White Paper on Indian States (1950)/Part 11/Control of the Government of India over the States during the transitional period

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White Paper on Indian States (1950)
Ministry of States, Government of India
Control of the Government of India over the States during the transitional period
2726374White Paper on Indian States (1950) — Control of the Government of India over the States during the transitional periodMinistry of States, Government of India

241. Other Matters.—Amongst other important features of the new Constitution, in so far as they concern the States, reference may be made to the following:—

(1) Control of the Government of India over the States during the transitional period.

In Part X of this Paper, the reasons which rendered it necessary for the Government of India to assure general control over the Unions of States have been set out in detail. As the stress of the transitional phase is likely to continue for some time, it has been considered necessary that the Government of India should exercise supervisory authority over the Governments of States specified in Part B till such time as may be necessary. This is provided in Article 371, which reads as follows:

"Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, during a period of ten years from the commencement thereof, or during such longer or shorter period as Parliament may by law provide in respect of any State, the Government of every State specified in Part B of the First Schedule shall be under the general control of, and comply with such particular directions, if any, as may from time to time be given by, the President:
Provided that the President may by order direct that the provisions of this Article shall not apply to any State specified in the order".

The following extract from the Statement made by the Hon'ble Minister for States before the Constituent Assembly on October 12, 1949, explains the policy of the Government of India in respect of the application of this Article:

"As the House is aware, the States, as we inherited them, were in varying stages of development. In most cases the advance had to be made from the starting point of pure autocracy. Having regard to the magnitude of the task, which confronted the Governments of the Unions in the transitional period, and to the fact that neither the Services inherited by them for the political organisations, as they existed there, were in a position to assume, unaided, full responsibilities of the administration, we made a provision in some of the Covenants that till the new Constitution came into operation in these Unions, the Rajpramukh and the Council of Ministers shall, in the exercise of their functions, be under the general control of the Government of India and comply with the instructions issued by that Government from time to time. The stress of the transitional phase is likely to continue for some years. We are ourselves most anxious that the people of these States should shoulder their full responsibilities; however, we cannot ignore the fact that while the administrative organisation and political institutions are to be found in most of the States in a relatively less developed state, the problems relating to the integration of the States and the change-over from an autocratic to a democratic order are such as to test the mettle of long established administrations and experienced leaders of people. We have therefore found it necessary that in the interest of the growth of democratic institutions in these States, no less than the requirements of administrative efficiency, the Government of India should exercise general supervision over the Governments of the States till such time as it may be necessary.

It is natural that a provision of this nature which treats States in Part B differently from Part A States should cause some misgivings. I wish to assure the Hon'ble Members representing these States, and through them the people of these States, that the provision involves no censure of any Government. It merely provides for contingencies which, in view of the present conditions, are more likely to arise in Part B States than in the States of other categories. We do not wish to interfere with the day-to-day administration of any of the States. We are ourselves most anxious that the people of the States should learn by experience. This Article is essentially in the nature of a safety valve to obviate recourse to drastic remedies such as the provisions for the breakdown of the constitutional machinery. It is quite obvious that in this matter the States, e.g. Mysore and Travancore-Cochin, where democratic institutions have been functioning for a long time and where Government responsible to Legislation are in office, have to be treated differently from the States not conforming to these standards. In all these cases our control will be exercised in varying degrees according to the requirements of each case. The proviso to the Article gives us the necessary discretion to deal with each case on its merits.

I hope this statement which embodies our considered policy will allay any apprehension which the Governments of any of these States may have concerning this Article."