United States v. Reese/Dissent Clifford

by Nathan Clifford

United States Supreme Court

92 U.S. 214

United States  v.  Reese

MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD and MR. JUSTICE HUNT dissenting.

MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD:--

I concur that the indictment is bad, but for reasons widely different from those assigned by the court.

States, as well as the United States, are prohibited by the [[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|Fifteenth Amendment]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]] of the Constitution from denying or abridging the right of citizens of the United States to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and power is vested in Congress, by the second article of that amendment, to enforce that prohibition 'by appropriate legislation.'

Since the adoption of that amendment, Congress has legislated upon the subject; and, by the first section of the Enforcement Act, it is provided that citizens of the United States, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, shall, if otherwise qualified to vote in state, territorial, or municipal elections, be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulalation of any State or Territory, or by or under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding.

Beyond doubt, that section forbids all discrimination between white citizens and citizens of color in respect to their right to vote; but the section does not provide that the person or officer making such discrimination shall be guilty of any offence, nor does it prescribe that the person or officer guilty of making such discrimination shall be subject to any fine, penalty, or punishment whatever. None of the counts of the indictment in this case, however, are framed under that section; nor will it be necessary to give it any further consideration, except so far as it may aid in the construction of the other sections of the act. 16 Stat. 140.

Sect. 2 of the act will deserve more examination, as it assumes that certain acts are or may be required to be done by or under the authority of the constitution or laws of certain States, or the laws of certain Territories, as a prerequisite or qualification for voting, and that certain persons or officers are or may be, by such constitution or laws, charged with the performance of duties in furnishing to such citizens and oopportunity to perform such prerequisites to become qualified to vote; and provides that it shall be the duty of every such person or officer to give all such citizens, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, the same and equal opportunity to perform such prerequisites to become qualified to vote.

Equal opportunity is required by that section to be given to all such citizens, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, to perform the described prerequisite; and the further provision of the same section is, that, if any such person or officer charged with the performance of the described duties shall refuse or knowingly omit to give full effect to the requirements of that section, he shall for every such offence forfeit and pay $500 to the person aggrieved, and also be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and punished as therein provided. Other sections applicable to the subject are contained in the Enforcement Act, to which reference will hereafter be made. 16 id. 141.

1. Four counts are exhibited in the indictment against the defendants; and the record shows that the defendants filed a demurrer to each of the counts, which was joined in behalf of the United States. Two of the counts-to wit, the first and the third having been abandoned at the argument, the examination will be confined to the second and the fourth. By the record, it also appears that the defendants, together with one William Farnaugh, on the 30th of January; 1873, were the lawful inspectors of a municipal election held on that day in the city of Lexington, in the State of Kentucky, pursuant to the constitution and laws of that State, and that they, as such inspectors, were then and there charged by law with the duty of receiving, counting, certifying, registering, reporting, and giving effect to the vote of all citizens qualified to vote at said election in Ward 3 of the city; and the accusation set forth in the second count of the indictment is, that one William Garner, at said municipal election, offered to the said inspectors at the polls of said election in said Ward 3 to vote for members of the said city council, the said poll being then and there the lawful and proper voting place and precinct of the said William Garner, who was then and there a free male citizen of the United States and of the State, of African descent, and having then and there resided in said State more than two years, and in said city more than one year, next preceding said election, and having been a resident of said voting precinct and ward in which he offered to vote more than sixty days immediately prior to said election, and being then and there, at the time of such offer to vote, qualified and entitled, as alleged, by the laws of the State, to vote at said election.

