentile testifying in passing.

Paragraph 20- If one was protesting a woman by saying she has an obligation of yibum from her brother-in-law, and that individual himself later testifies in front of court that he heard this brother-in-law had died a while ago, we would rely on the testimony because the original claim was not in front of court.

Paragraph 21- We do not interrogate witnesses who testify on women. Even if they were contradicted on bedikos they would still be valid. The court is prohibited from interrogating excessively unless it is a situation where trickery is suspected, in which case interrogation is necessary.

Paragraph 22- When looking at the deceased’s body to identify it and testify on it, we would check and look even at night, by the candlelight or moonlight.

Paragraph 23- If witnesses saw someone from afar, and the individual said he was so-and-so, the son of so-and-so, or that he was so-and-so from such-and-such place, and a snake then bit him and he died, and the witnesses then went and found that he had changed and they did not recognize him, the deceased’s wife would be able to marry on the basis of these witnesses.

Paragraph 24- If witnesses found someone murdered or dead, and his forehead, nose and the form of his face are still there and on that basis they recognize that is so-and-so, they may testify on him. If one of these marks were removed, even if they have incredibly precise identification on the deceased’s clothing, it is of no effect because we are concerned the clothing were loaned. Even if the witnesses had an identifying mark on the deceased’s body, they cannot testify on him, even if it was a mole. If they had an incredibly precise identification on his body, however, they can testify on him, such as where he has an extra or missing limb. If the limb was small, large, white or black, however, that is not a precise identification. Even 100 imprecise identifying marks are of no effect, even when combined with other circumstantial evidence. If there was a large protrusion on his nose or if his nose was very deep or something similar, that is a precise identification. If the nose was a little, bent, however, it would not be precise. The same applies for an impression on his body or limbs. With respect to large teeth, however, even if they are very large it would not be a precise identification. Any identification mark that is effective when a Jew testifies would be effective when a gentile testifies in passing.

Paragraph 25- Rabeinu Tam writes that this that witnesses cannot testify unless the deceased’s forehead, nose and form of his face are in existence is only where only the head is there. If the entire body is whole, however, the witnesses may testify they recognize him, even without a form, forehead or nose. The Achronim disagree with him.

Paragraph 26- Witnesses cannot testify on the deceased unless they discovered him within three days of his murder or death. Once three days has passed, however, they cannot testify on him because the form of his face changes. When is this true? When the deceased is on dry land. If he drowned in water, however, and the water cast him to dry land, the witnesses can testify on him even after many days if they recognize him because one’s form does not change in water until a long time later. This assumes the witnesses saw the deceased immediately when it arose from the water and that he was not wounded. If there was delay after it was cast from the water, however, they cannot testify on the deceased, even if it was within three days. Likewise, if the body had a wound they cannot testify on it because the water ruins the wound and makes it swell, which changes the body. If we are uncertain whether the body changed or not, we act stringently. Even if the woman remarried, she must get divorced. This is all applies where the witnesses testify on the basis that they recognize him. If they testify on the basis of precise identifying marks, however, we would allow the wife to marry.

Paragraph 27- If the witnesses discovered someone murdered and they recognize him and do not know when he was killed, there are those who say we assume he was killed within three days and they can testify on him. Others prohibit them from testifying. If, however, a rumor emerged that so-and-so died or was murdered, and they found him more than three days later and recognized him, his wife would be permitted to marry according to all opinions.

Paragraph 28- There are those who say in the name of Rabeinu Tam that this that witnesses can only testify within three days is where the deceased’s face is bruised. If his face is not bruised, however, they can testify on him even many days later, by recognizing his body and form, even he fell in water. This does not seem correct to the Achronim. There are those who are lenient and rule that where the deceased was next to the witness when he drowned, although he is whole, the witness cannot testify on him. If he did not see his drowning, however, and he says he recognizes the deceased, who is whole, he can testify on him.

Paragraph 29- Witnesses cannot testify that a person died unless they saw with certainty that he died, and there is no uncertainty. How so? If they saw him fall into a den of lions or leopards or anything similar, they cannot testify on him because the animals may not have been hungry and thus not eaten him. If he fell into a pit of snakes and scorpions, however, they can testify on him because by pushing them when he stands on them, they will harm him.

Paragraph 30- If one fell into a fiery furnace or boiling vat full of wine, oil or water or most or all of his trachea and esophagus were slaughtered, they can testify on him, even if he got up and fled, because he will certainly eventually die. The same applies to anything similar where it is a situation where the person cannot live and will die very shortly, and the witnesses may testify on him.

