Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition/Aristotle

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IN the history of European thought and knowledge, down to the period of the revival of letters, the name of Aristotle was, without a rival, supreme; and this supremacy arose from no false estimate or unwarranted preference. Aristotle, speaking generally, treated of every subject which came within the range of ancient thought, and if we regard matter, and not form or literary style, he treated of each of these subjects better than any one else. He also initiated many new branches of inquiry, dependent on observation and induction, and thus not only represented in himself the culmination of Greek speculative philosophy, but was also, as far as possible, the forerunner of modern science. Therefore, the sense of mankind recognised him gradually (after many vicissitudes of appreciation) as the strongest of the ancients. It even came to pass that, for a long period, all secular writings but those of Aristotle had dropped out of notice in Europe. His works may almost have the credit of having saved men from relapsing into barbarism. All sought in Aristotle the basis of knowledge. Universities and grammar schools were founded in Aristotle. Dante only justly expresses this predominance, when he speaks of Aristotle 1 as "the master of those that know," and depicts him as centre and head of the philosophic family. Of the influence which he has exercised over the minds of men we have evidence, not only in the vast literatures connected with his system, which exist in all great libraries, but also in the traces which that system has left in all the modern languages of Europe. The number of Aristotelian "fossils" 2 existing in our everyday language is quite remarkable. If it had not been for the system of Aristotle, we should have had to express many of our ordinary thoughts differently.

The thought of Aristotle takes its start out of two separate sets of elements previously existing in Greece: the one purely philosophical, the other scientific. In Plato were summed up and remoulded all the former results of logical, metaphysical, psychological, ethical, and political speculation in Greece. And Aristotle was, in the first place, thoroughly imbued with Plato, and all the purely philosophical side of his writings was conceived in close relation to Plato's works, the results of which he may be said to have codified, reducing into expository form what Plato had left scattered up and down, rather as hints and suggestions, in his brilliant dramatic dialogues. Partly, then, Aristotle adopted the results of Plato, and made them available for the world in general; partly he dissented from some of the Platonic doctrines, and carried on a polemic against them. To compare the Platonic dialogues with the works of Aristotle, and to trace the agreements and disagreements between them, forms an interesting study in the history of philosophy. But on the whole, the difference between Aristotle and Plato is one of aims rather than of doctrines. Aristotle's aim, almost from first to last, is to be scientific, and to reduce even philosophy to science. He wishes to deal with what can be known for certain, and to express this in exact language. Plato's aim was, in one sense, greater than this; in another sense it was inferior to it. Plato stood apart from dogmatic systematising; he seems to have regarded truth as too great and many-sided to be capable of being submitted to such a process; he was content to develop various aspects of the truth, on all the highest questions, as they appeared to different minds, or to the same mind at different periods. To do this he chose the vehicle of the dramatic dialogue, in which nothing was positively announced beyond the views arrived at for the moment by the particular speakers. He was a poet at the same time

[1] [2] that he was a philosopher, and his works exhibit that true note of poetry which consists in constant attention to form, so that no part is a mere means to a final result ; but each part is treated as an end in itself, and contains its own beauty and perfection. His dialogues are thus masterpieces of consummate literary art, though somewhat indefinite in their conclusions, and not without a tinge of imaginative mysticism. To all these Platonic tendencies in the treat ment of philosophy Aristotle was totally opposed. He disregarded form in all his extant works; he thought of matter alone, and his main care was to be definite and exhaustive. In adopting results from Plato he first stripped them of the poetry with which they had been surrounded. AVe shall revert below to some of the points on which he controverts Plato, but the real contrast between them is in their attitude; the one is essentially a dialectician, though of the highest and noblest type, the other more and more tends to be a man of science. Following out his proper bent, Aristotle, in many of his works, strikes on a path in which Plato had not been his precursor. In these works he lays the foundation for the sciences of Natural Philosophy, Mechanics, Physiology, and Natural History. In these branches of thought he stands related, not to Plato, but to the early Greek writers on physical subjects, the inquirers on special questions, the medical writers, and the travellers, whose works he often men tions, 1 though they are all now lost. If we possessed them, we should probably only see how meagre had been these beginnings of science, and what great things Aristotle achieved in the accumulation and systematising of knowledge, and in preparing the way for its future development.

Aristotle s complete neglect of artistic form (in his ex tant works), and his adherence " to essential naked truth," induced Wilhelm vonHumboldt 2 to say that Aristotle was un-Greek in the character of his mind; that he was deeper and more earnest than the Greeks, but was wanting in Greek fancy and grace, and spiritual freedom of treatment. This may be so; but in point of descent Aristotle was purely Hellenic. 3 His family, however, had been settled for some generations on the Macedonian frontier, and it was there that Aristotle was born, at the town of Stageira, 4 a Greek colony, on the Strymonic gulf. This place was not far from Pella, the residence of the Macedonian king, Amyntas, whose physician Nicomachus, the father of Aris totle, became. Intercourse with the Macedonians may have, to some extent, influenced the manners of this family. Bat it is to be remembered that they belonged to the race of the Asclepiads, or supposed descendants of ^Esculapius, and it is more natural to attribute the scientific tendencies of Aristotle s mind to the inherited character and traditions of this race than to any influence which he can have received from the Macedonians. Among those traditions it is said 5 to- have been one, that "from father to son they 1 See Bonitz s Index to Aristotle, in the 5th vol. of the edition of the Prussian Royal Academy (Berlin, 1870), under the words <pvffiK6s, 4>v<rioyos, Philosophus Incertus, TttpioSoi (books of travels), Iffropia, liriroKpd.Tris, &c., where the references to passages are given. s Iii a letter to F. A. Wolf, dated 15th June 1795. See his works, v. 125.

  • See Aristotle, by George Grote, kc. (1872), vol. i. p. 3, note.