Offer in due form to vote at the said election having been made, as alleged, by the said William Garner, the charge is that the said William Farnaugh consented to receive, count, register, and give effect to the vote of the party offering the same; but that the defendants, constituting the majority of the inspectors at the election, and, as such, having the power to receive or reject all votes offered at said poll, did then and there, when the said party offered to vote, unlawfully agree and confer with each other that they, as such inspectors, would not take, receive, certify, register, report, or give effect to the vote of any voters of African descent, offered at said election, unless the voter so offering to vote, besides being otherwise qualified to vote, had paid to said city the capitation-tax of one dollar and fifty cents for the preceding year, on or before the 15th of January prior to the day of the election; which said agreement, the pleader alleges, was then and there made with intent thereby to hinder, prevent, and obstruct all voters of African descent on account of their race and color, though lawfully entitled to vote at said election, from so voting. Taken separately, that allegation would afford some support to the theory of the United States; but it must be considered in connection with the allegation which immediately follows it in the same count, where it is alleged as follows: That the defendants, in pursuance of said unlawful agreement, did then and there, at the election aforesaid, wrongfully and illegally require and demand of said party, when he offered to vote as aforesaid, that he should, as a prerequisite and qualification to his voting at said election, produce evidence of his having paid to said city or its proper officers the said capitation-tax of one dollar and fifty cents for the year preceding, on or before the 15th of January preceding the day of said election; and the averment is to the effect that the party offering his vote then and there refused to comply with that illegal requirement and demand, or to produce the evidence so demanded and required.

Offences created by statute, as well as offences created at common law, with rare exceptions, consist of more than one ingredient, and, in some cases, of many; and the rule is universal, that every ingredient of which the offence is composed must be accurately and clearly alleged in the indictment, or the indictment will be bad on demurrer, or it may be quashed on motion, or the judgment may be arrested before sentence, or be reversed on a writ of error. United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. 174.

Matters well pleaded, it is true, are admitted by the demurrer; but it is equally true, that every ingredient of the offence must be accurately and clearly described, and that no indictment is sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly describe all the ingredients of which the offence is composed.

Citizens of the United States, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, if otherwise qualified to vote at a state, territorial, or municipal election, shall be entitled and allowed to vote at such an election, even though the constitution, laws, customs, usages, or regulations of the State or Territory do not allow, or even prohibit, such voter from exercising that right. 16 Stat. 140, sect. 1.

Evidently the purpose of that section is to place the male citizen of color, as an elector, on the same footing with the white male citizen. Nothing else was intended by that provision, as is evident from the fact that it does not profess to enlarge or vary the prior existing right of white male citizens in any respect whatever. Conclusive support to that theory is also derived from the second section of the same act, which was obviously passed to enforce obedience to the rule forbidding discrimination between colored male citizens and white male citizens in respect to their right to vote at such elections.

By the charter of the city of Lexington, it is provided that a tax shall be levied on each free male inhabitant of twenty-one years of age and upwards, except paupers, inhabiting said city, at a ratio not exceeding one dollar and fifty cents each. Sess. Laws 1867, p. 441.

Such citizens, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, in order that they may be entitled to vote at any such election, must be free male citizens 'over twenty-one years of age, have been a resident of the city at least six months, and of the ward in which he resides at least sixty days, prior to the day of the election, and have paid the capitation-tax assessed by the city on or before the 15th of January preceding the day of election.' 2 Sess. Laws 1870, p. 71.

White male citizens, not possessing the qualifications to vote required by law, find no guaranty of the right to exercise that privilege by the first section of the Enforcement Act; but the mandate of the section is explicit and imperative, that all citizens, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, if otherwise qualified to vote at any state, territorial, or municipal election, shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, even though forbidden so to do, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, by the constitution of the State, or by the laws, custom, usage, or regulation of the State or Territory, where the election is held.

Disability to vote of every kind, arising from race, color, or previous condition of servitude, is declared by the first section of that act to be removed from the colored male citizen; but unless otherwise qualified by law to vote at such an election, he is no more entitled to enjoy that privilege than a white male citizen who does not possess the qualifications required by law to constitute him a legal voter at such an election.

