West v. Edward Rutledge Timber Company/Opinion of the Court

United States Supreme Court

244 U.S. 90

West  v.  Edward Rutledge Timber Company

 Argued: May 7 and 8, 1917. --- Decided: May 21, 1917

The controversy in the case turns on the construction and application of the act of Congress. Because of it the land offices, local and general, rejected plaintiff's application to enter the lands as a homestead. By virtue of it the railway and its grantee, the timber company, assert title. Its primary purpose was to set aside certain public lands as a national park, to be known as the Mount Ranier National Park. An obstacle to the purpose was a grant of the desired lands to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company and their relinquishment had to be provided for. This was done (§ 3) by authorizing the company to select an equal quantity of public lands elsewhere, or, more specifically, within any state into or through which the railroad ran. There was a qualification of the character of the lands to be selected. They were to be 'nonmineral public lands, so classified as nonmineral at the time of actual government survey, which has been or shall be made, of the United States not reserved and to which no adverse right or claim shall have attached or have been initiated at the time of the making of such selection.' [30 Stat. at L. 994, chap. 377, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 5225.]

It was provided (§ 4) that upon the filing by the railroad company of the selection at the local land office, and payment of fees prescribed by law in analogous cases, and the approval by the Secretary of the Interior, he should cause a patent to issue to the company, conveying to it the lands so selected; that 'in case the land so selected at the time of selection be unsurveyed, the list filed by the company shall describe such tract in such manner as to designate the same with a reasonable degree of certainty;' and that, within thirty days after the tract shall have been surveyed and the plats thereof filed, a new selection shall be filed by the company, describing the tract according to such survey. And, further, that in case the tract as originally selected and described in the list filed in the local land office shall not precisely conform to the lines of the official survey, the company shall be permitted to describe such tract anew, so as to work such conformity.

Construing the act by its words there would seem to be no difficulty in determining its meaning. It would seem to be simple in purpose and clear in provision to accomplish the purpose. But plaintiff raises various questions upon it. He asserts: (1) That the grant was to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company and could not be availed of by its successor through foreclosure, the Northern Pacific Railway Company. (2) That the lands were classified as mineral under the Act of Congress of February 26, 1895 [28 Stat. at L. 683, chap. 131], and the classification approved by the Secretary of the Interior March, 1901, and the surveyor having failed to make any classification of the lands in terms as nonmineral, they were not subject to selection. (3) That if the first and second contentions be untenable, the lands were not described 'with a reasonable certainty' so as to bar the rights of settlers in good faith, without actual or constructive notice.

(1) The argument advanced to support this proposition is that by the foreclosure proceedings the Northern Pacific Railroad Company ceased to exist, and if everything it had or had an interest in did not go out of existence with it, at least its rights under the Act of 1899 did, and yet counsel say plaintiff has nothing to do 'with the question whether the conveyance of the lands to the United States under the provisions of the act conveyed a valid title.' It would be somewhat anomalous indeed if the act conveyed to the United States a valid title, but did not convey to the railroad anything substantial that could be transferred by sale under the decree of a court to the successor of that company. We might ask the question, Where in the world were the rights conveyed to the railroad company left-and if left at all, by whom were they to be enforced or availed of?

We agree with the district court that, as a mere matter of construction, the contention of plaintiff must be rejected. In July, 1896 (Northern P. R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 490, 57 L. ed. 931, 934, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 554; Northern P. R. Co. v. United States, 101 C. C. A. 117, 176 Fed. 706), three years prior to the act of Congress, the railway company had become successor to the railroad company, its vendor through the foreclosure proceedings of the lands the government desired, and yet the latter company was designated in the act as the company to select the lands in compensation for those desired and taken by the government for the Mount Ranier National Park. It may be, as said by the district court, a matter of speculation why the railroad company rather than the railway company was named as grantee, but it is certain it was done in recognition of rights, and not in mere jugglery to obtain lands for the National Park and convey nothing to either company in return,-nothing to the railroad company because, according to the contention, it had gone out of existence; nothing to the railway company because, according to the contention, it had not succeeded to the rights of the railroad company. On the contrary, we must assume that the act was passed and the railroad company selected to consummate the exchange either by itself or by its successor, the railway company, or by both. And this was done, and the two companies and the trustees of the railway company's mortgage joined in a deed of reconveyance to the United States. And this purpose of the act and what was done under it was recognized by the Land Department. Davenport v. Northern P. R. Co. 32 Land Dec. 28; Ferguson v. Northern P. R. Co. 33 Land Dec. 634; Idaho v. Northern P. R. Co. 37 Land Dec. 135, 138. See also Delany v. Northern P. R. Co. 45 Land Dec. 6. It is pertinently said by counsel for the railway company: 'The government itself is satisfied with its title; and certainly it cannot, while retaining that title, deny to those from whom it was obtained the lands offered in exchange.'