Paragraph 31- If witnesses saw him cut up and birds eating from him, even if he was stabbed or arrows had shot him, they cannot testify that he died. If they saw birds eating from a fatal area of the body, such as his brain, heart or intestines, the witnesses can testify that he died.

Paragraph 32- If witnesses saw him fall into the sea, even if he drowned in the Great Sea, they cannot testify that he died because he may have come out in a different location. If he fell into contained water, such as a pit or cave, where the witnesses can stand and see all of the surrounding area, and the witnesses remained there for the amount of time needed for him to die, they can testify he died and his wife can marry. Likewise, if he was tied by his legs and they chained him to a seat and only his leg from the knee and above came from the sea, we would allow his wife to marry after 12 months because a treifah cannot live for 12 months. If he fell into the sea and someone cast a net and pulled in one leg from the knee or above or anything similar, however, we would not allow the wife to marry because we say the leg may have belonged to someone else. If there was an incredibly precise identification on his leg, however, we would rely on the identification to say it came from the person who fell into the sea. There are those who say that an incredibly precise identification would even be effective on clothing because he was seen drowning with those clothing.

Paragraph 33- If a solo witness said he saw someone die at war or from a fallen structure or that he drowned in a large sea and died or anything similar where most people die, and he said that he buried him, he would be believed and the wife can marry on his say-so. If he did not say he buried him, she cannot marry. If she did marry, she would not have to be divorced.

Paragraph 34- Likewise, if someone testified on a behalf of a woman that her husband drowned in a sea with no visible border and he did not come up and his memory and name have been forgotten, the woman cannot marry on the basis of such testimony as was discussed. Even if a court permitted her to marry, but she did not yet do so, she cannot marry. If she did marry, she does not have to get divorced. This only applies where she married on the say-so of a scholar or because she mistakenly thought she was allowed to. If she married deliberately in sin, however, she would have to get divorced. This is all only where they testified that the husband literally drowned in waters without borders. If they testified he was in a boat that broke at sea or something similar, however, or even if they testified he drowned but did not testify they stayed there long enough for him to die, the woman must get divorced because it is a common occurrence for something like this to happen where someone drowns and comes out, unless they testified explicitly that he literally drowned and they remained there long enough for him to die. Even if the case was one where a gentile testified in passing and said so-and-so drowned, and the woman married on that basis, she would not have to be divorced. If a scholar permits a woman to marry in the first instance, in the case of water with no borders, we would excommunicate him.

Paragraph 35- There are those who say that in a case where the husband falls into water without borders, the woman may collect her kesubah, notwithstanding the fact that she is prohibited from marrying.

Paragraph 36- If a city was surrounded by an army, a ship was rocking at sea or someone was being taken to a trial, they are all presumed to be alive. One cannot testify on anyone in such a situation that he has died in order to permit his wife to marry. Even if one is in a city that the invading army has captured, the boat that sunk at sea or was being taken to his execution, one cannot testify on him because he may be alive. We place the stringencies of death and the stringencies of life on such people.

Paragraph 37- If a solo witness comes and testifies that a woman’s husband has died, and they permitted the woman to marry on that basis, and subsequently another solo witness comes and contradicts the first one and says the man did not die, the woman does not lose her initial right to marry and she may marry because when it comes to testimony on a woman, a solo witness has the status of two witnesses in other cases, and one witness cannot contradict two. Nevertheless, she should not marry because of the “chattering lips.” If the second witness came before she received permission to marry, however, she cannot marry. If she does marry, she must get divorced because her status is in doubt. If she married the witness that testified on her behalf and she says she is certain her husband died, she would not have to get divorced. There are those who say she would have to get divorced. If two witnesses come and say her husband did not die, everyone agrees that even if she married she would need to be divorced. This only applies where she was silent. If she also says her husband died, however, the case would be two witnesses opposing two witnesses, assuming these other witnesses are women. The husband that married her, however, has no believability on himself. When is this true? Where the solo witness whose testimony the woman married on was of the same status as the two witnesses that later contradicted him, such as where the woman married on the basis of a man, and two men came and said the husband did not die or where she married on the basis of a woman or the second husband himself and two women or two witnesses that are rabbinically disqualified say he did not die. If a valid witness says he died and many women say he did not, however, it has the status of 50/50. This is only where the witnesses all came together before the court permitted her to marry on the basis of the solo witness. If they permitted her to marry on the basis of the valid witness, however, and the disqualified witnesses later came, she would not lose her initial permission to marry. If she married one of her witnesses and says she is certain that her husband died, she would not have to be divorced. Gentiles that testify in passing have the status of other disqualified witnesses. Any gentile that testifies not in passing is not believed, whether to prohibit or permit.