Legal disability to vote at any such election, arising from race, color, or previous condition of servitude, is removed by the [[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|Fifteenth Amendment]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]], as affirmed in the first section of the Enforcement Act: but the Congress knew full well that cases would arise where the want of other qualifications, if not removed, might prevent the colored citizen from exercising the right of suffrage at such an election; and the intent and purpose of the second section of the act are to furnish to all citizens an opportunity to remove every such other disability to enable them to become qualified to exercise that right, and to punish persons and officers charged with any duty in that regard who unlawfully and wrongfully refuse or wilfully omit to co-operate to that end. Hence it is provided, that where any act is or shall be required to be done as a prerequisite or qualification for voting, and persons or officers are charged in the manner stated with the performance of duties in furnishing to citizens an opportunity to perform such prerequisite or to become qualified to vote, it shall be the duty of every such person and officer to give all citizens, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, the same and equal opportunity to perform such prerequisite, and to become qualified to vote.

Persons or officers who wrongfully refuse or knowingly omit to perform the duty with which they are charged by by that clause of the second section of the Enforcement Act commit the offence defined by that section, and incur the penalty, and subject themselves to the punishment, prescribed for that offence.

Enough appears in the second court of the indictment to show beyond all question that it cannot be sustained under the second section of the Enforcement Act, as the count expressly alleges that the defendants as such inspectors, at the time the complaining party offered his vote, refused to receive and count the same because he did not produce evidence that he had paid to the city the capitation-tax of one dollar and fifty cents assessed against him for the preceding year, which payment, it appears by the law of the State, is a prerequisite and necessary qualification to enable any citizen to vote at that election, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and the express allegation of the count is, that the party offering his vote then and there refused to comply with that prerequisite, and then and there demanded that his vote should be received and counted without his complying with that prerequisite.

Argument to show that such allegations are insufficient to constitute the offence defined in the second section of the Enforcement Act, or any other section of that act, is quite unnecessary, as it appears in the very terms of the allegations that the party offering his vote was not, irrespective of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude, a qualified voter at such an election by the law of the State where the election was held.

Persons within the category described in the first section of the Enforcement Act, of whom it is enacted that they shall be entitled and allowed to vote at such an election, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, are citizens of the United States otherwise qualified to vote at the election pending; and inasmuch as it is not alleged in the count that the party offering his vote in this case was otherwise qualified by law to vote at the time he offered his vote, and inasmuch as no excuse is pleaded for not producing evidence to establish that prerequisite of qualification, it is clear that the supposed offence is not set forth with sufficient certainty to justify a conviction and sentence of the accused.

2. Defects also exist in the fourth count; but it becomes necessary, before considering the questions which those defects present, to examine with care the third section of the Enforcement Act. Sect. 3 of that act differs in some respects from the second section; as, for example, sect. 3 provides that whenever under the constitution and laws of a State, or the laws of a Territory, any act is or shall be required to be done by any such citizen as a prerequisite to qualify or entitle him to vote, the offer of any such citizen to perform the act required to be done as aforesaid shall, if it fail to be carried into execution by reason of the wrongful act or omission aforesaid of the person or officer charged with the duty of receiving or permitting such performance or offer to perform, be deemed and held as a performance in law of such act; and the person so offering and failing as aforesaid, and being otherwise qualified, shall be entitled to vote in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had, in fact, performed the said act. By that clause of the section, it is enacted that the offer of the party interested to perform the prerequisite act to qualify or entitle him to vote shall, if it fail for the reason specified, have the same effect as the actual performance of the prerequisite act would have; and the further provision is, that any judge, inspector, or other officer of election, whose duty it is or shall be to receive, count, certify, register, report, or give effect to the vote of such citizen, upon the presentation by him of his affidavit, stating such offer and the time and place thereof, and the name of the officer or person whose duty it was to act thereon, and that he was wrongfully prevented by such person or officer from performing such act, shall for every such offence forfeit and pay the sum of $500 dollars to the person aggrieved, and also be guilty of a misdemeanor.