Hence his frequent appellation by the Greek commentators of 6 STcryeipiTTjy. This in English is often mis-spelt as " Stagyrite." 5 Gaien, De Anatomicis Administr., ii. 1. It is a doubtful and inter esting question whether Aristotle ever dissected the human subject. Tins would have been much opposed to Greek prejudices. See A ristotle: a Chapter from the History of Science, &c., by George Henry Lewes (London, 1864), pp. 159-170. We know that the school of Galen contented themselves with dissecting the lower animals ; the same may generally have been the case with Aristotle. But he appears to have dissected the human fcetus, and in one place, at all events, he seem s to indicate acquaintance with dissections of the adult human subject (De learned the art of dissection, as regularly as others learn to read and write." The best biography of Aristotle, hitherto written, is that given by Grote in his posthumous work referred to in note 3. The chief ancient authority on the subject is Diogenes Laertius, a compiler 6 and anecdote- monger, perhaps of the 3d or 4th century A.D. His life of Aristotle contains, amid many worthless, gossiping state ments, two fragments of antiquity which are of the greatest value. One of these is an extract from the chronology (xpoviKa) of Apollodorus (140 B.C.), giving the dates of the chief events of Aristotle s career; the other is a cata logue of " the books which he left behind him," to the number of 146. The following are the statements of Apollodorus: That Aristotle was born 384 B.C. That he joined Plato and passed twenty years with him, thirteen of them consecutively, and that he came to Mitylene 345 B.C. That in the first year after the death of Plato he went to Herineas, and abode with him three years ; that he came to Philip 343 B.C., when Alexander was fifteen years old; that he came to Athens 335 B.C. That he held a school in the Lyceum thirteen years, and then went to Chalcis 322 B.C., where he died of a disease, about sixty-three years old. This skeleton of the life of Aristotle is probably authentic; 7 and if so, we know as much about him as could possibly be expected. It is easy to fill up, to some extent, the details : he must have been in his seventeenth year when he came to Athens to put himself under Plato; twenty years afterwards, when Plato died, he was, on account of his great divergencies of mind from Plato, not appointed head of the school, and he, therefore, retreated to the court of his philosophical friend, Hermeas, ruler of Atarneas, in Asia Minor ; he married the niece of Hermeas, who was a eunuch, and had been a slave. On his death Aristotle went to live in retirement in Mityleue, whence, in his forty- second year, he was summoned by Philip of Macedon to undertake the tuition of Alexander the Great, then fifteen years old. Seven years later Philip was assassinated and Alexander became king of Macedonia, and was immediately absorbed in plans for the conquest of the East. Aristotle now came to Athens and spent the last thirteen years of his life there, and it is these years which have the most interest for us, for in them, in all probability, he composed all those of his works 8 which still remain. In rivalry to the Platonic school which had been established in the gar dens of the " Academia " on the west side of Athens, he set up his own school in the covered " walks " (TrfptVaroi) round the temple of the Lycean Apollo, on the east side of the city, and from this circumstance his philosophy got the appellation of "Peripatetic." His mind and the general features of his system were nov/ mature ; he had before him the task, on the one hand, of reducing to writing for the world the results of his reflections in philosophy, on the other hand, of accumulating fresh materials for those sciences of observation of which he was laying the founda tion. He set himself simultaneously to writing and to teaching, and there is reason to believe that he employed Part. Animal, i. v. 7). But his knowledge of anatomy, as compared with that of modern times, was superficial. 6 See his Lives of the Philosophers, v. i. 7 Niebuhr considered Apollodorus to be a trustworthy chronologist. Valentine Hose, however, De Aristolelis Librorum Online et Auctoritate Commentatio (Berlin, 1854), pp. 112-119, thinks that the date of Aristotle s death can alone be relied on, and that all the other particulars are filled in, going backwards from this, on conjecture. Eose believes that the account of Aristotle s connection both with Plato and with Alexander is a mere fiction, and, in short, that we know nothing about the life of Aristotle. This is an extreme of scepticism. 8 These works all seem to belong to the same epoch of the author s mind. They all presuppose a certain generally completed system of philosophy aud a certain previously settled phraseology. But consider able development of particular thoughts can be traced as having occurred during the actual writing of the books. his school to some extent, in co-operation with himself, to work out details, and to assist in a subordinate way in the construction of the great philosophical and scientific edifice which he had in view. The period of the zenith of Aristotle was coeval with the astonishing career of his pupil, Alexander. There is a tradition that Alexander[3] furnished him with funds for his physical and zoological researches. However this may have been, it appears certain that Aristotle was identified in Athens with the Macedonian cause, and that when, in the summer of 323 B.C., the startling news of the sudden death of Alexander was spread through Greece, Aristotle was involved in the temporary fall of a political party, and those who, from different causes, were his enemies, made an attack upon him which caused him to fly from Athens. Grote has well drawn out the various elements of enmity existing against Aristotle, and to his account we refer. Aristotle retired to Chalcis in Euboea, a place garrisoned by the Macedonians, and there shortly afterwards closed, in an illness, his life of unsurpassed activity and achievement. His will, preserved by Diogenes, would seem to indicate a kind, just, and generous disposition; of the genuineness of this document we cannot be sure, but there is nothing recorded of Aristotle with any certainty which would lead us to think of him personally otherwise than with respect.[4]

After his death his works had a strange and remarkable history. His library, containing all his own autographs, many of them being MSS. of unpublished and unfinished treatises, was bequeathed to Theophrastus, his chief disciple, who, dying thirty-five years later, bequeathed them in turn, together with his own books and writings, to Neleus, a Peripatetic scholar. Neleus took the whole precious collection with him to his home at Scepsis, in Asia Minor, and his heirs concealed it in a vault to prevent its being seized by the king of Pergamus, who was then levying contributions for his royal library. The Aristotelian MSS. were thus lost to the world for 187 years. About the year 100 B.C. they were brought out of their hiding-place and sold to a wealthy book-collector, named Apellicon, who carried them back to Athens. In the year 86 B.C., on the taking of Athens by Sulla, the library of Apellicon was seized and brought to Rome. There some learned Greeks obtained access to it; Tyrannion, the friend of Cicero, arranged the MSS.; and Andronicus of Rhodes undertook the task of furnishing a correct text, and a complete edition of the philosophical works of Aristotle, out of the materials at his disposal. He arranged the different treatises and scattered fragments under their proper heads, and published what was henceforth received as the authorised edition of the works of Aristotle.[5] It seems reasonable to believe with Grote[6] that "our Aristotle," that is, the collection of writings which under this name has come down to modern times, is none other than the edition of Andronicus, and thus dates from about the year 50 B.C. For the first generation after the death of Aristotle, his scholars,[7] Theophrastus, Eudemus, Phanias, Straton, &c., were engaged partly in editing, partly in paraphrasing, sometimes in endeavouring to improve upon his mostly unfinished works. But the Peripatetic school very rapidly declined; all the philosophic ability round the shores of the Ægean threw itself into one or other of the two new rival schools which had arisen, the Stoic and the Epicurean. The Peripatetics could not keep up to their master's level; they soon lost interest in the higher parts of his system; they took to writing monographs[8] on small separate questions, and moral platitudes[9] dressed up in rhetorical form. We may hesitate to affirm, that, during 187 years, there were absolutely no copies of Aristotle's greatest works extant besides those hidden in the vault of Scepsis, for the Stoical ethics and logic both bear traces of a knowledge of Aristotle. But, at all events, for the time, the world had lost its interest in all that we most prize in Aristotle's thought. Strabo[10] says expressly that "all his writings, except a few of a more popular character," had been lost; and in accordance with this, Cicero[11] says that "even philosophers know nothing of Aristotle, though they ought to have been attracted by the incredible sweetness of his diction." The latter part of this remark may seem sur prising, for it is not in the least applicable to any of the works of Aristotle which have come down to us. But Cicero is evidently referring to the Dialogues,[12] which were read, admired, and attributed to Aristotle in the days before the edition of Andronicus became known. The question has been raised, especially by Valentine Rose,[13] whether these dialogues, and other short, unsystematic works which passed under the name of Aristotle, were all forgeries, or were in any case genuine. On the one hand it is urged that the dialogic, or artistic, mode of exposition, was alien from Aristotle's turn of mind. On the other hand, it may be said that Aristotle in his youth may very probably have tried his hand at imitating the Platonic dialogues. And, indeed, unless he had done so, it is difficult to understand how even the forgers could have ventured to publish dialogues bearing his name. Very likely, after his death and the loss of the main bulk of his works by their removal to a vault in Asia Minor, a crop of forged Aristotelian writings sprung up, and imitations of his earlier and more popular works were among the number. But still, it appears safest to believe that Aristotle did at one time endeavour to make the dialogue his vehicle for philosophy. In the years that followed the death of Plato, he probably felt within himself a reaction and repugnance against this mode of writing, and when he returned to Athens as the leader of a school, he utterly renounced it, and set himself henceforth to the statement of the naked truth in the directest and most scientific terms which ho could find. Whether the dialogues which Cicero and his contemporaries read and admired were early works of Aristotle himself, or were forgeries, there is no means of knowing. But the fragments[14] of these works, which a search of all ancient literature has brought together, show us nothing worthy of Aristotle in his best days, nothing that contributes any light to his philosophy. And it is remarkable that all works of this kind seem to have been excluded from the edition of Andronicus. Owing to that exclusion they are all now lost, and thus the tables are turned, for whereas before the edition of Andronicus the Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 2.djvu/573 Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 2.djvu/574 Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 2.djvu/575 gical and physiobgical writings. Granting that the work On Soul was written later than most of the other works of Aristotle, it seems to us safest to say that, in all probability, many of his works were simultaneously " on the stocks " up to the time of his death, and this makes their precise order difficult to assign.

