United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense/III. B. Notes

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
III. B. 1.
FOOTNOTES
^1.  McClintock from Saigon tel. No. 502, May 4, 1954 (SECRET).
^2.  Dulles to Paris tel. No. 4398, June 4, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
^3.  The treaties are published in U.S. VerbMin/3 (May 12), pp. 99-101.
^4.  See the DRV's Declaration of Independence, in Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), III, 20.
^5.  Memorandum from Heath to Dulles and Smith: "The Indochina Phase of the Conference," May 1, 1954 (SECRET).
^6.  Lacouture and Devillers, p. 122.
^7.  The U.S. objection was based on long-standing opposition to any move that would accord China the status of a major power equivalent to the fifth member of a "Big Five." See, e.g., Dulles to American Embassy – Canberra tel. No. 158, April 1, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
^8.  Lacouture and. Devillers, pp. 122–23.
^9.  G. McMurtrie Godley (First Secretary) from Paris tel. No. 2757, April 29, 1954 (UNC).
^10.  Lacouture and Devillers, p. 123, n. 3
^11.  Ibid., pp. 123–24.
^12.  Ibid., p. 187.
^13.  U.S. VerbMin/IC Restricted 6, p. 7 (CONFIDENTIAL).
^14.  Smith from Geneva tel. SECTO 217, May 15, 1954 (SECRET).
^15.  Lacouture and Devillers, p. 234.
^16.  French insistence on the 18th parallel originated in the recommendation of General Navarre, who was asked several questions by the French delegation at Geneva regarding the likely impact of the then-existing military situation on the French negotiatory position. Navarre's responses were sent April 21. On the demarcation line, Navarre said that the 18th parallel would leave "us" the ancient political capitol of Hue and Tourane (Da Nang), and permit the retention of militarily valuable terrain. See General Ely's Memoires: l'Indochina dans la Tourmente (Paris: Plan, 1964), p. 112, and Lacouture and Devillers, p. 126.
^17.  Ibid., pp. 235–36.

^18.  U.S. VerbMin/3, pp. 104, 105.
^19.  I.C. Restricted/5, p. 16 (C). Records of the Restricted Sessions are summaries rather than word-for-word quotations, for the most part.
^20.  I.C. Restricted/6, p. 16 (C).
^21.  I.C. Restricted/7, p.13 (C).
^22.  U.S. VerbMin/7, p. 344.
^23.  I.C. Restricted/14, p. 26 (C).
^24.  CIA Report CS-42198, July 14, 1954, from Saigon (SECRET). Lacouture and. Devillers hold that Diem was stupefied when he learned of partition for the first time from Ambassador Heath via a personal letter from Eisenhower, July 12 (pp. 256–57).
^25.  Reported in Smith's priority tel. SECTO 633 from Geneva, July 17, 1954 (SECRET).
^26.  McClintock from Saigon tel. No. 2656, June 4, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
^27.  Smith from Geneva priority tel. SECTO 633, July 17, 1954 (SECRET).
^28.  Smith from Geneva priority tel. SECTO 654, July 18, 1954 (CONFIDENTIAL); Smith from Geneva tel. SECTO 655, July 18, 1954 (SECRET).
^29.  Smith from Geneva priority tel. SECTO 673, July 19, 1954 (SECRET).
^30.  U.S. VerbMin/8, pp. 347–48.
^31.  Ibid., p. 355.
^32.  Hans Morgenthau, "The 1954 Geneva Conference: An Assessment," in A Symposium on America's Stake in Vietnam, New York: American Friends of Vietnam, 1956, pp. 64–70.
^33.  Dulles to Smith at Geneva priority tel. TEDUC 212, June 17, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
^34.  Smith from Geneva priority DULTE 195; June 18, 1954 (SECRET). In an aide-memoire delivered by Henri Bonnet, the French ambassador to Washington, to Dulles and Eden on June 26, the French government urged the U.S. not to encourage an adverse Vietnamese reaction to partition. The U.S. was also asked "to intervene with the Vietnamese to counsel upon them wisdom and self-control and to dissuade them from refusing an agreement which, if it is reached, is dictated not by the spirit of abandoning them, but on the contrary by the desire to save in Indochina all that can possibly be saved, and to give the Vietnamese state, under peaceful conditions, opportunities which have not always been possible heretofore because of the war." See Dulles' tel. No. 4852 to American Embassy – Paris, June 28, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
^35.  AmEmbassy Paris 39, July 2, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
^36.  Johnson from Geneva priority tel. SECTO 560, July 6, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
^37.  Johnson from Geneva priority tel. SECTO 574, July 8, 1954 (SECRET).
^38.  Smith from Geneva tel. SECTO 655, July 18, 1954 (SECRET).

III. B. 2.
FOOTNOTES
^1.  U.S. VerbMin/8, 355
^2.  U.S. VerbMin/3, 104–105
^3.  I.C. Restricted/6, 16
^4.  I.C. Restricted/7, 13
^5.  I.C. Restricted/8, 8–9
^6.  U.S. VerbMin/7, 344
^7.  I.C. Restricted/14, 26
^8.  SECTO 633, July 17, 1954 (SECRET)
^9.  SECTO 654, July 18, 1954 (CONFIDENTIAL)
^10.  SECTO 673, July 19, 1954 (SECRET)
^11.  U.S. VerbMin/8, July 21, 1954, 347–348, 354–355