United Nations Special Committee on Palestine Report/Chapter II
A. GEOGRAPHIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
1. The total land area of Palestine is estimated to be about 26,000 square kilometres or a little over 10,000 square miles,40/ but about halt of this area is uninhabitable desert.
2. Situated at the cross-roads between Europe, Asia and North Africa, however, this small territory enjoys a geographical position from which it has derived, during much of its turbulent history, the ill-matched gifts of political strife and economic advantage.
3. The geographical and topographical conditions of Palestine are an important element in its problem, and it is vital, therefore, to grasp their main features. On the west, stretching from the Mediterranean Sea, is the coastal plain, very narrow in the north but widening considerably further south, although at no point more than some twenty miles in width. This plain is broken into two parts by a narrow spur of hills pointing like a finger towards the town of Haifa from the direction of the south-east.
North of Haifa is the small coastal plain of Acre, and to the south is the more extensive maritime plain. Reaching inland to the north of Mount Carmel near Haifa are the broad inland plains of Esdraelon and Jezreel breaking into the upper Jordan Valley south of the Sea of Galilee. In the Huleh Valley to the north of the Sea of Galilee is a stretch of unreclaimed swamp.
Apart from these inland plains in the north and portions of the desert area in the south, the interior of the country is very mountainous with the hills of Judea and Samaria in the centre and the hills of Galilee in the north. These hills fall away in the east to the rift-valley of the River Jordan, which marks the eastern boundary of Palestine with the State of Transjordan and which, starting from the borders of Syria and Lebanon with Palestine, flows through the Sea of Galilee to empty itself in the waters of the Dead Sea, some 1,200 feet below sea level. To the south is the vast area of the Beersheba district, which is arid, semi-desert, supporting at present a very small settled population and about 90,000 Bedouin nomads. As the annual rainfall diminishes further to the south, this merges into the Negeb proper a wild contusion of limestone hills, practically rainless and almost without life.
4. Along the whole western limits of Palestine lies the Mediterranean Sea from which, by the natural processes of evaporation and precipitation, the country receives its most valuable commodity—water. The heaviest precipitation is over the coastal plain and in the northern and central hills, where it is sufficient to support permanent agriculture. Over the Jordan Valley and further south in the Beersheba area, the rainfall is too small for summer crops unless the land is watered by irrigation. Under natural conditions even winter crops are subject to frequent failure in these regions. In the circumstances, it is not surprising to find the population distribution in Palestine coinciding very closely with rainfall distribution, if some allowance is made for the act that the plains are, for other reasons, more favourable to dense settlement than are the hills.
5. Broadly speaking, any further considerable development of agriculture in Palestine must rely upon a more intensive use of the land by irrigation, rather than upon an extension of the area of cultivation. Climatically, the most striking feature of Palestine is the regular recurrence of winter rain followed by a prolonged summer drought. Where irrigation is possible, the soil can generally be made to produce crops intensively all the year round. Moreover, the climate is suitable for the production of a wide variety of vegetables and fruits ranging from sub-tropical products, which can be produced in the Jordan Valley, to the products of temperate climates. This possibility of a great variety of agricultural production is a fact of considerable economic importance. Under natural conditions, however, summer cropping depends on. the amount of moisture that can be conserved during the rainy season by repeated ploughing of the bare fallow.
6. Irrigation has been greatly developed in recent years, and the limits of development have by no means been reached. Nevertheless, its extension on a considerable scale presents difficulties of cost and of water supply, for Palestine, unlike Egypt, has no great river flowing through its territories carrying water from catchment areas beyond its own boundaries. It depends upon the annual precipitation within its own boundaries and in the Syria-Lebanon catchment-area, from which the Jordan is partly fed at its source.
7. The major sources of water available for irrigation are springs and rivers, wadi storm water and underground water from wells and boreholes. The Government of Palestine has recently estimated the total volume of water avail-able annually for new exploitation as follows:41/
Dry year Average year Wet Year
(Millions of cubic metres)
Springs and Rivers 800 1,000 1,500 Wadi storm 100 500 1,200 Underground water 200 200 200 TOTAL 1,100 1,700 2,900
8. Somewhat higher estimates of available water supplies are given by the Jewish Agency and are implied in the over all irrigation scheme of Hays and Savage which, in its complete form, provides for an annual supply of nearly 2,000 million cubic metres of water actually reaching the fields. Perhaps the most that can be said at present is that government estimates are based on the most extensive information avail able, but may nevertheless be subject to revision in the light of further knowledge. There is, however, no disagreement on the fact that Palestine is not very bountifully supplied with water and that its continued development depends on making the most of what water there is.
9. In the physical resources which are typically the basis of modern industrial development, Palestine is exceedingly poor, having neither coal, iron, nor any other important mineral deposit. Indeed, the only considerable non-agricultural resources are the potassium and sodium salts which are extracted from the Dead Sea.
There are ample supplies of certain building materials in the form of stone and lime from which cement is manufactured. Oil, on which some people have set hopes, has not been discovered in payable quantities, though tests are still proceeding in the south. For its present supplies of fuel, Palestine is entirely dependent on the oil which comes to the Haifa refineries via the pipeline from the oil fields of Iraq.
(a) POPULATION STATISTICS
10. There have been two censuses of population in Palestine, in 1922 and in 1931. In 1936, in 1941 and again in 1946, the Government had made all preparations for a census, but political disturbances caused them to be postponed. There are, however, records of births and deaths for the whole population except the small Bedouin group living as nomads in the semi-desert areas of the south. On the basis of these figures, estimates of the total population and of its quantitative distribution according to various classifications are made by the government statistician at regular intervals. The population statistics of Palestine, compiled in this manner, are considered to be fairly accurate; but there is a margin of error which tends to increase as the census year on which the calculations are based becomes more remote. Only a new census can test the accuracy of these estimates.
11. The most striking demographic features of Palestine are, first, the rate at which the total population has grown in the last twenty-five years; second, the manner in which the proportions of the two major national groups, the Arabs and Jews, have changed; and third, the relative importance of immigration and rate of natural increase in their effect on the total population and on the proportion of Jews to Arabs. These are the essential and dynamic elements of what is, in detail, a very complicated matter. In addition, it is important to consider briefly the present regional distribution of the population.
12. The total settled population of Palestine at the end of 1946 was estimated to be nearly 1,846,000.42/ This is nearly three times the total population as revealed by the census of 1922 or, more exactly, an increase of 184 per cent. In greater detail, the population growth since 1922 has been as follows:
Population of Palestine by religions43/
Moslems Jews Christians Others Total 1922 486,177 83,790 71,464 7,617 649,048 1931 493,147 174,606 88,907 10,101 966,761 1941 906,551 474,102 125,413 12,881 1,518,947 1946 1,076,783 608,225 145,063 15,488 1,845,559
13. Since the main lines of conflict in Palestine are between Jews and Arabs as conscious national groups, it is of some importance to distinguish the population according to this classification. On this basis, the population at the end of 1946 was estimated as follows:
Arabs, 1,203,000; Jews, 608,000; others, 35,000; Total, 1,846,000.
14. It will have been noticed that not only has there been a remarkably rapid increase in the total population of Palestine but also the proportion of Jews in the total has greatly increased, from 12.91 -per cent in 1922 to 32.96 per cent in 1946. Conversely, of course, the Arab proportion has fallen since 1922. The Moslem proportion of the population (almost entirely Arab) has fallen from about 75 per cent of the total to 60 per cent, and the Christian proportion (very largely Arab) from 11 per cent to 8 per cent. Thus, at the present time about one-third of the total settled population is Jewish.
(b) IMMIGRATION AND NATURAL INCREASE
15. These changes in the population have been brought about by two forces: natural increase and immigration. The great increase in the Jewish population is due in the main to immigration. From 1920 to 1946, the total number of recorded Jewish immigrants into Palestine was about 376,000, or an average of over 8,000 per year. The flow has not been regular, however, being fairly high in 1924 to 1926, falling in the next few years (there was a net emigration in 1927) and rising to even higher levels between 1933 and 1936 as a result of the Nazi persecution in Europe. Between the census year of 1931 and the year 1936, the proportion of Jews to the total population rose from 18 per cent to nearly 30 per cent.
16. The Arab population has increased almost entirely as a result of an excess of births over deaths. Indeed, the natural rate of increase of Moslem Arabs in Palestine is the highest in recorded statistics,1 a phenomenon explained by very high fertility rates coupled with a marked decline in death rates as a result of improved conditions of life and public health, The natural rate of increase of Jews is also relatively high, but is conditioned by a favorable age distribution of the population due to the high rate of immigration.
(c) FUTURE TRENDS
17. These are dynamic elements in the problem of Palestine which have consequences for the future, and any consideration of the Palestine question must take them as fully into account count as is possible.
18. Estimates of future population trends for Palestine have been made by Mr. P. J. Loftus, the government statistician, and published in volume III of A. Survey of Palestine. This is the most complete demographic study that has yet been made of Palestine. In qualitative terms the main conclusions may be summarized as follows:
(1) The Arab population (particularly the Moslem Arabs) of Palestine will continue to grow rapidly, owing to high fertility and falling mortality rates. The conditions making for a high fertility rate are not likely to change greatly in the immediate future.
(2) Apart from immigration, the Jewish population will increase more slowly owing to a fertility rate which is already lower than that of Moslems and is considered likely to fall. The reduction in the death rate of the Jewish population is also likely to be less than the reduction in the Arab rate, since the Jewish mortality rate is already low.
19. In quantitative terms calculated on the basis of the most probable assumptions suggested by a close study of the present demographic situation, Mr. Loftus calculates that by 1960, if assuming that there were no immigration, the population of Palestine would be as follows:
Estimated population of Palestine in 1960
Moslems Jews Christians other Total 1946 (actual) 1,076,783 608,225 145,063 15,481 1,845,559 1960 (estimated) 1,533,000 664,000 176,000 21,000 2,394,000
Thus, according to this estimate, the population of Palestine would increase 30 per cent in fourteen years, assuming no immigration took place, and the Jewish population would decline from about 31 per cent of the total to 28 per cent.
(d)DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION
20. This potential increase of population in Palestine, independently of immigration, should be considered in relation to the area and resources of the country. Arithmetical density of population (i. e., the average number of persons per unit area of land) is by no means a reliable guide to the ability of an area to support a larger population without a fall in the standard of living. However, it is not without significance if considered in relation to other physical resources. At the end of 1944, Palestine had a population density of 174 persons to the square mile (67 per square kilometre) of land area. Excluding the Beersheba area, which is semidesert, and nearly half the total land area, the density rises to 324 per square mile (125 per square kilometre). This latter figure is a higher density than that of Switzerland and slightly lower than that of Italy. There are, of course, countries with much higher densities of population, but these are either agricultural populations with very low standards of living, as in parts of India, or else highly industrialized countries dependent upon their industrial resources. In this latter connexion, it must be recognized that Palestine does not contain within its own borders any of the basic raw materials of modern industry.
21. The regional distribution of the population of Palestine is of great significance for the Palestine problem. The heaviest concentration is along the whole coastal plain from the Gaza area to Haifa. Galilee, the plain of Esdraelon and the inland area of the Jerusalem sub-district are also fairly thickly populated. The central hill country north of Jerusalem comprising the districts of Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin and Beisan is considerably less thickly peopled, while to the south of the Jerusalem district in Hebron, and especially in Beersheba, the population becomes extremely sparse. In the vast area of the Beersheba sub-district, however, there are about 90,000 Bedouin nomads.
22. There is no clear territorial separation of Jews and Arabs by large contiguous areas. Jews are more than 40 per cent of the total population in the districts of Jaffa (which includes Tel Aviv), Haifa and Jerusalem. In the northern inland areas of Tiberias and Beisan, they are between 25 and 34 per cent of the total population. In the inland northern districts of Safad and Nazareth and the coastal districts of Tulkarm and Ramie, Jews form between 10 and 25 per cent of the total population, while in the central districts and the districts south of Jerusalem they constitute not more than 5 per cent of the total.
23. Thus, though the main concentration of Jewish population is on the coastal plain, the Jerusalem area and the northern uplands, there is a considerable concentration of Arabs, even in these areas, since these are the most populous parts of the country.
B. RELEVANT ECONOMIC FACTORS
24. The economy of Palestine presents a fascinating study, both because of its rapid development as an area of mass immigration and because of peculiarities in structure due to the lack of homogeneity between the two major elements of the population. In addition, the economic life of Palestine has more recently been subject to the quickening and disturbing influence of an enormously increased demand arising from wartime and post-war military expenditure.
The two economies
25. Although the total population of Palestine is less than two million, its economic life presents the complex phenomenon of two distinctive economies one Jewish and one Arab—closely involved with one another and yet in essential features separate. Apart from certain parts of the country which are predominantly Jewish and others which are predominantly Arab in population, this "economic" separateness"44/ of the two communities does not correspond to any clear territorial divisions. It finds its expression in certain facts which may be briefly summarized as follows:
(1) Apart from a small number of experts, no Jewish workers are employed in Arab undertakings, and apart from citrus groves (where some Arabs work as seasonal labourers on Jewish farms), very few Arabs are employed in Jewish enterprises. Indeed, government service, the Potash Company and the Oil Refinery are almost the only places where Arabs and Jews meet as coworkers in the same organizations.
(2) There are considerable differences between the rates of wages for Arab and Jewish workers in similar occupations, in the size of investment, and in productivity and labour costs which can be explained only by lack of direct competition between the two groups.
(3) Arab agriculture is based to a considerable extent on cereal production, and tends to be subsistence farming. Only about 20 to 25 per cent of Arab agricultural production (excluding citrus) is marketed; Jewish agriculture, on the other hand, is largely intensive and cash-crop farming. About 75 per cent of Jewish agricultural production is sold on the market. It is marketed mainly through Jewish marketing organizations to Jewish retailers.
