Whole Works of Joseph Butler/Correspondence between Dr. Butler and Dr. Clarke
Reverend Sir,—I suppose you will wonder at the present trouble, from one who is a perfect stranger to you, though you are not so to him; but I hope the occasion will excuse my boldness. I have made it, sir, my business, ever since I thought myself capable of such sort of reasoning, to prove to myself the being and attributes of God. And being sensible that it is a matter of the last consequence, I endeavoured after a demonstrative proof; not only more fully to satisfy my own mind, but also in order to defend the great truths of natural religion, and those of the Christian revelation which follow from them, against all opposers: but must own with concern, that hitherto I have been unsuccessful; and though I have got very probable arguments, yet I can go but a very little way with demonstration in the proof of those things. When first your book on those subjects (which by all, whom I have discoursed with, is so justly esteemed) was recommended to me, I was in great hopes of having all my inquiries answered. But since in some places, either through my not understanding your meaning, or what else I know not, even that has failed me; I almost despair of ever arriving to such a satisfaction as I aim at, unless by the method I now use. You cannot but know, sir, that of two different expressions of the same thing, though equally clear to some persons, jet to others, one of them sometimes is very obscure, though the other be perfectly intelligible. Perhaps this may be my case here; and could I see those of your arguments of which I doubt, differently proposed, possibly I might yield a ready assent to them. This, sir, I cannot but think a sufficient excuse for the present trouble; it being such an one as I hope may prevail for an answer, with one who seems to aim at nothing more than that good work of instructing others. In your demonstration of the being and attributes of God, Prop. VI.[2] (Edit. 2nd. p. 69, and 70,) you propose to prove the infinity or omnipresence of the self-existing Being. The former part of the proof seems highly probable; but the latter part, which seems to aim at demonstration, is not to me convincing. The latter part of the paragraph is, if I mistake not, an entire argument of itself, which runs thus: "To suppose a finite being to be self-existing, is to say, that it is a contradiction for that being not to exist, the absence of which may yet be conceived with- out a contradiction; which is the greatest absurdity in the world." The sense of these words, "the absence of which," seems plainly to be determined by the following sentence, to mean its absence from any particular place. Which sentence is to prove it to be an absurdity; and is this: "For if a being can, without a contradiction, be absent from one place, it may, without a contradiction, be absent from another place, and from all places." Now, supposing this to be a consequence, all that it proves is, that if a being can, without a contradiction, be absent from one place at one time, it may, without a contradiction, be absent from another place, and so from all places, at different times. (For I cannot see that if a being can be absent from one place at one time, therefore it may, without a contradiction, be absent from all places at the same time, i.e., may cease to exist.) Now if it proves no more than this» I cannot see that it reduces the supposition to any absurdity. Suppose I could demonstrate, that any particular man should live a thousand years; this man might, without a contradiction, be absent from one, and from all places, at different times; but it would not from thence follow, that he might be absent from all places at the same time, i.e., that he might cease to exist. No; this would be a contradiction, because I am supposed to have demonstrated that he should live a thousand years. It would be exactly the same, if, instead of a thousand years, I should say for ever; and the proof seems the same, whether it be applied to a self-existent or a dependent being.
What else I have to offer is in relation to your proof that the self-existent Being must of necessity be but one. Which proof is as follows, in Prop. VII.[3] (Edit. 2nd. p. 74.) "To suppose two or more different natures existing of themselves, necessarily and independent from each other, implies this plain contradiction; that each of them being independent from the other, they may either of them be supposed to exist alone; so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to exist, and consequently, neither of them will be necessarily existing." The supposition indeed implies, that since each of these beings is independent from the other, they may either of them exist alone, i.e., without any relation to, or dependence on, the other; but where is the third idea, to connect this proposition and the following one, viz., so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to exist? Were this a consequence of the former proposition, I allow it would be demonstration, by the first corollary of Prop, III.[4] [2nd. Edit. p. 26.] But since these two propositions [they may either of them be supposed to exist alone], and [so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to exist], are very widely different; since likewise it is no immediate consequence, that because either may be supposed to exist independent from the other, therefore the other may be supposed not to exist at all; how is what was proposed, proved? That the propositions are different, I think is plain; and whether there be an immediate connection, everybody that reads your book must judge for themselves. I must say, for my own part, the absurdity does not appear at first sight any more than the absurdity of saying, that the angles below the base in the isosceles triangle are unequal; which, though it is absolutely false, yet I suppose no one will lay down the contrary for an axiom; because, though it is true, yet there is need of a proof to make it appear so.