Paragraph 38- If a woman says a man died or if she says her husband died, and a valid witness then comes and says he did not die, the woman cannot marry. If she does marry, she must get divorced. There are those who say that if another woman or she herself said the husband died and the court permitted her to marry on that basis, and a solo valid witness later comes and says he did not die, the woman would not lose her initial right to marry. If two woman come initially, however, and they permitted the woman to marry on that basis, and a solo witnesses later comes, everyone would agree she would not lose her right to marry.

Paragraph 39- If a woman marries on the basis of a solo witness, she can only do so with the court’s permission. If she marries without receiving permission from the court, there are those who say she would not need to be divorced, even if a solo witness comes and says her husband did not die. The court must consist of three valid judges, who are not related to each other or to the witnesses.

Paragraph 40- If a woman says a man did not die, and two women say he did die, the wife can marry. Likewise, if 10 women say he did not died and 11 say he did, the wife may marry because we do not apply the principle of two witnesses are like 100 except when it comes to valid witnesses. When it comes to disqualified witnesses, however, we follow the majority, whether to be lenient or stringent.

Paragraph 41- If two witnesses testified that each heard from another witness that so and so had died, and a solo witness testifies that he heard from somebody that he is alive, the woman can marry.

Paragraph 42- If two witnesses testify a man died and two say he did not die, the wife cannot marry. If she does marry, she must be divorced because her status is uncertain. If she married one of her witnesses and says she is certain her husband died, she does not have to get divorced. We do not compel a woman to be divorced in the event a rumor emerged that her first husband is alive.

Paragraph 43- The wife herself is believed to say her husband died and she can marry or have yibum done on the basis of her testimony. We would give her the base amount of her kesubah. If she has yibum done, her yavam would take the inheritance on the basis of her testimony. Even an insane women is believed so long as she understands the nature of marriage and being a widow. When is this true? Where she comes to court and says her husband died and thus they should permit her to marry, but makes no mention of her kesubah, in which case we permit her to marry, have her swear and give her the kesubah amount. If she comes and says her husband died and thus they should give her the kesuba, however, they would not even permit her to marry because she is only coming for her kesuba and her husband has a presumption that he did not die. She has no intention to marry but just to collect her kesubah while her husband is alive. There are those who say that even if she has a solo witness, he would not be effective in such a case.

Paragraph 44- If a woman comes and says her husband died, permit me to marry and give me my kesubah, we would allow her to marry and give her the kesubah because the primary intent of her words was focused on the marriage. If she comes and says give me my kesubah and allow me to marry, however, we would allow her to marry but not give her the kesubah. If she seizes the kesubah we would not take the money away from her. There are those who say that in either case we would not permit her to marry because she mentioned her kesubah.

Paragraph 45- If one has two wives and one comes and says her husband died, she may marry on the basis of her own testimony. Her rival wife is prohibited because a wife is not believed with respect to her rival wife. Even if the first wife remarried, we do not say that if her husband had not died she would not have prohibited herself to him, because perhaps out of her hatred towards her rival wife she wants both of them to be prohibited.

Paragraph 46- If one wife says her husband died and her rival wife contradicts her by saying he did not died, the wife may still marry. Just as the rival wife cannot testify to permit her to marry, so too she cannot testify to prohibit her.

Paragraph 47- If one wife says her husband died and the other says he was murdered, because they both say he is not alive, they may marry.

Paragraph 48- When is it true that a woman is believed to say her husband died? When there is peace between them and peace in the world. If they are quarreling, however, such as where she says she was divorced in front of so-and-so and so-and-so, and those witnesses come and contradict her or where her husband became an apostate and left her chained, and she and her husband later went to another jurisdiction, and she now comes and says her husband died, she would not be believed, even if she said she buried him and even if there was peace in the word. Even if a solo witness comes and say her husband died, she cannot marry because she may have hired him. If she does marry, she does not have to get divorced because she has a solo witness. Likewise, if there was war in the world, and the woman comes and says her husband died in war, she would not be believed, even if there was peace between them because she is relying on the fact that most people who go to work get killed and she says he died, such as a case where those in front and back of her husband were killed, so she says given that they were killed he must have been killed too. Thus, she is not even believed to say she buried him. There are those who say that if she says she buried him, she would be believed. If she says he died in his bed, everyone agrees she is believed. The same is true in any case where she says he died or was murdered far from the war, and she would be believed, because we only assume she made her own calculation where she says he died or was murdered at war. If she does not say it was at war, however, she is believed to say he died, even if he went near the war to purchase booty.

