History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 4/Chapter 21

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CHAPTER XXI.

OPERATIONS AGAINST RAYON, VILLAGRAN, AND OSORNO.

1813.

Siege of Cerro del Gallo — The Poisoned Well — Insurgent Forces and their Tactics — Movements in Guanajuato — Sway of the Villagranes — Their Sudden Fall — Huasteca Campaign — Osorno and his Territory — Terreño's Military Promenade — Osorno Irrepressible — Administration of Cruz in New Galicia — Frontier Operations — Chapala Lake and its Rovers — Division of Provincias Internas — Lara's Exploits in Texas — A Flicker in the Orient.

The viceroy had just completed his dispositions for the campaign in the central provinces when news came of the several disasters to the arms of Rayon's colleagues, who were likewise torn by discord, and almost ruined by their imprudence and inefficiency. The purposes of Calleja were thus already half accomplished by his enemies, and he resolved to complete the work by demolishing their centre of operations at Tlalpujahua before it could recover from the recent blows, directing at the same time a force against the Villagranes, and keeping close watch on Osorno, in order to prevent coöperation.

The movement against the Rayon brothers was intrusted to Castillo y Bustamante, who set out from Toluca toward the end of April with somewhat over a thousand men, leaving Colonel Angulo y Guardamino in charge of this section.[1] On May 3d he camped in sight of the famous Cerro del Gallo, at the foot of which lay Tlalpujahua, the centre of a flourishing silver-mining district.[2] The hill itself was surrounded by a ravine, and so difficult of access as to be regarded as impregnable. The summit presented a level expanse of about 2,000 feet by 600, which commanded all adjoining heights, and was enclosed by a strong wall with seven bastions and a deep moat.

Notwithstanding the advantages of the position, Rayon thought it best to remove to a safer distance with funds, archives, printing-press, and other valuables, leaving the defence to his brother Ramon, who had hurried to the spot from Guanajuato. He had hardly gone half a league, however, on the morning of the 5th, when the royalists observed the movement and set out in pursuit. Rayon's small escort was quickly dispersed and most of his baggage captured, his own narrow escape being due to the speed of his horse.[3]

The fortress was now closely invested, receiving a sharp bombardment, especially from a battery on the adjoining hill of Los Remedies.[4] A number of bands had by this time collected in the neighborhood, but their intention of harassing and throwing in reënforcements received a check in the defeat of the main body under García and Sanchez.[5] On the following day,[6] a determined assault was made on the hill in three divisions, partly under cover of the battery. But the difficulties of the movement proved even greater than had been expected; and after a long struggle it had to be abandoned with considerable loss,[7] amidst the triumphant shouts of the besieged. The bodies of the slain were hurled with suspicious zeal into a crumbling mining shaft, hitherto serving as an occasional water source. Shortly afterward Ramon Rayon was puzzled by the mysterious warning of an Indian, "Beware of gachupin blood," the meaning of which presently appeared. The repulse had so discouraged Castillo that he sent to ask for reënforcements. Just then a point was discovered for another battery, which not only permitted a closer approach to the stronghold, but covered the communication between it and the river. This unexpected manœuvre reduced the garrison for its water supply to the mining shaft now poisoned with corpses.[8] The warning was no longer doubtful, yet the water had to be drank, to some extent, quenching thirst as well as hope. So far the garrison had felt confident, cheered by their successes, and sustained by abundance of food and ammunition; but an irresistible foe had joined against them. Thirst, and perhaps prudence hitherto neglected, prevailed over vainglory. During the night of March 12th Ramon Rayon stole silently from the place, unobserved by the besiegers, whose attention was attracted by a series of prearranged explosions.[9]

The following morning the silent walls with twenty four spiked guns smiled calmly on the enraged Castillo, who sent three parties in pursuit by different routes, toward Irimbo, Huichapan, and Maravatío, but with little result. On their return, however, the cavalry, under Aguirre, came upon a small band led by Colonel Valdespino, which was totally destroyed, and Filisola razed the fortifications at Cerro de Nadó, with all the storehouses and the valuable factories for arms.[10] This Filisola figures prominently in after years under Iturbide and Santa Anna; and a fellow-lieutenant in this campaign, Miguel Barragan, was the one who a dozen years later received the surrender of the last Spanish stronghold on the North American continent, and who soon after, as president of the republic, raised to the supreme rank in the country a descendant of Montezuma II., in the person of his wife. Such were the men now foremost in seeking to extinguish the dawning independence.

The capture of Cerro del Gallo involved the destruction of the best machinery possessed by the revolutionists for the manufacture of arms and ammunition, and its fall spread no little dismay. The reputed impregnable capital lost, and that within a few days, to a handful of men, and the president a fugitive, were disasters more discouraging than almost any previous defeat, and preceded the advancing royalists like an ominous blight.[11]

Castillo now marched to Zitácuaro, which Ramon Rayon had entered in company with his brother, only to abandon it on the approach of the royalists. He thereupon took up a position at Maravatío, thus assuring communication between Valladolid and the capital,[12] leaving the commander of the province to continue the pursuit. Notwithstanding his forlorn condition as fugitive, President Rayon moved with all the splendor he could muster, exacting pompous receptions and profound homage, and disdaining not even such titles as prince and liberator. In August he reached Puruándiro, and news arriving of his wife's accouchement at Huétamo, where her family had sought refuge, the town celebrated the incident in truly royal style, with salvoes, illuminations, balls, and other demonstrations.[13] The era of republican simplicity had not yet arrived.