Perhaps it may be answered, that I have not rightly explained the words, to exist alone; and that they do not mean only, to exist independent from the other; but that, existing alone, means that nothing exists with it. Whether this or the other was meant, I cannot determine; but, whichever it was, what I have said will hold. For if this last be the sense of those words, [they either of them may be supposed to exist alone,] it indeed implies that it will be no contradiction to suppose the other not to exist; but then I ask, how come these two propositions to be connected; that, to suppose two different natures existing of themselves necessarily and independent from each other implies that each of them may be supposed to exist alone, in this sense?. Which is exactly the same as I said before, only applied to different sentences. So that, if existing alone be understood as I first took it, I allow it is implied in the supposition; but cannot see that the consequence is, that it will be no contradiction to suppose the other not to exist. But if the words, existing alone, are meant in the latter sense, I grant, that if either of them may be supposed thus to exist alone, it will be no contradiction to suppose the other not to exist: but then I cannot see, that to suppose two different natures existing, of themselves, necessarily and independent from each other, implies that either of them may be supposed to exist alone in this sense of the words; bat only, that either of them may be supposed to exist without having any relation to the other, and that there will be no need of the existence of the one in order to the existence of the other. But though upon this account, were there no other principle of its existence, it might cease to exist; yet on the account of the necessity of its own nature, which is quite distinct from the other, it is an absolute absurdity to suppose it not to exist.
Thus, sir, I have proposed my doubts, with the reasons of them: in which, if I have wrested your words to another sense than you designed them, or in any respect argued unfairly, I assure you it was without design. So I hope you will impute it to mistake. And if it will not be too great a trouble, let me once more beg the feivour of a line from you, by which you will lay me under a particular obligation to be, what, with the rest of the world, I now am.
Reverend Sir,
November 4, 1713.
THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST LETTER.
Sir,—Did men, who publish controversial papers, accustom themselves to write with that candour and ingenuity with which you propose your difficulties, I am persuaded almost all disputes might be very amicably terminated, either by men's coming at last to agree in opinion, or at least, finding reason to suffer each other friendly to differ.
Your two objections are very ingenious, and urged with great strength and acuteness. Yet I am not without hopes of being able to give you satisfaction in both of them. To your first, therefore, I answer: whatever may, without a contradiction, be absent from any one place at any one time; may, also, without a contradiction, be absent from all places at all times. For, whatever is absolutely necessary at all, is absolutely necessary in necessary in every part of space and in every point of duration. Whatever can at any time be conceived possible to be absent from any one part of space, may for the same reason, [viz., the implying no contradiction in the nature of things,] be conceived possible to be absent from every other part of space at the same time; either by ceasing to be, or by supposing it never to have begun to be. Your instance about demonstrating a man to live 1000 years, is what (I think) led you into the mistake; and is a good instance to lead you out of it again. You may suppose a man shall live 1000 years, or God may reveal and promise he shall live 1000 years; and upon that supposition, it shall not be possible for the man to be absent from all places in any part of that time. Very true: but why shall it not be possible? Only because it is contrary to the supposition, or to the promise of God; but not contrary to the absolute nature of things; which would be the case, if the man existed necessarily, as every part of space does. In supposing you could demonstrate, a man should live 1000 years, or one year; you make an impossible and contradictory supposition. For though you may know certainly, (by revelation suppose,) that he will live so long; yet this is only the certainty of a thing true in fact, not in itself necessary: and demonstration is applicable to nothing but what is necessary in itself, necessary in all places and at all times equally.
