Williams v. Bankhead/Opinion of the Court

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Williams v. Bankhead
Opinion of the Court by Joseph P. Bradley
726267Williams v. Bankhead — Opinion of the CourtJoseph P. Bradley

United States Supreme Court

86 U.S. 563

Williams  v.  Bankhead


'Court was proclaimed in due form of law, when the following proceedings were had, to wit:

v.

JAMES H. BRANCH, JOSEPH BRANCH, AND George McGregor.}

'On this day, on motion, the mandate and opinion of the Supreme Court of Arkansas is filed, which opinion and mandate is in the words and figures following, to wit:

'STATE OF ARKANSAS,

IN THIS SUPREME COURT, SCT.

'Be it remembered, that at a term of the Supreme Court of the State, begun and held at the court-house in the city of Little Rock, on the first Monday in October, A.D. 1866, among others were the following proceedings had, to wit:

ISAAC BOLTON, APPELLANT,

v.

JAMES H. BRANCH, JOSEPH BRANCH, George McGregor et al., APPELLEES.}

Appeal from Desha Circuit Court, chancery.

'This cause came on to be heard upon transcript of the record of the Circuit Court of Desha County, in chancery, and was argued in this court by the solicitors of the parties. On consideration whereof,' &c.

In April, 1871, a decree was pronounced in the Circuit Court below, in favor of Bankhead for $8000, with interest from 1860, with a direction that McNiell, the administrator of Branch, as soon as he should receive from Bolton the sum of $3666.66, and the interest thereon, which by the State court had been decreed to be refunded, should pay it over to Bankhead, and leave was given to the latter to institute such further proceedings against Bolton, or others in possession of the plantation, as might enable him to obtain the benefit of this decree.

In pursuance of this last permission, Bankhead immediately filed a petition against McNiell, Bolton, and Williams, alleging a conspiracy between them and the widow of James H. Branch, and one Cash, administrator of Isaac Bolton, the vendor, to defraud him, Bankhead, out of the said sum of $3666.66, by procuring the same to be paid over to the said widow, upon a pretended claim set up by her. The petition further alleged that the decree made by the Desha County Court, awarding the said money to her, was fraudulently procured, he, Bankhead, not being a party to the proceedings. The petition prayed for a decree against Bolton, to compel him to pay the money into court or to the petitioner, and for a receiver to take possession of the land and receive the rents. The widow and Cash were not made parties, because, as the petition alleged, they did not reside in the State of Arkansas. The defendants who were made parties answered the petition, setting up, amongst other things, that the widow was an indispensable party to the proceedings, and that the decree of the Desha County Court was conclusive in her favor.

The court below decreed in favor of Bankhead, and that unless the defendants should pay to him the said sum of $3666.66, with the interest due thereon, by a certain day, the plantation should be sold to satisfy the original decree.

Appeals were taken from both the original and supplemental decrees.

1. The court below had no jurisdiction. The whole question had been settled by a decree in the State court for Desha County, in no wise annulled. Though the extracts which the record before this court give us of the proceedings in the State court are not full, they are enough to show that Bankhead was a party. The captions or titles to the orders are sufficient proof of who the parties to the case were. In the title to the mandate of the Supreme Court George McGregor et al. are expressly mentioned as the defendants. Who were these al.? Who could they be but the other partners of the firm? Bankhead, of course, included as the one chiefly or alone interested. Although in the caption of the case in the Desha County Court, the al. is omitted, yet the suit is palpably that same one which has come down from the Supreme Court, where the al. is set forth. The omission is a plain clerical error, amendable, and to be amended, by what appears in the caption meant to be copied; for the caption in the inferior court was to be the same as that in the superior, if the last was right. That the last was right is certain, for McGregor had nothing to do with the suit but in connection with the firm of which Bankhead was a member even more than he.

2. But, however this may be, it is quite plain that the widow should have been made a party. She claimed this money, and had a judicial decree awarding it to her. The proceeding below sweeps it all away from her, without her having had a chance to be heard. The law will not endure this.

1. The captions or titles to the orders of court prove nothing but that the clerk made such captions. Even if James Bankhead's name was set out specifically and at large, as a defendant, the fact would not show either that he was served or that he voluntarily, in some way, personally or by counsel, appeared. And unless he did so in some way appear, he is not concluded by the decree in the Desha County Court.

2. The widow is not a necessary party to the present suit. This court would only refuse to proceed when it is evident that the subject-matter cannot be disposed of, and ample justice done. [1] Her interest is set out fully in the record, and being junior to that of the appellee cannot be maintained here, unless this court shall consider itself absolutely concluded by the State court decree, in which event the relief prayed would be refused on that account, whether or not she was a party.

