Battle Damage Assessment, 18 June 1991/4-32 Armor

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Battle Damage Assessment, 18 June 1991
United States Army
4-32 Armor
1155778Battle Damage Assessment, 18 June 1991 — 4-32 ArmorUnited States Army

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

18 JUNE 1991

HQs, 4/32 Armor

A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF TACTICAL SITUATION: On the evening of 26 February 1991 TF 4-32 Armor's Scout Platoon encountered an Iraqi T-72 tank with mounted and dismounted infantry. The scout platoon was conducting a screen of the task force's left front and flank, with the task force in a hasty defence, During the action, an M3 cavalry fighting vehicle was hit by 25mm fire and the T-72 was destroyed by a TOW missile.

B. KNOWLEDGE OF ENEMY SITUATION AND CERTAINTY OF THAT INFORMATION: Knowledge of the enemy situation was vague. However, we believed that current contact indicated that the brigade was opposing at least a battalion-size enemy force in defensive positions.

C. TERRAIN AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS—PRECIPITATION, DUST, SMOKE, LIGHT CONDITIONS, DATE, TIME, ETC: The terrain was generally flat desert with numerous wadis and some hills. The action took place in a rocky, hilly area at approximately 1910 during the hours of darkness. Smoke end dust were in the air, but did not obscure optics. Moonlight was 95%, but the sky was overcast with some ambient light.

D. DYNAMICS OF INTERACTION: A T-72 tank with infantry riding on top appeared suddenly from behind a small rise at a range of approximately 300 meters and drove directly toward two Scout M3's. This precipitated the engagement.

E. RANGE OF ENGAGEMENT: The Bradley was struck in the rear from an unknown range. See enclosure 1 for shot lines.

F. SENSOR INFORMATION—SYSTEM USED: The vehicle that fired on the Bradley was not determined. The damaged vehicle was marked on the rear and sides with an inverted "V" and special thermal tape. The T-72 was simultaneously detected wine AN-PVS 7 night vision goggles and the M3's thermal sight.

G. TYPE OF MUITION FIRED, TYPE OF AMMUNITION CAUSING U.S. BATTLE DAMAGE: 25mm Armor Piercing fragments were removed from the turret, radiator, and turbo charger of the Bradley.

H. RESULTS UP ENGAGEMENT, INCLUDING HULL DAMAGE, COMPONENT DAMAGE,

FIRE AND SPALL DAMAGE, WERE THERE MULTIPLE VEHICLES DAMAGED ON THE SAME ENGAGEMENT? The rear of the M3 was pierced in three locations, the turret in three locations, and the left side was creased. Additional rounds may have entered the crew compartment as the rear door opened. Debris inside indicated that striking rounds caused some spall damage. Secondary explosions from 7.62mm and 25mm rounds damaged the crew compartment. No fire was evident. ; The vehicle's engine would not start, the fire control system suffered damage rendering the missile and gun systems inoperative, and the turret would only partially traverse. See enclosure 1.


I. CREW REACTION—SHUT OFF MAIN POWER, POSTION TURRET 90 DEGREES TO LONGITUDINAL AXIS OF VEHICLES, ETC.: The driver felt the vehicle shudder and the engine stall out. He opened his hatch, crawled out, and helped the wounded gunner. The driver returned in a few minutes and turned off the master battery. The vehicle commander was killed. Remaining crew members who were wounded exited though the rear personnel door.

J. CASUALTY DATA—WOUNDED, KILLED: Vehicle commander, killed while sitting in his turret seat. Gunner: wounded by —secondary explosions and spall while sitting in his turret seat. Observer: died of wounds received while sitting in left front seat. Loader: wounded while attempting to open the top hatch in order to reload TOW.

K. VEHICLE PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF VULNERABILITY REDUCTION FEATURES WORKING AS DESIGNED (FIRE SUPPRESSION, BLAST PANELS, AMMO COMPARTMENT DOORS, SPALL LINERS, ETC): No comment.

L. MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES: None

M. SOLDIER PERFORMANCE FACTORS, E.G. HOW LONG HAS THE CREW OR UNIT BEEN IN CONTACT OR ENGAGED IN CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS, AND PARTICULAR STRESS CONDITIONS: The task force has been in continuous operations for 12 hours, and this was the first direct fire contact with enemy forces.

N. NAME OF POC WHO CAN ELABORATE ON COMPILES RESULTS: LTC John F. Kalb, (ETS) 346-7204/7205.

Enclosure 1—DIAGRAM OF SHOT LINE AND STRIKE OF ROUNDS.


ASSESSMENT 2-9

4-32 ARMOR HQ-25


This was an M3A1 Bradley hit from the rear by ten small caliber KE rounds. The shot lines were as follows:

Impact 1: Round penetrated the top of the ramp, passed through the turret basket, the HE feed shoot, and expended itself on the turret azimuth ring.

Impact 2: Penetrated rear door and passed thought the turret basket, 25mm AP storage bin, the front turret basket, and expended itself against the front fire wall.

Impact 3: Round hit the top of the vehicle, passed through the (illegible text) barrier, cargo hatch torsion bar, and expended itself against the cargo hatch.

Impact 4: Entered rear of turret bustle, penetrated turret (illegible text),and impacted against the (illegible text) and expended itself.

Impact 5: Round entered though the turret bustle, penetrated the turret armour, passing underneath the 1760 (illegible text) storage box, the coax door, the gun shield, and the round was lost.

Impact 6: Round entered though the mounting bracket of the SC's hatch and deflected up into the hatch.

Impact 7: Round glanced off side of hull.


The following rounds impacted inside the crew compartment, but no entrance holes could found in the rear ramp.

basket shield, passed through the feeder chote, forward basket of the turret, the engine fire wall, air inlet duct, and expended itself in the radiator.

Impact 2A: Penetrated middle portion of the turret basket shield, passed through the AP storage bin, the forward turret basket, and expended itself into the radiator.

Impact 3A: Penetrated the lower portion of the turret basket shield, passed through the cabling for the turret distribution box, the turret power relay assembly, power control unit, and expended itself in the slippage ring.


There was no fire. There was extensive fragment damage in the turret compartment.
Assessment No. 2-9
Note: Shots 1A, 2A, 3A didn't penetrate outer hull

Bradley - Figure 1.

NOT TO SCALE

Assessment No. 2-9

Bradley - Figure 2.

Assessment No. 2-9

Bradley - Figure 3.

Assessment No. 2-9

Bradley - Figure 4.