To your second difficulty, I answer: what exists necessarily, not only must so exist alone, as to be independent of anything else; but (being self-sufficient,) may also so exist alone, as that everything else may possibly (or without any contradiction in the nature of things) be supposed not to exist at all: and consequently, (since that which may possibly be supposed not to exist at all, is not necessarily existent,) no other thing can be necessarily existent. Whatever is necessarily existing, there is need of its existence in order to the supposal of the existence of any other thing; so that nothing can possibly be supposed to exist), without presupposing and including antecedently the existence of that which is neeessary. For instance; the supposal of the existence of anything whatever, includes necessarily a presupposition of the existence of space and time; and if anything could exist without space or time, it would follow that space and time were not necessarily existing. Therefore, the supposing anything possibly to exist alone, so as not necessarily to include the presupposal of some other thing, proves demonstrably, that that other thing is not necessarily existing; because, whatever has necessity of existence, cannot possibly in any conception whatsoever, be supposed away. There cannot possibly be any notion of the existence of anything, there cannot possibly be any notion of existence at all, but what shall necessarily preinclude the notion of that which has necessary existence. And, consequently, the two propositions which you judged independent, are really necessarily connected. These sorts of things are indeed very difficult to express, and not easy to be conceived but by very attentive minds: but to such as can and will attend, nothing (I think) is more demonstrably convictive.
If anything still sticks with you in this, or any other part of my books, I shall be very willing to be informed of it: who am,
{{c|Sir, Your assured Friend and Servant,
{{smaller|November 10, 1713.
P.S.—Many readers, I observe, have misunderstood my second general proposition; as if the words [some one unchangeable and independent Being,] meant [one only—Being.] Whereas the true meaning, and all that the argument there requires, is, [some one at least.] That there can be but one, is the thing proved afterwards in the seventh proposition.
THE SECOND LETTER.
Reverend Sir,—I have often thought that the chief occasions of men’s differeng so much in their opinions, were either their not understanding each other, or else, that in- stead of ingenuously searching after truth, they have made it their business to find out arguments for the proof of what they have once asserted. However, it is certain there may be other reasons for persons not agreeing in their opinions: and where it is so, I cannot but think with you, that they will find reason to suffer each other to differ friendly; every man having a way of thinking, in some respects, peculiarly his own.
I am sorry I must tell you, your answers to my objections are not satisfactory. The reasons why I think them not so, are as follows:—
You say, "Whatever is absolutely necessary at all, is absolutely necessary in every part of space, and in every point of duration." Were this evident, it would certainly prove what you bring it for; viz., "that whatever may, without a contradiction, be absent from one place at one time, may also be absent from all places at all times." But I do not conceive, that the idea of ubiquity is contained in the idea of self-existence, or directly follows from it; any otherwise than as, whatever exists, must exist somewhere. You add, "Whatever can at any time be conceived possibly to be absent from any one part of space, may for the same reason, [viz., the implying no contradiction in the nature of things,] be conceived possibly to be absent from every other part of space, at the same time." Now I cannot see, that I can make these two suppositions for the same reason, or upon the same account. The reason why I conceive this being may be absent from one place, is because it doth not contradict the former proof, [drawn from the nature of things,] in which I proved only that it must necessarily exist. But the other supposition, viz., that I can conceive it possible to be absent from every part of space at one and the same time, directly contradicts the proof that it must exist somewhere; and so is an express contradiction. Unless it be said, that as, when we have proved the three angles of a triangle equal to two right ones, that relation of the quality of its angles to two right ones, will be wherever a triangle exists; so, when we have proved the necessary existence of a being, this being must exist everywhere. But there is a great difference between these two things: the one being the proof of a certain relation, upon supposition of such a being's existence with such particular properties; and, consequently, wherever this being and these properties exist, this relation must exist too. But from the proof of the necessary existence of a being, it is no evident consequence that it exists everywhere. My using the word demonstration, instead of proof, which leaves no room for doubt, was through negligence, for I never heard of strict demonstration of matter of fact.
