Aircraft in Warfare (1916)/Chapter 16

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2880067Aircraft in Warfare — Chapter XVIFrederick William Lanchester

CHAPTER XVI.

(December 24th, 1914)

PRESENT DAY POSITION AND FUTURE OF THE FOURTH ARM.

§ 106. The Fourth Arm in Peace Time. The problems connected with the maintenance of the Fourth Arm in time of peace are numerous, and present difficulties which will certainly be found to increase as the numerical strength of the Arm is augmented. It is not easy to form any real conception of what the future may have in store in the direction of numbers, but as a matter of guesswork it is difficult to believe that, sooner or later, the strength of the Flying Corps will not reach or exceed 1 per cent, of the number of bayonets. Thus a considerable part of the work formerly allotted to cavalry will in the future be assigned to the new Arm, and the cavalry ordinarily represents from 5 to 10 per cent, of the number of bayonets. Also, the guns will require the assistance of aircraft, probably one or more machines being attached to each battery or group. Beyond this there will be specialised fighting-machines of different denominations. Taking everything into consideration, the suggested 1 per cent, does not look like an overestimate; it is probably too low.

Assuming 1 per cent, as a basis, the numbers are already formidable. Thus, for the British regulars on home service prior to the outbreak of war, the number would need to be at least some 1,000 machines. In the case of the large Continental armies—say, the French—with over 700,000 men (peace footing), it may be anticipated that a total of about 5,000 machines will be required.[1]

The peace training of these vast numbers of flying-men would represent an organisation of immense proportions, especially if the author's anticipations in such matters as aeronautical tactics, formation flying, etc., come to be realised. The multiplicity of flight-grounds, training-schools, workshops, sheds, etc., with the necessary staff of instructors, mechanics, and other non-combatant members of the organisation, will render the whole matter a very big undertaking.

In view of the probable magnitude of the business, it is to be feared that the question of peace-time casualties in the Flying Corps will inevitably become a matter of the most serious importance. It is quite certain that everything possible must be done to minimise the dangers of military flying in peace time; this looks like a self-evident proposition, but apparently it is not. The author has frequently passed comment on the seriously defective nature of some of the existing flight-grounds, and has found himself met (quite unofficially) by the argument that since the men will have to alight upon pasture land, or even ploughed fields, when on service, it is best that they should have plenty of experience of rough ground when at home; further, that it is necessary to test the strength of the machines by using them in peace time under service conditions. So far as the machine is concerned, this kind of argument is altogether unsound. If the type is one which has been thoroughly tested in the first instance before adoption, and if the machines are properly inspected during manufacture, they will be far more reliable in the battlefield if they have not been knocked about by rough treatment over bad ground in peace-time flying. Testing to destruction is good in its way, but the particular article so tested must not be subsequently used. With regard to the men themselves, the argument that a bad ground is better than a good one is almost as gravely at fault. One hundred alightings on a good ground (with a fair surface and without obstructions) will carry less risk than, say, 20 or 30 on a poor or bad ground, and the man who has made his 100 alightings, with, if we wish, imaginary obstacles, is a better man than the one who has only done his 20 or 30, especially if the latter is disabled or dead. A man who practises jumping uses a light lath, which will do him no injury if he falls, in spite of the fact that his object may be to join a club of harriers and jump a five-bar gate.

The need for improvement in our flying grounds is very much emphasised, when the importance of night flying is taken into consideration. With bad or indifferent flight grounds, such as existent at the time of the outbreak of war, alighting by night is an operation of extreme risk, and is only possible for a pilot of great experience. There is no real reason why alighting by night should be unduly dangerous; flight grounds of adequate area, properly drained, and of good surface, are however essential. There are many ways, by means of artificial lights, by which the difficulty of judging the distance from the ground may be overcome.

It is more than possible that, in some respects and from certain points of view, flying by night may become less hazardous than by daylight, just as, for example, there are many conditions under which navigation at sea is actually safer by night than by day.

The military importance of night flying is in part due to the need for countering the activity of the larger dirigible or Zeppelin, but the question is far wider than this. At present all raids, reconnaissances and other duties entrusted to the aeroplane are subject to the condition that the operation must be completed in time to return to headquarters before dark; infraction of this condition is prone to result in serious losses, both of machines and men. It is abundantly clear that no such restriction should be tolerated, and the solution of the difficulty is to be sought in the provision of flight grounds, worthy of our present day aircraft. It is a serious reflection on our conduct as a nation that we have so far shown ourselves prepared to spend more money in the provision and upkeep of cricket fields, than we are ready to do for the safety of our flying men and the efficiency of the Aeronautical Arm.

