Why Defend the Nation?/The Organized Reserves

by Frank David Ely

CHAPTER VI.

The Organized Reserves

UNDER the National Defense Act of 1920, which establishes a Plan for Defense, the land forces of the Nation are collectively termed “The Army of the United States.” The successive Lines for Defense are as follows:

First Line—
	a. The Regular Army.
	b. The National Guard of all the States.
Second Line—
	c. The Organized Reserves.

Inasmuch as the two components of the First Line aggregate only about three hundred thousand men, while in a modern war we would need to mobilize two millions immediately on declaration of war, it is apparent that the Second Line is our main dependence for defense. The First Line must hold the enemy at the sea coast or on the frontier and win time for the mobilizing and training of the Second Line, and means must be found and employed to shorten this period to a minimum. The weakness of the First Line demands this.

The Organized Reserves are trained volunteers. They are the volunteers of old, only they wisely prefer to do their volunteering in advance of any emergency, so that they can benefit by receiving training and thus measurably fit themselves for their jobs. A football or other athletic team that is not well trained has a sorry chance to win; and an army that is not trained has no chance whatever against an equally strong army that is trained.

Home-owned knowledge of hygiene and of simple remedies doesn’t create illness, or induce surgical operations, but improves the general health and saves doctor bills; and a little common sense preparation against national dangers doesn’t make our people “militaristic,” or create war. As shown in the preceding chapter, war is the result of somebody’s unrighteousness.

We trained and commissioned about 200,000 officers in the World War. Twelve thousand are in the Regular Army. Some thousands are in the National Guard of the forty-eight States. Some seventy thousand have enrolled and accepted commissions in the Organized Reserves. The remaining hundred thousand includes those who died or were killed or incapacitated, and men who are now in civil life, without military affiliation.

The officers for the Reserve are obtained by examining and recommissioning officers of the World War who apply; and by the examination and appointment of applicants from among the enlisted men of that war and of men from civil life who meet the requirements. A source for obtaining trained officers lies in the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, the name collectively given to the students of educational institutions who acquire military training during their courses, under Regular Army officers regularly detailed as instructors. Another source lies in the graduates of the courses of training prescribed for civilians who take the required courses in the Civilian Military Training Camps, of which there is one established for a month each summer in each of the nine corps areas into which the whole of the United States is divided.

While the organization of the Reserves is actual and real so far as completed, it is contemplated to enroll and assign to units of this force only the full complement of officers and a percentage of the more essential non-commissioned officers. To fill up the ranks seems unnecessary, for the officers and the noncommissioned officers require the most training and are therefore more difficult to secure on the outbreak of war. With officers ready assigned and more or less completely trained, these can be immediately ordered to a designated mobilization camp and can there receive, equip, and train the men enlisted or drafted to complete the full complement of their units.

The force called for on paper for both lines is six field armies, the majority of which will be of the organized reserves. All of the divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, companies, etc.; staff organizations; supply and transport, etc., are provided for, including the Corps and Army troops and G. H. Q. Reserves. Officers are everywhere assigned to appropriate units according to grade and to arm or branch of service. So there are infantry, cavalry, artillery, air service, chemical warfare service, signal, ordnance and quartermaster officers, adjutants, inspectors, judge advocates, etc., etc., down to the last unit. In addition there are a large number of officers holding what are called General and Branch assignments. The former will in event of war be employed directly under orders from the War Department on all kinds and classes of special and detached service, the need here being for a very large number of officers of various grades and qualifications; while the latter will be similarly employed directly under the orders of the chiefs of branches to which assigned. This provision for extra officers avoids any necessity of denuding the combat units of officers, and insures a surplus of trained officers to be drawn on in emergency, as to make up losses or to organize additional units.

In 1917 we were unable to immediately mobilize men to fill up the divisions, there being no officers available to receive, equip, and train them. It was necessary to first enroll, train, commission, and assign officers from raw material; and then the officers so made available were without war experience and of exceedingly limited training. If your own boy is going out to fight at his country’s call, he is entitled to leaders who know their business and who can instruct him, and who can really command whether in camp, in transport, or in battle. With the old system in vogue before the recent war, this was impossible. Now, if the present laws can be fully carried out, the boy can be sure of proper instruction and training before he actually meets the enemy.