We shall now proceed briefly to indicate, we cannot attempt more, the leading features of the contents of Aristotle's undoubted works, as they have come down to us. The books of the Oryanon (see note 10, p. 5 14) form together a connected whole. Of these the Topics appear to have been written first, but the sequence of thought between the books is that the Prior Analytics stand first, as containing the theory of the syllogism, a necessary preliminary to reasoning of all kinds; and then growing out of this root we have two divergent treatises: the Posterior Analytics, on demonstrative reasoning, or the logic of science; and the Topics, on dialectic, or the art of discussing subjects in which demonstration is impossible. For the details contained in these treatises we must refer the reader to Grote's (see note 3, p. 511) generally 1 excellent account. The matter of the Prior Analytics has become the common property of all modern books on logic. And scarcely anything 3 has had to be detracted from or added to what Aristotle wrote upon the syllogism. His was the proud distinction of having discovered and fully drawn out the laws under which the mind acts in deductive reasoning. That in deduction the mind proceeds from some universal proposition, and how it proceeds these were the first things which Aristotle had to tell the world. The modern attempts to impugn these principles, and to show that the mind does not reason from universals, are a failure. They confuse inductive with deductive reasoning, and ignore both the case of a science like geometry, which is all deduction, and also the numerous cases where the mind, having unduly assumed a universal principle, rests in it afterwards and makes deductive applications of it. Grant ing that there is such a thing as deductive reasoning (and surely life is full of it), it is a great matter to have the laws of this so clearly ascertained, that about the process itself there can no longer be doubt, and any flaw in the process can instantly be detected. This was the service that Aristotle rendered in drawing out the laws of the syllogism. Men, of course, reasoned deductively by means of "the syllogism " before Aristotle had appropriated this name 3 to indicate the formula for deductive reasoning, and before he had discovered and stated the laws under which the mind acts in deductive reasoning. They did so, how ever, unconsciously and by instinct, just as men wrote and talked grammatically before any idea of a science or an art of grammar existed. In Aristotle deductive reasoning became conscious of itself. Unfortunately for his reputation, this merely preliminary part of his labours, in which the principles and rules of syllogistic inference were drawn out, occupied almost exclusively the minds of thinkers in the Middle Ages. The errors of modern Aristotelians were imputed to Aristotle, and hence arose the notion that Aristotle explained nature by means of the syllogism. Nothing could be further from the truth; Aristotle was not only one of the most inquiring and encyclopaedical, but also one of the most thoroughly sensible, of all writers, and no one would have repudiated more strongly than himself the idea that the formula of the syllogism can be used to test or explain anything beyond the process of reasoning from certain premisses possessed or assumed, and he is never tired of telling us that the only means of obtaining premisses is by experience and observation of facts. While discussing the syllogism itself, he says, 4 " This is the case in astronomy, which is based on the observation of astronomical phenomena, and it is the case with every branch of science or art. When the facts in each branch are brought together, it will be the province of the logician to set out the demonstrations in a manner clear and fit for use." It is true that Aristotle did nothing towards the logic of Induction, that is to say, towards elucidating the methods by which the mind legitimately arrives at general facts or laws of nature. This was left to be worked out by the moderns,, by Galileo, and Bacon, and Whewell, and J. S. Mill. Aristotle, indeed, made a cursory attempt 5 to put the inductive process into syllogistic form, thus: "A, B, and C draw iron; A, B, and C are (or represent) all magnets; therefore all magnets draw iron." It is clear that this syllogism does not explain the inductive process, it only records in the minor premiss a previous induction. The real question is, do A, B, and C here properly represent all magnets 1 To answer this, verification would be required. The syllogism, then, does not explain the inductive process, but only calls attention to what is implied in it. Leaving unattempted the question how [the minor premiss in the Inductive syllogism is to be obtained, and how tested, what Aristotle really works out is the logic of Deductive Science (in the Post. Analytics) and the logic of Deductive Probability (in the Topics). Under the former head he draws the ideal of a perfect science, and recounts the conditions necessary to its existence. Interesting discussions 6 are introduced by him on Causation, Hypotheses, Axioms,. Ultimate Laws, Definition, and the Apprehension of Primary Truths. In all this there is little which might not be accepted by a man of science of the present day. The Topics, on the other hand, treat of a subject which possesses rather an antiquarian than a living interest, namely, the conduct and regulation of Dialectic as practised in Athenian society. In the Middle Ages men made a business 7 of propounding, attacking, and defending theses, but this was a lame imitation of the spontaneous disputations of lively Athens, and from its utter profitlessness has long fallen into desuetude. The Dialogues of Plato may serve to give us an idea of a society possessed with an insatiate appetite for discussion and controversy, and always delighted to take part in, or assist at, an intellectual game or fencing match between two opponents. And it is the object of the Topics of Aristotle to lay down the rules for the game of Dialectic, and to establish it as a highly salubrious and necessary intellectual art. Dialectic, properly speaking, is discussion with a view to probable truth, and so far is worthy of the attention of a philosopher. But it may easily emerge into Eristic, which is discussion with a view to victory. Even under this aspect Aristotle does not think it ought to be neglected. Drawing on his vast and methodised observation of life, he gives rules and hints for the conduct of Eristic. The name Topics means " On Common-places;" the chief contents of this treatise consist of "heads" useful in arguing for or against a proposition. All this is wearisome to read in eight books. Much more readable are the Sophistical Refutations, which form a conclusion to the

[15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] Topics. The intellectual tendencies of Athenian society Lad given scope to a class, which gradually arose, of professional and paid disputants, or professors and teachers of the art of controversy. This professional class, under the name " Sophists," got a bad name in antiquity, 1 and Aristotle treats them disparagingly as mere charlatans. Thus, while Eristic is arguing for victory, he describes Sophistry as arguing for gain. The Sophist, according to Aristotle, tried to refute by means of fallacy, in order that ha might be thought clever, and so get pupils and make money. Aristotle collects, classifies, and exposes these fallacious refutations; and so exhaustive is he in one short book, that the human mind has hardly invented any fallacious argument since which may not be brought under some head of the Sophistical Refutations. The theory of fallacy was a proper wind up to the Organon, as containing the theory of reasoning in all its branches. Aristotle concludes this part of his system with words full of a just pride in his achievements. It is almost 2 the only place in his writings in which any reference to his own personality can be traced. He says, 3 " In regard to the process of syllogising I found positively nothing said before me; I had to work it out for myself by long and laborious research."