(4) The occupational structure of the Jewish population is similar to that of some homogeneous industrialized communities, while that of the Arabs corresponds more nearly to a subsistence type of agricultural society.
26. It must not, however, be supposed that Jews and Arabs in Palestine are not mutually interdependent in their economic life. Under the Mandate, there has been a unified administration, internal freedom of trade, a common transport system, a single currency and some development of public services in the interests of the population as a whole; and it is within this general framework that the differences of economic life between Jews and Arabs in other respects must be viewed. Moreover, the great investment of capital associated with Jewish immigration has, in developing the Jewish economy, profoundly affected Arab life, increasing money incomes and the extent to which Arabs have become concerned with an exchange economy. Competition and a sense of pride on the part of the Arabs have also had their share in raising Arab standards of living. Nevertheless, the economic relations between the two groups have something of the character of trade between different nations. As consumers, their separateness is less marked, but as producers (with the main exception of the citrus industry) they maintain a degree of separateness unyielding, thus far, to the pressure of the economic forces which might have been expected to bring about a greater degree of homogeneity. When all this is considered, it is not the few instances of the submergence of differences between Arab and Jew in common economic interests which are remarkable, but the fact that such instances are so few as to be unusual.
(d) THE MAIN FEATURES
27. Palestine is still mainly an agricultural country since about 65 per cent of the population gain a living directly from agriculture. Nevertheless, the country is not self-sufficient in food and is especially deficient in cereal production, about 50 per cent of its cereals being supplied by imports. According to government estimates, most of the land capable of being cultivated by present methods is under crops, and any considerable development depends on more advanced methods of farming and, more particularly, on more extensive irrigation. Jewish authorities claim, however, that government estimates are too conservative.
28. Despite its small area the country enjoys, owing to its topographical peculiarities, wide variations both of climates and soils which permit the production of a wide range of crops. The most important crops are citrus, cereals, olives, grapes, vegetables and tobacco. Citrus is the main export crop; before the trade was interrupted during the war it accounted for 80 per cent of the total value of exports. Under the stimulus of wartime demand, there was a considerable increase in the production of vegetables. Potato production in particular has been successfully developed.
(b) JEWISH AND ARAB AGRICULTURE
29. Apart from citrus production, which is approximately equally shared between Jewish and Arab cultivators, there are marked differences between Jewish and Arab agriculture. Arab cultivators produce over 80 per cent of the total cereal crops and more than 98 per cent of the olives. Jewish agriculture, however, is mainly devoted to mixed farming and is for the most part cash farming, about 75 per cent of the produce being sold on the market. The majority of Arab cultivators, on the other hand, are to a greater extent self-sufficient and retain on the average about 75 per cent of their total production for their own consumption. Naturally, these somewhat different aims of Arab and Jewish cultivators find an expression in different methods of farming and in different attitudes to the problems of rural life. For, although Arab cultivators are influenced, and increasingly so, by the money incentives of the market, they have the strong urges of all such partly self-sufficient producers to maintain their traditional methods and habits of life.
30. Jewish agriculture, on the other hand, is on the whole progressive, scientific and experimental. It is being increasingly developed in the direction of mixed farming and in very large part serves the needs of urban populations. It is highly organized not only in respect of production through the three hundred or so communal and co-operative settlements, but also in respect of the "Tnuva" and other co-operative organizations through which its products are marketed.
31. The Jews have brought to agriculture in Palestine both capital and skill which together have had a profound effect on the country, transforming some of it from waste and neglected land to fruitful ground, so that it may truly be said that they have made "the desert blossom as the rose." In this enterprise they have been impelled by the force of an ideal which has come to realization in the communal, co-operative and individual settlements. These have increased from five in 1882 to over 300 to day with a population of well over 150,000. Although the individual and co-operative settlements together considerably outnumber the communal settlements (kibbutzim), it is these latter which perhaps most completely express the spirit of sacrifice and co-operation through which this has been achieved.
(c) AGRICULTURAL METHODS
32. Palestine is an area of winter rainfall and summer drought, and agriculture in Palestine is dominated by that fact. Summer crops are possible under natural conditions only in regions where the rainfall is sufficient for the ground to retain moisture during the summer months; this fact as a rule necessitates ploughing the bare fallow in the winter months. Where land can be irrigated, the soil is usually capable of being intensively cultivated all the year around, and Jewish agriculturists have given much attention to the problems of irrigation. But where irrigation is not possible for reasons of cost or for lack of water, improvements in output can be obtained only by improvements in farming methods within the general framework of "extensive" farming. There 'is room for such improvement, particularly in regard to land reform which would consolidate divided holdings and such land as is held in common and distributed every two or four years among the tenants. Both these systems of tenancy are bad for farming practice and, in these and other respects, the complicated land laws and customs of Palestine require some reform. Nevertheless, it must not be considered that Arab agriculture' in Palestine is on a very low level. Within the range of these customs and technical knowledge, it is adapted to the conditions of climate and soil. Moreover, there has been considerable improvement in later years, partly as the result of the great development in Jewish agriculture and partly as the result of the increase in prices of agricultural products during and since the war. The production of vegetables by Arab cultivators has greatly increased recently; and all though the yields of Arab farmers are lower than those of Jewish cultivators, their production costs also are often lower.
(d) RECENT TRENDS IN JEWISH AND ARAB AGRICULTURE
33. The general nature and relative importance of Arab and Jewish agriculture are summarized in the following table for the year 1944-1945.
Value of agricultural production from main groups of crops in the season 1944-1945, distinguishing between Arab and Jewish cultivation45/
Jewish Arab Total
Grains 497,048 4,403,409 4,900,457 Vegetables 1,745,870 5,113,553 6,859,423 Fodder 951,178 156,847 1,108,025 Fruits (excluding citrus) 1,379,620 3,139,374 4,518,994 Olives 53,235 3,320,320 3,373,555 Melons 83,975 969,630 1,053,605 TOTALS 4,710,926 17,103,133 21,814,059
34. During and since the war, there has been a rapid development of production in certain fields of agriculture. Vegetable production in particular has greatly increased, from 129,000 tons in 1939 to 245.000 in 1945. Grain production, on the other hand, has not expanded, fluctuations in output being mainly explained by weather conditions. Thus, in 1939 grain production was estimated at 242,000 tons, and in 1945 at 209,000. There has also been a steady increase in the output of fruit (excluding citrus), from 131,000 tons in 1939 to 174,000 in 1945.
35. Both Jewish and Arab cultivators have greatly benefited from the rise in agricultural prices since the beginning of the war. The only exception to this is in respect of the citrus producers, since export was practically at a stand still. Citrus groves suffered in consequence from lack of attention, and the capacity of the in industry has declined to some extent. The Government assisted citrus producers by advances of more than £.P. 3,250,000, and production is now rapidly moving towards the pre war levels. Ex ports in the 1945-1946 season were equal to more than 5 million cases valued at nearly £.P. 3,500,000 as compared with 15 million cases valued at about f.P. 4,500,000 in 1938-1939.
36. Since 1941, the citrus industry has been controlled by a Citrus Control Board consisting of three official members and eight producer members, Jew and Arabs. In 1941 it was decided also to set up a Citrus Marketing Board of two official members and four other members chosen as representatives of the Jewish and Arab producers. This latter Board, which has had to handle the problem of surplus fruit due' to the loss of the export trade, has worked satisfactorily on the basis of equal export quotas to Jewish and Arab producers. The citrus industry is, in fact, the one considerable economic activity where Jews and Arabs are producing for the same market under similar conditions. Most of the producers are relatively small-scale producers and their identity of economic interest has, in the circumstances, provided a basis for co-operation.
(e) IRRIGATION AND LAND DEVELOPMENT
37. Any considerable development of agriculture in Palestine depends to a large degree on irrigation. The only extensive areas of good land which are undeveloped are the Huleh Valley in the extreme north-east and the very much more extensive semi-desert area of the northern part of the Beersheba sub-district. The former is a swamp which could be reclaimed by draining, and in respect of which a Jewish concession originally granted by the Turkish Government is in existence. The concession has been of no value, in part because it needs to be extended to a larger area to be made effective, and in part because of the interests of the Palestine Electric Company in the water-flow lower down the valley. Altogether, an area of 150,000 dunams (one dunam equals 1,000 square metres or about 1/4 acre) could be reclaimed.
As this is the area of the headwaters of the Jordan and borders on Syria and Lebanon, it is of great importance to the whole of Palestine in the event of any large-scale irrigation project based on use of the waters of the upper Jordan.
38. The semi-desert Beersheba area in the south has at present a settled population of 7,000 (mostly in the town of Beersheba) and about 90,000 nomadic Bedouins. The area has a good soil but insufficient rain to support a denser population. It can only be developed by irrigation. There are small Jewish settlements in the south of this area (sometimes loosely described as the Negeb) which are at present experimental and based on water brought by pipeline at great cost from a considerable distance. The further development of this area remains, therefore, problematic, being dependent either on the discovery of nonsaline underground water at economical depths or the development of reservoirs to store the winter rainfall over fairly wide areas.38/
(a) GENERAL DEVELOPMENT
39. Although Palestine is still in an occupational sense predominantly an agricultural country, industry has now emerged as the largest contributory to the natural income. There have been two major periods of industrial development in Palestine: the 1933 to 1939 period, when the dominant influence was the influx of refugee immigrants from Western Europe and particularly Germany, with capital and technical and managerial skill; and the 1941 to 1945 period, when the protection resulting from 'the closing of outside sources of supply and the great demands of the military authorities in the Middle East both contributed to an enormous stimulus.
40. Some idea of the magnitude of this development is provided by an estimate of Jewish capital invested in industry and of industrial equipment imported into Palestine. Between 1925 and 1929, it is estimated that £.P.47/ 1,000,000 of Jewish capital was invested in Palestine industry. The amount invested during the period 1930 to 1932 was £.P. 2,500,000; and the value of imports of industrial equipment over the same period was £.P. 606,000. During 1938 and 1939, the investment of capital was £.P. 7,000,000; and the value of industrial equipment imported was nearly £.P. 5,000,000. From 1940 to 1944, the investment of capital in industry was f.P. 6,000,000; and the value of imports of industrial equipment was just over £ P. 1,000,00048/
41. An index of employment in manufacturing industry in all communities shows the following trend:49/
1939 1942 1943 1944 1945 100 200 214 209 221
42. The industrial development is also reflected in the structure of imports in which raw materials play a greater, and wholly manufactured goods a lesser, part. In 1939, raw materials and unmanufactured articles were 10 per tent of total imports, while wholly manufactured goods were 64 per cent. In 1946 raw materials were 32 per cent of the total, and manufactured goods 41 per cent.
(&) THE NATURE OF PALESTINE INDUSTRY
43. Palestine is not very favorably endowed for industrial production apart from its geographical location, which is of considerable importance in relation to the whole Middle East. It has no raw materials of any consequence apart from the Dead Sea minerals. Nevertheless, the influx of immigrants with developed tastes for a variety of consumer goods, and the development of electric power by the hydroelectric installation on the Jordan and by oil driven plants at Haifa and Tel-Aviv, provided an important foundation for the industrial development of the last fifteen years.
44. The most important industries are textiles, food production, chemicals and light metal industries producing a variety of products such as doors, window frames, household articles and a number of other products. During the war, there was an important development in diamond cutting and polishing as a result of the settlement in Palestine of skilled diamond cutters from Europe. This industry has become important in the export trade of Palestine; in 1946 the value of cut and polished diamonds exported was £.P. 5,500,000. The chemical industry, including the potash produced from the Dead Sea, is now relatively important, and is one of the industries which expanded rapidly during the war.
45. Broadly speaking, the industries which have taken root in Palestine are either consumption-goods industries, industries based to a great extent on the local market, industries whose location is not determined by the presence of raw materials but which depend on local skill as does the diamond industry, or in some few cases (as, for example, the potash industry and some food-processing industries) those which depend on local raw materials. It must be remembered that almost all these industries are small-scale enterprises.
46. According to the 1942 census of industry, 75 to 80 per cent of all persons engaged in industry were employed in Jewish-owned enterprises and about 90 per cent of the total number of workers in industry are Jewish. In the main, Jewish workers are employed in Jewish concerns and Arabs in Arab-owned industries, although there are a few exceptions to this. The most developed Arab industries are milling, tobacco manufacturing and some branches of the textile and metal trades. The purely Arab soap industry at Nablus is worthy of mention since its products are bought by Moslems in countries outside Palestine. By and large, however, Arab industry in Palestine is much less developed and less capitalized than Jewish industry.
(c) THE CONCESSIONS
47. Reference should be made to the electricity concessions, the Dead Sea concession and the oil concession. Electric power is supplied to Palestine by two companies, the Jerusalem Electric and Public Service Corporation and the Palestine Electric Corporation, which are operating under the terms of concessions, the former covering Jerusalem and the latter covering other areas in Palestine. The Palestine Electric Corporation is working two concessions: one granted to Mr. Phineas Rutenberg in 1921 for the purpose of utilizing the Auja basin for supplying electrical energy and for irrigation within the Jaffa district; and the Jordan Concession for the utilization of the waters of the River Jordan and its basin, including the Yarmuk River, for the purpose of supplying and distributing electrical energy throughout Palestine and Transjordan.
48. The Palestine Potash Company was granted a concession in 1930, for a period of seventy-five years, for the extraction of salts and minerals from the Dead Sea. The company is operating plants at the northern and southern extremities of the Dead Sea. 49. Concessions have been granted to the Anglo-Iranian Oil and to the Iraq Petroleum Companies to construct and operate pipelines to a terminal point on the Palestine coast at Acre Bay if practicable, with the right to load and unload oil within the oildock at Haifa harbour. The right to construct refineries at Haifa was also included, and the right was transferred by agreement to the Consolidated Refineries Limited, which established a refinery at Haifa in 1939.
