Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Muhammed Zamir (2008-01-16)

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UNCLASSIFIED
Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
16 January 2008
To: Muhammed, Zamir
Subject: Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Muhammed Zamir
1.

An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2.

The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3.

The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a) Commitment
  1. The detainee stated he left Khartoum, Sudan, in 1994 via Kenyan Airlines and flew to New Delhi, India, with a transit stop in [[w:Kenya}Kenya]]. The detainee then traveled by train to Lahore, Pakistan. From Lahore, the detainee traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan, and then on to Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee stated he served as a weapons trainer at Camp Khalden in Afghanistan for approximately six to seven months in 1997. The detainee trained approximately 50 to 70 people on the following weapons: PKs, Kalashnikov rifles, RPGs, RPKs, mortars and artillery. Instruction from the detainee included assembly and disassembly of weapons, operations of the weapons and controlling fields of fire
  3. The detainee was a weapons instructor at Khalden Training Camp,
  4. Khalden Camp included instruction on the Kalashnikov rifle, the American M16; German G13; and, the Israeli light and heavy Uzi. The trainees at Khalden Camp also took special courses: explosives; topography, tactical; and, first aid.
  5. The detainee was an al-Qaida operative who provided terrorist training in Afghanistan.
  6. The detainee worked for an al Qaida operative at Khalden Camp from 1993 until the camp closed. The detainee was a camp instructor, but because the detainee was good with people, the detainee was frequently left in charge of Khalden Camp because the detainee could handle all aspects of the camp, including managing money, people, course scheduling, and instruction.
  7. The same al Qaida operative trained numerous al Qaida personnel at Khalden Camp who in turn were either involved in or may become involved in al Qaida terrorist attacks.
  8. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in late 1998/early 1999 and was assigned to participate in al Qaida-planned attacks against unnamed United States military bases in Khobar and/or Dhahran.
  9. The detainee ran Khalden Training Camp in the absence of the senior at Qaida operative.
  10. The detainee was one of three veteran trainers at Khalden Camp in Afghanistan in 1998 who received a two-month training course on electronic firi ng devices. The training included: electrical theory and basic electronic circuitry; simple remote control firing devices; timers; and, photocell firing devices. The detainee was expected to train other Mujahedin on electronics after the course.
  11. The detainee was an instructor and the head of Khalden Training Camp,
  12. The detainee stated he was the 70th Taliban commander.
  13. The detainee was a trainer at Khalden Training Camp.
  14. The detainee stated he was captured in a safe house operated by an al Qaida facilitator.
b) Training
  1. The detainee stated he arrived at Khalden Camp in 1994. The detainee received instruction on: the Kalashnikov rifle; PK machine gun; 75 and 82 mm heavy artillery; SPG-9 anti-tank weapon; 82 mm mortar; Zukair anti-aircraft weapon; RPG launcher; and, mountain warfare. The detainee stated he trained hundreds of recruits on the use of small arms and artillery from 1994 until 1999.
  2. The detainee trained on SAM-7s as well as having trained at al Farouq Camp, which included instruction on weapons, handguns, artillery and explosives.
  3. The training in the al Farouq camp took 45 days, and was a basic training course. The training involved a preparation course that covered all types of topics, such as weapons, topography, field gums, first aid and explosives.
c) Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee stated he attended a meeting with several individuals , where he learned the Taliban government would formally deactivate Camp Khalden in July 2000.
  2. The detainee stated he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan, after the Khalden Camp closed in 1999. During his stay there, the detainee met Ayman at Zawahiri and another senior al Qaida facilitator. The detainee stated he met al Zawahiri once, but had frequent contact with the al Qaida facilitator.
  3. A senior, trusted associate of Usama bin Laden stated Ayman al Zawahiri is one of bin Laden's closest al Qaida associates. The trusted associate also stated Zawahiri is the Emir of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and a constant companion to Usama bin Laden,
  4. The detainee stayed in a senior al Qaida leader's guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan in 2000. The detainee and the senior al Qaida leader became close associates.
  5. The detainee stated he met Usama bin Laden and Abu Atta while at the Jihad Wali Camp.
  6. Abu Hafs al Masri is a high-ranking individual in Usama bin Laden's organization.
  7. The detainee stated that he was at Zubayda's house when he was captured on 24 March 2002.
d) Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee's skill in electronics was average and the detainee had difficulty making a circuit when given a schematic, but could probably make a device given enough time. The detainee was not able to train others in electronics.
  2. The detainee was a Sudanese who used to work among Usama bin Laden's guards and was important within al Qaida.
  3. The detainee had no connection with previous operations and his relationship with al-Qaida was limited. When Khalden Training Camp closed, the detainee became sad and angry with al-Qaida.
  4. The detainee stated the purpose of Camp Khalden was not to train al Qaida, but to train the normal Muslim for future jihad. The detainee also stated it is every Muslim's duty to train for future jihad and that there is no jihad happening today.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
a)

The detainee stated he felt as if he was being accused of al Qaida and he is not a member of al Qaida and has no knowledge of al Qaida's operations.

b)

The detainee stated he never swore allegiance to al Qaida, the Taliban, Usarna bin Laden, or any other individuals or groups.

c)

The detainee stated he is not a fighter and does not believe in fighting. The detainee also stated he does not agree with the fatwa issued by Usama bin Laden calling for violence against America.

5.

You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding . The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case . The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

ISN 707
DMO Exhibit 1
UNCLASSIFIED