Greece at this time was full of Dialectic and Rhetoric, and the two were closely connected; and it was quite natural for Aristotle (whose aim was to take up and carry out to perfection all that the intellect of his countrymen Lad assayed), next in order after Logic and Dialectic, to deal with Rhetoric. We have already seen (p. 515) that I13 probably wrote his Rhetoric immediately after the main books of the Organon, but before the Sophistical Refutations. But a distinction must here be added, for it seems pretty j>lain that, after he had written the two first books of his Rhetoric, there was an interval, and that he did not add on the third book 4 for some time afterwards. Many treatises on the same subject had previously been composed, an account of which has been given by Spengel in his Artium Scriptores, 5 or Writers of Arts of Rhetoric, a work professing to replace, as far as might be, the lost book called Swaywyr) T^XVUV, attributed, rightly or wrongly, to Aristotle. It is a curious fact that one of these earlier systems of Rhetoric has been preserved for us among the works of Aristotle, having been long attributed to him on account of a spurious letter prefixed to it, and purporting to be from Aristotle to his former pupil, Alexander the Great. Hence the treatise got its name of Rhetoric, addressed to Alexander. But the investigations of scholars 6 show conclusively that this work could not luive been written by Aristotle, that with great probability it may be attributed to Anaximenes, the historian and rhetorician, and that it was written between 340 and 330 B.C., only a few years before the composition of Aristotle's treatise. The -work itself is representative of the school of the Sophistical Rhetoricians, and abounds in those tricks of procedure 7 which gained their bad name for the Sophists, and which drew forth the reprobation both of Plato and Aristotle. Plato, 8 indeed, identified rhetoric with trickery, and refused to countenance the study of it. Aristotle, who often exhibits less moral earnestness, but greater intellectual breadth than Plato, thought it necessary that this, like other intellectual fields, should be exploited. He thought, 9 amongst other reasons, that unless this were done, truth and justice would sometimes be left deprived of proper representation and support. He repudiates the practice of the earlier rhetoricians, who had based their " Arts " entirely on appeals to the passions; and in a large and manly way he proceeds to develop all the various points which an orator must keep in view, and to indicate all the kinds of knowledge which he must acquire in order to be master of his profession. In so doing, Aristotle has displayed his extraordinary power of exhausting any subject to which he gave his mind. Hardly anything of importance on the subject of Rhetoric has been added to what he wrote. Take the most powerful and subtle specimens of modern oratory, for instance, Shakspeare's speech of Mark Antony over the body of Caesar, and you will find the rationale of every telling point set forth by anticipation in the Rhetoric of Aristotle. His work contains some few Greek technicalities, for instance, the doctrine of the Enthymeme, 10 or rhetorical syllogism, on the precise nature of which commentators are not agreed. But the main bulk of the treatise consists of a rich collection of remarks on human nature and life, applicable to all periods. In the wisdom and knowledge of the world which it exhibits, Aristotle's Rhetoric might be compared with tha Essays of Lord Bacon. And it might be compared with them also in this respect, that a bad and Machiavelian use might certainly be made of some of the suggestions which it contains, though Aristotle professes only to give them to be employed in the interest of truth and justice. The third book, on Style, is excellent so far as it goes, but it is less exhaustive and universally applicable than the former books, which treat of the matter of speeches.

Rhetoric was said by Aristotle n to be allied, on the one hand to Dialectic, on the other hand to Ethics; and, accordingly, he seems to have gone next to the exploration of the latter subject. At all events he wrote the Nicomachean Ethics later than the Rhetoric. When we compare the two treatises together we are struck with the growth of mind which has taken place between them. The Rhetoric is full of ethical definitions of happiness, pleasure, virtue, friend ship, and the. like. But in the Ethics these are all remodelled, and made far deeper and more exact.

The Nicomachean Ethics was, perhaps, the first of Aristotle's extant works which entered upon the matter of know ledge, as distinct from the theory of the reasonings by which knowledge is obtained, and from the theory of the statement by which knowledge may be best set forth. The moral system herein contained differs from the ethics of Plato, first, in its more accurate psychological analysis, in distinguishing the will from the intellect, and in making virtue to consist in a formed state of the will, rather than

[22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] in wise insight; secondly, in being disconnected from any assumption, or theory, of the immortality of the soul, from all that we should call "Faith." Whether or not Aristotle denied a future life is another question to be considered later. But at all events he constructed ethics independently of such a doctrine. On the other hand, his system differs from the modern point of view, in that he asks, not, What is right] what is our duty? or what is the ground of moral obligation] but, What is the chief good for man 1? In order to answer this question, he calls in the aid of his metaphysical forms of thought, 1 such as the doctrine of the Four Causes, and of Actuality and Potentiality. From these he deduces that the chief good for man must consist in something which is an End in itself, and that it must be found in the actuality of the human powers. It is a weak point in the system that, instead of at once recognising the law of moral obligation as the deepest thing in man, it introduces 2 the idea of virtue and morality in a dry logical way, saying that the chief good for man must be the actuality of his powers according to their own proper law of excellence (Kara r^v ot/ceiW dper-^v). Having in this colourless and neutral way brought in the term dpe-n; = excellence or virtue, Aristotle divides it, in relation to man, into moral and intellectual. The part of his work which treated of intellectual excellence is lost, or was left unwritten. His discussion on moral excellence or virtue is full of interest. Its salient points are -first, the doctrine oi the formation of habits or states of mind; second, the doctrine of "the mean," as the essential determinator of virtue; third, a brilliant analysis of the qualities and characters which were reckoned either as cardinal or secondary virtues in Greece. On Aristotle's doctrine of "the mean" a word must be said. Objection has been made to it in modern times, on the ground that it sets up a merely quantitative difference between virtue and vice. But Aristotle's point of view was thoroughly Greek, it was based on the analogy of Art. When we speak of actions being "right" or "wrong" the Greeks spoke of them as being "beautiful" ( K aXa) or " ugly "(alcrxpa). In all Greek art and literature the great aim was to avoid the "too much" and the "too little," and in this way to attain perfection. Aristotle only followed Greek feeling, and the lead of Plato, 3 in applying the same idea to morals. It might, indeed, be urged that this idea of " the mean," of "neither too much nor too little," is a negative and merely regulative conception, and that it does not suffice to explain the moral beauty of the phenomena which Aristotle had in view. For instance, he describes the brave man 4 consciously meeting death for a worthy object, and consciously sacrificing life and happiness, and much that he holds dear, because he feels that it is " beautiful " to do so. But, so far as we can learn from Aristotle, the "beauty" here consists in exhibiting neither too much nor too little boldness, but the exact mean. In this there is obviously something inadequate; but the fault seems to lie, not so much in laying down "the mean" as the law of beauty, but rather in not going beyond the identification of the morally admirable with the beautiful. This leaves each moral action, or course of conduct, to be judged of as a work of art. The proportions in each case are relative, but he who can judge aright will feel the harmony or otherwise of the details. With this artistic and somewhat superficial conception of morality, Aristotle is, in his own way, an intuitionist. He thinks 5 that we have a sense (See) for moral beauty, but that this sense exists in perfection in the wise man (<poVi/^os), to whom in all casca must be the ultimate appeal.