Another advantage is that during peace time officers can be tested and assigned according to fitness and qualification. In the hurry and confusion of assignment after war is declared, a jeweler might find himself in a heavy bridge train of an engineer unit, and an automobile salesman in the signal corps; a lawyer who has no knowledge of horses other than seeing these on a Sunday in the parks might find himself in the cavalry, while a farmer, accustomed to horses all his life, might be assigned to a balloon unit. Thus was fitness sacrificed and time lost. The wisdom of the present plan for avoiding such misfits by the elimination of the haphazard methods which brought them about needs no argument.

The present Plan of Defense is so sensible and so eminently practical that it appeals to all who are familiar with the difficulties of mobilization, organization, and training at the outbreak of war.

A further reason why it is not contemplated to assign the complement of enlisted men to units in advance of an actual emergency is that it not only seems unnecessary as above stated, but the enrollment of two millions of men would seriously interfere with industry and agriculture, and would further require a very greatly increased overhead in additional personnel and expense for the Regular Army to enable it to handle the added details; and unless training could be imparted to the man, and maintained, there would be no real advantage in the pre-enrollment. Such training if given would vastly increase the annual appropriations necessary, running up military costs when it is the universal desire that these be kept as low as consistent with assured safety in defense. With trained officers available, and with Congress able to quickly authorize the draft, men can be rapidly enrolled, the physically unfit eliminated or assigned to light duties for which they are qualified, and all who are accepted for service rapidy trained. Such is the medium ground which appeals alike to officers, members of Congress, Administration leaders, and all other informed persons; and there can be no question of the soundness of the reasoning.

Any large body of selected men that is organized and directly affiliated with government is a strong factor for good government. Identification with any branch of government places it in sympathy with all of the government. For many reasons the Officers’ Reserve Corps of the Organized Reserves (in main of the American Legion), physically fit, and that fact established by medical examination prior to recommission, and again sworn to uphold the Nation, is the strongest single factor in this country for assurance of future good government. Its members are many times more numerous than those of the other components of the Army, and they are all in position to exercise the rights of franchise, which many of the others cannot. Nation-wide, built up from proved and virile men in trade, commerce, business, and the professions, and the majority with real experience in war, it is the strongest, most democratic, the widest and greatest real “He-Man Club” in America or in the world today. In peace as in war, it is a tremendous power for good.

Think what they are and where they came from—all that they represent! When this Nation was forced into war against Germany and the Central European powers, the pick of the country volunteered and entered the training camps. These men were sound of body—proved so by thorough medical examinations—strong of heart, and what is perhaps most important of all, sound in their ideas of the fundamental needs of this Nation. They offered all and many paid it. Others are living who are broken mentally or physically from the hell gone through of bullet and bayonet, gas and shell, submarine and bomb, from physical exposure to the elements and physical and mental strains long sustained. For these the Nation has the tenderest regard, the utmost gratefulness, as it has for all who thus served; and it demands that the ultimate be done toward their restoration to health and for their physical comfort. It will watch the accomplishment of these its mandates with most critical and jealous eyes. And the Administration in power is perhaps more critical, more demanding even than the body politic; and in this lies assurance and mental comfort.