In your answer to my second difficulty, you say; "Whatsoever is necessarily existing, there is need of its existence, in order to the supposal of the existence of any other thing." All the consequences you draw from this proposition, I see proved demonstrably; and consequently, that the two propositions I thought independent are closely connected. But how, or upon what account, is there need of the existence of whatever is necessarily existing, in order to the existence of any other thing? Is it as there is need of space and duration, in order to the existence of anything; or is it needful only as the cause of the existence of all other things? If the former be said, as your instance seems to intimate, I answer, Space and duration are very abstruse in their natures, and, I think, cannot properly be called things, but are considered rather as affections which belong, and in the order of our thoughts are antecedently necessary to the existence of all things. And I can no more conceive how a necessarily existing being can, on the same account or in the same manner as space and duration are, be needful in order to the existence of any other being, than I can conceive extension attributed to a thought: that idea no more belonging to a thing existing, than extension belongs to thought. But if the latter be said, that there is need of the existence of whatever is a necessary being, in order to the existence of any other thing, only as this necessary being must be the cause of the existence of all other things: I think this is plainly begging the question; for it supposes that there is no other being exists, but what is casual, and so not necessary. And on what other account, or in what other manner than one of these two, there can be need of the existence of a necessary being in order to the existence of anything else, I cannot conceive.
Thus, sir, you see I entirely agree with you in all the consequences you have drawn from your suppositions, but cannot see the truth of the suppositions themselves.
I have aimed at nothing in my style but only to be intelligible: being sensible that it is very difficult (as you observe) to express one's self on these sort of subjects, especially for one who is altogether unaccustomed to write upon them.
I have nothing at present more to add, but my sincerest thanks for your trouble in answering my letter, and for your professed readiness to be acquainted with any other difficulty that I may meet with in any of your writings. I am willing to interpret this, as somewhat like a promise of an answer to what I have now written, if there be anything in it which deserves one. I am.
Reverend Sir,
Your most obliged and humble Servant
{{smaller|NOVEMBER 23, 1713.
THE ANSWER TO THE SECOND LETTER.
Sir,—It seems to me, that the reason why you do not apprehend ubiquity to be necessarily connected with self-existence, is because, in the order of your ideas, you first conceive a being, (a finite being, suppose,) and then conceive self-existence to be a property of that being; as the angles are properties of a triangle, when a triangle exists: whereas, on the contrary, necessity of existence, not being a property consequent upon the supposition of the things existing, but antecedently the cause or ground of that existence, it is evident this necessity, being not limited to any antecedent subject, as angles are to a triangle, but being itself original, absolute, and (in order of nature) antecedent to all existence, cannot but be everywhere, for the same reason that it is anywhere. By applying this reasoning to the instance of space, you will find, that by consequence it belongs truly to that substance, whereof space is a property,[5] as duration also is. What you say about a necessary being existing somewhere, supposes it to be finite; and being finite, supposes some cause which determined that such a certain quantity of that being should exist, neither more nor less; and that cause must either be a voluntary cause; or else such a necessary cause, the quantity of whose power must be determined and limited by some other cause. But in original absolute necessity, antecedent (in order of nature) to the existence of anything, nothing of all this can have place; but the necessity is necessarily everywhere alike.
Concerning the second difficulty, I answer, That which exists necessarily, is needful to the existence of any other thing; not considered now as a cause, (for that indeed is begging the question,) but as a sine qua non; in the sense as space is necessary to everything, and nothing can possibly be conceived to exist, without thereby presupposing space: which, therefore, I apprehend to be a property or mode of the self-existent substance; and that, by being evidently necessary itself it proves that the substance, of which it is a mode, must also be necessary: necessary both in itself, and needful to the existence of anything else whatsoever. Extension, indeed, does not belong to thought, because thought is not a being; but there is need of extension to the existence of every being, to a being which has or has not thought, or any other quality whatsoever.
I am, Sir,
Your real Friend and Servant.