50. The concession companies enjoy certain privileges, such as immunity from. the customs duties on products imported for the work of the companies.
(a) THE MAIN FEATURES
51. The main features of the foreign trade statistics of Palestine which are relevant to an understanding of the present situation and future possibilities are: (1) the change in the volume and composition of foreign trade since 1939; (2) the large adverse balance of payments and dependence of capital imports; and (3) the trade relations of Palestine with other Middle East countries.
52. From the beginning of the mandate until 1940, there was a great increase in the total foreign trade of Palestine. In 1922 total exports were f.P. 4,000,000 and total imports £.P. 5,700.000. In 1939 exports were £.P. 5,100,000 and imports £.P. 14,600,000. During the recent war, the values of imports and exports rose, largely owing the price increases. The volume of trade increased only in 1945 and still more in. 194$. Developments since 1939 are summarized in. the table below:
Total imports and exports of Palestine50/ by value in 1939, 1945 and 1946
1939 1945 1946
(thousands of Palestine pounds)
Imports 14,633 40,691 70,432 Exports 5,468 20,396 24,485 Excess of imports 9,165 20,295 45,945
53. During the war, the virtual cessation of citrus exports had a great effect on the structure of exports. This, however, was a purely temporary phenomenon, and it is evident that citrus exports will again become a dominant element in total exports. At the same time, with the greater diversity of economic activity in Palestine brought about as a result of wartime expansion, it is to be expected that Palestine will be able to export a greater variety of products, including some manufactured products. Indeed, there is a necessity for Palestine to increase its exports of such products if it is to maintain, its high rate of imports.
(b) CAPITAL IMPORTS
54. Palestine depends on foreign trade to secure, by import, food (especially wheat, meat and cattle fodder), raw materials, machinery and equipment which have been and are essential to its development. The financing of these imports is covered only in part by exports. There remains, indeed, as a persistent feature, a remarkably large balance of imports over exports which is financed by imports of capital consisting mainly of funds coming from world Jewry, capital brought in by immigrants, and funds coming to religious institutions.50/ During and since the war, there has also been a very large military expenditure by the British Government. Largely as a result of this war expenditure, there are now sterling balances estimated to be about 125,000,000 pounds sterling, held mainly by private Palestine citizens.
(c) IMPORTANCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST
55. Owing to its position in the Middle East, the further economic development of Palestine depends to a considerable degree on increasing its trade with other Middle East countries. During the war there was a great increase in the proportion of trade with Middle Eastern countries to total trade. Although this trend was mainly influenced by transport difficulties and isolation from other markets, it is also a natural line of development for Palestinian trade. Its importance during and since the war is indicated by the fact that in 1939 only 17.7 per cent of Palestine's imports and 10: per cent of its exports represented exchanges with Middle Eastern countries, while in 1946 the percentages were 39 and 31 respectively. These proportions are partly influenced by the fact that exports to the United Kingdom were lower in 1946 than in 1939 on account of the temporary decline of. citrus exports.
(d) THE ARAB BOYCOTT
56. In 1946 exports to Arab countries were adversely influenced by the boycott of Jewish products. Although it is not possible to determine how effective the boycott is, there can be no doubt that it could seriously hamper industrial development in Palestine if it were indefinitely maintained.
The wartime inflation
(a) THE MAIN CAUSES
57. In common with most countries, Palestine experienced considerable inflation during and since the war. The inflation in Palestine was greater than in the United States of America or Great Britain, but somewhat less than in some other Middle East countries. It was due, on the side of demand, to a large expansion of income and, on the side of supply, to an inability of output to respond to the increase in demand for consumer goods on account of (1) the cutting off of imports, (2) the diversion of local production to military needs, and (3) the limited capacity of agriculture to increase output in a short period. The extent of the inflation is indicated approximately by the cost of living index as follows:52/
Cost-of-living index for Palestine for December of each year (Pre-war 100)
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 131 166 211 230 238 252 275
58. The main cause of the increase in income was the military expenditure of the British Government, which was as follows:53/
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 (millions of Palestine pounds) 8.5 20.7 25.4 31.5 25..0 24.3 23.5
59. When the war broke out, stocks of commodities in Palestine were fairly high and imports fell seriously only in 1941. By 1943 and 1944, military expenditure and the pressure of demand on the food supply reached a peak. There was a considerable expansion in the out-put of food and an increase in imports from Middle East countries at high prices, but this was not sufficient to prevent further fairly modest price rises. Since the war, the maintenance of military expenditure at the peak war rates has prevented the: level of incomes from falling, and although the supply situation has improved, owing to an increase in imports in 1946 and 1947, the increases in supply have not been, sufficient to prevent further price rises.
(b) WAGES AND PRICES
60. Wages in Palestine responded fairly quickly to increases in the cost of living as a result of the acute shortage of labour which developed. Wage increases took the form of increases in basic rates and allowances directly linked with the cost of living index. Thus, average industrial earnings between 1939 and 1945 increased in the case of Arabs by 200 per cent and, in the case of Jews, by 258 per cent. Earnings in some agricultural occupations increased even more than average industrial earnings, and in the construction trades the increase in earnings of unskilled workers between 1939 and 1945 was 405 per cent for Arabs and 329 per cent for Jews. On the whole, therefore, it seems that, despite the price increases, there was not much of a fall in real wages, while for some groups of workers real wages actually increased.
(c) AGRICULTURAL DEBT
61. One effect of the wartime price increases has been to relieve the cultivators of the burden of debt. An inquiry made before the war indicated that the average Arab cultivator was considerably burdened by debt, which in some instances amounted to as much as the cultivator's total annual cash income. At the same time, the increased demand for labour offered an additional source of income; in consequence, the income and standard of living of many Arab producers have increased.
(d) RECONVERSION TO PEACETIME CONDITIONS
62. In relation to its capacity in 1939, Palestine industry was greatly expanded in response to war demands. During the war 130,000 people were either in the armed forces, working on military construction, or on production for military orders. Since the war, the reabsorption of this labour force has had no significant effect on the labour market. This is mainly accounted for by:
(a) The high volume, of demand which has been maintained by the continuance of military expenditure at a level which is about 20 per cent of the total national income, together with the delayed demand which could not be satisfied during the war.
(b) A continued shortage of supplies of both industrial and agricultural consumer goods.
63. Although, for these reasons, there has been no problem of unemployment and no great difficulty in adapting the war-expanded industrial capacity to non-war demands, there are inherent in the situation some difficulties of longer term adjustment.
64. Costs of food production on Jewish mixed-crop farms in Palestine are relatively high and the pressure to maintain industrial wages consequently very strong; since the rise in industrial wages has not been altogether offset by increases in output per worker, the labour costs of Palestine industry are high. When the world shortages of consumer goods are overcome, Palestine industry will be subject, both at home and in external markets, to the competition of lower cost production. To the extent that a fall in food prices would permit a fall in wages, this situation would improve with a fall in world wheat prices, since Palestine at present imports wheat from other Middle East countries at very high prices.
65. It remains to be considered, However, that a substantial fall in military expenditure, unless offset by investment from other sources, would bring about a fall in income and in prices.
66. Should this occur, a period of economic depression and unemployment would be the natural consequence. Thus, the Palestine economy may be expected in the near future to have to adjust itself to the double effect of increasing industrial competition and a fall in income as a result of the reduction of military expenditure.
67. Owing to its associations for three world religions, Palestine is likely to attract a great many tourists when peace is restored there and when world economic conditions improve. Such tourist traffic is likely to provide a considerable source of income. This would, of course, offset in some degree the effects which might otherwise follow from a heavy drop in present military expenditures.
C. PALESTINE UNDER THE MANDATE
68. On 25 April 1920, the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers agreed to assign the Mandate for Palestine to Great Britain on the understanding that the Balfour Declaration54/ would be put into effect. The draft mandate was confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations on 24 July 1922, and entered into force formally on 29 September 1923. Following its occupation by British troops in 1917-1918, Palestine had been controlled by the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration of the United Kingdom Government. Anticipating the establishment of the Mandate, the United Kingdom Government, as from 1 July 1920, replaced the military with a civilian administration, headed by a High Commissioner ultimately responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in Great Britain.
69. The preamble and articles of the mandate are reproduced as Annex 20. As a perspective for reviewing the administration of the mandate in Palestine, the following obligations are of major significance:
(1) The placing of the country "under such political, administrative arid economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home, as laid down in the preamble . . ." (article 2) considered together with the obligation to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions" arid "encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency referred to in article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes" (article 6).
(2) The safeguarding of the "civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion" (article 2); taken together with the proviso in the Balfour Declaration reproduced in the preamble, "it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine" and with the similar proviso of "ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced . . ." (article 6).
(3) The placing of the country "under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure . . . the development of self-governing institutions . . ." (article 2) and the encouragement "so far as circumstances permit," of "local autonomy" (article 3).
(4) The responsibility for the welfare of Palestine as a community: Thus, to "safeguard the interests of the community in connexion with the development of the country" with special reference to making provision for public ownership or control of natural resources, public works, services and utilities; for introducing an appropriate land system and promoting its close settlement and intensive cultivation (article 11); together with the provision in article 2 safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, and that of article 15: "No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language."
(5) The responsibilities regarding the Holy Places55/ (articles 13 and 14).
70. Under article 25 of the Mandate, the mandatory Power, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, was empowered to withhold, in the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine, application of those provisions of the Mandate (other than those in articles 15, 16 and 18) considered to be inapplicable. In September 1922, the Council of the League approved a British Government memorandum which defined the boundaries of Transjordan and excluded it inter alia from the provisions of the Palestine Mandate regarding the Jewish National Home.
The mandate in practice
71. The constitutional basis of the Government of Palestine established by the mandatory Power is set out in the Palestine orders-in-council, 1922 to 1940. The original Palestine order-in-council of 10 August 192256/ was amended in 1923 to provide57/ that the High Commissioner,
without prejudice to powers inherent in or reserved by the Order to the King (article 89 of the 1922 Order) and subject to instructions given him by His Majesty's Government, "shall have full power and authority ... to promulgate such ordinances as may be necessary for the peace, order and good government of Palestine . . . ." It is specifically provided, however, that no ordinance promulgated should restrict "complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, save in so far as is required for the maintenance of public order and morals" or which "shall tend to discriminate in any way between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language." Of particular relevance to the Administration's discharge of the mandate is the further provision that "no ordinance shall be promulgated which shall be in any way repugnant to or inconsistent with the provisions of the Mandate, and no ordinance which concerns matters dealt with specifically by the provisions of the Mandate shall be promulgated until a draft thereof has been communicated to a Secretary of State and approved by him with or without amendment."
72. In accordance with the Orders-in-Council referred to above, the administration of Palestine is carried on by a High Commissioner responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the United Kingdom Government. He is assisted by an Executive Council consisting of senior officers appointed from time to time, and including ex officio the Chief Secretary (the principal executive officer of the Government), the Attorney General and the Financial Secretary. In 1923, powers of legislation were conferred on the High Commissioner and provision was made for an Advisory Council which the High Commissioner is bound to consult before ordinances are promulgated. The Advisory Council is composed of Executive Council members, heads of major Government departments and district commissioners. Centrally, the Government is organized into various departments responsible for the discharge of prescribed duties. For general administrative purposes, Palestine is divided into six administrative districts,58/ each under the control of a district commissioner acting as representative of the Government in his district and responsible to the Chief Secretary. He is assisted by a deputy district commissioner and one or more assistant district commissioners. In 1945, the total number of government employees was approximately 45,000, of which some 68 per cent were Arab, 21 per cent Jewish and 10 per cent British (reduced to some 4 per cent if police other than officers are omitted). Government posts of any importance including those of the level of assistant district commissioners59/ are held by British officials, though it was submitted in evidence to the Committee that since 1939, in accordance with the White Paper, attempts were being made to bring Palestinians into more responsible posts.60/
73. In August 1937 the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, in the course of its preliminary opinion to the Council of the League on the Palestine Royal Commission (Peel) Report issued in June 1937, made the following pronouncement:
"The present Mandate became almost unworkable once it was publicly declared to be so by a British Royal Commission speaking with the twofold authority conferred upon it by its impartiality and unanimity and by the Government of the mandatory Power itself."61/
74. In its own statement of policy62/ issued simultaneously with the report of the Royal Commission, the mandatory Power had found itself "driven to the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the aspirations of the Arabs and those of the Jews in Palestine" and "that these aspirations cannot be satisfied under the terms of the present Mandate . . . ." It is in the light of this background of-deepening conflict intensified by the events of the succeeding ten years, that the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine feels it proper to view the working of the Mandate in Palestine. The "Jewish National Home" and Arab rights
75. Few phrases in history have provoked such lasting contention as "Jewish National Home." Twenty years after the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, the Royal Commission devoted a chapter63/ of its report to a careful appraisal of the relevant texts and historical antecedents in order to clarify the meaning of the phrase.
76. Regarding the political implications of the term "National Home," the finding of the Commission is unequivocal:
"We have been permitted to examine the records which bear upon the question and it is clear to us that the words "the establishment in Palestine of the National Home' were the outcome of a compromise between those Ministers who contemplated the ultimate establishment of a Jewish State and those who did not. It is obvious in any case that His Majesty's Government could not commit itself to the establishment of the Jewish State. It could only undertake to facilitate the growth of a Home. It would depend mainly on the zeal and enterprise of the Jews, whether the Home would grow big enough to become a State."64/
77. As far as the mandatory Power is concerned, the statement65/ of British policy in Palestine which was issued in June 1922 by Mr. Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, has remained the authoritative interpretation.66/ The following excerpts express the substance of the statement:
"Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English. His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine. In this connexion, it has been observed with satisfaction that at the meeting of the Zionist Congress, the supreme governing body of the Zionist Organization, held at Carlsbad in September 1921, a resolution was passed expressing as the official statement of Zionist aims 'the determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on terms of unity and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common home into a flourishing community, the upbuilding of which may assure to each of its peoples an undisturbed national development. ". . . When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connexion."