Payment of the capitation-tax on or before the 15th of January preceding the day of the election is beyond all doubt one of the prerequisite acts, if not the only one, referred to in that part of the section; and it is equally clear that the introductory clause of the section is wholly inapplicable to a case where the citizen, claiming the right to vote at such an election, has actually paid the capitation-tax as required by the election law of the State. Voters who have seasonably paid the tax are in no need of any opportunity to perform such a prerequisite to qualify them to vote; but the third section of the act was passed to provide for a class of citizens who had not paid the tax, and who had offered to pay it, and the offer had failed to be carried into execution by reason of the wrongful act or omission of the person or officer charged with the duty of receiving or permitting the performance of such prerequisite.

Qualified voters by the law of the State are male citizens over twenty-one years of age, who have been residents of the city at least six months, and of the ward in which they reside at least sixty days, immediately prior to the day of the election, and who have paid the capitation-tax assessed by the city on or before the fifteenth day of January preceding the day of the election. Obviously, the payment of the capitation-tax on or before the time mentioned is a prerequisite to qualify the citizen to vote; and the purpose of the second section is to secure to the citizen an opportunity to perform that prerequisite, and to punish the persons and officers charged with the duty of furnishing the citizen with such an opportunity to perform such prerequisite, in case such person or officer refuses or knowingly omits to do his duty in that regard. Grant that, still it is clear that the punishment of the offender would not retroact and give effect to the right of the citizen to vote, nor secure to the public the right to have his vote received, counted, registered, reported, and made effectural at that election.

3. Injustice of the kind, it was foreseen, might be done; and, to remedy that difficulty, the third section was passed, the purpose of which is to provide that the offer of any such citizen to perform such prerequisite, if the offer fails to be carried into exection by reason of the wrongful act or omission of the person or officer charged with the duty of receiving or permitting such performance, shall be deemed and held as a performance in law of such act and prerequisite; and the person so offering to perform such prerequisite, and so failing by reason of the wrongful act or omission of the person or officer charged with such duty, if otherwise qualified, shall be entitled to vote in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had, in fact, performed such prerequisite act. Nothing short of the performance of the prerequisite act will entitle any citizen to vote at any such election in that State, if the opportunity to perform the prerequisite is furnished as required by the act of Congress; but if those whose duty it is to furnish the opportunity to perform the act refuse or omit so to do, then the offer to perform such prerequisite act, if the offer fails to be carried into execution by the wrongful act or omission of those whose duty it is to receive and permit the performance of the prerequisite act, shall have the same effect in law as the actual performance.

Such an offer to perform can have the same effect in law as actual performance only in case where it fails to be carried into execution by reason of the wrongful act or omission of the person or officer charged with the duty of receiving or permitting such performance; from which it follows that the offer must be made in such terms, and under such circumstances, that, if it should be received and carried into execution, it would constitute a legal and complete performance of the prerequisite act. What the law of the State requires in that regared is, that the citizen offering to vote at such an election should have paid the capitation-tax assessed by the city, which in this case was one dollar and fifty cents, on or before the 15th of January preceding the day of election. Unless the offer is made in such terms and under such circumstances, that, if it is accepted and carried into execution, it would constitute a legal and complete performance of the prerequisite act, the person or officer who refused or omitted to carry the offer into execution would not incur the penalty nor be guilty of the offence defined by that section of the act; for it could not be properly alleged that it failed to be carried into effect by the wrongful act or omission of the person or officer charged with the duty of receiving and permitting such performance.

Viewed in the light of these suggestions, it must be that the offer contemplated by the third section of the act is an offer made in such terms, and under such circumstances, that, if it be accepted and carried into execution by the person or officer to whom it is made, it will constitute a complete performance of the prerequisite, and show that the party making the offer, if otherwise qualified, is entitled to vote at the election.

