Debates in the Several State Conventions/Volume 4/Bankrupt Bill (1818)
Bankrupt Bill.
Mr. HOPKINSON. The subject seems to have been considered in this light by the framers of the Constitution, who have, therefore, among the enumerated powers of Congress, expressly granted the power "to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies."
Mr. H. said he considered this as a declaration of the will of the people, that Congress should act on this subject—at least, so far as to establish a uniform rule. It binds us to no particular system, it is true; but it does enjoin on us most impressively to provide some one which shall be uniform in its operations on the different states, giving a certain known rule, and preventing those numerous and obvious evils that must arise from various and conflicting systems in the different states, by which the relation between debtor and creditor, so interesting to all classes of our citizens, must forever be changing, be imperfectly understood, and be daily producing inequality and injustice between the creditors and debtors residing in the different states. Mr. H. insisted that, when the several states parted with this power, it was only to attain that uniformity of system which could be established only by the general government; and that the states, having surrendered the power for this purpose, had a fair claim on the general government not to disappoint this expectation, but to apply the power to the uses intended by the grant of it.
Mr. TYLER, (of Virginia.) The honorable gentleman yesterday demanded of this house to carry all the powers of the government; and represented it as our bounden duty, in every instance, in which the Constitution gave power, to exercise it. The gentleman's position leaves us no alternative. Our discretion is taken from us—our volition is gone. If the gentleman be correct, we are stopped at the threshold of this inquiry; for inasmuch as the Constitution confers on Congress the power to adopt a uniform system of bankruptcy,—according to his doctrine, we are not to inquire into the expediency of adopting such system, but must yield it our support. Here, sir, I join issue with that gentleman. What, sir, is the end of all legislation? Is it not the public good? Do we come here to legislate away the rights and happiness of our constituents, or to advance and secure them? Suppose, then, by carrying into effect a specified power in the Constitution, we inflict serious injury upon the political body; will gentlemen contend that we are bound by a blind fatality, and compelled to act? Sir, such a doctrine cannot be supported even by the distinguished talents of that gentleman. The powers of this Constitution are all addressed to the sound discretion of Congress. You are not imperatively commanded, but authorized to act, if by so acting the good of the country will be promoted.
Mr. SERGEANT, (of Pennsylvania.) Why, it is said, why not extend the provisions to all classes of the community? Why confine them to a single class? The answer is a very plain one. The design of the Constitution was to vest in the government of the United States such powers as were necessary for national purposes, and to leave to the states all other powers. Trade, commercial credit, and public or national credit, which is intimately allied to it, were deemed, and rightly deemed, to be national concerns of the highest importance. In the adjustment of our government, at once national and federal, they were intended to be confided, and were confided, to the care of the public authority of the nation.
It does not appear to me that we need inquire, whether the term "bankruptcy" had a definite meaning, to which we are limited, nor whether we are bound to follow the model of the statutes of England, or any state bankrupt laws that may have existed here before the Constitution was formed. For the present purpose, the general spirit and scope of the Constitution furnish a sufficient guide. The design of that instrument was to occupy national ground, and leave the rest to the states.
Mr. MILLS, (of Massachusetts.) Once establish the principle that the situation of the country is such as to require the exercise of that power with which the Constitution has vested you upon this subject,—and whether the prominent features of your system shall be drawn from the commercial code of Napoleon, or the acts of the British Parliament, will be a mere question of expediency, to be determined by their relative merits, and their analogy to your habits and institutions. Sir, I shall not stop here to inquire into the extent of the obligation imposed on you by the Constitution. It is enough for me to find the power "to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States" expressly delegated to Congress by that instrument, and to satisfy myself that the exigencies of the country require its exercise, to appreciate the weight of this obligation. Too long already has this delegation of authority remained a mere dead letter in that compact; and too long have those, for whose benefit it was introduced, called upon you to give it life, and energy, and action.
Are you sure that, since the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the state legislatures have any legitimate authority to pass those laws? By that instrument, it is contended. Congress alone have power to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy, and the states are expressly prohibited from passing "any laws impairing the obligation of contracts." So far, therefore, as these laws impugn either of those provisions, so far they transcend the powers retained by the states. Upon this subject, however, I wish not to be understood as giving an opinion, or attempting to sustain an argument.
Mr. HOPKINSON. I have never contended that there is an absolute indisputable, constitutional obligation on Congress to pass a bankrupt law. but I do contend that it comes so recommended by the Constitution, and by the people who speak in and by that Constitution, that we may not disregard it; that it is our duty to exercise that power, to execute the trust,—unless, on a full and fair investigation of the subject, it shall be unwise, and injurious to the nation, to do so. I do contend that this high and general duty ought not to be dispensed with on doubtful reasons, on hypothetical arguments, drawn altogether from a presumed abuse of the law; much less from an indulgence of old prejudices or local views and interests. It is a great national object of legislation; it should be decided on national principles; it is deeply interesting to a vast and valuable portion of the people of this country; it should, therefore, be considered in relation to those interests, and determined on a fair comparison between the good it will certainly produce to this class, and the evil it may inflict, if any, on the rest of the community. This government is founded on a compromise of interests, and every one has a fair claim to attention and regard.