But the whole question of man's moral nature is really subsidiary in the Ethics of Aristotle. His question is, What is the chief good for man? and the answer to this question is, It must consist in the evocation and actuality of man's highest faculty, namely, the Reason. Thus, the highest happiness is to be found in contemplation and speculative thought; the joys of the philosopher are beyond compare. A satisfaction of an inferior kind is to be found in the exercise of the moral virtues. Such is, in brief, the view which Aristotle gives of human life. He excludes religion from his consideration of the subject, though his disciple, Eudemus, 6 in restating his conclusions, tries to introduce it. The same question, What is the summum bonum for man] has been answered in somewhat similar terms, in modern times, by Spinoza. 7

The concluding paragraphs of the Nicomachean Ethics form the prelude and introduction to the Politics of Aristotle. Neither virtue nor happiness, 8 he says, can be attained by the individual separately. Moral development and the realisation of our powers (erepyeia) require as external conditions a settled community, social habits, the restraint and protection of laws, and a wisely-regulated system of public education. Man is by nature a political creature; he cannot isolate himself without becoming either less or more than man (^ 6-rjpiov?} $tos). Thus the state is a prime necessity to man, and, indeed, the state is prior in idea to the individual, that is to say, the normal conception of man is of man in a state of civilisation, and this implies beforehand the conception of a state. On these grounds Aristotle went on from his Ethics to the composition of his Politics. Some little time, 9 however, may have elapsed between the two works. This is suggested by the mature and free handling given to ethical questions when they occur in the Politics. Aristotle, with his usual tendency to seek a solid basis of experiences for his theories, may, in this interval, have been engaged in making that remarkable collection called the Constitutions (noAn-eTai), which, according to Diogenes Laertius (v. 27), contained a description and history of the constitutions, manners, and usages of 158 states, and of which numerous fragments 10 remain. However this may be, the Politics, as we possess them, are full of learning and information. After a preliminary dissertation on the family as a unit in, the state, they give a critical history of previous philosophical theories of politics, and an examination of some of the chief existing constitutional systems, before proceeding to the statement of Aristotle's own view. The treatise is unfinished; in Bekker's edition it breaks off in the middle of Aristotle's theory of education (book viii.) Some have thought that this unfinished book was put last by some editor because it was unfinished, but that it originally stood earlier in the treatise, and that the commonly received order of the books should be transposed as follows: i. ii. iii. vii. viii. iv. vi. v. It is forcibly argued 11 that a better

[33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] logical order for the subject matter of the entire treatise is thus provided; book i. being preliminary on the family, book ii. being critical of previous theories and existing constitutions, books iii. vii. viii. giving Aristotle's own conception of an ideal state (unfortunately not concluded in the raost interesting part of all), books iv. vi. v. forming a return from the ideal point of view to practical statesmanship, and suggesting remedies for the different evils apparent in the actual Governments of Greece. Suffice it, however, to say that the Politics of Aristotle have come down to us in a fragmentary condition, not carrying out nil that their author had intended, and probably never having received his last hand. The contents of this work r.re interesting, first, from an antiquarian point of view, as throwing a flood of light on Grecian history; secondly, from the knowledge of human nature and the wise remarks applicable to all times with which they abound. On the other hand, Aristotle's considerations are too much confined to Greek states, that is, to states on an extremely small scale, to allow of his political theories being very useful in modern times. Owing to this his Politics have been comparatively little studied. It is said 1 that in the Italian republics, from their resemblance to the Greek states, more attention than elsewhere was paid to this treatise. Aristotle had no political ties; he lived at Athens as a metic, or foreigner, without the rights or duties of a citizen, and thus he was in a position to write, with the utmost impartiality, of political questions. But his statesmanship does not appear to have extended to what we should call the "balance of power," by which national existence might be preserved and guaranteed. He limited his view to the well-being of each little state within itself, though he probably would not have objected to, and perhaps even contemplated, the hegemony of Macedonia, provided that under this each Greek city were left to carry on its own civic life.

His ideal state contrasts favourably, from a scientific point of view, with that of Plato. For while giving, as we have seen above, great and predominant weight to the idea of the state, he refuses to allow the individual and the family to be absorbed by the state. He thus resists all approaches to that communism 2 which was carried to so great extravagance in the Republic of Plato. The form of government which, ideally speaking, he prefers, is a wise monarchy or aristocracy, some government, in short, in which neither wealth nor numbers shall be permitted to determine everything. In some points it must be confessed that he exhibits a narrow and conservative spirit, and a belief in the divine right of things as they are, which puts him at a disadvantage in comparison either with Plato or with modern views. Thus, despite counter opinions in his own day, he maintains the institution of slavery as based on nature, and even lays it down 3 that it is justifiable to make war upon and reduce to slavery those races who were evidently intended by nature to be subject. In accordance with his physiological system, he treats woman 4 as stunted man, fixed by nature in a position of inferiority; and, therefore, he resists Plato's proposals for the emancipation and improved education of women. And by a third mis application of his favourite conception of " nature," he denounces interest 5 as unnatural, money being a mere instrument of exchange, whereas interest unnaturally increases it. These specimens of backwardness of thought all occur in the first book of the Politics, and may serve to show how much " Truth is the daughter of Time," and into what weaknesses the strongest individual minds may fall on questions not yet sufficiently ventilated and sifted by time. From his unfinished theory of education 6 in the eighth book of the Politics, Aristotle was led on to the composition of his work On Poetry. This also is a fragment, and while promising 7 to treat of tragedy, comedy, and epic poetry, it treats only of tragedy, adding a few brief remarks on epic poetry, and omitting comedy altogether. Aristotle, when he wrote it, had not yet written the third book of his Rhetoric* and he had not yet got the division of the two subjects clear in his niiiid; for he introduces into his fragment On Poetry observations on style, and even on grammar, which would have been more appropriate elsewhere.

His account of tragedy is a profound piece of aesthetic philosophy. By implication he defends tragedy against Plato, who had wished to banish the drama from his ideal republic, as tending to make men unmanly. In his celebrated definition of tragedy, 9 Aristotle says that, " by pity and fear, it effects the purification of such feelings. On the exact meaning of these terms a lively discussion 10 has taken place in Germany. The question is, whether purification" (/<a$apcris) has a moral significance, such as was associated with the term in the Greek " mysteries," or whether it is a purely medical metaphor, and means simply " purging." In the Politics (viii. 7, 3) Aristotle has used the same term (Ka$apcris) in reference to the effect of certain kinds of music, and had promised to give a fuller explanation of it in his treatise On Poetry; but this promise is unfulfilled, and we have rather to go back to the Politics 11 as affording most light on the subject. The result of the discussion seems to be that K<x$apcris is a medical term, and that Aristotle's meaning is that tragedy, by causing the feelings of pity and fear to "operate" pleasurably, relieves 12 the moral nature of a certain burden. We must regret, however, that the fuller disquisition on this subject, which he had promised, has not been given. Much stress has been laid, especially by the French, on " the unities " of the drama, as supposed to be prescribed by Aristotle On Poetry. But in reality he attaches no importance to the external " unities " of time and place. In enumerating the differences between tragedy and epic poetry, he says, 13 that "the one generally tries to limit its action to a period of twenty-four hours, or not much to exceed that, while the other is imlimited in point of time." But he does not lay this down as a law for tragedy. The peculiarity of the Greek drama, in which a chorus remained constantly present and the curtain never fell, almost necessitated "the unities," but Aristotle only concerns him self with internal unity, which he says that tragedy must have in common with every other work of art, 14 and which consists in making every part bear an organic relation to the whole, so that no part could be altered or omitted without the whole suffering. This principle, much more valuable than that of "the unities," is habitually

[44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] violated by all but the few first-rate works of fiction of the present day.

