Unlawful Marriage/Chapter 12

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3033218Unlawful Marriage — Chapter XIIJ. J. Janeway

CHAPTER XII.

Conclusion.—Leviticus 18:18.—Meaning.—Objections.—Implication often rejected.—Penalties of the Hebrew civil law

In the last chapter it was shown, by just rules of interpretation, that it is unlawful for a man to marry his deceased wife's sister, for the following reasons:

1. He sustains to her precisely the same relation which he sustains to his brother's wife, whom he is expressly forbidden (v. 16) to marry.

2. As the law addresses women as well as men, when it says to a man, Thou shalt not cohabit with thy brother's wife, it virtually says to a woman, Thou shalt not cohabit with thy sister's husband.

3. A man's sister-in-law is near of kin to him; and so comes under the general rule of prohibition in the 6th verse.

4. She is blood-kin to her sister, with whom her brother-in-law has cohabited.

To all these reasons we subjoin another, that a man is expressly prohibited to marry his wife's sister. (Ver. 18.)

The prohibition is so plain that our brethren do not deny that it was unlawful to marry a wife's sister, while she was living. But they contend, that the prohibition was binding only during the life-time of the first sister to whom the man was married.

In replying to this objection, we shall not avail ourselves of the position taken by our friends, who contend that this part of the law relates to Polygamy. Allowing the construction put upon the text by our opponents to be correct, we shall meet them on their own chosen ground.

Two remarks will aid us in coming to a right conclusion.

1. The question under debate, is not whether it was lawful for a Jew, but whether it is lawful for a Christian, to marry his deceased wife's sister? These questions are materially different; because the circumstances of the two individuals are widely different. The Jew lived under a Theocracy, a civil government in which God was the king; and the light which he enjoyed was obscure. In consideration of the dispensation under which he lived, his conduct was, in some things, winked at. He might have more than one wife, and he might divorce his wives, and not be punished by the civil magistrate for his offence against the moral law. But to a Christian, who lives under the new and better dispensation, and enjoys the clear light of the gospel, polygamy is utterly unlawful; nor is he permitted to divorce his wife, except for fornication. What might, in the eye of the civil magistrate, be regarded as not unlawful to a Jew, is now known to be entirely unlawful to a Christian. It is important to keep this distinction in view. Neither Omicron nor the Puritan gave it due weight in the argument.

2. The question is to be settled by availing ourselves of the light of the gospel, and not by returning to the obscurity of the old dispensation. This seems perfectly obvious; and yet we have seen how both the Puritan and Omicron wish to try the question at the bar of Judaism, and in a Jewish court.

Our brethren plead, as an objection to our doctrine, that the lawfulness of the marriage under discussion, may be inferred from the clause in the 18th verse; "in her life-time." They contend, that, although the law forbids a man to have for wives two sisters at the same time, yet it does not forbid a man to marry two sisters in succession, the second after the death of the first.

We reply, The law, as we have before shown by a fair construction, has, in preceding sections, pronounced its prohibition of such a marriage; and this prohibition is not to be set aside by a mere inference from a single clause in a single verse.

With more plausibility may an inference in favor of polygamy be drawn from this text; for, while it prohibits a man to take his wife's sister in marriage, it does not prohibit him to marry another woman, during the life-time of the first wife. Is such an inference admissible? Is polygamy now lawful, or was it ever really lawful? Neither the Puritan nor Omicron pleads for this. "We grant," says the first, (p. 20,) "that polygamy was forbidden in the moral law; though in terms so obscure, that the best of men seem not to have been aware of the prohibition, in the early days of the Hebrew commonwealth. It was one of those sins which, being deeply imbedded in the customs of the people and institutions of society, was only checked and restrained, and not absolutely forbidden by civil legislation. "The latter says, (p. 29,) "But further, the Mosaic laws, if they did not sanction polygamy, did at least in some instances regulate it, as being a former custom; just as in other cases of old customs, which the Lawgiver did not see fit expressly to prohibit."

Polygamy then was, by the admission of both our opponents, always sinful: "which God," says the Puritan, (p. 20,) "as moral governor, uttering the higher laws of the universe, condemned." The inference, therefore, in favor of this sinful custom, derived from this verse, with more force and plausibility than the inference in favor of the marriage under debate, must be rejected as unsound and inadmissible. The Jew, accustomed to regard polygamy as lawful, did not see this truth: but Christians, who have been taught to regard that Oriental custom as sinful, inconsistent with the original design of the marriage institution, and in opposition to the plainly expressed will of our Lawgiver, see it clearly, and, therefore, reject the inference.