(2) As we have seen, the right was to select 'an equal quantity of nonmineral public lands, so classified as nonmineral at the time of actual survey.' The lands are in fact nonmineral, but the contention is that they were not so classified at the time of actual survey. The deputy surveyor who made the survey reported that the lands, if cleared, would be suitable for grazing, but at the time of the report were more valuable for their timber. This, it is contended, is not a classification of the lands as nonmineral; that it was not a classification, but an omission to classify,-negative, not affirmative; inferential, not positive,-and therefore not a compliance with the statute. We cannot concur. The report was accepted by the Department as a description of the lands as nonmineral. They could be made suitable for grazing, was the report; pending that time they were more valuable for their timber. There was positive description of their character; words excluding some other character were not necessary. Classification is characterization through the selection of some quality or feature, and therefore lands may be classified as pasture (grazing), timber, arable, or mineral. It is determined by surface indications. Minerals may be hidden under any surface, but a surveyor is not expected to explore for them, that he may include or exclude reference to them in his reports. Such character is exceptional, besides, and considered by the Land Office as absent if not noted. ^[1]

The contention that the lands were classified as mineral under the Act of February 26, 1895, is answered by the admission made at the trial that the records do not show it.

(3) The act of Congress authorized the selection of an unsurveyed tract, but required it to be described 'in such manner as to designate the same with a reasonable degree of certainty,' and it was provided that, when surveyed, a new list was to be filed, describing the tract 'according to such survey.'

The lands, we have seen, were designated by sectional number, township, and range, and it is contended that such designation-'terms of future survey,' as counsel term it-was not a description 'with a reasonable degree of certainty.'

This seems to have been the only contention submitted to the court of appeals, and upon careful consideration the court decided against the contention upon the Act of 1899, and, in analogy, upon other acts of Congress in relation to the public lands, and also upon the rules and decisions of the Land Department. It is not necessary to repeat the reasoning of the court. What was a description having 'a reasonable degree of certainty' was to be determined by the circumstances. It was in the nature of a question of fact and had tests for decision, as the court of appeals pointed out. It had the aid of an adjoining survey, and the lands could be readily located from such survey. It was pointed out that the act of Congress did not require exactness; it contemplated a subsequent readjustment. 'The filing of the first list is in a sense preliminary to obtaining the patent. It initiates the right, and not as much particularity and exactness is ordinarily required as where final stages are to be observed in clearing up and completing the transaction. In fact, by contemplation of the statute, the new selection is required to conform with the established survey and thus to correct the description in the primary selection. By reasonable intendment, therefore, we are impressed that the description contained in the railway company's list No. 61, under the conditions prevailing of the survey of township 45 to the north and the proximity of the land in question thereto, designated the land with a reasonable degree of certainty, and must be held sufficient as a matter of law.' For the premises from which this excerpt is the conclusion we refer to the opinion.

The court of appeals said that the question of the sufficiency of the description was 'the single question urged' for its decision, and counsel for defendants contend that no other question is open to our review, and cite Montana R. Co. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348, 351, 34 L. ed. 681, 682, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96. Plaintiff replies that the principle of that case applies only to questions of procedure, and not to questions of jurisdiction or the foundation of the right; adducing Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 40 L. ed. 606, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434, 10 Am. Crim. Rep. 251; Old Jordan Min. & Mill. Co. v. Soci ete Anonyme des Mines, 164 U.S. 261, 41 L. ed. 427, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 113; Gila Valley, G. & N. R. Co. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94, 58 L. ed. 521, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229. See also Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106, 113, 59 L. ed. 151, 153, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77.

The distinction between questions seems to be artificial. The essential circumstance would seem to be that a review is sought of that which was not decided, not submitted at all, or withdrawn from submission, and which, if it had been submitted, might have been decided in favor of the appealing party.

However, in deference to the earnestness of counsel, we have considered the questions.

Affirmed.

Notes

1. Davenport v. Northern P. R. Co. 32 Land Dec. 28; Bedal v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 29 Land Dec. 254; Idaho v. Northern P. R. Co. 37 Land Dec. 135; Re St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 34 Land Dec. 211; Re Northern P. R. Co. 40 Land Dec. 64.