Williams v. State

by the Arkansas Supreme Court

Supreme Court of Arkansas

259 Ark. 667

Robert Lewis Williams  v.  State of Arkansas

Appeal from Miller Circuit Court

No. CV-17-500. --- Delivered: May 3, 1976. 

 

1. PERJURY—DIRECTED VERDICT, DENIAL OF—REVIEW.—Motion for directed verdict on perjury charge based upon an alleged false affidavit on the ground that the alleged false statements were not material to the issues raised in a proceeding for postconviction relief was properly denied because the definitions of perjury in the first degree in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-3001 (Repl. 1964) and of perjury in the second degree in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-3002 (Repl. 1964) do not require that the false statements in an affidavit be material to a cause, matter or proceeding before a court, tribunal, body corporate or other officer and because the statements alleged to be false were material, as a matter of law, to a motion for the disqualification of the judge presiding over the court in which the accused's petition for postconviction relief was pending.
2. PERJURY—DEGREES OF OFFENSE—STATUTORY DEFINITION.—As defined in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-3002 (Repl. 1964), perjury in the second degree is a lesser included offense of first degree perjury.
3. CRIMINAL LAW—INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY—REFUSAL AS ERROR.—Appellant's requested instruction in a perjury case that if the facts sworn to were not material to the proceedings before the court, defendant should be found innocent was correctly refused as an incorrect statement of the law.
4. PERJURY—MATERIALITY OF FACTS—QUESTIONS FOR JURY.—Where there is no dispute about the facts sworn to, any question of materiality is not for the jury but is one of law for the court.
5. PERJURY—STATEMENTS IN AFFIDAVIT—MATERIALITY.—The materiality of statements in an affidavit is not an essential element of perjury in either degree under applicable statutes but the false statements should be relevant.
6. CRIMINAL LAW—PLEA OF NOT GUILTY—TRIAL & DETERMINATION.—Appellant by his plea of not guilty availed himself of any defense and all matters of justification and excuse available under the law, which are not required to be specifically pleaded, and put all material facts alleged in the information in issue, and the plea was a continuing denial of all evidence and every statement of every witness who testified against him.
7. CRIMINAL LAW—PLEA OF NOT GUILTY—PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.—By appellant's plea of not guilty, he invoked his right to the presumption of his innocence and put the burden upon the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as well as his right to remain silent in the hope that the jury would not be convinced of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
8. CRIMINAL LAW—PLEA OF NOT GUILTY—PRESUMPTION & BURDEN OF PROOF.—The presumption of innocence is so strong it serves an accused as evidence in his favor throughout trial and entitles him to an acquittal unless the state adduces evidence which convinces the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the crime charged.
9. CRIMINAL LAW—ARGUMENTS & CONDUCT OF COUNSEL MATTERS NOT WITHIN ISSUES & EVIDENCE.—Closing arguments to the jury must be confined to questions in issue, the evidence introduced, and all reasonable inferences and deductions which can be drawn therefrom.
10. CRIMINAL LAW—ARGUMENTS & CONDUCT OF COUNSEL—MATTERS NOT SUSTAINED BY EVIDENCE.—Error occurs when trial counsel argues matter that is beyond the record and states facts or makes assertions not supported by any evidence that are prejudicial to the opposite party.
11. CRIMINAL LAW—ARGUMENTS & CONDUCT OF COUNSEL—ACTION OF COURT.—When proper objection is made to counsel's statements, the presiding judge should appropriately reprimand counsel and instruct the jury not to consider the statement and do everything possible to see that the jury verdict is neither produced nor influenced by such arguments.
12. CRIMINAL LAW—ARGUMENTS & CONDUCT OF COUNSEL—ACTION OF COURT.—Failure to sustain a proper objection to argument of matters not disclosed by the record is error since it gives the appearance that the improper argument has not only the sanction but the endorsement of the court.
13. CRIMINAL LAW—ARGUMENTS & CONDUCT OF COUNSEL—DISCRETION OF COURT.—The trial judge has a wide latitude of discretion in the control of arguments to the jury but it is not unlimited.
14. CRIMINAL LAW—ARGUMENTS & CONDUCT OF COUNSEL—REVIEW.—The Supreme Court will reverse where counsel goes beyond the record to state facts that are prejudicial to the opposite party unless the trial court has by its ruling removed the prejudice, and failure of the trial court to interfere calls for a reversal.
15. CRIMINAL LAW—ARGUMENTS & CONDUCT OF COUNSEL—REVIEW.—Error in the overruling of an objection to prosecutor's statement in argument to the jury could not be said to be harmless in view of the punishment fixed by the jury.

 

Appeal from Miller Circuit Court, J. Hugh Lookadoo, Judge; reversed and remanded.

Charles D. Barnette, for appellant.

Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., by: B. J. McCoy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

JOHN A. FOGLEMAN, Justice, delivered the opinion of the court.