The most that could happen by her not being made a party would be the exposure of Bolton and McNiell, to be called on by her after having paid the money to Bankhead. But the facts of the case, and the decree of this court, would be their answer.

Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.

In this case James Bankhead obtained a decree for $8000 due him from James H. Branch, and for the specific application by way of payment to him on said decree of $3666.66 due to Branch's estate, for the reimbursement of money paid by the latter on a plantation which he had mortgaged to Bankhead, but for which he had never acquired full title. The State court of Desha County, in a suit brought therein, had decreed that the plantation must be delivered back to the vendor, and that the latter must refund the amount paid on it, which was the sum above stated. The State court, on a cross-bill filed by Branch's widow, had also decided that the reimbursement-money was in equity payable to her as her separate property under a marriage settlement. But the Circuit Court in this case, in which the widow was not a party, decreed that the same fund should be paid to Bankhead, to whom Branch had mortgaged the plantation, and, in case it was not paid by the vendor in a certain time, the plantation should be sold to raise the amount due on the mortgage. The excuse for not making the widow a party was that she did not reside in Arkansas and could not be served with process.

The parties actually before the court were one McNiell, the personal representative of Branch, Bolton, the devisee of the vendor of the plantation, and Williams, the tenant in possession of the plantation, who had rented it from the widow of Branch, she having retained possession under the alleged marriage settlement. On the other hand, the defendants contended (and that is one ground of appeal) that Bankhead was a party to the proceedings in the State court and was bound by the decree there made. This, however, was controverted by him.

The other ground is that the widow of Branch is an indispensable party in this case.

As to the first ground, it is undoubtedly true that Bankhead would be bound by the decree of the State court if he was a party to the proceedings. But he alleges that he was not a party, and the proof on the subject is not sufficient to show that he was a party. The record of the proceedings in the Desha County Court (since the war) was put in evidence, and is before us. It contains nothing to show that Bankhead, or his copartners, were parties to the suit, except the bare title of the cause at the head of one or two orders, in which the names of George McGregor, in one case, and George McGregor et al. in another, appear as defendants. Neither the original petition nor complaint, the process, nor anything else that would give light on the subject, is contained in the record as given to us. In the answer of McNiell to Bankhead's amended and supplemental cross-bill, which was struck from the files, it is positively alleged that he and his partners were made parties to the proceedings in the Desha County Court as non-resident defendants, and that a regular order of publication for their appearance was made and published, and that they actually knew of the suit and took part in it. But these allegations were not responsive to the bill, and we have nothing else on the subject sufficiently explicit to show the truth of the case.

The other ground of appeal, namely, that the widow was an indispensable party, presents a more serious question.

On the one hand it is said that, not being a party, her rights were not concluded; and that the only inconvenience arising from proceeding with the case without her was the double liability to which Bolton and the administrator of Branch became exposed by having to pay her and Bankhead both, under contrary decrees of different courts. The general rule as to parties in chancery is, that all ought to be made parties who are interested in the controversy, in order that there may be an end of litigation. But there are qualifications of this rule arising out of public policy and the necessities of particular cases. The true distinction appears to be as follows: First. Where a person will be directly affected by a decree, he is an indispensable party, unless the parties are too numerous to be brought before the court, when the case is subject to a special rule. Secondly. Where a person is interested in the controversy, but will not be directly affected by a decree made in his absence, he is not an indispensable party, but he should be made a party if possible, and the court will not proceed to a decree without him if he can be reached. Thirdly. Where he is not interested in the controversy between the immediate litigants, but has an interest in the subject-matter which may be conveniently settled in the suit, and thereby prevent further litigation, he may be a party or not, at the option of the complainant.

In the present case, if the question were one of mere personal liability on the part of Bolton, McNiell, and Williams, it might have been admissible to proceed without making the widow of Branch a party, inasmuch as she was not a resident of Arkansas, and could not at the time be made a party in the Circuit Court without being served with process in the district of Arkansas or voluntarily appearing to the suit. The act to further the administration of justice, by which an order of publication for the appearance of non-resident defendants is provided for, if it would apply to the case, had not then been passed. But this is not a case of mere personal liability. It concerns the disposal of a specific fund, in which the widow claims an interest. If the sum of $3666.66 mentioned in the decree is not paid, the plantation is directed to be sold in order to raise the amount of Bankhead's claim. And this plantation is in the possession of the widow by her tenants. She is to receive the rents and profits thereof until her claim is satisfied by the payment of the said sum of $3666.66 and the interest due thereon, awarded her by the Desha County Court. Her interests, therefore, are directly affected by the decree.

Under these circumstances we think that she was an indispensable party. The decree, therefore, must be REVERSED, and the cause remanded to be proceeded in

ACCORDING TO LAW.

Notes[edit]

  1. Payne v. Hook, 7 Wallace, 431.

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).

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