{{smaller|London, November 28, 1713.
THE THIRD LETTER.
Reverend Sir,—I don't very well understand your meaning when you say that you think, in the order of my ideas, I first conceive a being (finite suppose) to exist, and then conceive self-existence to be a property of that being. If you mean, that I first suppose a finite being to exist I know not why; affirming necessity of existence to be only a consequent of its existence; and that, when I have supposed it finite, I very safely conclude it is not infinite; I am utterly at a loss upon what expressions in my letter this conjecture can be founded. But if you mean, that I first of all prove a being to exist from eternity, and then, from the reasons of things, prove that such a being must be eternally necessary; I freely own it. Neither do I conceive it to be irregular or absurd; for there is a great difference between the order in which things exist, and the order in which I prove to myself that they exist. Neither do I think my saying a necessary being exists somewhere, supposes it to be finite; it only supposes that this being exists in space, without determining whether here, or there, or everywhere.
To my second objection, you say, That which exists necessarily, is needful to the existence of any other thing, as a sine quâ non; in the sense space is necessary to everything: which is proved (you say) by this consideration, that space is a property of the self-existent substance; and being both necessary in itself, and needful to the existence of everything else; consequently the substance, of which it is a property, must be so too. Space, I own, is in one sense a property of the self-existent substance; but, in the same sense, it is also a property of all other substances. The only difference is in respect to the quantity. And since every part of space, as well as the whole, is necessary, every substance consequently must be self-existent, because it hath this self-existent property; which, since you will not admit for true, if it directly follows from your argument, they cannot be conclusive.
What you say under the first head proves (I think) to a very great probability, though not to me with the evidence of demonstration; but your arguments under the second, I am not able to see the force of.
I am so far from being pleased that I can form objections to your arguments, that, besides the satisfaction it would have given me in my own mind, I should have thought it an honour to have entered into your reasonings, and seen the force of them. I cannot desire to trespass any more upon your better employed time: so shall only add my hearty thanks for your trouble on my account, and that I am, with the greatest respect,
Reverend Sir,
Your most obliged humble Servant.
December 5, 1713.
THE ANSWER TO THE THHID LETTER.
Sir,—Though, when I turn my thoughts every way, I fully persuade myself there is no defect in the argument itself; yet in my manner of expression I am satisfied there must be some want of clearness, when there remains any difficulty to a person of your abilities and sagacity. I did not mean that your saying a necessary Being exists somewhere does necessarily suppose it to be finite; but that the manner of expression is apt to excite in the mind an idea of a finite being, at the same time that you are thinking of a necessary Being, without accurately attending to the nature of that necessity by which it exists. Necessity absolute, and antecedent (in order of nature) to the existence of any subject, has nothing to limit it; but, if it operates at all, (as it must needs do,) it must operate (if I may so speak) everywhere and at all times alike. Determination of a particular quantity, or particular time or place of existence of anything, cannot arise but from somewhat external to the thing itself. For example: why there should exist just such a small determinate quantity of matter, neither more nor less, interspersed in the immense vacuities of space, no reason can be given. Nor can there be anything in nature, which could have determined a thing so indifferent in itself as is the measure of that quantity, but only the will of an intelligent and free agent. To suppose matter or any other substance necessarily existing in a finite determinate quantity; in an inch-cube, for instance, or in any certain number of cube-inches, and no more, is exactly the same absurdity, as supposing it to exist necessarily, and yet for a finite duration only; which every one sees to be a plain contradiction. The argument is likewise the same in the question about the original of motion. ^ Motion cannot be necessarily existing; because, it being evident that all determinations of motion are equally possible in themselves, the original determination of the motion of any particular body this way rather than the contrary way, could not be necessary in itself, but was either caused by the will of an intelligent and free agent, or else was an effect produced and determined without any cause at all, which is an express contradiction; as I have shown in my Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, [p. 14, Edit. 4th and 5th;] [p. 12, Edit. 6th, 7th, and 8th.]
