White Paper on Indian States (1950)/Part 11/Judicial Integration

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White Paper on Indian States (1950)
Ministry of States, Government of India
Judicial Integration
2642283White Paper on Indian States (1950) — Judicial IntegrationMinistry of States, Government of India

Judicial Integration

227. "In determining a nation's rank in political civilisation", Henry Sidgwick has written, "no test is more decisive than the degree in which justice, as defined by the law, is actually realised in its judicial administration, both as between one citizen and another and as between a private citizen and a member of the Government". Indeed, the manner in which a State dispenses justice is the measure of its moral character and of its ability to ensure the sanctity of fundamental human rights. The mechanism of justice in a modern State involves an elaborate process; in this process details such as the qualifications of the men who are to administer justice in Courts, the way in which they are to perform their functions, the method by which they are to be selected, the terms on which they shall hold office, are as vitally important as the jurisdiction or the authority of the Courts and the machinery for the enforcement of their judgments and orders. On the nature of the mechanism of justice depends the application of the principle, summed up in the expression "the Rule of Law" which constitutes one of the fundamental legal safeguards enjoyed by citizens of progressive States.

Judiciary in States in varying phases of development

228. The judicial systems of States, as they existed under British paramountcy, reflected the varying phases of their moral and material conditions and were very far from the standards of the institutions which guarantee the supremacy of the "Rule of Law".

In a large number of States, laws were not to be found recorded in any Code accessible to the people. Only in a limited number of States did there exist a recognised body of laws; the code of laws in such cases consisted generally of the British Indian laws adopted mutatis mutandis.

229. If in the generality of cases, the decree of the Ruler was law, in a number of cases the Ruler not only constituted the source of justice but also personally administered it in actual practice. For a large number of States, owing to their slender resources, an organised judiciary was a luxury, which they could not afford. Thus for instance, if the Ruler of a State with a population of little more than 600 individuals and an annual income of less than Rs. 2,000 enjoyed full judicial powers, subject only to confirmation of capital sentences by the Resident and, in consequence, concentrated in himself all original, appellate and revisional jurisdiction over his subjects, the system which sustained such an untenable set-up, rather than the Ruler concerned, was at fault.

230. The Crown itself developed several forms of jurisdiction in States resting on various foundations. Apart from claiming exclusive jurisdiction over certain classes such as European British subjects, and certain territories such as cantonments, residencies, railway lands, etc., the Crown shared the jurisdiction in certain States. A notable instance of such arrangements was the judicial organisation in the Kathiawar peninsula where political officers exercised a wide civil and criminal residuary jurisdiction. In other States such as the Central India and Simla Hill States, jurisdiction could be exercised by the Rulers but a sentence of death or imprisonment for life could be executed only after the sentence had been confirmed by the local political officer. The jurisdiction of the Crown over States was recognised and its exercise in some measure regulated by the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts of 1879 and 1890.

231. Only the more important and progressive States had judicial organisations approximating to the judiciary in the Provinces. Even in these States, there was considerable scope for improvement in the direction both of the conditions of service of the judges and of the independence of judiciary from the control of the executive. The judges were appointed by the Ruler and were removable at his pleasure. His executive officers were not amenable to the Courts for their public acts. In some States, the Minister holding the portfolio of Law also acted as Chief Justice; in other States he constituted the highest appellate authority. A number of States had some kind of judicial Committees to advise the Rulers in the exercise of their prerogative.