Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Company/Opinion of the Court

United States Supreme Court

196 U.S. 539

Worcester  v.  Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Company

 Argued: January 23, 24, 1905. --- Decided: February 20, 1905

The defendant in error makes no objection to the form in which the question to be decided comes before us. Whether one or the other action or proceeding is proper and appropriate need not, therefore, be considered.

The contention on the part of the plaintiff in error is that, by virtue of the restrictions or conditions placed by it upon granting the various extensions of locations of the tracks of the railroad company, and by the acceptance of the same by the company, a contract was entered into between the city and the railroad company, which could not be altered without the consent of both parties; and that as the city had never consented to any alteration of the obligation of the railroad company to make the repairs in the streets, as provided for in those restrictions or conditions, the subsequent legislation contained in the act of 1898 impaired the obligation of that contract, and was therefore void, as a violation of the Constitution of the United States.

In the view we take of this subject it may be assumed, for the purpose of argument, that the city of Worcester had power, under the legislation of the state, to grant the right to extend the location of the railroad company's tracks upon the restrictions or conditions, already mentioned. It may also be assumed, but only for the purpose of the argument, that the restrictions or conditions contained in the orders or decrees of the board of aldermen, upon their acceptance by the company, became contracts between the city and the company.

The question then arising is whether the legislature, in the exercise of its general legislative power, could abrogate the provisions of the contract between the city and the railroad company with the assent of the latter, and provide another and a different method for the paving and repairing of the streets through which the tracks of the railroad company were laid under the permit of their extended location. We have no doubt that the legislature of the commonwealth had that power. A municipal corporation is simply a political subdivision of the state, and exists by virtue of the exercise of the power of the state through its legislative department. The legislature could at any time terminate the existence of the corporation itself, and provide other and different means for the government of the district comprised within the limits of the former city. The city is the creature of the state. East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co. 10 How. 511, 533, 534, 13 L. ed. 518, 528.

As is stated in United States v. Baltimors & O. R. Co. 17 Wall. 322, 329, 21 L. ed. 597, 600, a municipal corporation is not only a part of the state, but is a portion of its governmental power. 'It is one of its creatures, made for a specific purpose, to exercise within a limited sphere the powers of the state. The state may withdraw these local powers of government at pleasure, and may, through its legislature or other appointed channels, govern the local territory, as it governs the state at large. It may enlarge or contract its powers, or destroy its existence. As a portion of the state, in the exercise of a limited portion of the powers of the state, its revenues, like those of the state, are not subject to taxation.'

In New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644, 654, 24 L. ed. 521, 522, it was stated by Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the opinion of the court, that—

'A city is only a political subdivision of the state, made for the convenient administration of the government. It is an instrumentality, with powers more or less enlarged, according to the requirements of the public, and which may be increased or repealed at the will of the legislature. In directing, therefore, a particular tax by such corporation, and the appropriation of the proceeds to some special municipal purpose, the legislature only exercises a power through its subordinate agent, which it could exercise directly; and it does this, only in another way, when it directs such corporation to assume and pay a particular claim not legally binding for want of some formality in its creation, but for which the corporation has received an equivalent.'

In Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U.S. 307, 23 L. ed. 552, it was held that public or municipal corporations were but parts of the machinery employed in carrying on the affairs of the state, and that the charters under which such corporations are created may be changed, modified, or repealed as the exigencies of the public service or the public welfare may demand; that such corporations were composed of all the inhabitants of the territory included in the political organization; and the attribute of individuality is conferred on the entire mass of such residents, and it may be modified or taken away at the mere will of the legislature, according to its own views of public convenience, and without any necessity for the consent of those composing the body politic.

It was said in that case that 'public duties are required of counties as well as of towns, as a part of the machinery of the state; and, in order that they may be able to perform those duties, they are vested with certain corporate powers; but their functions are wholly of a public nature, and they are at all times as much subject to the will of the legislature as incorporated towns, as appears by the best text writers upon the subject, and the great weight of judicial authority.'