The Rhetoric, the Nicomachean Ethics, the Politics, and the fragment On Poetry, make up the sum of Aristotle's extant contributions to "practical" and "productive" philosophy. We have now to follow him into the "speculative" part of his system, consisting of a rich series of physical and physiological treatises. In this department the results arrived at 2200 years ago by Aristotle come into sharp contrast with the achievements of modern science up to the present day. Those who enter upon the comparison are apt to run into one of two extremes,[58]—either to pass undiscriminating eulogies on Aristotle, and to credit him with impossible anticipations of future discovery, or to treat him with undue disparagement, as utterly false in method and puerile in his views of nature. It is only owing to Aristotle's real greatness that such a comparison could for a moment be made, for what, comparatively speaking, could be expected of a philosophy 2000 years old in respect of the sciences of observation and experiment, whose very essence consists in gradual advance from one new vantage point to another 1 To do personal justice to Aristotle, we must conceive, as a matter of fancy, what it would have been if he could have had one of the great modern discoveries imparted to him, the Copernican system, or the law of gravitation, or the circulation of the blood, or the analyses of air and water, or the conservation of energy; if he could have had any modern instrument of observation, such as the telescope or micro scope, or even the thermometer or barometer, placed in his hands. How swiftly would he have used such an advantage! what new and ramifying deductions and inductions he would have made! how radically he would have had modified many of his views! But all this was, of course, impossible. Physical knowledge was in its infancy; Aristotle could only start where his predecessors left off; he laid the foundation of many sciences, and wherever simple observation was adequate, as, for instance, in politics and in some parts of natural history, his achievements were complete and surprising. But for the greater realms of science he had no starting point and no appliances; he could only slightly modify the almost childlike views of the Greeks, and rest content with such unverified hypotheses[59] as seemed to him best to cohere together, and to explain the nature of things. Thus, it is not to be wondered at that he considered the earth to be stationary and the centre of the world, with the seven planets (including as such the sun and moon) moving round it in oblique courses to the left, while the outer heaven or sphere of the stars composed not of perishable matter, but of divine ether he thought to move from left to right, with perfect and regular motion returning on itself, deriving its motion from the encompassing Godhead, -that essence which moves things, but is not moved itself. Such was, according to the belief of Aristotle, the framework of the universe; and the order[60] of his physical treatises corresponds with the filling up of this framework. Of his method it may be said, in one word, that no one was ever more keen than he to make " fact " (TO on) the basis of every theory. It is not to be supposed for a moment that he attempted to explain nature by means of the syllogism. But, on the other hand, the art of experimenting, and the exact quantitative record of observations had not been developed. So Aristotle was often quite destitute of the appropriate " facts " for a particular inquiry, and sometimes deceived in the "facts" upon which he founded. And his training a? a dialectician was in some respects a disadvantage to him, as it led him to depend too much on the evidence of language in forming his theories of nature. The logical order of the physical treatises, and, probably to a great extent, the actual order of their composition, is as follows: 1st, The Physical Discourse, in eight books, forms an introduction to the entire subject. It is, as Hegel called it, "a Metaphysic of Physic." It treats of the Principles of Existence, Matter and Form, Nature, Motion, Time, Space, the Unmoved First Mover, and the Evermoved, i.e., the sphere of the outer heaven. 2c/, The treatise On the Heavens, in four books, naturally succeeds; and Aristotle, thus beginning with the periphery and divinest part of the universe, descends gradually to the region of the material and perishable. In so doing it becomes necessary to him to consider the causes of those changes, that passing into and out of existence, which had no place in the higher region. Therefore, 3d, the treatise On Generation and Destruction, in two books, gives us Aristotle's theory of the Hot and the Cold, and the Wet and the Dry, pairs of opposites, the first pair active, and the second pair passive, which by their combinations and mutual workings produce the four elements (Hot and Dry = Fire, Hot and Wet = Air, Cold and Dry = Earth, Cold and Wet = Water), and form the ground for all natural changes, kth, The Meteorologies, in three books, treat of the region of the planets, comets, and meteors, a region ever full of change and alteration. The fourth book of this treatise does not logically belong to it, for in it Aristotle develops his theory of two exhalations the steamy or wet, and the smoky or dry which, being imprisoned within the earth, produce, the former the metals, and the latter the rocks, and such other minerals as are incapable of being melted. This theory, which seems to be a dim fore shadowing of the doctrine of crystallisation, takes us out of the mid-air below the surface of the earth. It is, therefore, out of place; but almost everything in Aristotle must be looked upon as unfinished. 5th, The treatise On the Parts of Animals, in four books, leads the way to the investigation of organic life. It contains Aristotle's physiological distinction between homogeneous and unhomogeneous sub stances (6/ioto/Aep^ and dvo/xoto/zep-//), i.e., tissues and organs. This distinction, which is recognised still as perfectly valid, gives a scale of ascension from the inorganic to the organic world. First, Heat and Cold, &c., form the simple elements; out of the elements are formed the homogeneous substances or tissues; out of these are formed the organs, out of the organs the organised being. Asa principle of method, Aristotle lays it down[61] that all which is common to the various species of living beings should be discussed before entering upon their specific differences. Therefore, dtth, the treatise On Soul follows next in order, which, as Spengel observes (see note 3), is not to be regarded as a work on psychology in the modern sense, but as a physiological treatise on the soul or vital principle common to all living beings. And next follow, 7th, the so-called Parva Naturalia, which form appendices to the three books On Soul, and treat physiologically of sense and sensation, youth and age, sleep and waking, and other phenomena attaching to life in general. 8th, The short essay On Locomotion of Animals shows how various organs in the Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 2.djvu/581 Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 2.djvu/582 widely from the modern point of view, and which, therefore, are his points of weakness. Much that the world has accepted from him, many a solid mass of wisdom and good sense, to be found in his writings, we have been obliged to pass over in silence. On most subjects Aristotle is no longer an authority, but yet, for many reasons his works are well worth study. First, on account of the important part they have borne in the history of the world. No one who aspires to cultivation can dispense with a historical knowledge of the thought of Europe, and Aristotle is one of the great fountain-heads of that thought. Secondly, if cultivation consists, as has been said, in an acquaintance with all the best productions of the human mind, Aristotle's works, despite their want of style, certainly come among the number. Hegel advocated the study of these works as " the noblest problem of classical philology." The University of Oxford, during the present century, has made a renewed study of Aristotle one of its chief instruments of education, and with great success, as was especially testified to by the late Dr Arnold[62] of Rugby. Aristotle's great knowledge of human nature, exhaustive classification, and clear methods of disentangling a question and dealing with what is essential in it, render many of his works an excellent curriculum for training young men, and fitting them for all the superior business of life. There is a certain dynamical impulse to be derived from Aristotle, independent of all his results and conclusions. The Aristotelian element in thought and knowledge may, perhaps, be summed up as " analytic insight; and this insight arises out of concentration of the mind upon the subject in hand, marshalling together all the facts and opinions attainable upon it, and dwelling on these, and scrutinising and comparing them till a light flashes on the whole subject. Such is the procedure which may be learnt, by imitation, from Aristotle.