Evidence is entirely wanting to show that the authors of the Enforcement Act ever intended to abrogate any State election law, except so far as it denies or abridges the right of the citizen to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Every discrimination on that account is forbidden by the [[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|Fifteenth Amendment]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]; and the first section of the act under consideration provides, as before remarked, that all citizens, otherwise qualified to vote, . . . shall be entitled and allowed to vote, . . . without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, any constitution, law, &c., to the contrary notwithstanding. State election laws creating such discriminations are superseded in that regard by the [[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|[[Additional amendments to the United States Constitution#Amendment XV|Fifteenth Amendment]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]; but the Enforcement Act furnishes no ground to infer that the law-makers intended to annul the State election laws in any other respect whatever. Had Congress intended by the third section of that act to abrogate the election law of the State creating the prerequisite in question, it is quite clear that the second section would have been wholly unnecessary, as it would be a useless regulation to provide the means to enable citizens to comply with a prerequisite which is abrogated and treated as null by the succeeding section. Statutes should be interpreted, if practicable, so as to avoid any repugnancy between the different parts of the same, and to give a sensible and intelligent effect to every one of their provisions; nor is it ever to be presumed that any part of a statute is supererogatory or without meaning. Potter's Dwarris, 145.

Difficulties of the kind are all avoided if it be held that the second section was enacted to afford citizens an opportunity to perform the prerequisite act to qualify themselves to vote, and to punish the person or officer who refuses or knowingly omits to perform his duty in furnishing them with that opportunity, and that the intent and purpose of the third section are to protect such citizens from the consequences of the wrongful refusal or wilful omission of such person or officer to receive and give effect to the actuall offer of such citizen to perform such prerequisite, if made in terms, and under such circumstances, that the offer, if accepted and carried into execution, whould constitute an actual and complete performance of the act made a prerequisite to the right of voting by the State law. Apply these suggestions to the fourth count of the indictment, and it is clear that the allegations in that regard are insufficent to describe the offence defined by the third section of the Enforcement Act.

4. Beyond all doubt, the general rule is, that, in an indictment for an offence created by statute, it is sufficient to describe the offence in the words of the statute; and it is safe to admit that that general rule is supported by many decided cases of the highest authority: but it is equally certain that exceptions exist to the rule, which are as well established as the rule itself, most of which result from another rule of criminal pleading, which, in framing indictments founded upon statutes, is paramount to all others, and is one of universal application,-that every ingredient of the offence must be accurately and clearly expressed; or, in other words, that the indictment must contain an allegation of every fact which is legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted. United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. 174.

Speaking of that principle, Mr. Bishop says it pervades the entire system of the adjudged law of criminal procedure, as appears by all the cases; that, wherever we move in that department of our jurisprudence, we come in contact with it; and that we can no more escape from it than from the atmosphere which surrounds us. 1 Bishop, Cr. Pro., 2d ed., sect. 81; Archbold's Crim. Plead., 15th ed., 54; 1 Stark Crim. Plead., 236; 1 Am. Cr. Law, 6th rev. ed., sect. 364; Steel v. Smith, 1 Barn. & Ald. 99.

Examples of the kind, where it has been held that exceptions exist to the rule that it is sufficient in an indictment founded upon a statute to follow the words of the statute, are very numerous, and show that many of the exceptions have become as extensively recognized, and are as firmly settled, as any rule of pleading in the criminal law. Moreover, says Mr. Bishop, there must be such an averment of facts as shows prima facie guilt in the defendant; and if, supposing all the facts set out to be true, there is, because of the possible nonexistence of some fact not mentioned, room to escape from the prima facie conclusion of guilt, the indictment is insufficient, which is the exact case before the court. 1 Bishop, Cr. Pro., 2d ed., sect. 325.

It is plain, says the same learned author, that if, after a full expression has been given to the statutory terms, any of the other rules relating to the indictment are left uncomplied with, the indictment is still insufficient. To it must be added what will conform also to the other rules. Consequently, the general doctrine, that the indictment is sufficient if it follows the words of the statute creating and defining the offence, is subject to exceptions, requiring the allegation to be expanded beyond the prohibiting terms. 1 id., sect. 623.

In general, says Marshall, C. J., it is sufficient in a libel (being a libel of information) to charge the offence in the very words which direct the forfeiture; but the proposition is not, we think, universally true. If the words which describe the subject of the law are general, . . . we think the charge in the libel ought to conform to the true sense and meaning of those words as used by the legislature. The Mary Ann, 8 Wheat. 389.