In Tippecanoe County v. Lucas, 93 U.S. 108-114, 23 L. ed. 822-824, the question of the validity of an act of the legislature was presented, and Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:

'Were the transaction one between the state and a private individual, the invalidity of the act would not be a matter of serious doubt. Private property cannot be taken from individuals by the state except for public purposes, and then only upon compensation or by way of taxation; and any enactments to that end would be regarded as an illegitimate and unwarranted exercise of legislative power. . . . But between the state and municipal corporations, such as cities, counties, and towns, the relation is different from that between the state and the individual. Municipal corporations are mere instrumentalities of the state, for the convenient administration of government; and their powers may be qualified, enlarged, or withdrawn at the pleasure of the legislature.'

In Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514, 25 L. ed. 699, it was held that, where no constitutional restriction is imposed, the corporate existence and powers of counties, cities, and towns are subject to the legislative control of the state creating them.

In New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co. 142 U.S. 79, 35 L. ed. 943, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 142, it was also held that a municipal corporation was the mere agent of the state in its governmental character, and was in no contract relations with its sovereign, at whose pleasure its charter may be amended, changed, or revoked without the impairment of any constitutional obligation. It was also therein held that such a corporation, in respect of its private or proprietary rights and interests, might be entitled to constitutional protection. The Massachusetts courts take the same view of such a corporation. Browne v. Turner, 176 Mass. 9, 56 N. E. 969.

Enough cases have been cited to show the nature of a municipal corporation as stated by this court. In general it may be conceded that it can own private property, not of a public or governmental nature, and that such property may be entitled, as is said, 'to constitutional protection.' Property which is held by these corporations upon conditions or terms contained in a grant, and for a special use, may not be diverted by the legislature. This is asserted in Tippecanoe County v. Lucas, 93 U.S. 115, 23 L. ed. 824, and in Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 35 Am. St. Rep. 515, 33 N. E. 695, the supreme court of Massachusetts held that cities might have a private ownership of property which could not be wholly controlled by the state government.

It seems, however, plain to us that the as serted right to demand the continuance of the obligation to pave and repair the streets, as contained in the orders or decrees of the board of aldermen granting to the defendant the right to extend the locations of its tracks on the conditions named, does not amount to property held by the corporation, which the legislature is unable to touch, either by way of limitation or extinguishment. If these restrictions or conditions are to be regarded as a contract, we think the legislature would have the same right to terminate it, with the consent of the railroad company, that the city itself would have. These restrictions and conditions were of a public nature, imposed as a means of collecting from the railroad company part, or possibly the whole, of the expenses of paving or repaving the streets in which the tracks were laid, and that method of collection did not become an absolute property right in favor of the city, as against the right of the legislature to alter of abolish it, or substitute some other method with the consent of the company, even though as to the company itself there might be a contract not alterable except with its consent. If this contention of the city were held valid, it would very largely diminish the right of the legislature to deal with its creature in public matters, in a manner which the legislature might regard as for the public welfare. In Springfield v. Springfield Street R. Co. 182 Mass. 41, 64 N. E. 577, this question was before the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, and the contention of the city to the same effect as the plaintiff in error contends in this case, was overruled. It was therein held that the city acted in behalf of the public in regard to these extensions of locations, and that the legislature had the right to modify or abrogate the conditions on which the locations in the streets and public ways had been granted, after such conditions had been originally imposed by it. The case at bar was decided at the same time as the Springfield Case (182 Mass. 49, 64 N. E. 581), and the proposition that the legislature had the power to free the company from obligations imposed upon it by the conditions in the grant of the extended locations was adhered to, and the Springfield Case cited as authority for the same. We concur in that view.

There is no force in the contention that the city of Worcester has a proprietary right in the property of the defendant in error, reserved to it under the original statute incorporating the Worcester Horse Railroad Company. Mass. Laws, 1861, chap. 148. These sections simply give the city of Worcester the right, during the continuance of the charter of the corporation, and after the expiration of ten years from the opening of any part of said road for use, to purchase all its franchises, property, rights, etc. That right is not affected by the legislation in question, even assuming (which we do not for a moment intimate) that the act of 1898 affected the right of the city to make the purchase under the sections above cited.

We see no reason to doubt the validity of the act of 1898, and the judgments of the Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Court of Massachusetts are, respectively, affirmed.

Notes