78. Commenting on the above passage and its context, the Royal Commission concluded as follows:
"This definition of the National Home has sometimes been taken to preclude the establishment of a Jewish State. But, though the phraseology was clearly intended to conciliate, as far as might be, Arab antagonism to the National Home, there is nothing in it to prohibit the ultimate establishment of a Jewish State, and Mr. Churchill himself has told us in evidence that no such prohibition was intended."67/
79. While there have been grounds for controversy regarding the precise implication of the term "National Home," a perhaps more stubborn difficulty has emerged from the undertakings of the Mandate towards the Jewish and Arab inhabitants of Palestine respectively: the so-called "dual obligation." The general terms in which the Mandate is phrased have invited attempts to discover in them some primacy of purpose. In 1930, the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League, of Nations satisfied itself "that the obligation laid down by the Mandate in regard to the two sections of the population are of equal weight."68/ Approaching the question from a strict examination of the terms of the Mandate, the Royal Commission found that "unquestionably, however, the primary purpose of the Mandate, as expressed in its preamble and its articles, is to promote the establishment of the Jewish National Home."69/ (Italics as in text). From a different context we have the opinion of Mr. Churchill, while addressing the House of Commons on 23 May 1939, that the intention of the 1922 White Paper was "to make it clear that the establishment of self-governing institutions in Palestine was to be subordinated to the paramount pledge and obligation of establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine."70/
Development of the National Home
8O. In 1937, the members of the Palestine Royal Commission summed up their impressions thus: "Twelve years ago the National Home was an experiment, today it is a going concern."71/ Within the decade since their report was issued, the Jewish population of Palestine has increased from 400,000 to some 625,000.72/ In place of the 203 agricultural settlements containing some 97,000, there are now more than 300 such settlements and small towns with a population of some 140,000. The larger towns and cities of the Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine) have likewise greatly expanded both in size and amenities. In particular Tel Aviv, with its present population of over 180,000, its highly developed civic organization, its cultural activities and other indications of a diversified community life, cannot fail to impress. Remembering the deserted sandiness from which Tel-Aviv has sprung, one can well understand the pride which the Jewish community takes in its creation.
81. Membership in the Jewish community is virtually automatic73/ for all Jews aged eighteen or more who have lived in Palestine for at least three months. All adults in the community from the age of twenty participate in voting for the Elected Assembly, from which is formed the Vaad Leumi (National Council).74/ The Vaad Leumi maintains, almost exclusively from its own tax revenue and resources,75/ in co-operation with other community organizations, the Jewish school system and a network of public health and social services. Within the Elected Assembly may be found representatives of diversified political opinions, including influential groups76/ which do not fully share the official programme of the Jewish Agency. Similarly, varied political opinion is expressed in the Histadruth (Jewish Federation of Labour), which includes in its membership of some 160,000 (approximately 75 per cent of the total Jewish working population) not only most industrial workers but farmers and professional workers.
82. In the life of the Jewish community, the Jewish Agency occupies a special place in virtue both of its status under article 4 of the mandate77/ and as a representative organization of world Jewry. Organized in Palestine into some twenty departments corresponding in general to the departments of State in a self-governing country, the Agency concerns itself with every aspect of Jewish economic and social development in Palestine and exercises a decisive influence in major questions of policy and administration, particularly in regard to immigration and agricultural development.
83. The Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine) is thus a highly organized and closely-knit society which, partly on a basis of communal effort, has created a national life distinctive enough to merit the Royal Commission's title of "a State within a State." Proud of its own achievements in self-government and cultural life, it is sensitive to any apparent lack of appreciation of what it regards as its just and reasonable needs. Its initiative, purposefulness and self-confidence react strongly against a situation in which it finds itself under an "alien bureaucracy."78/ Its memories of the Arab rising of 1936-39, and more recent anti-Jewish pogroms in Middle Eastern countries, coupled with the immediate background of Hitlerism, keep it constantly vigilant and preoccupied with securing adequate defense for the National Home.
Immigration and land settlement
84. When the Mandate was first approved in 1922, there were only some 84.000 Jews settled in Palestine. While immigration was therefore regarded as essential for the growth of the potential National Home, some form of control was necessitated by the proviso of article 6 that the "rights and position of other sections of the population" were not to be prejudiced in consequence. The regulative principle adopted by the mandatory Power in 1922 was explained in the statement of policy (Churchill memorandum):
". . . immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment."
This principle, later reaffirmed in Mr. Ramose Macdonald’s letter of 13 February 1931, to Dr. Weizmann, was accepted by the Zionist Organization79/ at the time, and was also endorsed by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations.80/
85. By 1937 the total Jewish population had reached nearly 400,000. The first three years of the Nazi terror in Germany (1933 to 1935) alone brought in some 135,000 immigrants. In 1936, however, there occurred incidents which grew rapidly into the widespread Arab campaign of terrorism and armed resistance directed both at the Jewish population and at the police and military of the Administration.81/ It was in these circumstances that the Royal Commission in 1937 came to the conclusion that, in determining the volume of immigration, "the principle of economic absorptive capacity ... . is at the present time inadequate. . . . Political and psychological factors should be taken into account."82/
86. Since 1939 Jewish immigration into Palestine has been determined in accordance with the White Paper of 1939. 83/ The major decisions regarding immigration deserve notice here.
(1) During the five years following 1939, providing economic absorptive capacity permitted, some 75,000 Jews in all were to be admitted:
10,000 in each year together with a further 25,000 Jewish refugees as soon as adequate provision for their maintenance could be assured. The intention of the mandatory Power was to bring the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the total population of Palestine.
(2) After this five-year period, "no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it."84/
(3) Illegal immigration would be checked by "further preventive measures," and the numbers of any illegal immigrants entering Palestine would be deducted from the yearly quota for immigration.
87. The substance of the mandatory Power's attitude may be gleaned from the following excerpt from the White Paper:85/
". . . His Majesty's Government do not read either the statement of policy of 1922 or the letter of 1931 as implying that the Mandate requires them, for all time and in all circumstances, to facilitate the immigration of Jews into Palestine subject only to consideration of the country's economic absorptive capacity. Nor do they find anything in the Mandate or in subsequent statements of policy to support the view that the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine cannot be effected unless immigration is allowed to continue indefinitely. If immigration has an adverse effect on the economic position in the country, it should clearly be restricted; and equally, if it has a seriously damaging effect on the political position in the country, that is a factor that should not be ignored."
88. The White Paper of 1939 also substantially modified the policy of the Administration towards Jewish land settlement. Stressing the obligation under article VI of the Mandate regarding the "rights and position" of non-Jewish sections of the population, the White Paper declared that:
"The Reports of several expert commissions have indicated that, owing to the natural growth of the Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of Arab land to Jews, there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land, whilst in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created."
The White Paper's land policy was put into effect through the land transfer regulations86/ of 1940. Under these regulations, the country was divided into three zones: in the first two87/ (covering 95 per cent of the area of Palestine) the transfer of land to Jews by Palestinian Arabs was either prohibited or required the sanction of the Government; in the third or "free" zone an area of some 332,000 acres (5 per cent of the total area of Palestine), mainly in the coastal plain but including land around Jerusalem, all land purchased was unrestricted.
89. The White Paper of 1939 was considered at length during the thirty-sixth session of the Permanent Mandates Commission in June 1939. The substance of its findings, as reported to the Council of the League were:88/
(a) "That the policy set out . . . was not in accordance with the interpretation which, in agreement with the mandatory Power and the Council, the Commission had always placed upon the Palestine Mandate";
(b) That, regarding the possibility of a new interpretation of the Mandate, with which the White Paper would not be at variance, four members "did not feel able to state that the policy of the White Paper was in conformity with the mandate . . .", while the other three members of the Commission considered that "existing circumstances would justify the policy of the White Paper, provided that the Council did not oppose it,"
90. The reaction of Arab leaders, who were much concerned with the constitutional proposals,89/ was officially to reject the mandatory Power's policy as falling short of Arab demands. Jewish opinion may be summed up in a sentence taken from the letter90/ dated 31 May 1939 of the President of the Jewish Agency to the High Commissioner for Palestine:
"It [the White Paper] subjects the Jewish National Home to Arab rule; it perpetuates the Jewish minority position; it places Jewish immigration at the mercy of the Arabs; in short, it envisages the termination of the mandate by jettisoning its primary purpose."
91. Against the background of an active Jewish war effort and intensified Nazi persecution of the remnants of European Jewry, enforcement of the White Paper provisions stimulated efforts to bring illegal immigrants91/ into Palestine. The action of the Administration in circumventing illegal immigration by the seizure of immigrant ships led to constant and serious friction accompanied by mounting Jewish resistance.
92. The consequent rising tension between the Administration and the Jewish community was in no way eased by the announcement of the Biltmore Programme adopted by the Zionist Conference in New York on 11 May 1942, which, inter alia, called for unlimited immigration and for Palestine to be established as a Jewish Commonwealth. From 1945 onwards, the Jewish resistance to the enforcement of the White Paper was accompanied by increasing acts of violence, culminating in 1946-1947 in the underground activities of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the so-called Stern Group. Since the July 1946 attack by terrorists on the headquarters of the Administration Secretariat in the King David Hotel, Jerusalem, representatives of the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi have from time to time condemned terrorist activities, and there have been some signs of active opposition to such methods on the part of the Haganah.92/ By June 1946, however, the breach had widened so far that the Administration found it necessary to arrest and detain on grounds of public security some 2,600 Jews, including four members of the Jewish Agency Executive.
93. Yet the present difficult circumstances should not distort the perspective of solid achievement arising from the joint efforts of the Jewish community and the Administration in laying the foundations of the National Home. In 1937 the Royal Commission concluded that, as far as immigration was concerned, "the mandatory has so far fully implemented its obligation to facilitate the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish People in Palestine."93 At the same time, the Commission laid down its view regarding the future: "This does not mean that the National Home should be crystallized at its present size. . . . We cannot accept the view that the mandatory, having facilitated the establishment of the National Home, would be justified in shutting its doors."94/
94. Two years later, the White Paper expressed the conviction of the mandatory that, with a defined addition of a specified number of immigrants, the National Home must be regarded as fully established. That policy, modified by the admission for the time being of 1,500 Jewish immigrants per month, still stands. The recommendation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews, while in substance accepted in the mandatory Power's constitutional proposals95/ of 1946-1947, was not put into practice. Similarly, no effect has been given to the Anglo-American Committee's recommendation for the rescinding of the Land Transfer Regulations and providing for "freedom in the sale, lease or use of land irrespective of race, community or creed."
Rights and position of the Arabs96/
95. The Mandate speaks in general terms only of safeguarding or not prejudicing the "civil and religious rights" and the "rights and position" of the Arab community in Palestine. Regarding interpretation, in January 1918 the British Government assured King Hussein in the "Hogarth Message", that the aspirations of the Jews for a return to Palestine would be realized "in so tar as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political." This interpretation, however, was not officially made known to the Permanent Mandates Commission until 1939 97/ nor was it acceptable to the Commission as a whole.
96. Whatever the intended implication of "civil" rights, Arab leaders in Palestine have consistently denied the legality of the Mandate and demanded cessation of Jewish immigration, independence, and full national self-government.98/ Actions by the mandatory Power and the Palestine Administration designed to safe-guard Arab rights under the Mandate have thus tended to be judged in accordance with these unchanging criteria.
97. Setting aside these ultimate standards of reference for the moment, one may find in the record of the Palestine Administration evidence of persistent effort to effect gradual improvements in the economic and social condition of the Arab population. In examining such evidence, particularly in regard to land utilization and agricultural development, due account has to be taken of the pioneer nature of the task which the Administration faced:
"The country was disease-ridden, under-developed, poverty-stricken; it had the scantiest facilities for education, virtually no industry, and an indifferent agricultural regime. Internally it was given to lawlessness and it was open to the predatory attention of nomad bands from the desert. To make self-advancement possible and to open the way for private enterprise, State action in all these fields had been required."99/
Regard must be had also for the recurring periods of civil disturbance, particularly in 1921, 1929-1930, 1936-1938 and 1945-1947, which have both diverted attention from economic and social development and drained budgetary resources.100/ However, though not formally accepted by the most influential Arab leaders, the 1939 White Paper's restrictions on Jewish immigration and land settlement were plainly designed to protect Arab rights as understood by the mandatory Power.
98. At the same time, one can well understand Arab criticism ,that more has not been done to accelerate the tempo of Arab development in economic and social affairs. It is pointed out that during 1944-1946, for example, the Government spent each year only some 3 per cent of its total expenditure on public health and less than 4 per cent on education. The Government's responsibilities have been primarily directed towards the Arabs since the Jews maintain, at a very much higher per capita cost, their own community health and education services. Yet, despite serious and recognized inadequacies in the health services, an improvement in the general health conditions of the Arab community is indicated in the substantial reduction of the child mortality rate during the past twenty years.101/ In regard to education the responsibility, which the Administration has assumed, of eliminating illiteracy has by no means yet been discharged; and the Government system of public education "still covers only some 57 per cent of Arab boys of school age and 23 per cent of the girls.102/ The criticism which the Royal Commission in 1936-1937 expressed103/ of the lack of both primary and secondary, not to mention higher, education facilities for the Arabs would still seem to apply, and there can be no question as to the dissatisfaction in the Arab community with the slowness of the progress that has been realized.