Even before the outbreak of the present war, the author had more than once given expression to the opinion that our flight grounds stood more in need of immediate improvement than the machines themselves. Thus the following is quoted from the author's recent "James Forest" lecture (1914):— {{quote|"There is, moreover, another factor (quite extraneous to flying conditions proper) that at present puts a definite handicap on high speed and prevents the aeronautical designer from doing himself justice in that direction; namely, the backward condition of existing accommodation in the way of alighting-grounds. Owing to quite wellunderstood conditions, it is necessary, before rising, to attain a speed on the ground not very much less than the normal flight-speed of the machine, and so, in the case of a machine designed for 120 miles per hour maximum flight-velocity, it would be necessary to acquire a speed round about 80 miles per hour before leaving the ground, which would necessitate a straight-line run of about 300 yards. To comply with this condition, and to give safe room otherwise for handling the machine, a flight-ground of at least half-mile length should be provided, having a surface far better than is now customary. Beyond this, since in bad weather it is undesirable either to start or to alight across the direction of the wind, it would appear that a ground of not less than some lOO or 150 acres in extent would be desirable. At the present time the Author believes that the provision of well-appointed flight-grounds of the area stated in different parts of the country would do more to further the cause of aviation than an equal expenditure of money in any other direction.

"It is possible that at some future time the landing-gear of machines may be so far improved that it may be found possible to alight on the ordinary high road; also it may be that sections of the high road will be specially widened and freed from adjacent obstruction to serve in cases of emergency. It is clear, however, that the general use of the high road for this purpose would in any case be open to very grave objection.

"It might be thought that the setting apart as flightgrounds of such considerable areas of land as above indicated would impose too serious a financial burden on flying, at least for some time to come, to be commercially possible. It is, however, to be borne in mind that with proper management such grounds could, especially if duplicated, be utilized for grazing purposes: thus, if an area of 200 acres were available, a herd of some few hundred head of cattle could be grazed, being transferred from one section of the ground to another from time to time. It is therefore evident that, under favourable conditions, the commercial aspect of the problem is by no means outrageous, even during the period that must intervene before flying as a mode of locomotion can become in any sense popular. Beyond this, assuming that the flying-machine is able to justify its existence apart from its employment by the Services, there seems no reason to suppose that the returns of a well-equipped flying-ground might not easily become far greater than the agricultural value of the land concerned, which at the best is but a few pounds per annum per acre."}}

§ 107. The Fourth Arm in Peace Time. Depreciation and Obsolescence. A somewhat knotty point is that of the duration of the service life of aircraft. So far no definition has been generally accepted. The
PLATE XII.

An example of rough usage. The Sopwith "Scout," a very fast Single Seater. After an upset due to bad landing. The wing structure bore the shock and weight; the Pilot escaped injury.

truth is that any machine may become "superannuated" either owing to depreciation or to obsolescence; in the former case the number of miles covered will be the determining factor, coupled, perhaps, with other facts relating to its history or usage; in the latter, it is the age of the machine which determines its unfitness for service, considered, of course, in relation to the advance which has been made in the art of construction since the date of building. Thus a machine may be unfit for service either because it is, according to some accepted definition, worn out and incapable of repair, or because it is obsolete in design. In some cases obsolescence may be absolute, as when a design is so out of date that by comparison with the best available it is to be considered unsafe or uneconomical; in this case it is only fit to be destroyed; or its obsolescence may be relative, as when it is out-classed by the machines of corresponding type in the service of some neighbouring Power; in this case it is fit to be sold out of the Service or to be transferred to some distant part of the Empire, where competition is not equally severe. The questions of depreciation and obsolescence and the disposal of condemned machines have not yet received due consideration. On continuous active service it would appear that the life of a present day aeroplane is about three or four months.

The foregoing may be taken merely as samples of the many questions which have to be faced before the training of army pilots and aeroplane gunners and signallers can be attempted in the thousands, or tens of thousands, for which the warfare of the future may call. Without adequate consideration of these questions, coupled with appropriate measures, progress in the direction of increase of numbers and the practical development of aeroplane tactics on a large scale will be most seriously handicapped.