The history of the study of the Aristotelian philosophy, since the time of Andronicus, falls under various heads, dealt with elsewhere. It is contained, first, under such names as those of the Greek commentators, Boethus, Nicolas Damascenus, Alexander of ^Egse, Aspasius, Adrastus, Galenus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, lamblichus, Dexippus, Themistius, Proclus, Ammonius, Damascius, David the Armenian, Asclepius, Olympiodorus, Simplicius, and Johannes Philoponus; secondly, under the history of the caliphs of Baghdad, and their encouragement of the translation into Arabic of Greek philosophical works; thirdly, under the names of Avicenna (of Baghdad), and Averroes, and Moses Maimonides (of Cordova), and the history of the controversies to which they gave rise; fourthly, under the name of Thomas Aquinas, and the history of Scholasticism generally; fifthly, under the history of the Renaissance, and of the manifold editions of Aristotle to which the first age of printing gave birth; sixthly, under the names of Ramus and Bacon, and the history of the reaction against scholastic Aristotelianism; seventhly, under the names of Lessing, Hegel, and other great Germans who, within the last hundred years, have revived a genuinely philosophical and critical study of Aristotle.

For the bibliography of Aristotle's works we must refer to the first volume of Buhle's (Bipontine) edition (1791-1800), which contains an enumeration of all the earlier editions, translations, and commentaries. All previous editions of the text of the entire works give way to the recension of Immanuel Bekker (1831-1840), which being supplemented by a volume of Scholia upon Aristotle, edited by Brandis (1836), and a complete index to all the works, compiled by Bonitz (1870), constitutes the great edition of the Prussian Royal Academy. Within the last forty years much admirable work has been done in Ger many in the way of clearing up special questions relating to Aristotle, and introducing correct judgments about his philosophy generally. Perhaps the scholar who, by a mixture of rich learning and penetrating good sense, has deserved best of Aristotle is Dr Leonhard Spengel, to whose papers, contributed to the Royal Bavarian Academy of Munich, we have of ten previously referred. The historians of philosophy, beginning with Hegel's "Lectures," and going on to Brandis, Zeller, Schwegler, and Ueberweg, reflect the progressive opinions about Aristotle of critical and philosophical circles. Many excellent editions of the separate treatises, and many monographs on special points, have performed a subsidiary function. And a good German translation, executed by Stahr, Bender, Karsel, tc., of the works of Aristotle, now nearly complete, has been published at Stuttgart, by Krais and Hoffmann.

No other nation can compare with Germany in recent services towards a knowledge of Aristotle. France has contributed translations of the Physics, De Anima, Parva Xaturalia, Organon, Politics, and Ethics, by Barthelemy St Hilaire, an essay on the Metaphysics, by Ravaisson, and a few less important works. The translations are readable, but cannot be relied on for accuracy in any difficult point. In England the contributions to Aristotelian literature have borne no sort of proportion to the extent to which minds have been educationally imbued with certain of Aristotle's works. The unproductiveness of Oxford in this respect is certainly a matter of reproach to that university. Sir W. Hamilton exhibited great learning in all that concerned Aristotle rather than a true insight into Aristotle himself. Grote's work was conceived in a German spirit, but it was begun far too late in life to have any chance of success. The problem how to translate Aristotle into English has not yet been solved. We have had a translation of the entire works by the not very sane, and very unscholarlike, Thomas Taylor (10 vols., London, 1806-12), which exists only as a curiosity for book collectors. And wo have had the not uncreditable versions of Bohn's Classical Library, but these latter were done to order, and cannot be expected to perform what is in itself so difficult. Mr Poste, perhaps the most thorough of present English Aristotelians, in his Aristotle on Fallacies, gives us rather a condensed paraphrase than a translation, and is often as difficult as the original Greek. The problem is, how to convey, in readable English, a philosophical style, full of technical terms for which we .have no exact representatives. Circumlocution, or paraphrase, becomes necessary; the question is, how to use this with the greatest tact, so as, while conveying Aristotle's exact meaning, to retain some thing of his manner. Perhaps this problem may, in course of time, be solved, if in the meanwhile the study of Greek is not altogether abandoned in England.

The following are works relating to Aristotle which are worthy of consultation, but have not been mentioned in the previous text or notes: Stahr, Aristotelia (2 vols., Halle, 1830-32); Aristoteles bei den Romern (Leipsic, 183i). Biese, Die Philosophic des Aristoteles (2 vols., Berlin, 1835-42). Waitz, Organon (2 vols., Leipsic, 1844-46). Schwegler, Metaphysica (4 vols., Tubingen, 1847-48). Torstrick, De Anima (Berlin, 1862). Meyer, J. B., Dissertatio de Principiis Aristotelis in distribution animalium adhibit is (Berlin, 1854); Aristotelis Thierlatnde: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Zoologie, Physiologie, und alien Philosophic (1855). Spengel, Ucber die Ehetorik des Aristoteles (Munich, 1851). (A GR.)