To the second head of argument I answer,—space is a property [or mode] of the self-existent substance, but not of any other substances. All other substances are in space, and are penetrated by it; but the self-existent substance is not in space, nor penetrated by it, but is itself (if I may so speak) the substratum of space, the ground of the existence of space and duration itself. Which [space and duration] being evidently necessary, and yet themselves not sub- stances, but properties or modes, show evidently that the substance, without which these modes could not subsist, is itself much more (if that were possible) necessary. And as space and duration are needful (i.e., sine quâ non) to the existence of everything else; so, consequently, is the substance, to which these modes belong in that peculiar manner which I before mentioned.
I am, Sir,
Your affectionate Friend and Servant.
December 10, 1713.
THE FOURTH LETTER.
Reverend Sir,—Whatever is the occasion of my not seeing the force of your reasonings, I cannot impute it to (what you do) the want of clearness in your expression. I am too well acquainted with myself to think my not understanding an argument a sufficient reason to conclude that it is either improperly expressed, or not conclusive; unless I can clearly show the defect of it. It is with the greatest satisfaction I must tell you, that the more I reflect on your first argument, the more I am convinced of the truth of it; and it now seems to me altogether unreasonable to suppose absolute necessity can have any relation to one part of space more than another; and if so, an absolutely necessary Being must exist everywhere.
I wish I was as well satisfied in respect to the other. You say,—All substances, except the self-existent one, are in space, and are penetrated by it. All substances, doubtless, whether body or spirit, exist in space: but when I say that a spirit exists in space, were I put upon telling my meaning, I know not how I could do it any other way than by saying, such a particular quantity of space terminates the capacity of acting in finite spirits at one and the same time, so that they cannot act beyond that determined quantity. Not but that I think there is somewhat in the manner of existence of spirits in respect of space, that more directly answers to the manner of the existence of body; but what that is, or of the manner of their existence, I cannot possibly form an idea. And it seems (if possible) much more difficult to determine what relation the self-existent Being hath to space. To say he exists in space, after the same manner that other substances do, (somewhat like which I too rashly asserted in my last,) perhaps would be placing the Creator too much on a level with the creature: or, however, it is not plainly and evidently true: and to say the self-existent substance is the substratum of space, in the common sense of the word, is scarce intelligible, or at least is not evident. Now, though there may be a hundred relations distinct from either of these, yet how should we come by ideas of them I cannot conceive. We may indeed have ideas to the words, and not altogether depart from the common sense of them, when we say the self-existent substance is the substratum of space, or the ground of its existence: but I see no reason to think it true; because space seems to me to be as absolutely self-existent, as it is possible anything can be; so that, make what other supposition you please, yet we cannot help supposing immense space; because there must be either an infinity of being, or (if you will allow the expression) an infinite vacuity of being. Perhaps it may be objected to this, that though space is really necessary, yet the reason of its being necessary, is its being a property of the self-existent substance; and that it being so evidently necessary, and its dependence on the self-existent substance not so evident, we are ready to conclude it absolutely self-existent, as well as necessary, and that this is the reason why the idea of space forces itself on our minds, antecedent to, and exclusive of (as to the ground of its existence) all other things. Now this, though it is really an objection, yet it is no direct answer to what I have said; because it supposes the only thing to be proved, viz., that the reason why space is necessary, is its being a property of a self-existent substance. And supposing it not to be evident, that space is absolutely self-existent; yet, while it is doubtful, we cannot argue as though the contrary were certain, and we were sure that space was only a property of the self-existent substance. But now, if space be not absolutely independent, I do not see what we can conclude is so; for it is manifestly necessary itself, as well as antecedently needful to the existence of all other things, not excepting (as I think) even the self-existent substance.
All your consequences I see follow demonstrably from your supposition; and, were that evident, I believe it would serve to prove several other things as well as what you bring it for. Upon which account, I should be extremely pleased to see it proved by any one. For, as I design the search after truth as the business of my life, I shall not be ashamed to learn from any person: though at the same time I cannot but be sensible, that instruction from some men is like the gift of a prince, it reflects an honour on the person on whom it lays an obligation.