Similar views are expressed by this court in United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 474, in which the opinion was given by Mr. Justice Story. Having first stated the general rule, that it is sufficient certainty in an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the Statute, he proceeds to remark, 'We say, in general; for there are doubtless cases where more particularity is required, either from the obvious intention of the legislature, or from the application of known principles of law. Known principles of law require more particularity in this case, in order that all the ingredients of the offence may be accurately and clearly alleged; and it is equally clear that the intention of the legislature also requires the same thing, as it is obvious that the mere statement of the party that he offered to perform the prerequisite was never intended to be made equivalent to performance, unless such statement was accompanied by an offer to pay the tax, and under circumstances which shown that he was ready and able to make the payment. Authorities are not necessary to prove that an indictment upon a statute must state all such facts and circumstances as constitute the statute offence, so as to bring the party indicted precisely within the provisions of the statute defining the offence.

Statutes are often framed, says Colby, to meet the relations of parties to each other, to prevent frauds by the one upon the other; and, in framing such statutes, the language used is often elliptical, leaving some of the circumstances expressive of the relations of the parties to each other to be supplied by intendment or construction. In all such cases, the facts and circumstances constituting such relation must be alleged in the indictment, though not expressed in the words of the statute. 2 Colby, Cr. Law, 114; People v. Wibur, 4 Park, Cr. Cas. 21; Com. v. Cook, 18 B. Monr. 149; Pearce v. The State, 1 Sneed, 63; People v. Stone, 9 Wend. 191; Whiting v. The State, 14 Conn. 487; Anthony v. The State, 29 Ala. 27; 1 Am. Cr. Law, 6th rev. ed., sect. 364, note d, and cases cited.

Like the preceding counts, the preliminary allegations of the fourth count are without objection; and the jury proceed to present that the party offering to vote, having then and there all the qualifications, as to age, citizenship, and residence, required by the State law, did, on the thirtieth day of January, 1873, in order that he might become qualified to vote at said election, offer to the collector at his office in said city to pay any capitation-tax due from him to said city, or any capitation-tax that had been theretofore assessed against him by said city, or which could be assessed against him by said city, or which said city or said collector claimed was due from him to said city; and that the said collector then and there wrongfully refused, on account of his race or color, to give the said party an opportunity to pay said capitation-tax for the preceding year, and then and there wrongfully refused to receive said tax from the said party in order that he might become qualified to vote at said election, the said collector having then and there given to citizens of the white race an opportunity to pay such taxes due from them to said city, in order that they might become qualified for that purpose.

All that is there alleged may be admitted, and yet it may be true that the complaining party never made any offer at the time and place mentioned to pay the capitation-tax of one dollar and fifty cents due to the city at the time and place mentioned, in such terms, and under such circumstances, that if the offer as made had been accepted by the person or officer to whom the offer was made, and that such person or officer had done every thing which it was his duty to do, or every thing which it was in his power to do, to carry it into effect, the offer would have constituted performance of the prerequisite act.

Actual payment of the capitation-tax on or before the 15th of January preceding the day of election is the prerequisite act to be performed to qualify the citizen, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, to vote at said election. Such an offer, therefore, in order that it may be deemed and held as a performance in law of such prerequisite, must be an offer to pay the amount of the capitation-tax; and the party making the offer must then and there possess the ability and means to pay the amount to the person or officer to whom the offer is made; for, unless payment of the amount of tax is then and there made to the said person or officer, he would not be authorized to discharge the tax, and could not carry the offer into execution without violating his duty to the city.

5. Readiness to pay, therefore, is necessarily implied from the language of the third section, as it is only in case the offer fails to be carried into execution by reason of the wrongful act or omission of the person or officer charged with the duty of receiving or permitting such performance that the offer can be deemed and held as performance in law of such prerequisite act. Where the party making the offer is not ready to pay the tax to the person or officer to whom the offer is made, and has not then and there the means to make the payment, it cannot be held that the offer fails to be carried into execution by reason of the wrongful act or omission of the person or officer to whom the offer is made, as it would be a perversion of law and good sense to hold that it is the duty of such a person or officer to carry such an offer into execution by discharging the tax without receiving the amount of the tax from the party making the offer of performance.