  1. 1 Inferno, canto iv. 130, sqg>.
  2. 2 The Aristotelian words in modern use come chiefly through Latin renderings of his phraseology. Some of them are -.Maxim = a major premiss; principle, iromprincipium, the translation of Aristotle's apx-n, has the same meaning. Subject (rb iWoKei/xeW) comes from the doctrine of the four causes. So does matter from materies (timber), the Latin for VTJ. So form, end, final cause, &c. Motive is a fossilised confusion, as it should stand for the efficient cause (apxv taxijo-ecos), whereas it really denotes the final cause of action. Faculty (in Universities) represents Aristotle's Svva/j.is = art. Energy is of purely Aristotelian origin, though not quite keeping its philosophic sonse. Actually is from the Latinised form of the same term. So, too, in category and predicament (e.g., " an unpleasant predicament ") we preserve both the Greek and Latin form of an Aristotelian term. Uatnt (in morals) varies a little in meaning from?{. We have also another Jiabit (i.e., "dress") from ix eiv ( see n te 2, p. 515). The mean and the extremes stilllive in modern parlance, and so does the quintessence, or fifth substance beyond the four elements of which the outer heaven, according to Aristotle, was composed. Metaphysics is derived from the name given by his followers to his last treatise, and natural history from his " Histories" or investigations " about animals."
  3. Athencæus, ix. 398. Pliny, H. N., viii. c. 16.
  4. See some remarks in the Edinburgh Review, No. 278, page 525.
  5. The authorities for this story are Strabo (who was the pupil of Tyrannion), xiii. 609; Plutarch, Sulla, c. xxvi.; Porphyry, Vita Plotini, p. 117. It has been much criticised by Stahr, Brandis, Zeller, Bernays, Rose, &c. For the last remarks on the subject see Grote (l. c.), and Sir A. Grant's Ethics of Aristotle, illustrated with Essays and Notes, 3d edition (London, 1874), essay i. pp. 5-18.
  6. Aristotle, vol. i. pp. 57-62.
  7. See Brandis, Scholia in Arist., p. 28, note.
  8. See Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus (Leipsic, 1863), pp. 20-22, where a list of many such productions falsely ascribed to Aristotle is given.
  9. Strabo, xiii. 609, says that all they did was θέσεις ληκυθίζειν.
  10. Ibidem.
  11. Topica, i. 1-3.
  12. See Cicero, Epist. ad Famil., t. ix. 23, where he speaks of his three books De Oratore as "a dialogue in the style of Aristotle," and Epist. ad Atticum, xiii. xix., where he says that he has copied Aristotle "who in his dialogues always assigns to himself the leading part in the conversation." This shows that the dialogues of Aristotle were very different from those of Plato, and were probably expository and dogmatic, and not at all dramatic.
  13. Arist. Pseudepigraphus, pp. 23-26.
  14. These fragments are given collectively in the 5th volume of the Prussian Royal Academy's edition of Aristotle (Berlin, 1870).
  15. 1 See some criticisms upon Grote's account of the Organon, Edinburgh Review, No. 278, pp. 546-9.
  16. 2 " Both Kant and Hegel acknowledge that from the time of Aristotle to their own age, logic had made no progress " (Stahr, in Smith's Diet, of Greek and Roman Biography). The fourth figure was added to the syllogism (uselessly); and Sir W. Hamilton introduced the quantification of the predicate. Voihl tout,
  17. 3 In Plato ffvoyifffj.6i meant a "computation" generally. By a special and technical meaning was given to the word.
  18. 4 Analyt. Prior., i. 30, 3.
  19. 6 ibid., ii. 23, 2-4. See a criticism on this in Professor Bain's Inductive Logic (London, 1870), chap. i. 2.
  20. 6 See The Logic of Science; a Translation of the Post. Analyt. of Aristotle, with Notes and Introduction, by E. Poste (Oxford, 1850).
  21. 7 See, e.g., the achievements, in this way, attributed to "The admirable Crichton," so late as about 1580 A.D.
  22. 1 A controversy on the justice of the reproaches of Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, &c., against the Sophists, was initiated by Grote in vol. viii. of his History of Greece, and continued in his subsequent works on Plato and Aristotle. On the other side, see Prof. Jowett's Dialogues of Plato translated (vol. iii. p. 449, sqq.)
  23. * Another exception is in Eth. Nic. i. 6, where he refers to the fact of Plato having been his friend.
  24. 3, Mr . Poste in his Aristotle on Fallacies, p. 95, translates the words, trtpl TOV a-vo-yl<-<r6a.t, as if they meant "on dialectic" generally. But the general opinion is, that Aristotle was here referring to his having worked out the forms of the syllogism.
  25. * Book iii. opens with the same words with which book ii. had concluded. This looks as if Aristotle had returned to the subject after tin interval, having forgotten the exact form of what he had before written. This book (c. i. 10) quotes the treatise On Poetry, which must have been written in the meantime.
  26. * L. Spengel, Zwaiuy^Ttx*, sive Artium Scriptores, &c. (Stutt gart, 1823).
  27. 6 See An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, by E. M. Cope, &c. (London, ] 367), pp. 401-414, where the evidence on this point is briefly EUUllLCd up.
  28. 7 75., p. 457, sqq.
  29. 8 Goryias, p. 465, &c
  30. 9 KhcL, i. 1, 12.
  31. nexpressed. See Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, vol. i. p. 3 qq.; Mr Cope's Introduction, p. 103, sqq.; and Crete's Ar., voL i. 91, sqq.
  32. 11 Rhet., I. 2, 7.
  33. 1 See Grant's Ethics, vol. i. essay 4.
  34. 2 Eth. Nic., i. 7, 15.
  35. 3 Plato's term for the law of the beautiful was Fl-ilebus, pp. 23-27, and Grant's Ethics, essay 4.
  36. 4 Eth. Xic., iii. 9, 4.
  37. 1 Se Politics, i. 2, 12.
  38. 6 See Fritzschius, Eudemi Rhodii Ethica (Ratisbon, 1851), p. 40 note, p. 261, note; and Grant's Ethics, essay 1.
  39. 7 De Intellcctus Emendations, ii. 13, 14. The highest good (says Spinoza) is to arrive at a state consisting in knowledge of the union which the mind has with the whole of nature, and to be able to enjoy that state in common with other individuals.
  40. 8 Eth. Nic., x. 10, 8-23; Pol., L 2, 8, 9.
  41. 9 Spengel thinks that "the Politics were written long after the Ethics."
  42. 10 These, as collected and annotated by C. F. Neumann, are given in Bekker's Oxford edition of Aristotle.
  43. 11 See M. Barthelemy St Hilaire's Politique cC Aristotle (Paris, 1837); Spengel, " Ueber die Pol. des Ar." (Abhand. dcr Bayerisch. Akad., 1849); Nickes, De Arist. Polit. Lib. (Bonn, 1851); and MrCongrcvc a Pol. of Ar. (London, 1855, 1874).
  44. 1 Soe Mr Congreve, Pol. of Ar., introduction, p. xxiii.
  45. 2 Pol., ii. 1, 3; 5, 28.
  46. 3 Pol., i. 8, 12.
  47. 4 Pol., i. 13, 7-11. Cf. A celebrated passage on the characteristics cf females, Hist. Animal., ix. 1.
  48. 5 Pol, i. 10, 4.
  49. 6 See an interesting summary of Aristotle's views on this subject, National Education in Greece, in the ith Century B.C., by A. S. Wilkius, (London, 1873), pp. 135-167.
  50. 7 Poet., vi. 1.
  51. 8 See note 4, p. 517.
  52. 9 Po2t.,i. 2.
  53. 10 See Aristoteles ilber Kunst, besonders tiler Tragddic, von Dr J. H Reinkens (Vienna, 1870), pp. 78-167, in which the controversy is summarised.
  54. 11 Besides the passage above quoted, there is another place in the Pol. where the terms larpda and &KOS are used to express the relief of the passions procured by indulging them, Pol., ii. 7, 11, 12.
  55. 12 Pol., viii. 7, 5, traffi ytyvfffOai -rtva KaOapfftv Kal Kov<pifff?<ii fj.f6 T)5ovf)r.
  56. 13 Poet., v. 8.
  57. 14 Poet., viii. 4.
  58. This subject may be studied in Mr Lewes's Aristotle, a Chapter from the History of Science, referred to in note 5, p. 511. Mr Lewes quotes some of the principal eulogies upon Aristotle's scientific merits. He himself affords an instance of the opposite extreme, being in many points too hard upon Aristotle.
  59. There are some interesting remarks on the position of a Greek philosopher of the 4th century B.C. in relation to physical science, in Professor Jowett's Dialogues of Plato, translated (Oxford, 1871), vol. ii. p. 503, sqq. in the introduction to the "Timreus."
  60. 3 See Dr Leonhard Spengel's paper on this subject, Abhandlungender Philos.-philol. Klasse der Bayerischen Akademie, 5th vol. 2d div. p. 142 (Munich, 1849).
  61. De Part. Anim., i. 1, 4-7.
  62. See The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D.D., &c., by A. P. Stanley, &c., vol. ii., letter 274.