United States v. Union Pacific Railway Company (148 U.S. 562)/Opinion of the Court

by Henry Billings Brown

United States Supreme Court

148 U.S. 562

United States  v.  Union Pacific Railway Company

The object of this bill is to procure the surrender and cancellation of certain patents issued for a triangular tract of land of about 200,000 acres in extent, lying upon the outside of the right angle, or elbow, made by the junction at Denver of the Kansas Pacific Railway, whose general course is east and west, with the Denver Pacific Railway & Telegraph Company, whose general course is north and south. These roads are now consolidated under the name of the Union Pacific Railway Company.

By the original act of July 1, 1862, incorporating the Union Pacific Railroad Company, (12 St. p. 489,) this company was empowered to construct a road from a point on the 100th meridian, between certain north and south limits, to the western boundary of Nevada, and by the same act a Kansas corporation was empowered to construct its line from the Missouri river westwardly to the initial point of the Union Pacific at the 100th meridian, and to connect with the latter road at that point. Subsequently, and in 1866, the Kansas corporation, whose name had meantime been changed to the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, was authorized to so change its line as to connect with the Union Pacific at a point not more than 50 miles westward from the meridian of Denver. Acting upon this, the company did change its line so as to make the same extend from Kansas City westward in a direct line to Denver, and thence northward in a direct line to Cheyenne. By the original act the Union Pacific was to receive a grant of 5 alternate sections of land for every mile (subsequently raised to 10) on each side of the road, and, as the Kansas corporation was to construct its road 'upon the same terms and conditions in all respects' as the Union Pacific, it followed that it was entitled to the same land grant. The act authorizing the Kansas corporation to change its line of road (14 St. p. 79) provided that, upon the filing of a map showing the general route of the road, the lands along the entire line thereof, so far as the same might be designated, should be reserved from sale by order of the secretary of the interior, showing clearly that it was designed to preserve the land grant to which the road was entitled under the original act.

In this condition of things the act of 1869 was passed, which authorized this corporation, then known as the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, to contract with the Denver Pacific, a Colorado corporation, for the construction of that portion of its line between Denver and Cheyenne, (hereby clearly recognizing the validity of the change of location,) to adopt its roadbed, to grant the Denver Pacific a 'perpetual use of its right of way and depot grounds, and to transfer to it all the rights and privileges, subject to all the obligations appertaining to such part of its line.' Even supposing that the act of 1866 did not, upon its face, authorize the change that was actually made,-that is, westwardly to Cheyenne, by the way of Denver,-it is clear that by the act of March, 1869, this line was recognized as a proper compliance with the act of 1866, and as a valid and continuous line from Kansas City to Cheyenne.

The position of the government in this connection is that the act of 1869 separated the grant of lands to the Denver Pacific from that in aid of the Eastern Division of the Union Pacific, and thereby made them two distinct and independent lines of road, each with its own land grant. This construction would disentitle the Kansas Pacific Company to any lands west of its terminus at Denver, or west of a north and south line across its 20-mile limit, and the Denver Pacific to any lands south of its terminus at the same place, leaving a triangular piece of about 200,000 acres to revert to the government. These are the lands in dispute.

We do not, however, so read the act. It did not declare that the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, should end at Denver, or that the Denver Pacific should begin at Denver, but simply that the former might contract with the latter for the construction, operation, and maintenance of a part of its line. Under the interpretation contended for, if that part had been between the 100th meridian and Denver, instead of between Denver and Cheyenne, it would thereby have made a distinct and independent line of road, though running in the same direction.

It is true that, under the original act of 1862, the grant was limited to the odd-numbered sections 'on each side of said railroad, on the line thereof, and within the limits of ten miles on each side of said road,' but it does not follow that, if the road makes a curve or right angle, the grant ceases in any way to be operative at that point. The railroad is entitled to its grant of 10 alternate sections to each mile of road, and is entitled to have it selected within the limits of 20 miles on each side; but there is no requirement that the lands shall be reached by a line run at right angles to the road. Considerable light is thrown upon the interpretation of the statute of 1869 by the phraseology of section 2, which provides that the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, shall extend its line to Denver, 'so as to form with that part of its line herein authorized to be constructed' by the Denver Pacific 'a continuous line of railroad and telegraph from Kansas City by way of Denver to Cheyenne,' and that 'all the provisions of law for the operation of the Union Pacific Railroad, its branches and connections as a continuous line, without discrimination, shall apply the same as if the road from Denver to Cheyenne had been constructed by the Union Pacific Railway Company, Eastern Division.' So far from this language indicating that this was not to be considered a single line, it is difficult to see how congress could have expressed more clearly, by inference, that they were not to be treated as independent roads. This construction is also reinfored by the amendatory act of June 20, 1874, (18 St. p. 111,) which provides that 'for all the purposes of said act, [of 1862,] and of the acts amendatory thereof, the railway of the Denver Pacific Railway and Telegraph Company shall be deemed and taken to be a part and extension of the Kansas Pacific Railroad to the point of junction thereof with the road of the Union Pacific Railroad Company at Cheyenne, as provided in the act of March third, 1869.'

Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the act of 1862 being a grant in praesenti, the rights of the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, to the lands upon each side of its road became fixed from the moment it proceeded, under the act of 1866, to establish its line of definite location so as to make the same extend from Kansas City westwardly to Denver, and thence northwardly to Cheyenne; and, in fact, that was practically the ruling of this court in Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 97 U.S. 491, 496-498. But, however this may be, it is entirely clear that the act of 1869 should not be construed to have the effect of breaking the continuity of the line unless its language imperatively requires it. So far from this being the case, the very title of the act, 'to authorize the transfer of lands' granted to the Union Pacific to the Denver Pacific, 'and to expedite the completion of railroads to Denver,' indicates that it was never intended to operate as a forfeiture, or as a reduction in amount, of any lands to which the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, had become entitled by filing its line of definite location, or to create distinct lines of road, but was merely designed to permit the Union Pacific to contract with the Denver Pacific for the construction, operation, and maintenance of a portion of its line. It is true that by the third section, which authorizes the 'said companies' to mortgage 'their respective portions of said road,' and provided that 'each of said companies shall receive patents to the alternate sections of land along their respective lines,' the two corporations were thereby recognized as independent, yet, at the same time, it recognized them as two corporations engaged in the construction of the same line of road, and evidently contemplated a division between them of the land grant approprated to such line. The special proviso of section 3 was doubtless inserted to entitle the Denver Pacific to take patents for its portion of the land granted, direct from the United States.

In addition to all this, the facts set forth in the plea of Joseph Standley, which, for the purposes of this case, may be taken as true, indicate very strongly an acquiescence of the interior department from the date of the act of March 3, 1869, down to December, 1887, a period of over 18 years, in the construction of the act contended for by the defendant. The plea set forth that in compliance with the act of 1866 the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, filed with the secretary of the interior a map of the general route of its line from the western boundary of Kansas, through Denver, to Cheyenne, and that the secretary of the interior on the same day directed the withdrawal of lands in Colorado on the designated line of said route; that, in pursuance of said direction, the commissioner of the land office prepared a diagram showing the line of route, and the map of the land grant, and forwarded the same to the register and receiver of the land office at Denver, directing the odd-numbered sections to be withdrawn on account of this grant; that, included in said diagram, are all the lands mentioned in the bill; that these lands were so withdrawn in accordance with these instructions; that this map of the general route was the only one ever filed; that the directions to withdraw these lands were never vacated; that on August 21, 1869, the Denver Pacific filed its map of definite location of the section between Denver and Cheyenne, which was approved by the secretary of the interior; that on May 26, 1870, the Kansas Pacific also filed its map of definite location between the boundary of Kansas and Denver, which was approved by the secretary of the interior; that, under his directions, the commissioner of the general land office prepared maps showing the limits of the land grants; that included in these maps were all the lands described in the bill; and that in 1870, a contest having arisen between the two roads as to the ownership of certain sections, an adjustment was had by the department of the interior of their several rights.

The plea further avers that, in 1873, in a case then pending in the general land office between the Kansas Pacific and one William Hodge and John Tracy, the commissioner of the land office formally decided that the act of 1869 did not sever the original grant to the Union Pacific, but that the grant was a continuous one through Denver to Cheyenne; that his ruling in that particular was affirmed in 1874 by the acting secretary of the interior; and that this was the uniform construction put upon the act until 1887, when the department reversed its former decision, and for the first time held that the lands covered by the bill were not included within the land grant to either road.

If there were any doubts with regard to the interpretation of the act of 1869, the construction placed upon it by the land department for 18 years, under which construction these lands have been put upon the market and sold, would undoubtedly be entitled to considerable weight.

We have no doubt of the correctness of the conclusion reached by the court below, and its decree is therefore affirmed.

Notes