Paragraph 49- If there was no established war in the world and the woman comes and says there was a war in such-and-such place and he died at war, she cannot marry in the first instance. If she does marry, she does not have to be divorced. There are those who say that even if she does marry she must get divorced.

Paragraph 50- If a solo witness comes and says he saw a man die at war or from a collapsed building and he says he buried him, the wife may marry on that basis. If he did not say he buried him, she cannot marry. If she does marry, she does not have to be divorced. With respect to two witnesses, however, even if they did not say they buried him they would be believed. There are those who say that even in the case of a solo witness, if he says the husband died or was killed and I later saw him and recognized him well and saw that he was dead, he would be believed because it is as if he said he buried him. A gentile testifying in passing and saying the man died at war would also need to say he buried him. There are those who are lenient in such a case.

Paragraph 51- If a woman says her husband died from a falling building, she is not believed. Likewise, if there was an outbreak of snakes and scorpions and she says her husband was bit by a snake or scorpion and died, she is not believed because she may be assuming her husband is like most people who died from such a bite and thus it has the status of war and she needs to say her husband died on his bed or that she buried him.

Paragraph 52- If the woman said the smoke forced us to leave our home or cave and I was saved, she is not believed. Just as a miracle happened to her, so too could it have happened to her husband.

Paragraph 53- If it was a year of hunger and a woman said her husband died, she is not believed, even if she said he died on his bed. If she said he died and she buried him, she would be believed. If she said he died from thirst it is as if she said he died from hunger.

Paragraph 54- If she said idolaters or bandits attacked us and my husband was killed while I was saved, she is believed because it is atypical for them to kill women and thus we do not apply the principle that just as she was saved, so too he was saved.

Paragraph 55- If there was a plague in the world and the wife says her husband died, she is believed. There are those who say she is not believed.

Paragraph 56- If a woman’s husband went overseas and they came and told her that her husband died and she married and her first husband later returns, regardless of whether she married on the basis of a solo witness or two witnesses, and even if the marriage was not consummated, she must leave both husbands, would receive a get from both husbands and would not receive kesubah payments from either one, even if she returns to her first husband, nor would she receive her usufruct fruits that the husband consumed, notwithstanding the fact that they are not required to redeem her. This only applies where the second husband consumed the fruits before the first husband returned. That which he consumed after the first husband returned, however, must be returned. The husband is not required to give her the depreciation of her tzon barzel properties, so long as they were completely ruined. She would, however, take what is still in existence. If she took her kesuba payment or fruits from either husband, she must return them. This only applies where she took from the second husband after the first husband arrived. If she took from him before the first husband arrived, she would not have to return. Neither husband can make themselves impure for her if they are kohanim. Neither have rights to her found items or her work product nor can they annul her vows. She is disqualified from the kehuna, from terumah and from maaser if she is a Levi. Her first husband would, however, inherit her if she died. If the husbands dies, each of their brothers would perform chalitzah, but not yibum, on the wife. Any child born from the second husband is biblically illegitimate if the child was born before the first husband divorced her. If the child was only born after the first husband died or divorced her, however, the child from the second husband would only be rabbinically illegitimate. If the first husband had sexual relations with her before the second husband divorced her, any child that results would be rabbinically illegitimate.

Paragraph 57- If witnesses told a woman that her husband died, and she married, and they later told her he was actually still alive at the time and now had died, any child born before the husband died is biblically illegitimate. Any child born after he died is not illegitimate. There are those who say the child would be rabbinically illegitimate.

Paragraph 58- If the woman did not marry a second man but just had kiddushin performed, and her husband returned, she would not need a get from the second husband and would be permitted to return to her first husband. Likewise, she would be permitted to the second husband if the first husband died or divorced her. If kiddushin was done to a woman, and she erred and thought it had not been done and she then married someone else, she must leave both husbands and all the above would apply. If they forced her to marry, however or if the court mistakenly permitted her to marry, it is like she was compelled and she is permitted to her first husband.