99. In view of the complexity of the issues, any general estimate as to the effects of the mandatory regime on Arab economic and social welfare is not to be made lightly. In 1937 the Royal Commission commented:104/
"Our conclusion, then, is that, broadly speaking, the Arabs have shared to a considerable degree in material benefits which Jewish immigration has brought to Palestine. The obligation of the Mandate in this respect has been observed. The economic position of the Arabs, regarded as a whole, has not so far been prejudiced by the establishment of the National Home."
Ten years later the Government of Palestine has affirmed substantially the same conclusion:105/
"Over all, the conditions of the Arab community have more materially improved during the past twenty-seven years, as is shown perhaps most emphatically in their rapid increase through natural cause; their standard of living has been greatly raised; and their ability to provide for themselves in a competitive world has been enhanced."
100. However, even if it were incontrovertibly established that in economic and social life the Arab community had appreciably benefited from the establishment of the National Home and the mandatory regime, it is plain, as the Royal Commission of 1936 emphasized, that such considerations weigh little with those who direct Arab political life. The basic premise of Arab political leaders is that self-government in an independent State from which all further Jewish immigration is barred alone offers any acceptable guarantee of their "rights and position."
101. The mandatory Power has attempted, within the limits of its interpretation of the "dual obligation" of the mandate, to provide some satisfaction of Arab political desires. Apart from steps taken to develop self-governing institutions, which clearly are of primary significance for Arab interests, the Administration has endeavoured to foster representative institutions within the Arab community itself. Thus, in 1921, under an Order of the Administration, the Supreme Moslem Council was created for the control and management of Awqa106/ and Sharia affairs in Palestine. Again in 1923, the mandatory Power "proposed to establish an Arab Agency which was to occupy "a position exactly analogous to "that accorded to the Jewish Agency under article 4 of the Mandate". The offer was unanimously declined by Arab leaders of the day on the grounds that it "would not satisfy the aspirations of the Arab people".
102. The Royal Commission of 1936-37 was impressed by the fact that the Arab national movement.
". . . is now sustained by a far more efficient and comprehensive political machine than existed in earlier years. The centralization of control . . . has now been as fully effected as is possible in any Arab country. All the political parties present a 'common front' and their leaders sit together on the Arab Higher Committee. Christian as well as Moslem Arabs are represented on it. There is no opposition party."107/
103. Subsequent events have confirmed this trend. It is true that, in 1937 and again in 1939 on the question of the White Paper, differences emerged in the Arab Higher Committee.108/ Yet they were differences mainly of method and tactics rather than as to the major objectives of Arab nationalism. The dissolution of the Arab Higher Committee and deportation of six of its leaders, including Jamal Eff. el Husseini, by the Government of Palestine in 1937 brought little change in the structure of Arab political life. While Haj Amin Eff. el Husseini,109/ who had been associated with the Axis during the Second World War, has not been allowed to return to Palestine, the present Arab Higher Committee, reestablished in 1945 and reconstituted in 1946, now has as vice-chairman Jamal Eff. el Husseini, it being understood that the post of chairman is held open for the Mufti.110/
104. There can be little doubt, moreover, that the present pattern of control is expressed throughout the local Arab communities by means of a network of committees. Decisions taken at the centre, whether relating to an economic boycott of Jewish goods or to the attitude to be taken towards the present United Nations Committee, are thus for the most part effectively administered throughout the Arab community.
105. Differences of approach and interest, sometimes on such a major question as that of Arab-Jewish relations, can be discerned, the more so from the strong pressure that is brought against them.111/ In times of crisis, as in 1936-1938, such pressure has taken the form of intimidation and assassination. At present time, nonconformity regarding any important question on which the Arab Higher Committee has pronounced a policy is represented as disloyalty to the Arab nation. The Arab community, being essentially agrarian, is loosely knit and mainly concerned with local interests. In the absence of an elective body to represent divergences of interest, it therefore shows a high degree of centralization in its political life.
Development of self-governing institutions and local autonomy
106. In its statement of policy of June 1922, the United Kingdom Government declared:112/
"It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to foster the establishment of a full measure of self-government in Palestine, but they are of opinion that, in the special circumstances of that country, this should be accomplished by gradual stages and not suddenly."
The mandatory Power's attempts to introduce a measure of self-government in Palestine can be understood only within the context of divergent Arab-Jewish aspirations. In October 1920, an Advisory Council was established consisting of ten British officials, seven Arabs (four Moslem and three Christian), and three Jews. In 1922, the Palestine Administration projected, as a first step towards the introduction of self-government, a Legislative Council which was to consist of the High Commissioner and twenty-two members: ten official and twelve elected (ten Arabs, of whom eight were to be Moslems and two Christians, and two Jews). The proposal was rejected by the Palestine Arab Executive on the grounds that Arab representatives should have a majority over all others, and an Arab boycott of the elections held in 1923 created a stalemate.
107. In the first years of the 1930's some progress was made in the sphere of local self-government. By the beginning of 1935, some twenty elective municipal councils were in being; in the same year a municipal council composed of equal numbers of Arabs and Jews was established in Jerusalem.113/ Whilst Jewish critics complained of the restrictive limits imposed on their own municipalities, particularly Tel Aviv, by the Local Government Ordinance,114/ it is clear that the first step had been taken to "encourage local autonomy" in accordance with article 3 of the Mandate. At present some hundred local authorities are in being, together with forty village councils all of which are Arab of the four existing mixed municipal commissions, only those in Haffa and Tiberias include Arab and Jewish, members who are not Government officers.
108. A further attempt was made by the Government of Palestine at the end of 1935 to establish a legislative council. It was to have consisted of twenty-eight members115/ presided over by "some impartial person unconnected with Palestine." The council was to have been empowered to initiate and recommend legislation, subject to certain far-reaching limitations, in particular the withholding of any questioning of the validity of the Mandate and the reserving to the High Commissioner of powers of direct legislation and effective control of immigration and money bills. Arab opinion-on the proposal was divided between moderate elements favouring its acceptance and the Arab leaders who rejected it as falling far short of the traditional demand for full national self-government. Jewish opinion, seeing in it the prospect of domination of the National Home by an overwhelming Arab majority, was in vehement opposition.
109. Not until 1939, when the 1936-1938 rising had spent its force, was there any fresh attempt at constitutional reform. The White Paper of 1939 struck a new note. Within ten years, the Mandate would terminate and Palestine become an independent State subject to the conclusion of "such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future". No details as to the constitutional form of the proposed State were given but, five years following the restoration of "peace and order", an "appropriate body representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government" was to be set up to make recommendations regarding the constitution. During the transition period, Palestinians were gradually to be given an .increasing part in the Government, the objective being "to place Palestinians in charge of all the departments of Government, with the assistance of British advisers and subject to the control of the High Commissioner."
110. Jewish opinion reacted strongly to this proposal claiming that it was "a surrender to Arab terrorism", the effect of which "is to deny to the Jewish people the right to reconstitute their National Home in their ancestral country."116/ Since the proposal did not measure up to the political demands proposed by Arab representatives during the London Conference of early 1939, it was officially rejected by the representatives of Palestine Arab parties acting under the influence of Haj Amin Eff el Husseini. More moderate Arab opinion represented in the National Defence Party117/ was prepared to accept the White Paper.
111. Following the Second World War, the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the dissolution of the League of Nations the following year opened a new phase in the history of the mandatory regime. The mandatory Power, in the absence of the League and its Permanent Mandates Commission, had no international authority to which it might submit reports and generally account for the exercise of its responsibilities in accordance with the terms of the Mandate. Having this in mind, at the final session of the League Assembly the United Kingdom representative declared that Palestine would be administered "in accordance with the general principles" of the existing Mandate until "fresh arrangements had been reached."118/ At the Assembly meeting of 18 April 1946, a resolution on mandates was passed which declared inter alia that the Assembly:119/
"Recognizes that, on the termination of the League's existence, its functions with respect to the mandated territories will come to an end, but notes that Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations embody principles corresponding to those declared in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League;
"Takes note of the expressed intentions of the Members of the League now administering territories under mandate to continue to administer them for the well-being and development of the peoples concerned in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective Mandates, until other arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective mandatory Powers."
112. On 1 May 1946,-the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was published. Its major constitutional proposals were:120/
(a) That "Palestine shall be neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State", but that it should "ultimately become a State which guards the rights and interests of Moslems, Jews, and Christians "alike."
(b) That until Arab-Jewish hostility disappears "the Government of Palestine be continued as at present under mandate pending the execution of a Trusteeship Agreement under the United Nations." A long period of trusteeship was envisaged in view of the Committee's conviction as to the depth of political antagonism between Arab and Jew, and it was proposed that the trusteeship burden would be lightened "if the difficulties were appreciated and the Trustee had the support of other members of the United Nations."
113. Following an examination of the Anglo-American Committee's report by a group of British and American officials, in July 1946 the so-called Morrison Plan121/ was projected by the mandatory Power as a basis for discussion with Arab and Jewish representatives and those of the Arab States at a conference122/ held in London later in the year. In its constitutional aspects the plan provided for division of Palestine into four semi-autonomous areas including an Arab and Jewish province, and for a Central Government whose powers were to be exercised initially by the High Commissioner assisted by a nominated Executive Council. The provinces were to have only such powers as were expressly conferred, and authority in major fields was reserved to the Central Government.
114. The Jewish Agency rejected the proposal unreservedly. The Arab delegates to the London Conference also unanimously opposed the plan. They suggested123/ as an alternative that Palestine should become an independent unitary State with a permanent Arab majority in which the Jewish community would be entitled to seats in a legislative assembly proportionate to the number of Jews with Palestinian citizenship, provided that the number of Jewish representatives should in no case exceed one-third of the total membership.
115. On 7 February 1947, the British delegation at the Anglo-Arab Conference in London submitted a new proposal,124/ for a five-year British Trusteeship over Palestine as a preparation for independence. The proposed Trusteeship Agreement was to provide for a wide measure of local autonomy in Arab and Jewish areas, and the High Commissioner was to seek the formation at the centre of a representative Advisory Council. After four years a Constituent Assembly was to be elected and, providing agreement could be reached between a majority of Arab and Jewish representatives respectively, an independent State would be established immediately.
116. The proposal was unacceptable both to the Arab State delegations and to representatives of the Palestine Arab Higher Committee then present at the London Conference, and unacceptable also to the Jewish Agency. The leaders of the Arab delegations "re-emphasized that no proposal which involved any form of partition or Jewish immigration would be acceptable as a basis for the solution of the problem."125/ The Jewish Agency's statement126/ declared that the proposals were incompatible with the basic purposes of the mandate and with Jewish rights to immigration, settlement and ultimate statehood. In this situation, and in accordance with its declaration of 7 February 1947 that "His Majesty's Government are not prepared to continue indefinitely to govern Palestine themselves merely because Arabs and Jews cannot agree upon the means of sharing its government between them", the mandatory Power referred the question of "the future government of Palestine" to the United Nations.127/
The present situation
117. The atmosphere in Palestine today is one of profound tension. In many respects the country is living under a semi-military regime. In the streets of Jerusalem and other key areas barbed wire defences, road blocks, machine-gun posts and constant armoured car patrols are routine measures. In areas of doubtful security, Administration officials and the military forces live within strictly policed security zones and work within fortified and closely-guarded buildings. Freedom of personal movement is liable to severe restriction and the curfew and martial law have become a not uncommon experience. The primary purpose of the Palestine Government, in the circumstances of recurring terrorist attacks, is to maintain what it regards as the essential conditions of public security. Increasing resort has been had to special security measures provided for in the defence emergency regulations.128/ Under these regulations, a person may be detained for an unlimited period, or placed under police supervision for one year, by order of an area military commander; and he may be deported or excluded from Palestine by order of the High Commissioner. Where there are "reasons to believe that there are grounds which would justify . . . detention ... or deportation", any person may be arrested without warrant by any member of His Majesty's Forces or any police officer and detained for not more than seven days, pending further decision by the military commander. The regulations concerning military courts prohibit a form of judicial appeal from or questioning of a sentence or decision of a military court.129/ Under the regulations, widespread arrests have been made; and as of 12 July 1947, 820 persons130/ were being held in detention on security grounds, including 291 in Kenya under Kenya's 1947 ordinance dealing with the control of detained persons. The detainees were all Jews with the exception of four Arabs. In addition to these, 17,873 illegal immigrants were under detention.131/
118. The attitude of the Administration to the maintenance of public security in present circumstances was stated to the Committee in the following terms:132/
"The right of any community to use force as a means of gaining its political ends is riot admitted in the British Commonwealth. Since the beginning of 1945 the Jews have implicitly claimed this right and have supported by an organized campaign of lawlessness, murder and sabotage their contention that, whatever other interests might be concerned, nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of a Jewish State and free Jewish immigration into Palestine. It is true that large numbers of Jews do not today attempt to defend the crimes that have been committed in the name of these political aspirations. They recognize the damage caused' to their good name by these methods in the court of world opinion. Nevertheless, the Jewish community of Palestine still publicly refuses its help to the Administration in suppressing terrorism, on the ground that the Administration's policy is opposed to Jewish interests. The converse of this attitude is clear, and its result, however much the Jewish leaders themselves may not wish it, has been to give active encouragement to the dissidents and freer scope to their activities."