I am, Reverend Sir,
Your obliged Servant.
December 16, 1713.
THE ANSWER TO THE FOURTH LETTER.
Sir,—My being out of town most part of the month of January, and some other accidental avocations, hindered me from answering your letter sooner. The sum of the difficulties it contains is (I think) this: that it is difficult to determine what relation the self-existent substance has to space: that to say it is the substratum of space, in the common sense of the word, is scarce intelligible, or at least is not evident; that space seems to be as absolutely self-existent, as it is possible anything can be; and that, its being a property of the self-existent substance, is supposing the thing that was to be proved. This is entering indeed into the very bottom of the matter: and I will endeavour to give you as brief and clear an answer as I can. That the self-existent substance is the substratum of space, or space a property of the self-existent substance, are not perhaps very proper expressions; nor is it easy to find such. Bat what I mean is this: the idea of space (as also of time or duration) is an abstract or partial idea; an idea of a certain quality or relation, which we evidently see to be necessarily existing; and yet which (not being itself a substance) at the same time necessarily presupposes a substance, without which it could not exist; which substance consequently must be itself (much more, if possible) necessarily existing. I know not how to explain this so well as by the following similitude: a blind man, when he tries to frame to himself the idea of body, his idea is nothing but that of hardness. A man that had eyes, but no power of motion, or sense of feeling at all, when he tried to frame to himself the idea of body, his idea would be nothing but that of colour. Now as, in these cases, hardness is not body; and colour is not body; but yet, to the understanding of these persons, those properties necessarily infer the being of a substance, of which substance itself the persons have no idea: so space, to us, is not itself substance, but it necessarily infers the being of a substance, which affects none of our present senses; and being itself necessary, it follows that the substance, which it infers, is (much more) necessary.
I am, Sir.
Your affectionate Friend and Servant.
January 29, 1714.
THE FIFTH LETTER,
Reverend Sir,—You have very comprehensively expressed, in six or seven lines, all the difficulties of my letter, which I should have endeavoured to have made shorter, had I not been afraid an improper impression might possibly occasion a mistake of my meaning. I am very glad the debate is come into so narrow a compass; for I think now it entirely turns upon this, whether our ideas of Space and duration are partial, so as to presuppose the existence of some other thing. Your similitude of the blind man is very apt to explain your meaning, (which I think I fully understand,) but does not seem to come entirely up to the matter. For, what is the reason that the blind man concludes there must be somewhat external, to give him that idea of hardness? It is because he supposes it impossible for him to be thus affected, unless there were some cause of it; which cause, should it be removed, the effect would, immediately cease too: and he would no more have the idea of hardness, but by remembrance. Now, to apply this to the instance of space and duration; since a man, from his having these ideas, very justly concludes that there must be somewhat external, which is the cause of them; consequently, should this cause (whatever it is) be taken away, his ideas would be so too: therefore, if what is supposed to be the cause be removed, and yet the idea remains, that supposed cause cannot be the real one. Now, granting the self-existent substance to be the substratum of these ideas, could we make the supposition of its ceasing to be, yet space and duration would still remain unaltered: which seems to show that the self-existent substance is not the substratum of space and duration. Nor would it be an answer to the difficulty, to say, that every property of the self-existent substance is as necessary as the substance itself: since that will only hold, while the substance itself exists; for there is implied in the idea of a property, an impossibility of subsisting without its substratum. I grant, the supposition is absurd: but how otherwise can we know whether anything be a property of such a substance, but by examining whether it would cease to be, if its supposed substance should do so? Notwithstanding what I have now said, I cannot say that I believe your argument not conclusive; for I must own my ignorance, that I am really at a loss about the nature of space and duration. But did it plainly appear that they were properties of a substance, we should have an easy way with the atheists; for it would at once prove demonstrably an eternal, necessary, self-evident Being; that there is but one such; and that he is needful in order to the existence of all other things. Which makes me think, that though it may be true, yet it is not obvious to every capacity; otherwise it would have been generally used, as a fundamental argument, to prove the being of God.