Giving full effect to the several allegations of the count, nothing approximating to such a requirement is therein alleged, nor can any thing of the kind be implied from the word 'offer' as used in any part of the indictment. Performance of that prerequisite, by citizens otherwise qualified, entitles all such, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, to vote at such an election; and the offer to perform the same, if the offer is made in terms, and under such circumstances, that, if it be accepted and carried into execution, it will constitute performance, will also entitle such citizens to vote in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had performed such prerequisite, provided the offer fails to be carried into execution by reason of the wrongful act or omission of the person or officer charged with the duty of receiving and permitting such performance.

Judges, inspectors, and other officers of elections, must take notice of these provisions, as they constitute the most essential element or ingredient of the offence defined by the third section of the act. Officers of the elections, whether judges or inspectors, are required to carry those regulations into full effect; and the provision is, that any judge, inspector, or other officer of election, whose duty it is or shall be to receive, count, certify, register, report, or give effect to the vote of such citizens, who shall wrongfully refuse or omit to receive, count, certify, register, or give effect to the vote of any such citizen, upon the presentation by him of his affidavit stating such offer, and the time and place thereof, and the name of the officer or person whose duty it was to act on such offer, and that he, the citizen, was wrongfully prevented by such person or officer from performing such prerequisite act, shall for every such offence forfeit and pay the sum of $500 to the person aggrieved, and also be guilty of a misdemeanor, and be fined and imprisoned as therein provided.

6. Of course, it must be assumed that the terms of the affidavit were exactly the same as those set forth in the third count of the indictment; and, if so, it follows that the word 'offer' used in the affidavit must receive the same construction as that already given to the same word in that part of the section which provides that the offer, if it fail to be carried into execution by reason of the wrongful act or omission of the person or officer charged with the duty of receiving or permitting such performance, shall be deemed and held as a performance in law of such prerequisite act. Decisive confirmation of that view is derived from the fact that the complaining party is only required to state in his affidavit the offer, the time, and the place thereof, the name of the person or officer whose duty it was to act thereon, and that he, the affiant, was wrongfully prevented by such person or officer from performing such prerequisite act.

None will deny, it is presumed, that the word 'offer' in the affidavit means the same thing as the word 'offer' used in the declaratory part of the same section; and, if so, it must be held that the offer described in the affidavit must have been one made in such terms, and under such circumstances, that, if the offer had been accepted, it might have been carried into execution by the person or officer to whom it was made; or, in other words, it must have been an offer to do whatever it was necessary to do to perform the prerequisite act; and it follows, that if the word 'offer,' as used in the act of Congress, necessarily includes readiness to pay the tax, it is equally clear that the affidavit should contain the same statement. Plainly it must be so; for unless the offer has that scope, if it failed to be carried into execution, it could not be held that the failure was by the wrongful act or omission of the person or officer to whom the offer was made. Such a construction must be erroneous; for, if adopted, it would lead to consequences which would shock the publice sense, as it would require the collector to discharge the tax without payment, which would be a manifest violation of his duty. Taken in any point of view, it is clear that the third count of the indictment is too vague, uncertain, and indefinite in its allegations to constitute the proper foundation for the conviction and sentence of the defendants. Even suppose that the signification of the word 'offer' is sufficiently comprehensive to include readiness to perform, which is explicitly denied, still it is clear that the offer, as pleaded in the fourth count, was not in season to constitute a compliance with the prerequisite qualification, for the reason that the State statute requires that the capitation-tax shall be paid on or before the fifteenth day of January preceding the day of the election.

Having come to these conclusions, it is not necessary to examine the fourth section of the Enforcement Act, for the reason that it is obvious, without much examination, that no one of the counts of the indictment is sufficient to warrant the conviction and sentence of the defendants for the offence defined in that section.