The large numbers incapacitated greatly reduced the approximate 200,000 of commissioned officers. From all those remaining some seventy thousand, after another severe physical examination to prove continued fitness, have offered themselves to their country, in response to the country’s fretful call that it be not left wholly defenseless. Little did it offer—the bare honor of the old commission so gloriously held. Asking that those who enroll stand ready to serve should war ever be forced upon us, whether required at home, on the icy tundra of the North, under the scorching rays of. the tropical sun or across the seas, it yet limits the schooling of these splendid men—the guarantors of the Nation—to a mere fifteen days per year to fit them for their arduous task. When we consider the demand, and the terms imposed—those of us who know from long experience just what those demands may mean—no wonder we all but despair. Well indeed is it for America that these splendid civilian soldiers are strong of heart and light of spirit. They need all they possess of both. Given fifteen days’ training per year only, and where would we be for doctors, carpenters, dentists, plumbers, lawyers, farmers, bakers, bankers ? Why, that’s easy, for America simply would not, could not, be America—our America! And yet for war, admittedly the most difficult art and science known to all mankind, in its demands running the whole gamut of business, scientific and professional knowledge, with much additional learning required that is purely military (tactical, strategical, command, supply, etc., etc.)—to acquire all this needful knowledge of the essentials of war but fifteen days of annual training is authorized!

But that is not all—the facts are worse still. The plans authorized by law are dependent—

1. Upon a sufficiency of Regular Army personnel to supervise and impart training. The numbers of that personnel were recently reduced to a figure which forbids, absolutely, fulfillment of the needs of training.

2. On the fact that all plans are contingent on annual appropriations which to date have been wholly insufficient, and highly problematical until near the annual training period, thus cutting short the time for planning the best use of the limited appropriations finally available.

The funds for training are so inadequate that in one corps area, having over 8,000 Reserve officers, about one in eleven could be sent to the summer training camp. A few attended absolutely at their own personal expense, so highly did they regard the privilege. There are not many who can afford this, nor should it be necessary.

Counting out of the fifteen-day training period the two Sundays included therein and allowing one day travel to camp, and the same for return to their homes, a total of four days are lost from the fifteen, reducing this to eleven days. Since the appropriations, as shown, permit only about one out of eleven Reserve officers to attend the annual camp, it is apparent that instead of fifteen days’ annual training the officers will get but one period of eleven days of training in eleven years!

Does the country know all this? It probably does—at least somebody knows something of each of the many features of the law, and of the various workings thereunder, including the skimpiness of the appropriations. But there is no question but that the country does not realize the inexpediency and unwisdom of the short-sighted course that is being run.

National Defense is merely national insurance. Admittedly, the recent expenses of the government were excessive and had to be reduced. But no less admittedly, wisdom demands that they be reduced in accordance with sound business principles and practice.

Now when individuals or partnerships or corporations reduce expenses, they don't, as a part measure, cut their insurance below the net value of their inventories. Yet Congress, in reducing expenses, led (not followed) a noted movie comedian who has grown more or less famous through scenes which appear under the caption of "Safety Last." And that is the play we are nationally staging today, and which we have been staging from the day the demobilization of our World War forces was completed.

How does it strike you, neighbor? Are you in favor of continuing the act? Or will you join in a popular demand that the old actors either stage a better play or that they be discharged and more up-to-requirement-political-business-military-scientific artists replace them in a new scene?

If the country wants protection it can have it, whether it be a high tariff against manufactured imports, a quarantine against disease, a special branch of service to prevent the counterfeiting of its currency, or an effective insurance against invasion and attack. And if any of these be determined upon by the people as necessary to the country, then the people should assure themselves that their wishes are carried out.

Our immediate needs are those of authorization so far as concerns this question of National Defense; in other words, our present needs can be entirely met by legislative action. That action taken, the army from top to bottom, rank and file, can be trusted to quickly complete all necessary details and start efficiency rolling; and like the snow ball of our boyhood, rolled by us with all of the neighbors’ boys, that efficiency will grow and grow as the effort continues, until it reaches the point where the whole country, which by then will all be in on the rolling, will be completely reassured, and satisfied that the Nation is at last safe.

“IN SOME of our colleges and universities there is a good deal of false teaching. Professors in many instances spread discontent among the students. The things that are good and essential to patriotism are neglected, and existing ills in political and economic conditions are magnified. Those who would tear down are much more diligent than those who support our form of government.”—Extract from an address delivered before the American Bar Association at Minneapolis, Aug. 29, 1923, by Associate Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court Pierce Butler.