In fact, this verse, if it does not contain a general prohibition of polygamy in plain terms, certainly does contain a prohibition of polygamy in respect to two sisters. It also assigns the reason of this prohibition, the vexation and unhappiness that would result from it to the first wife; and does not the same reason apply to this sinful practice, whether the two wives be sisters, or be taken from unrelated families? See the case of Elkanah and his wives. (1 Sam. 1:1–8.) Had not the Hebrews been misled by the prevalence of this vicious custom, they might have derived salutary instruction from this prohibition, which was designed to impose a restraint on polygamy.

The inference in favor of polygamy is urged by none; it is abandoned by all as unsound and inadmissible: and why should not the inference in favor of the marriage in question be relinquished as untenable? Will it be said, If this marriage were sinful, the prohibition would have been delivered in plainer terms? The assumption is unfounded, and does not accord with facts. Polygamy was always sinful, and yet the terms in which the law prohibited it were not so plain as to convince the ancient Hebrews of its unlawful nature. The supreme Lawgiver always legislates with infinite wisdom, but not always as human wisdom would dictate.

To rest the decision of an important question in morals, on so slight and seeming an implication of a single phrase in a single text, would be hazardous indeed.

Various passages might be here adduced from sacred Scripture, the implication of which must be rejected. Take a few examples: "The LORD said unto Joshua, Make thee sharp knives, and circumcise again the children of Israel the second time." (Jos. 5:2.) From this some might be led to think, that circumcision was to be repeated on those who had already received in their flesh the sign of the covenant. Such an inference, however, could not be admitted, though seeming to accord with the terms of the command. Nothing more was meant by it, than that the children on whom this sign had not been impressed, should now receive it—"Therefore Michal, Saul's daughter, had no child unto the day of her death," (2 Sam. 6:23,) does not imply that she had a child at her death, or after that event, as an unreflecting person might imagine.—Paul says, "Then we which are alive and remain, shall be caught up together with them in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air." (1 Thes. 4:17.) Some might feel inclined to suppose Paul believed that he and some of the Thessalonians would be alive at the second advent of our Redeemer; but though the words of the apostle seem to imply it, we know he did not so believe.—In answer to Peter's question about John, "Jesus saith unto him, If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee? Follow thou me." What inference was drawn from these words of our Lord? The sacred historian has told us: "Then went this saying abroad among the brethren, that that disciple should not die." Was this inference correct? It was not; for John, we know, did die; and he himself adds, as a corrective of their mistake, "Yet Jesus said not unto him, He shall not die, but if I will that he tarry till I come, what is that o thee?" (John 21:20–23.)

We have, it is true, sufficient reason for rejecting the implication of these texts; and have we not abundant reason for rejecting the implication of the particular text under review?

Let the truths that have been established in this discussion be again recalled. We have, it is believed, proved, that the Levitical law is an ecclesiastical law, (not civil or judicial,) designed for the Church in every age; which, having never been repealed, is perpetually binding on Christians. It has been proved, that this law prohibits not only single incestuous acts of uncleanness between near relations, but their marriage, and prescribes the limits of lawful marriage. It has been proved, that this ecclesiastical law is a moral law, designed to regulate the conduct of men in a matter of high interest, in which domestic purity and sound morals in the community are deeply concerned; and a natural law, resting on the natural relations which the Creator has constituted. It has been proved, that this ecclesiastical, moral, and natural law prohibits, in various ways, and in different sections, the marriage in question.

1. It comes within the compass of the general prohibition or rule laid down in the sixth verse: for the sister of a married woman is near of kin to her husband; because she sustains a near affinity relation to him, and a near blood relation to her with whom he has cohabited.

2. A man sustains to his sister-in-law the same relation which he sustains to his brother's wife, whom he is expressly forbidden to marry, (v. 16;) and, therefore, by parity of reason, he is forbidden to marry his wife's sister.

3. As the law addresses women as well as men, when it expressly prohibits a man to marry his brother's wife, it virtually prohibits a woman to marry her sister's husband; and, therefore, if it is unlawful for this woman to marry this man, it must be unlawful for him to marry her.

4. A man is forbidden to marry his mother's sister; and the reason assigned for the prohibition is this: "She is thy mother's near kinswoman." (Ver. 13.) Observe, the law does not say she is thy, but thy mother's, near kinswoman.