119. There can be no doubt that the enforcement of the White Paper of 1939, subject to the permitted entry since December 1945 of "1,500 Jewish immigrants monthly, has created throughout the Jewish community a deep-seated distrust and resentment against the mandatory Power. This feeling is most sharply expressed in regard to the Administration's attempts to prevent the landing of illegal immigrants. During its stay in Palestine, the Committee heard from certain of its members an eyewitness account of the incidents relative to the bringing into the port of Haifa, under British naval escort, of the illegal immigrant ship. Exodus 1947.133/ In this, as in similar incidents, the Committee has noted the persistence 'of the attempts to 'bring Jewish immigrants to Palestine irrespective of determined preventive measures on the part of the Administration, and also the far-reaching support which such attempts receive from the Jewish community 'in Palestine and abroad. The unremitting struggle to admit further Jews into Palestine, irrespective of the quota permitted by the Administration, is a measure of the rift which has developed between the Jewish Agency and the Jewish community, on the one hand, and the Administration on the other. In the present state of tension, little practicable basis exists for the discharge by the Jewish Agency of its function under the Mandate of "advising and cooperating" with the Administration in matters affecting the interests of the Jewish community.
120. As far as the Arab community is concerned, the Committee has had less opportunity of ascertaining its attitude in detail in view of the boycott on association with the Committee pronounced by the Arab Higher "Committee. During the hearings of representatives of thee Arab States at Beirut, however, the-Arab assessment of the present situation of unrest in "Palestine was safer thus:134/
"Zionism, however, does not content itself with mere propaganda in favour of the fulfilment of its expansionist projects at the expense of the Arab countries. Its plan involves recourse to terrorism, both in Palestine and in other countries. It is known that a secret army has been formed with a view to creating an atmosphere of tension and unrest by making attempts on the lives of representatives of the governing authority and by destroying public buildings . . . This aggressive attitude, resulting from the mandatory Power's weakness in dealing with them, will not fail to give rise in turn to the creation of similar organizations by the Arabs. The responsibility for the disturbances which might result therefrom throughout the Middle East will rest solely with the Zionist organizations, as having been the first to use these violent tactics." It was declared at the same meeting that "against a State established by violence, the Arab States will be obliged to use violence; that is a legitimate right of self-defence".135/
121. Arab resistance to Jewish political demands in Palestine has in part taken the form of an economic boycott of Jewish goods, decided on by a resolution of the Council of the Arab League in December 1945.136/ Representatives of the Arab States stressed in evidence to the Committee that the boycott would prove effective due to the dependence of Jewish industry on the market of Arab countries.137/ Within Palestine, though it would be difficult to estimate its present effectiveness, the boycott is regarded by the Arab, leaders as an important means of furthering their political aims. During the Arab Conference in Haifa in July 1947, Jamal Eff. el Husseini spoke of the necessity of "strengthening the boycott in order to pull down Zionist existence", and warned Arab merchants who did not observe the boycott that they would be regarded as "traitors", since "the nation cannot keep patient over humiliation."138/
122. The view of the mandatory Power on Arab-Jewish relations was given by the British Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons on 13 November 1945, as follows:
"The whole story of Palestine since the mandate was created has been one of continued friction between the two races culminating at intervals in serious disturbances. The fact has to be faced that since the introduction of the mandate it has been impossible to find common grounds between the Arabs and the Jews."
Yet, while recognizing that in practice the Mandate has become unworkable, one cannot ignore the belief of those responsible for the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate that the obligations undertaken towards Arabs and Jews respectively would not seriously conflict. To many observers at the time, conclusion of the Feisal-Weizmann Agreement139/ promised well for the future co-operation of Arab and Jew in Palestine. If Arab protests and uprisings in the 1920's seemed to give warning of serious conflict, it was assumed, and repeatedly proclaimed by the mandatory Power, that the necessary measures of Arab-Jewish co-operation would be found to bridge the gap between the two communities within the framework of the Mandate.140/
123. In the circumstances of the mandatory regime, that necessary measure of understanding between the two peoples of Palestine has not yet been evident. The immediate and compelling reality is the constant pressure exerted by Arab and Jewish political leaders to maintain and advance their respective national interests. Yet there are those, both Jew and Arab, who believe in the possibility of mutually advantageous understanding and, as circumstances permit, seek its promotion.141/ Instances of co-operation and good neighbourly relations in the affairs of everyday life may be observed. In the field of labour, joint Jewish-Arab strike actions have occurred. On official bodies, such as the General Agricultural Council the Citrus Control Board and the Citrus Marketing Board, Arabs and Jews have co-operated in furtherance of a common interest.
124. Against the background of major and conflicting political objectives, however, these forms of co-operation are necessarily limited in scope and effectiveness. Their prospects of success have been and are determined by the complex of political and economic factors, internal and external to Palestine, which the application of a mandatory regime has brought about. Should these conditions be adjusted so as to permit the joint utilization of the resources of Palestine between the two peoples on a basis of national autonomy, the forces working for amicable relations between Arabs and Jews may yet become a significant factor in the future of Palestine.
D. THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS
125. The basic contentions of the Arab and Jewish claims are summarized separately in this section with a brief appraisal of each claim.
The Jewish case
126. The Jewish case, as herein considered, is mainly the case advanced by the Jewish Agency which, by the terms of the Mandate, has a special status with regard to Jewish interests in Palestine.
127. The Jewish case seeks the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, and Jewish immigration into Palestine both before and after the creation of the Jewish State subject only to the limitations imposed by the economic absorptive capacity of that State. In the Jewish case, the issues of the Jewish State and unrestricted immigration are inextricably interwoven. On the one hand, the Jewish State is needed in order to assure a refuge for the Jewish immigrants who are clamoring to come to Palestine from the displaced persons camps and from other places in Europe, North Africa and the Near East, where their present plight is difficult. On the other hand, a Jewish State would have urgent need of Jewish immigrants in order to affect the present great numerical preponderance of Arabs over Jews in Palestine. The Jewish case frankly recognizes the difficulty involved in creating at the present time a Jewish State in all of Palestine in which Jews would, in fact, be only a minority, or in part of Palestine in which, at best, they could immediately have only a slight preponderance. Thus, the Jewish case lays great stress on the right of Jewish immigration, for political as well as humanitarian reasons. Special emphasis is therefore placed on the right of Jews to "return" to Palestine.
128. Aside from contentions based on biblical and historical sources as to this right, the Jewish case rests on the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and on the Mandate for Palestine, which incorporated the Declaration in its preamble and recognized the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and the grounds for reconstituting the Jewish National Home there.
129. It is the Jewish contention that the mandatory Power in Palestine became a trustee for the specific and primary purpose of securing the establishment of the Jewish National Home by means of Jewish immigration, which must be facilitated, and by close settlement of the Jews upon the land, which must be encouraged subject to certain safeguards.
130. In their view, the Mandate intended that the natural evolution of Jewish immigration, unrestricted save by economic considerations, might ultimately lead to a commonwealth in which the Jews would be a majority.
131. They regard the pledges to the Jews in the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate as international commitments not to the Jews of Palestine alone, who were at the time only a small community, but to the Jewish people as a whole, who are now often described as the "Jewish nation".
132. They contend that there has been no change in conditions since these intentions were expressed, for the existence of an Arab majority was a fact well understood at the time when the legal and political commitments of the Mandate were originally made.
133. The Jews, it is urged, have built in Palestine on the basis of faith in the international pledges made to the Jewish people and they cannot be halted in midstream.
(a) The Jewish immigrants to Palestine, who are said to be merely returning to they home-land, are portrayed as having been primarily responsible for developing the economy of the country, for establishing an infant industry, for cultivating theretofore waste lands, for instituting irrigation schemes and for improving the standard of living of Palestine Arabs as well as Jews.
(b) The immigrant Jews displace no Arabs, but rather develop areas which otherwise would remain undeveloped.
134. They contend that no time limit was suggested for immigration or settlement. The Mandate, it is claimed, was to be terminated only when its primary purpose, the establishment of the Jewish National Home, had been fulfilled. That Home will be regarded as having been established only when it can stand alone, for there can be no security for it unless it is free from Arab domination. Any proposed solution, therefore, should ensure the existence and continued development of the Jewish National Home in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the international pledges made.
(a) The establishment of the Jewish Home and State will, it is claimed, do no political injustice to the Arabs, since the Arabs have never established a government in Palestine.
(b) In the Jewish Home and State the Arab population, which, as a result of accelerated Jewish immigration will have become a minority population, will be fully protected in all its rights on an equal basis with the Jewish citizenry.
Appraisal of the Jewish case
135. Under the preamble of the Mandate, the Principal Allied Powers agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a mandatory Power the administration of the territory of Palestine. They also 'agreed that this mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the Balfour Declaration. Article 2 of the Mandate made the mandatory responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as would assure:
(a) The establishment of a Jewish National Home, as laid down in the preamble, and (b) The development of self-governing institutions.
The obligation to assure the establishment of a Jewish National Home was qualified by article 6. which made the mandatory Power responsible for the facilitation of immigration and the encouragement of dose settlement on the land.
136. There has been great controversy as to whether the obligations relating to the National Home and self-governing institutions were equal in weight, and also as to whether they were consistent with each other. Opinions have been expressed that between these two obligations the Mandate recognizes no primacy in order of importance and no priority in order of execution, and that they were in no sense irreconcilable. According to other opinions, however, the primary purpose of the Mandate, as expressed in its preamble and in its articles, was to promote the establishment of a Jewish National Home, to which the obligation of developing self-governing institutions was subordinated.
137. The practical significance of the controversy was that, if the country were to be placed under such political conditions as would secure the development of self-governing institutions, these same conditions would in fact destroy the Jewish National Home. It would appear that, although difficulties were anticipated, when the Mandate was confirmed it was not dearly contemplated that these two obligations would prove mutually incompatible. In practice, however, they proved to be so. The conflict between Arab and Jewish political aspirations, intensified by the growth of Arab nationalism throughout the Arabic-speaking countries and by the growth of anti-Semitism in some European countries, excluded any possibility of adjustment which would allow the establishment of self-governing institutions. Had self-governing institutions been created, the majority in the country, who never willingly accepted Jewish immigration, would in all probability have made its continuance impossible, causing thereby the negation of the Jewish National Home.
138. It is part of the Jewish case that any restriction on immigration, other than economic considerations, is illegal and in violation of the provisions of the Mandate. Article 6 of the Mandate made the mandatory Power responsible for facilitating Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, while insuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population were not prejudiced. No other restriction was provided thereon.
139. By 1922, the mandatory construed article 6 to mean that Jewish immigration could not be so great in volume as to exceed whatever might be the economic capacity of the country to absorb new arrivals. This interpretation was accepted by the Executive of the Zionist Organization and, thus, by construction, a restriction of the general terms of the article was established.
140. The Jewish contention, that the Mandate intended that the natural evolution of Jewish immigration might ultimately lead to a commonwealth in which Jews would be a majority, raises the question as to the meaning of "National Home".
141. The notion of the National Home, which derived from the formulation of Zionist aspirations in the 1897 Basle program142/ has provoked many discussions concerning its meaning, scope and legal character, especially since it has no known legal connotation and there are no precedents in international law for its interpretation. It was used in the Balfour Declaration and in the Mandate, both of which promised the establishment of a "Jewish National Home" without, however, defining its meaning. The conclusion seems to be inescapable that the vagueness in the wording of both instruments was intentional. The fact that the term "National Home" was employed, instead of the word "State" or "Commonwealth" would indicate that the intention was to place a restrictive construction on the National Home scheme from its very inception. This argument, however, may not be conclusive since "National Home", although not precluding the possibility of establishing a Jewish State in the future, had the advantage of not shocking public opinion outside the Jewish world, and even in many Jewish quarters, as the term "Jewish State" would have done.
142. What exactly was in the minds of those who made the Balfour Declaration is speculative. The fact remains that, in the light of experience acquired as a consequence of serious disturbances in Palestine, the mandatory Power, in a statement on "British Policy in Palestine," issued on 3 June 1922 by the Colonial Office, placed a restrictive construction upon the Balfour Declaration.143/
143. The statement recognized for the first time "the ancient historic connection" of the Jews with Palestine144/, and declared that they were in Palestine "as of right and not on sufferance". It, however, excluded in its own terms "the disappearance or subordination of the Arabic population, language or customs in Palestine" or "the imposition of Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole", and made it clear that in the eyes of the mandatory Power, the Jewish National Home was to be founded in Palestine and not that Palestine as a whole was to be converted into a Jewish National Home.
144. It should be noted here that this construction, which restricted considerably the scope of the National Home, was made prior to the confirmation of the Mandate by the Council of the League of Nations145/ and was formally accepted at the time by the Executive of the Zionist Organization, in its capacity as the "appropriate Jewish agency" provided for in article 4 of the Mandate.146/
145. Nevertheless, neither the Balfour Declaration nor the Mandate precluded the eventual creation of a Jewish State. The Mandate in its Preamble recognized, with regard to the Jewish people, the "grounds for reconstituting their National Home". By providing, as one of the main obligations of the mandatory Power the facilitation of Jewish immigration, it conferred upon the Jews an opportunity, through large-scale immigration, to create eventually a Jewish State with a Jewish majority.
146. Both the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate involved international commitments to the Jewish people as a whole. It was obvious that these commitments were not limited only to the Jewish population of Palestine, since at the time there were only some 80,000 Jews there.
147. This would imply that all Jews in the world who wish to go to Palestine would have the right to do so. This view, however, would seem to be unrealistic in the sense that a country as small and poor as Palestine could never accommodate all the Jews in the world.
148. When the Mandate was approved, all concerned were aware of the existence of an overwhelming Arab majority in Palestine. More over, the King-Crane Report, among others, had warned that the Zionist program could not be carried out except by force of arms. It would seem clear, therefore, that the provisions of the Mandate relating to the Jewish National Home could be based only on the assumption that sooner or later the Arab fears would gradually be overcome and that Arab hostility to the terms of the Mandate would in time weaken and disappear.
