Yazoo Company v. City of Clarksdale
United States Supreme Court
Yazoo Company v. City of Clarksdale
No. 15 Argued: Oct. 6, 1921. --- Decided: Nov 7, 1921
YAZOO & MISSISSIPPI VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY et al. v. CITY OF CLARKSDALE.
ERROR AND CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI.
Certiorari to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi rendered in favor of the City of Clarksdale in a suit brought by the city to assert its ownership in shares of stock in a railway company. The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. H. D. Minor, with whom Mr. Charles N. Burch and Mr. Blewett Lee were on the briefs, for plaintiffs in error and petitioners.
Mr. Gerald Fitzgerald, with whom Mr. Geo. F. Maynard and Mr. W. W. Venable were on the briefs, for defendant in error and respondent.
The writ of error should be dismissed. Jud. Code, § 237, as amended. The federal question presented was not of sufficient importance to warrant certiorari.
The Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 751, has no application to a sale of property under execution in common-law cases. Under §§ 914, 916, Rev. Stats., the only way to enforce one's judgment in the federal court is to proceed according to state practice. Chamberlain v. Mensing, 47 Fed. 435; Ex parte Boyd, 105 U. S. 647; Perez v. Fernandez, 202 U. S. 80; Amy v. Watertown, 130 U. S. 301. Section 914 contains the significant words not contained in the former acts,—"any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding." See Ward v. Chamberlain, 2 Black, 430. The state rules can be varied only where necessary to enable federal officers to function under them.
The rule of court need not be in writing, but may exist in the general practice of the court. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1 ; Logan v. Goodwin, 104 Fed. 409; Citizens Bank v. Farwell, 56 Fed. 570.
The form of the marshal's return shows that he was acting under the Mississippi Code of 1892, and is convincing evidence that it was the custom of the court to use the statute in force at the time the officer acted.
The decisions of the state courts construing their own statutes are binding upon the federal court even though it might be said that such state statutes when adopted by the federal courts become pro hoc federal statutes.
The writs and levy and sale thereunder are all void and of no effect and subject to collateral attack.
At common law, stock in a corporation could not be levied upon, and it is only by statutory authority that this can now be done; the statute must be literally and strictly followed. 17 Cyc 944, 945; Cook, Corporations, vol. 2, 6th ed., § 480; Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U. S. 1 ; Miss. Code, 1892, § 3467.
There is a sharp difference between the real interests of a person in a corporation and the stock certificate or indicium of ownership of the share or interest. Section 3467, Code 1892, especially draws this distinction, and does not provide for the sale of the stock certificate. The distinction is plainly drawn in the Jellenik Case, supra. See Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co., 165 N.Y. 193.
The Code of 1871, § 849, also makes this distinction, for it requires that demand be made upon the company, in which the debtor is supposed to own a share or interest, for the amount and value of said share or interest belonging to the debtor, which provision precludes the idea that the stock certificate itself could be sold as such.
A sale made by the marshal of the United States of personal property or real estate in front of the federal court building is void. Koch v. Bridges, 45 Miss. 247; Jones v. Rogers, 85 Miss. 802 ; Moody's Heirs v. Moeller, 72 Tex. 635; Sinclair v. Stanley, 64 Tex. 72; Smith v. Cockrill, 6 Wall. 756; Bornemann v. Norris, 47 Fed. 438.
Where a sale is void and not merely voidable, it may be attacked in collateral proceedings. 17 Cyc. 1286; Harper v. Hill, 35 Miss. 63; Koch v. Bridges, supra; Jones v. Rogers, supra; Smith v. Cockrill, supra; 2 Freeman on Execution, 3d ed., § 289.
Mr. Chief Justice Taft delivered the opinion of the court.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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