I must add one thing more: that your argument for the omnipresence of God seemed always to me very probable. But being very desirous to have it appear demonstratively conclusive, I was sometimes forced to say what was not altogether my opinion. Not that I did this for the sake of disputing (for, besides the particular disagreeableness of this to my own temper, I should surely have chosen another person to have trifled with;) but I did it to set off the objection to advantage, that it might be more fully answered. I heartily wish you as fair treatment from your opponents in print, as I have had from you: though I must own, I cannot see, in those that I have read, that unprejudiced search after truth, which I would have hoped for.
I am, Reverend Sir,
Your most humble Servant.
February 3, 1714.
THE ANSWER TO THE FIFTH LETTER.
Sir,—In a multitude of business, I mislaid your last letter; and could not answer it, till it came again to my hands by chance. We seem to have pushed the matter in question between us as far as it will go; and upon the whole I cannot but take notice I have very seldom met with persons so reasonable and unprejudiced as yourself, in such debates as these.
I think all I need say in answer to the reasoning in your letter is, that your granting the absurdity of the supposition you were endeavouring to make, is consequently granting the necessary truth of my argument. If[6] space and duration necessarily remain, even after they are supposed to be taken away, and be not (as it is plain they are not) themselves substances; then the[7] substance on whose existence they depend, will necessarily remain likewise, even after it is supposed to be taken away; which shows that supposition to be impossible and contradictory.
As to your observation at the end of your letter, that the argument I have insisted on, if it were obvious to every capacity, should have more frequently been used as a fundamental argument for the proof of the being of God; the true cause why it has been seldom urged, is I think, this: that the universal prevalency of Cartes' absurd notions (teaching that matter[8] is necessarily infinite and necessarily eternal, and ascribing all things to mere mechanic laws of motion, exclusive of final causes, and of all will, and intelligence, and divine Providence from the government of the world) hath incredibly blinded the eyes of common reason, and prevented men from discerning Him in whom they live, and move, and have their being. The like has happened in some other instances. How universally have men for many ages believed that eternity is no duration at all, and infinity no amplitude. Something of the like kind has happened in the matter of transubstantiation, and (I think) in the scholastic notion of the Trinity, &c.
I am, Sir,
Your affectionate Friend and Servant.
- ↑ The following correspondence may, with the utmost propriety, be introduced into this edition of Dr. Butler's works, as the letters to Clarke were written by Butler, then a student at a dissenting academy in Tewkesbury. Though not generally known, Butler was the person who signed himself, A Gentleman in Gloucestershire.
- ↑ Page 45. edit. 4th; p. 41. edit. 6th; p. 43. edit 7th; p. 44. edit. 8th.
- ↑ Page 48. edit. 4th; p. 44. edit. 6th; p. 46. edit. 7th; p. 47. edit. 8th.
- ↑ Pages, 16, 17. Edits. 4th, 6th, 7th, and 8th.
- ↑ Or, mode of existence.
- ↑ Ut partiam temporis ordo est immutabilis, sic etiam ordo partium spatii. Moveantur hæc de locis suis, et movebuntur (ut ita dieam) de scipsis—Newton, Princip. Mathemat. Schol. ad definit. 8.
- ↑ Deus non est æternitas vel infinitas, sed æternus et infinitus; non est duratio vel spatium, sed durat et adest. Durat semper, et adest ubique; et existendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium, æternitatem et infinitatem, constituit. Cum unaquæque spatii particula sit semper; et unumquodque durationis indivisibile momentum, ubique; certe rerum omnium fabricator ac Dominus, non erit nunquam nusquam. Omnipræsens est, non per virtutem solam, sed etiam per substantiam; nam virtus sine substantia subsistere non potest. In ipso continentur et moventur universa, &c.—Newton, Princip. Mathemat. Schol. general, sub finem.
- ↑ Puto implicare contradictionem, ut mundus (meaning the material world) sit finitus.—Cartes, Epist. 69, Partu Prime.