United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense/III. The Geneva Accords

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III The Geneva Accords 1954

A. U.S. Military Planning and Diplomatic Maneuver, January–July, 1954

B. Role and Obligations of the State of Vietnam

C. The Viet Minh Position and Sino–Soviet Strategy

D. The Intent of the Geneva Accords

TOP SECRET – SENSITIVE


UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS

1945 - 1967








VIETNAM TASK FORCE




OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


SET #13


TOP SECRET – SENSITIVE

III
THE GENEVA ACCORDS
1954


Sec Def Cont Nr. X-0295

PART III
THE GENEVA ACCORDS

1954


Foreword


This part of the study examines the Geneva Conference of 1954. Section A deals with U.S. positions before and during the conference. Section B discusses the role of the Bao Dai Government of Vietnam during Geneva, and its consequent obligations. Section C relates the Viet Minh position at Geneva to overall objectives and strategy of the communist powers. The final portion, Section D, analyzes the outcome of the conference as viewed, first by the communists, then by the West, and finally as its spirit and effects can be seen in objective retrospect.


A. U.S. Military Planning and Diplomatic Maneuver, January–July, 1954

B. Role and Obligations of the State of Vietnam

C. The Viet Minh Position and Sino–Soviet Strategy

D. The Intent of the Geneva Accords