149. This seems to have been the basic assumption, but it proved to be a false one, since the history of the last twenty-five years has established the fact that not only the creation of a Jewish State but even the continuation of the building of the Jewish National Home by restricted immigration could be implemented only by the use of some considerable force. It cannot be properly contended that the use of force as a means of establishing the National Home was either intended by the Mandate or implied by its provisions. On the contrary, the provisions of the Mandate should preclude any systematic use of force for the purpose of its application. In its preamble, the Mandate states that the Principal Allied Powers agreed to entrust Palestine to a mandatory Power for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.147/ The guiding principle of that Article was the well-being of peoples not yet able to stand by themselves.
150. It has been suggested that the well-being of the indigenous population of Palestine might be ensured by the unfettered development of the Jewish National Home, "Well-being" in a practical sense, however, must be something more than a mere objective conception; and the Arabs, thinking subjectively, have demonstrated by their acts their belief that the conversion of Palestine into a Jewish State against their will would be very much opposed to their conception of what is essential to their well-being. To contend, therefore, that there is an international obligation to the effect that Jewish immigration should continue with a view to establishing a Jewish majority in the whole of Palestine, would mean ignoring the wishes of the Arab population and their views as to their own well-being. This would involve an apparent violation of what was the governing principle of Article 22 of the Covenant.
151. That the Jews have performed remarkable feats of development in Palestine cannot be denied. The fact remains, however, that there may be serious question as to the economic soundness of much of this achievement, owing to the reliance on gift capital and the political motivation behind many of the development schemes with little regard to economic considerations.
152. That Jews would displace Arabs from the land if restrictions were not imposed would seem inevitable, since, as land pressures develop, the attraction of Jewish capital would be an inducement to many Arabs to dispose of their lands. Some displacement of this nature has already occurred.
153. It would appear that the dear implication of the Jewish contention that the National Home can be safeguarded from Arab domination only when it can stand by itself is that an independent Jewish State in all or part of Palestine is the only means of securing the promise of the Mandate for a Jewish National Home. Even a binational State, on a parity basis, unless there were extensive international guarantees, would not seem to meet the Jewish contention.
154. The Jewish assurance that no political injustice would be done to the Arabs by the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine, since the Arabs have never established a government there, gains some support from the fact that not since 63 B.C., when Pompey stormed Jerusalem, has Palestine been an independent State. On the other hand, the fact remains that today in Palestine there are over 1,200,000 Arabs, two-thirds of the population, who oppose a Jewish State and who are intent on establishing an independent Arab State.
155. Any solution assuring the continued development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine would necessarily involve continued Jewish immigration, the postponement of independence, and also administration by a third party, at least until the Jewish people become a majority there. Such absolution would have to be enforced, in view of the opposition of the Arab population. Many Jews contend that, if given the opportunity, the Jews alone could defend a Jewish State. Even this, however, envisages the possibility of a violent struggle with the Arabs.
The Arab case
156. The Arab case as here set forth is based mainly on the contentions made by the representatives of the Arab Higher Committee before the first special session of the General Assembly and by the representatives of the Arab States at that session, at Beirut and Geneva.
The Arab case seeks the immediate creation of an independent Palestine west of the Jordan as an Arab State. It rests on a number of claims and contentions which are summarized below.
The Arabs emphasize the fact of an actual Arab numerical majority, in the ratio of two to one in the present population of Palestine.
157. They postulate the "natural" right of the Arab majority to remain in undisputed possession of the country, since they are and have bean for many centuries in possession of the land. This claim of a "natural" right is based on the contention that the Arab connection with Palestine has continued uninterruptedly from early historical times, since the term "Arab" is to be interpreted as connoting not only the invaders from the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century, but also the indigenous population which intermarried with the invaders and acquired their speech, customs and modes of thought in becoming permanently Arabized.
158. The Arabs further stress the natural desire of the Arab community to safeguard its national existence from foreign intruders, in order that it may "pursue without interference its own political, economic arid cultural development.
159. The Arabs also claim "acquired" rights, based on the general promises and pledges officially made to the Arab people in the course of the First World War, including, in particular, the McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1915-1916 and the Anglb-French Declaration of 1918. The "Hogarth-Message", the Basset letter, and the "Declaration to the Seven" are regarded as 'further support for the Arab claim to an independent Palestine.
(a) In the Arab view, these undertakings, taken collectively, provide a firm recognition of Arab political rights in Palestine which, they contend. Great Britain is under a contractual obligation to accept and uphold—an obligation thus far unfulfilled.
(b) It is also their contention that these promises and pledges of Arab freedom and independence were among the main factors inspiring the Arabs to revolt against the Ottoman Empire and to ally themselves with Great Britain and the other allies during the First World War.
160. The Arabs have persistently adhered to the position that the Mandate for Palestine, which incorporated the Balfdur Declaration, is illegal. The Arab States have refused to recognize it as having any validity.
(a) They allege that the terms of the Palestine Mandate are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations for the following reasons:
(1) Although paragraph 4 of Article 22 stipulated that certain communities had reached a stage of development where their existence as "independent nations" could be provisionally recognized, subject only to a limited period of tutelage under a mandatory Power in the form of administrative advice and assistance until such time as these communities would be able to stand alone, the Palestine Mandate violated this stipulation by deliberately omitting immediate provisional recognition of the independence of the territory and by granting to the mandatory Power in article 1 of the Mandate "full powers of legislation and administration".
(2) The wishes of the Palestine community had not been "a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory", as provided for in Article 22, paragraph 4 of the Covenant.
(b) The principle and right of national self-determination were violated.
(c) The Arab States were not Members of the League of Nations when the Palestine Mandate was approved, and are not, therefore, bound by it.
161. Although the terms of the Palestine Mandate are, in the Arab view, illegal and invalid and, therefore, Jewish immigrants have had no legal right to enter the country during the period of the Mandate, the Arab position regarding such Jews is that their presence has to be recognized as a de facto situation.
Appraisal of the Arab case
162. That the Arab population is and will continue to be the numerically preponderant population in Palestine, unless offset by free "and substantial Jewish immigration, is undisputed. The Arab birth rate is considerably higher than the Jewish birth rate. Only large-scale Jewish immigration, strongly assisted by capital and efforts from outside Palestine, can provide the basis for the attainment of numerical parity between Arabs and Jews in the population.
163. The Arabs of Palestine consider themselves as having a "natural" right to that country, although they have not been in possession of it as a sovereign nation.
164. The Arab population, despite the strenuous efforts of Jews to acquire land in Palestine, at present remains in possession of approximately 85 per cent of the land. The provisions of the land transfer regulations of 1940, which gave effect to the 1939 White Paper policy, have severely restricted the Jewish efforts to acquire new land.
165. The Arabs consider that all of the territory - of Palestine is by Tight Arab patrimony. Although in an Arab State they would recognize the right of Jews to continue in possession - of land legally acquired by them during the Man-date, they would regard as a violation of their "natural" right any effort, such as partition, to reduce the territory of Palestine.
166. The desire of the Arab people of Palestine to safeguard their national existence is a very natural desire. However, Palestinian nationalism, as distinct from Arab nationalism, is itself a relatively new phenomenon, which appeared only after the division of the "Arab rectangle" by the settlement of the First World War. The National Home policy and the vigorous policy of immigration pursued by the Jewish leadership has sharpened the Arab fear of danger from the intruding Jewish population.
167. With regard to the promises and pledges made to the Arabs as inducement for their support of the Allies in the First World War, it is to be noted that apparently there is no unequivocal agreement as to whether Palestine was included within the territory pledged to independence by the McMahon-Hussein correspondence. In this connexion, since the question of interpretation was raised Great Britain has consistently denied that Palestine was among the territories to which independence was pledged.
168. These promises were examined in 1939 by a committee consisting of British and Arab representatives which was set up for that purpose during the Arab-British Conference on Palestine. That committee considered the Mc-Mahon correspondence and certain subsequent events and documents which one party or the other regarded as likely to shed light on the meaning or intention of the correspondence. It examined, inter alia, the so-called Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Balfour Declaration, the "Hogarth Message", the "Declaration to the Seven", General Allenby's assurance to the Amir Feisal, and the Anglo-French Declaration of 7 December 1918.
169. In its report148/ the committee stated that the Arab and the United Kingdom representatives had been "unable to reach agreement upon an interpretation of the correspondence".149/ The United Kingdom representatives, however, informed the Arab representatives that the Arab contentions, as explained to the committee, regarding the interpretation of the correspondence, and especially their contentions relating to the meaning of the phrase "portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Horns and Aleppo 150/ have greater force than has appeared hitherto".151/ Moreover, the United Kingdom representatives informed the Arab representatives that "they agree that Palestine was included in the area claimed by the Sherif of Mecca in his letter of 14 July 1915, and that unless Palestine was excluded from that area later in the correspondence, it must be regarded as having been included in the area in which Great Britain was to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs. They maintain that on a proper construction of the correspondence, Palestine was in fact excluded. But they agree that the language in which its exclusion was expressed was not so specific and unmistakable as it was thought to be at the time".152/
170. With regard to the various statements mentioned in paragraph 168, the above committee considered that it was beyond its scope to express an opinion upon their proper interpretation, and that such opinion could not in any case be properly formed unless consideration had also been given to a number of other statements made during the war. In the opinion of the committee, however, it was evident from these statements that "His Majesty's Government were not free to dispose of Palestine without regard for the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of Palestine, and that these statements must all be taken into account in any attempt to estimate the responsibilities which—upon any interpretation of the correspondence—His Majesty's Government have incurred towards those inhabitants as a result of the correspondence".153/
171. With regard to the "Hogarth Message", the Arab representatives explained that they relied strongly on a passage in the message delivered to King Hussein of the Hejaz in 1918, to the effect that Jewish settlement in Palestine would be allowed only in so far as would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arab population.
172. It is noteworthy that the "Hogarth Message" was delivered to King Hussein in January 1918, that is, two months after the Balfour Declaration was made. There is a dear difference between the Balfour Declaration itself, which safeguarded only the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities, and the "Hogarth Message", which promised political freedom to the Arab population of Palestine.
173. A Memorandum presented by Amir Feisal to the Paris Peace Conference, however, would indicate that the special position of Palestine was recognized in Arab circles. He said:
"The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood and there is no conflict of character between the two races. In principle we are absolutely at one. Nevertheless, the Arabs cannot risk assuming the responsibility of holding level the scales in the clash of races and religions that have, in this one province, so often involved the world in difficulties. They would wish for the effective superposition of a great trustee, so long as a representative local administration commended itself by actively promoting the material prosperity of the country."
174. It was also Amir Feisal who, representing and acting on behalf of the Arab Kingdom of the Hejaz, signed an agreement with Dr. Weizmann, representing and acting on behalf of the Zionist Organization. In this agreement, Feisal, subject to the condition that the Arabs obtained independence as demanded in his Memorandum to the British Foreign Office of 4 January 1919, accepted the Balfour Declaration and the encouragement of Jewish immigration into Palestine. The Feisal-Weizmann agreement did not acquire validity, since the condition attached was not fulfilled at the time.
175. The Peel Commission, in referring to the matter, had noted in its report that "there was a time when Arab statesmen were willing to consider giving Palestine to the Jews, provided that the rest of Arab Asia was free. That condition was not fulfilled then, but it is on the eve of fulfilment now".
176. With regard to the principle of self-determination, although international recognition was extended to this principle at the end of the First World War and it was adhered to with regard to the other Arab territories, at the time of the creation of the "A" Mandates, it was not applied to Palestine, obviously because of the intention to make possible the creation of the Jewish National Home there. Actually, it may well be said that the Jewish National Home and the sui generis Mandate for Palestine run counter to that principle.
177. As to the claim that the Palestine Mandate violates Article 22 of the Covenant because the community of Palestine has not been recognized as an independent nation and because the mandatory was given full powers of legislation and administration, it has been rightly pointed out by the Peel Commission:
" (a) That the provisional recognition of certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire as independent nations is permissible; the words are can be provisionally recognized, not 'will' or 'shall';
" (b) That the penultimate paragraph of Article 22 prescribes that the degree of authority to be exercised by the mandatory shall be defined, at need, by the Council of the League;
" (c) That the acceptance by the Allied Powers and the United States of the policy of the Ball-four Declaration made it clear from the beginning that Palestine would have been treated differently from Syria and Iraq, and that this difference of treatment was confirmed by the Supreme Council in the Treaty of Sevres and by the Council of the League in sanctioning the Mandate."154/
178. With regard to the allegation that the wishes of he Palestine community had not been the principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory Power, it should be noted that the resolutions of the General Syrian Congress of 2 July 1919, in considering under certain conditions the possibility of the establishment of a mandate over the Arab countries, gave Great Britain as a second choice, the United States of America being the first. This choice was also noted by the King-Crane Commission.
179. There would seem to be no grounds for questioning the validity of the Mandate for the reason advanced by the Arab States. The terms of the Mandate for Palestine, formulated by the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied Powers as a part of the settlement of the First World War, were subsequently approved and confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations.
180. The spirit which prevailed at the creation of the Mandate for Palestine was explained by Lord Balfour at the opening of the eighteenth session of the Council of the League of Nations as follows:
"The mandates are not our creation. The mandates are neither made by the League, nor can they, in substance, be altered by the League. . . .
"Remember that a mandate is a self-imposed limitation by the conquerors on the sovereignty which they obtained over conquered territories. It is imposed by the Allied and Associated Powers themselves in the interests of what they conceived to be the general welfare of mankind and they have asked the League of Nations to assist them in seeing that this policy should be carried into effect. But the League of Nations is not the author of the policy, but its instrument. It is not they who have invented the system of mandates; it is not they who have laid down the general lines on which the three classes of mandates are framed. Their duty, let me repeat, is to see, in the first place, that the terms of the mandates conform to the principles of the Covenant, and in the second place, that these terms shall, in fact, regulate the policy of the mandatory Powers in the mandated territories.