§ 108. Present Position. British Superiority. The reports as to the performance of the air-craft, and more particularly the aeroplanes, of the different belligerent armies are at present very meagre and incomplete. However, it would appear from the observations of those best qualified to judge that the British machines are by no means backward, and in many important respects are superior both to those of the enemy and to those of our Allies. The features in which we at present possess the advantage are those in which the flying capacity of the machine, rather than its more essentially fighting quality, is concerned. Thus superiority may be claimed for the British aeroplanes: firstly, as being better aerodynamically — that is to say, for given horse-power and weight they possess a greater speed and climbing power; secondly, they are more stable — in fact, our present-day machines are definitely automatically or inherently stable; thirdly, they have a higher factor of safety than any of their Continental rivals and are far more robust as to alighting gear; and, fourthly, they are more weather-proof. In short, they are better fitted to service conditions. Beyond this, one of the latest models turned out by the Royal Aircraft Factory is by far the fastest machine in the world, being some ten or twenty miles per hour faster than anything the Continent can show. On the other hand, on the outbreak of hostilities we found ourselves without a thoroughly satisfactory fighting or gun-carrying type of machine — it is one matter to be able to mount a gun on an aeroplane, and quite another to design and construct machines expressly for that purpose. It is, indeed, doubtful whether at that date any really satisfactory gun-carrying aeroplane existed at all; it is in any case precisely in this direction that our own air service has found itself most lacking. In brief, it may fairly and undoubtedly
Plate XIII.

R.A.F. TYPE S.E.4. Single Seat Reconnaissance Machine.
Maximum Sped over 130 Miles per hour.

be claimed that so far as the reconnaissance machine is concerned, the British aircraft are more than able to hold their own with those of the other European nations.

In the main the "proprietary" machines built by private firms have lacked the all-round qualities of those turned out by the Government factory, or under contract to the Royal Aircraft Factory specification. In some cases they have failed from a constructional standpoint; under the exacting conditions of service the alighting chassis have sometimes proved inadequate; in other cases the weather-proof qualities of the "proprietary" machines have been found deficient. These defects have not only shown themselves amongst British-built machines, but also some of the best known of the French makes have failed, or at least are reported to have cut a very sorry figure when submitted to the rigorous test of service conditions in real warfare. Possibly it was not anticipated (as it appears is the case) that machines would be required to remain permanently in the open night and day, shelter being the exception rather than the rule. It is under these conditions that our own Aircraft Factory machines have exhibited an unrivalled robustness of constitution. On behalf of the "proprietary" makes of machine, however, it must be said that some of the most notable of the exploits performed by the Naval Air Service (such as the raids on Düsseldorf and Friedrichshafen) have been performed by such machines,[2] which proves that, from the point of view of flying, they are fully worthy of the Service and a credit to their designers and constructors.

§ 109. Causes which have Contributed to British Ascendancy. The position of the British in the matter of military aeronautics—more particularly aviation—to-day, which, subject to the limitations stated, may properly be described as "ascendancy," is not to be attributed to any one definite cause; the results achieved in the field have been contributed to both by the personnel of our Flying Corps and Naval Air Service, and by the sound qualities of the machines employed. In view of the peace-time exploits of the airmen of the three leading Western Powers, in which it may fairly be said that honours have been divided, it would appear that, without belittling the magnificent performance and daring of our flying men, it is in the matter of material—i.e., actual machines, etc.—that our superiority is most marked.[3]

In discussing the influences which have led to the development of the present-day types of service machine it must be borne in mind that these influences have been at work in the factories of the private firms engaged equally with the Government factory at Farnborough. There has in the past been little or no secrecy in connection with the Royal Aircraft Factory—private builders and the designers attached to private firms have virtually had the "run of the place," and all possible assistance has been rendered them; in brief, the private firm has been at all times kept thoroughly up-to-date in the matter of technical information.

The main factors that have contributed to the production of the machines of outstanding merit, which are upholding our reputation in the field to-day, are unquestionably the greater scientific knowledge possessed by our designers, and the conspicuous ability shown by the staff of the Royal Aircraft Factory in making practical use and application of the latest and best information at their disposal, and in their own full-scale experimental work and study of the many practical problems outside the range of purely scientific research.

The machinery set up by the Government for dealing with a new and difficult question of the greatest national importance, has, so far as its allotted scope is concerned, worked with singular smoothness and undeniable effect. In brief, we have the Royal Aircraft Factory, which may be regarded as the headquarters of the national sources of production, and in itself of the character of an experimental or pioneer department rather than a national manufactory. Behind this we have the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, a body whose functions are mainly concerned with scientific and technical questions, and at the disposal of the Advisory Committee a large and growing department forming part of the National Physical Laboratory. In addition to this, there exists the Naval side, consisting of constructional works and depot at Aldershot, which has taken over in its entirety the Dirigible (Balloon) section of the work.