A wife's sister is to her precisely the same, her near kinswoman: and, therefore, by parity of reason, her husband may not marry his sister-in-law; because he is expressly forbidden to marry his mother's sister, who sustains the same relation to his mother which his sister-in-law sustains to his wife.

Again, the husband bears to his wife's sister a nearer relation than he bears to his mother's sister; because he is more nearly related to his wife, than to his mother: and, therefore, we infer a fortiori that it is unlawful for him to marry his deceased wife's sister; because he is expressly forbidden to marry a woman to whom he is not so nearly related: just as we infer it to be unlawful for a brother and sister born of the same parents to marry; (although such a marriage is not specified in the law;) because the marriage of a half-brother and sister, one born of the father, and the other of the mother, is expressly prohibited.

5. Finally, the marriage of a man with his sister-in-law, is in express words forbidden. (Verse 18.)

Now, in opposition to this accumulated evidence, ought not the seeming implication of the concluding clause of the 18th verse, "in her life-time," to be regarded as futile? Is it reasonable to suppose, that this clause was introduced by the Lawgiver to turn away the bearing of his law upon the marriage in question; which, by a fair construction, manifestly, and in various aspects of it, prohibits this marriage? We are compelled to believe that it was not introduced for such a purpose. It was, we conceive, designed, not to mark the time during which it was unlawful to marry a sister-in-law; for the unlawfulness of such a marriage had been previously settled in the law; but to set forth before the Jews, who were accustomed to regard polygamy as lawful, the injustice and cruelty of marrying two sisters; because the marriage of the second would be a source of vexation and unhappiness to the first wife as long as she lived.

This case is entirely different from that of a brother marrying the widow of his brother who had died without issue; for, although the law before us had, in the 16th verse, forbidden a man to marry his brother's wife, yet afterwards, by an express enactment of the Lawgiver, couched in terms not to be misunderstood, this case was excepted; and it became obligatory on a brother in the circumstances specified, to marry his brother's widow, that he might raise up seed to him.

In this case, by the admission of all, a man is, in express terms, forbidden to marry his wife's sister during her life-time; and no one will affirm that the text says, in plain words, he may marry such a relation after his wife's decease. It is silent in regard to the time subsequent to her death, because it was not necessary to utter more than had been written; for the law, in its preceding sections, had spoken in terms sufficiently clear to make known to us our Master's will.

It may be objected, If the unlawfulness of this marriage was settled in the preceding parts of the law, why was the prohibition of it repeated in the 18th verse? If the reader will turn to Levit. 24, he will find, that the penalty annexed to murder in the 17th verse, is repeated in the 21st verse. In the 18th chapter, which contains the law under discussion, the very first particular prohibition (v. 7) is repeated in the same verse; and the prohibition to marry a sister in the 9th verse, is repeated in the 11th verse. Why these repetitions? Are they not emphatic? Were they not designed particularly to mark the unlawfulness of these marriages? And is not the repetition in the 18th verse emphatic? Was it not designed, as we have said before, to be a check on polygamy, and to guard against the recurrence of the particular kind of polygamy which consisted in having two sisters for wives, and which, if it had not been expressly prohibited, might have been frequent?

To the civil penalties which God, as the Head of the Hebrew commonwealth, was pleased to annex to this ecclesiastical law, and which he required the civil magistrate to inflict on transgressors, we are not subject; because we do not belong to that commonwealth: but to the law itself we, and all who come to the knowledge of it, are bound to yield implicit obedience; and from this obligation neither we nor they can be freed by any civil or ecclesiastical authority. It is Jehovah's published will; and it must be obeyed.

Were the public mind deeply impressed with the truth we have labored to establish, it would tend much to preserve the purity of domestic life; render the intercourse of a wife's sister in her family, at all times and in all circumstances, easy and pleasant, free from suspicion and embarrassment; and preserve her and her brother-in-law from the temptations to which human nature, in its present fallen condition, is too liable. It would make a sister's house like that of an own brother.

But let the public mind be impressed with an opposite conviction, and the belief of the lawfulness of the marriage in question become prevalent, and then a sister's house will assume a different aspect. Its security, its freedom of intercourse, will be impaired. A delicate female, one who regards her own character, and has a due respect to the opinions of others, will feel that she cannot dwell in her sister's family with that ease and pleasure, which she would enjoy if she knew the marriage of a man with a deceased wife's sister to be not only forbidden by the law of God, but condemned by public opinion. The purity of private life will be contaminated; public morals deteriorated; and the commandment of the most High God disobeyed.

THE END.