"Now, it is clear from this statement, that both those who hope and those who fear that what, I believe, has been called the Balfour Declaration is going to suffer substantial modifications, are in error. The fears are not justified; the hopes are not justified. . . . The general lines of policy stand and must stand."155/
40/ A Survey of Palestine prepared for the Anglo-American Committee by the Government of Palestine. Volume 1, page 103.
41/ From the memorandum on the water resources of Palestine prepared by the Government of Palestine, page 10
42/The 1931 census revealed that there were 66,000 nomadic Bedouins; today they are estimated to number 90,000. Little is known demographically about the people and no account is taken of them in the statistics of this chapter, which deal only with the settled population.
43/ All the statistical material on population is extracted from A Survey of Palestine, volume III, section I, and from the supplement to A Survey of Palestine.
44/ This high natural rate of increase has excited some comment. Prior to 1918, the male population of Palestine was subject to conscription for the Turkish army, and the discontinuance of this practice is sometimes advanced in explanation of the rapid increase in the Arab population since then. It seems probable that the true rate of natural increase is, however, lower than the observed rate owing to an influx into Palestine of young Arab women. As reproduction rates are related to the age-sex composition of the population, according to the census of 1931 the effect is to over-estimate the reproduction rates in the case of the Moslem population. Between 1942 and 1945, owing to the effect of food rationing, there was a tendency to understate deaths and overstate births.
45/ The expression is borrowed from the Government of Palestine's A Survey of Palestine, volume III, page 1272.
46/ A Survey of Palestine, volume I, page 327.
47/ The Committee visited the settlement of Reviving In this area, and inspected a reservoir constructed to conserve 50,000 cubic metres of rainwater.
48/ Palestine pounds.
49/ A Survey of Palestine, volume I, page 511. Ibid,, volume I, page 509.
50/ A Survey of Palestine, volume I, page 462 and supplementary volume, page 41.
51/ Much of the Jewish capital imported into Palestine is In ^ the nature of a free gift, and consequently involves neither interest-nor amortization charges. To the extent that gift capital is part of the capita} imports in the structure of the balance of payments, it will not require an increase of exports in the future to meet debt charges.
52/ Government of Palestine, official index. Idem., volume IIL section 15,
53/ Idem, volume III, section 15,
54/ Annex 19.
55/ The question of the Holy Places is dealt with in Chapter III.
56/ For text see R.. H. Drayton (ed.): The Laws of Palestine, volume III, pages 2569ff.
57/ Palestine (Amendment) Order-in-Council, 1923, article °- Subsequent references are also to this article.
58/ These are Jerusalem, Lydda (headquarters Jaffa). Haifa, Gaza, Samaria (headquarters Nablus) and Galilee (headquarters Nazareth).
59/ Of the thirty-nine present assistant district commissioners, one is an Arab and one is a Jew. (See document A/AC.13/SR.6/Rev. 1, page 9: Hearing of the representatives of the Palestine Government.)
60/ Ibid., page 9.
61/ Permanent Mandates Commission: Minutes of the 23nd (Extraordinary} Session, page 229.
62/ Cmd. (Command Paper) 5513.
63/ Palestine Royal Commission: Report, chapter II.
64/ bid., chapter II, paragraph 20.
65/ Cmd. 1700.
66/ E.g.. White Paper of 1939: "His Majesty's Government adhere to this interpretation of the Declaration of 1917 and regard it as an authoritative and comprehensive description of the character of the Jewish National Home in Palestine." (Cmd. 6019, paragraph 6.)
67/ Op. cit.. Chapter II, paragraph 39.
68/ Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 17th (Extraordinary) Session, page 145.
69/ Palestine Royal Commission: Report, chapter II, paragraph 42(4).
70/ Parliamentary Debates—volume 547, number 108 23 May 19S9), Columns 2177-2189.
71/ Op. cit.. Chapter V, paragraph 2.
72/ Estimate for June 1947 given in Government of Palestine: Memorandum on the Administration of Palestine under the Mandate, paragraph 16.
73/ A minority of orthodox Jews, mainly belonging to Agudath Israel, are by their own wish not included in the community register.
74/Officially recognized and granted the right to receive revenue from the local community rate to maintain social services and for other communal purposes under the Jewish community regulations (1928).
75/ In 1945 the total expenditure in Jewish social services was more than six and a half million pounds, of which over 82 per cent came from the Jewish community, 5 per cent from the Government and the remainder from out-side sources. See Vaad Leumi: The Jewish Community and Its Social Services, page 11.
76/ They include, e.g., the moderate Aliya Hadasha (New Immigration Party), the left-wing Socialist Hashomer Hatzair, and the Communist Party of Palestine. Although not a political party, the Ihud (Union) organization, led by Dr. J. L. Magnes, President of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, also differs from Zionist policy in advocating a bi-national Palestine State.
77/ An appropriate Jewish Agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country. The Zionist Organization, so long as its organization • and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory, appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish National Home." Following agreement between Zionist and non-Zionist Jews at the Zionist Congress in 1929, an enlarged Jewish Agency was formed; it was recognized in 1930 by the mandatory Power as the "public body" referred to in article 4.
78/ Palestine Royal Commission, op. cit; chapter V, paragraph 17.
79/ Replaced in 1930 by the Jewish Agency as the "public body" provided for in article 4 of the mandate.
80/ E.g., Permanent Mandates Commission: Minutes of the 17th Session (June 1930), page 142.
81/ For an analysis of the 1936 disturbances, see Palestine Royal Commission: op. cit.. chapter IV. Some 4,000 lives were lost and approximately one million pounds damage to property incurred as a result of the Arab revolt of 1936-1939.
82/ Op. cit, chapter X, paragraph 77.
83/ Cmd. 6019.
84/ On 10 November 1943, the Secretary of State for the Colonies announced in the House of Commons that since the war had prevented entry of more than 43,922 legal and illegal immigrants up to SO September 1943, His Majesty's Government would permit the balance of some 31,000 persons to enter Palestine if necessary after the closing date of 31 March 1944, "subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity."
85/ Cmd. 6019, paragraph 12.
86/ Cmd. 6180.
87/ Zone A: About 4.1 million acres (63 per cent of the total area), mainly the hill country and land in the south in the Gaza-Beersheba area. Transfer of land to Jews by Palestinian Arabs was prohibited, but by persons other than Palestinian Arabs transfers might in some cases be permitted.
88/ Zone B: About 2 million acres (32 per cent of the total area), comprising the valley around Lake Huleh and the Sea of Calilee area, the valley of Esdraelon, the Negeb and certain areas in the coastal plain south of Jaffa and south of Haifa. Land purchase by Jews was restricted in this area, requiring the sanction of the Palestine Government.
89/ Permanent Mandates Commission: Minutes of 36th Session, pages 274-275. The report was not considered of the Council of the League owing to the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939.
90/ See paragraphs 109-110.
91/ Text reproduced In Jewish Agency for Palestine (New York): Book of Documents submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations. May 1947, pages 140 ff. The letter was submitted as a representation to the Permanent Mandates Commission at its 36th session.
92/ Since April 1939, the estimated number is 30,000 to 38,000 (Government of Palestine: Supplement to A Survey of Palestine, page 23). Immigration since 1 October 1944 has been permitted at the rate of 1,500 monthly.
93/ The defence force of the Jewish community: an illegal organization under Palestine law. See Government of Palestine: Supplement to A Survey of Palestine, page 85. Cf. also the resolution of the Inner Zionist Council meeting in Jerusalem 29 October 1946 which denounced "bloodshed by groups of terrorists who defy national discipline and thereby place themselves outside the ranks of the Jewish Community" and called on the Yishuv to isolate and withhold any support of such groups. (Government of Palestine: Supplementary Memorandum, page 21.)
94/ Op. cit., chapter X, paragraph 95.
96/ See chapter IV.
97/ The terms of the Mandate (preamble and article 6) are "non-Jewish communities" and "other sections of the population." The Arab community alone is discussed here; special interests of the Christian community are dealt with in chapter III.
98/ Permanent Mandates Commission: Minutes of 36th Session, page 97 and Cmd. 5964 (1939).
99/ The Arab view of the Mandate is discussed in chapter II D.
100/ Government of Palestine, Memorandum on the Ad-ministration of Palestine under the Mandate, page 10, paragraph 23.
101/ From 1920 to 1946, apart from maintenance of the British armed forces in Palestine which is a charge on the United Kingdom Government, total Administration expenditure on the maintenance of law and order in Palestine was approximately 36 per cent of all Government expenditure (other than that resulting from Palestine's participation in the Second World War). See Government of Palestine: A Survey of Palestine, volume II, page 608.
102/ There was a 39 per cent decrease between 1927 and 1944 (taking figures of deaths per 1,000 survivors during the first five years of life). See Government of Palestine: A Survey of Palestine, volume II. pages 708-709.
102/ Government of Palestine: Memorandum on the Ad ministration of Palestine; under the Mandate, page 11 paragraph 24.
103/ Op. cit., chapter 16, paragraphs 12-17.
104/ Op. cit., chapter 5, paragraph 24.
105/ Op. cit., page,12, paragraph 25.
106/ Plural of Waqt: Moslem benevolent or religious endowment.
107/ Moslem-religious courts.
108/ Op. cit., chapter 5, paragraph S9.
209/ Between representatives of the Palestine Arab Party (led by Jamal Eff. el Husseini, kinsman and follower of the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin Eff. el Husseini) and those of the National Defence Party under the leadership of Ragheb Bey Nashashibi and inclined towards more moderate polices at the time.
110/ Appointed Mufti of Jerusalem in 1921 and President of the Supreme Moslem Council in 1922.
111/ Government of Palestine: Supplementary Memorandum, page .13.
112/ For evidence submitted to the Committee regarding political
opposition to the Husseini party see, inter alia, document A/AC.13/PV. 32, pages 31 to 47.
113/ Cmd. 1700.
114/ The council's work became increasingly deadlocked by political dissension. In 1945, after failure to settle the question of the mayoralty, the Administration announced the appointment in place of the council of a commission composed solely of officials.
115/ Entered into force January 1934.
116 Five officials, two representatives of commerce, eleven Moslems (eight elected and three nominated), seven Jews (three elected and four nominated) and three Christians (one elected and two nominated).
117/ Statement by the Jewish Agency on the White Paper of 1939. Text reproduced in the Jewish Agency tor Palestine: Book of Documents, pages 137-138.
118/ Formed in December 1934 by Ragheb Bey Nashashibi.
119/ League of Nations Official Journal (Special Supplement 194): Records of the 20th (conclusion) and 21st ordinary sessions of the Assembly, page 28.
120/ Ibid., page 38.
121/ Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom, chapter 1, recommendations 3 and 4.
123/ Neither the Jewish Agency, nor the Palestinian Arabs in the first instance, accepted invitations and the conference was attended by representatives of the Arab States only, together with the Secretary General of the Arab League.
124/ See Cmd.7044, pages 9-11.
125/ The so-called Bevto Plan. See Cmd. 7044, pages 11 to 14.
126/ Document A/AC.13/2, page 356.
127/ Ibids., pages 347-351. "See Annex 1.
128/ Authorized under -the Palestine (Defence) Order in Council of 1937, which empowered the High Commissioner to make regulations in the interests of public security during the period of Arab terrorism 1936-1939. See Government of Palestine: The Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 (as amended until 2 March 1947).
129/ The sentences of Military Courts are subject to confirmation by the General Officer Commanding, to whom petition for reconsideration of sentence may be made.
130/ A total of 492 had been detained for eleven months (approximate average period), 33 for twelve months, 4 tor six months, and 291 (at present in Gilgil "Camp, Kenya) for twenty-one months. See document
131/ A/AC:13/-NC.77: Communication from the Government of Palestine On Detentions.
132/ 15,864 in Cyprus under the Cyprus Detention (Illegal Immigrants) Law, 1946.
133/ Government of Palestine: Supplementary Memorandum/pay 56, paragraph 3.
143/ See document A/AC.13/SR.57, pages 1-2. Document A/AC.13/P.V.38, page 10.
135/ Ibid., page 12.
136/ For text, see Government of Palestine: A Survey of Palestine, volume I. pages 84-85.
137/ Document A/AC.13/P.V.39, page 17.
138/ Palestine Prefs Reviews, 8 July 1947,
139/ Concluded in January 1919 between Amir Feisal, son of King Hussein, and Dr. Weizmann, then President of the Zionist Organization.
140/ See Palestine Royal Commission: op. cit., chapter 3,
paragraphs 66-68, for evidence of the persistence of this view.
141/ For evidence submitted to the Committee in this respect, see documents A/AC. 13/P.V. 30 and A/AC. 13/P.V. 32, particularly pages 48 to 59.
142/ "Zionism strives to create for the Jewish people a Home in Palestine secured by public law."
143/ British White Paper, Cmd. 1700; see relevant extracts above, paragraph 77.
144/ Later to be mentioned in recital 3 of the Mandate.
145/ The Mandate was confirmed on 24 July 1922.
146/ The relevant resolution runs as follows: "The Executive of the Zionist Organization, having taken note of the statement relative to British Policy in Palestine, transmitted to them by he Colonial Office, under date June 3rd, 1922, assured His Majesty's Government that the activities of the Zionist Organization will be conducted in conformity with the policy therein set forth". (Cmd. 1700, 1922, pages 28-29).
147/ Annex 21.
148/ Cmd. 5974.
149/ Ibid., paragraph 17.
150/ Sir H. McMahon's letter of 24 October 1918.
151/ Cmd. 5974, paragraph 17.