The secretarial headquarters of the Advisory Committee is permanently located at the National Physical Laboratory, the Director of the latter. Dr. R. T. Glazebrook, F.R.S., being the Chairman of the Committee under the presidency of Lord Rayleigh, O.M., F.R.S.; the Army being represented by the Director-General of Military Aeronautics. Major-General Sir David Henderson, K.C.B., the Navy by the Director of the Air Department of the Admiralty. Captain Murray F. Sueter, and the Royal Aircraft Factory by the Superintendent. Mr. Mervyn O'Gorman, C.B. In a sense the Advisory Committee may be said to act as a "clearing-house" for information, inasmuch as its functions are to ensure, on the one hand, that the information obtained from the work done at the National Physical Laboratory, and collected from other sources, is duly made available to the Royal Aircraft Factory and to the Services, and, on the other hand, to hear and dispose of the difficulties and demands of the said parties. This latter may be a matter either of tendering immediate advice or of appropriately employing the resources of the National Physical Laboratory, or requisitioning any such other assistance as may be deemed expedient. The work is carried out in the main on an annual programme framed on a sufficiently elastic basis to allow of all possible contingencies being dealt with. In addition to the foregoing, the Committee receive and publish a considerable number of new investigations, also abstracts of most of the work of importance done on the Continent; in these latter respects the work accomplished by the Committee can be best judged from a perusal of the Annual Report presented to Parliament.[4] It is by these means that those responsible for the design, specification, and construction of our aircraft, whether military or naval, have been, and are, kept fully informed of all that concerns them from both technical and scientific standpoints, and have been able to employ the somewhat limited resources granted them by the Treasury to the best possible advantage. Beyond this the staff of the Royal Aircraft Factory includes men of exceptional resource and ability, who have proved themselves again and again more than competent in the execution of the duties entrusted to their care. It is
Plate XIV.

Early experimental model of B.E.2c Calculated and Demonstrated
as inherently stable by the late Mr. E. T. Busk. Compare Plate III.

impossible in this connection to pass over without mention the great loss which the factory (and the country, it may be said), has suffered in the death of Mr. H. T. Busk, who recently lost his life in the execution of his duties, being burnt to death in mid-air whilst personally carrying out investigations of an experimental character. Mr. Busk combined with exceptional ability as an experimenter a very thorough knowledge of his work; he was largely responsible for the design and construction of many instruments and appliances which have proved of the greatest service in the development of the present-day machine.

There are many of the less-informed members of the public who believe that the flying-machine has been developed, and is to-day being designed, by empirical methods, and that the scientific man has had nothing to do with it, except, perhaps, late in the day, to give plausible explanations of the " whys and wherefores." Nothing is further from the truth. The work relating to the design and construction of the modern aeroplane is quite as much the result of careful and scientific calculation, in fact, rather more so, than in the case of shipbuilding. All matters connected with the flying properties of a machine, whether it be lifting power, propulsion, or stability, are amenable to rigorous scientific treatment, and are as carefully founded on scale-model and wind-channel experiment as the analogous problems in ship design

In scientific work connected with flight (as pointed out by the author in his recent James Forrest Lecture), the work which has been done in this country is far in advance of that done on the Continent; more especially is this the case in connection with stability: it is fair to take it that the advantageous position in which Britain finds herself to-day in the matter of aircraft is legitimately to be regarded as a reflection of this fact. No one acquainted with the history of the development of our Service machines can have the slightest doubt as to the truth of this statement.


  1. The fact should not be lost sight of that Great Britain may require to regulate the strength of her Flying Corps by that of her neighbours rather than by the strength of her own Army.
  2. The execution of these sensational feats of arms by our naval airmen must not be taken to mean that they could not have been performed equally well by members of the Royal Flying Corps, but rather that the latter are fully occupied by their regular daily work of military reconnaissance, and are certainly no more than numerically sufficient for the needs of our Army in the field. In the Navy, the routine or "business" employment of aircraft (more especially aeroplanes) is not yet understood; the efficient patrolling by aircraft of the seas in which a state of war exists—mainly the North Sea, in the present instance—should be considered by the Air Department of the Admiralty to be its most important duty; this will require the systematic employment of a considerable fleet of aeroplanes, which should, if possible, be machines of 16 or 18 hours' capacity and at least capable of 80 miles per hour. The large airship, until recently in contemplation for this duty, provides, in the author's opinion, a doubtful solution, without recapitulation of its other deficiencies, it is too slow; the key-note in matters of military or naval advancement is mobility, the measure of which is flight speed. As in certain other fields of employment, the dirigible might prove better suited to the work in question than the aeroplane, were it not for the fact that sooner or later, the aircraft of the enemy will have to be faced. The inherent weakness of the slow and vulnerable balloon type cannot fail to place it at a disadvantage.
  3. In time of peace the opportunities for public demonstration accorded to Service machines are limited. Since the time of writing it has become apparent that our superiority is no less due to our men and organisation than to the merits of our machines.
  4. Reports 1909-10, 1910-11, 1911-12, and 1912-13, at present published.