Ramon Rayon had meanwhile taken another direction in pursuance of his newly received dignity as comandante del Norte, with special control of the southern part of Guanajuato, Doctor Cos being confirmed in the charge of the northern. About the same time García Conde, the royalist commander of the province, and fully acquainted with its features and people, was replaced by Brigadier Sotarriba, a man to whom this field was comparatively unknown. The change in itself caused an interruption in the campaign, which gave respite to the insurgents and permitted them to recuperate. Ramon Rayon now retrieved himself in a skirmish at Chaparaco near Zamora, wherein he displayed strategic skill of no mean order.[14]

This skill, unfortunately, was seldom brought into practice when most needed; that is, in more important engagements. In such cases as involved a combination of forces, the rivalry between the different subordinate chiefs and their assumption of independence in control of their men, interfered with the plans and orders of the commander-in-chief, so that their ineffectiveness must not be too hastily attributed to him. Another still greater source of weakness was the want of discipline. The leaders lacked the power, or the inclination—perhaps both—to enforce it to any considerable extent. Nor did they themselves, as a rule, possess the experience or ability to organize troops. They were little better than the raw recruits who swelled their continually broken and dispersed ranks, wherein the wide gaps were filled with the first material that came to hand. Eager for military rank, which depended largely on the number of men enlisted, the value of the force was of less immediate consideration with them; and so the insurgents remained in altogether too great proportions a mere rabble, who did further injury to their cause by reckless disregard for property, even where retaliation or other outrages were uncalled for.

Ramon Rayon's triumph was of short duration, for at Zacapo a third of his small force was taken with fever, and while thus crippled, a royalist body under Landázuri came suddenly upon him on September 19th. He had barely time to post a handful of men with which to occupy the enemy, while the dragoons carried the sick beyond reach, each horseman taking an invalid on his saddle. He thereupon hastened to place the skirmishers in safety, with the royalists close on their heels—so close, indeed, that his brother, the president, with whom he came up, had to save himself by shooting at the pressing horsemen. Fortunately for them they reached the bridge at the hacienda Zpimiéo slightly in advance of the pursuers, and by destroying it the latter were checked.[15] The Rayons now took different directions, Ignacio going to Uruapan, and Ramon leading his reunited force toward lake Cuitzeo, thence to operate along the course of the Lerma. Sotarriba being soon after called away, the energetic Landázuri remained in command of Michoacan, to the manifest advantage of royalist arms.

North-eastward in Guanajuato the insurgents confined themselves under the direction of Cos more distinctly to guerrilla movements, for which the mountainous country was well adapted. The most successful of the leaders was Matias Ortiz, known from his phlegmatic temperament as the Pachon, a name which acquired an enviable record for daring. A notable achievement was the defeat inflicted on the newly formed royalist regiment Moncada, which under the command of Vicente Bustamante had driven Cos into the fastnesses round Leon, and inflicted no little damage on other bands from its subsequent headquarters at San Felipe. On June 28th, while returning from an expedition with a captured herd, it was surprised and routed with considerable slaughter by Ortiz, Bustamante with six other officers being among the slain. The result was the abandonment of San Felipe, followed by that of several other posts.[16] Francisco Rayon shared in these triumphs by a decided success near San Juan del Rio, in Querétaro, wherein he overwhelmed one detachment at Galindo, and repulsed a larger reënforcement;[17] and his brother Rafael obtained a similar advantage near Celaya.[18]

These movements, however, were becoming more circumscribed as Iturbide, the new commander of the province, extended his energetic operations. Aware of Ramon Rayon's intention to seek the Cuitzeo region, he had in August called on Ordoñez of Querétaro for coöperation, and made a sweep of the Salvatierra district, completing the task by razing the fortifications on the famous lake island of Liceaga. Forces from Michoacan had marched to intercept the insurgents along the south line, who, however, obtained timely information. Orrantia, second to Iturbide, remained for a time in charge at Salvatierra to maintain the advantage, and managed to capture the leader Rubí, who was promptly executed. By a further movement in the direction of Pénjamo, early in October, the proposed reunion there of different insurgent forces was frustrated, and consequently their campaign plan. Similar prompt manœuvres along the east side, from Celaya northward, tended greatly to extend the royalist influence, affirmed as it was by increased activity among the local militia for the protection of their respective districts.[19]

At the same time that Castillo marched against Rayon another expedition moved against the adjoining power represented by the Villagranes, father and son, whose forces were ever threatening the eastern side of the northern highways, and extending their raids into the lake valley. By coöperating with Rayon and other leaders they might have rendered good service to the revolutionary cause, but the latter served them mainly as a cover for their own ambitious views, to exercise sovereign sway in their district, protected by its natural strength and favored by the diversion of royalist arms elsewhere. The efforts of Rayon to stir their patriotism and recall them to duty had proved ineffectual, as we have seen, and the messenger of the president had actually been imprisoned, the apology sent by themselves being a meaningless concession, followed by a smile at Rayon's severe formality in accepting it.[20]

The elder Villagran held out at Zimapan, in the centre of a rich silver region, disposing of men and property very much as he pleased, founding cannon and coining money wherewith to extend and affirm his power, notably to the east, where he claimed control under the pompous title of Julian I., emperor of the Huasteca, before alluded to—a country rejoicing in its fastnesses and in the independent spirit of its people. He had also bent his eyes northward to the Jalpan region, tributary to the Tamain branch of Rio Tampico, and obtained a certain foothold by the aid of his trusty lieutenant Casimiro Gomez, an Indian who figured as colonel and comandante general;[21] but General Arredondo, stationed in the Valle del Maiz, took energetic measures, and in January the intruders were obliged to recross the dividing range.[22] General Rebollo of Querétaro cooperated in the adjoining districts, from Toliman to Hichú, defeating and capturing the well known insurgent Colonel Peralta, and driving off the band of Valenzuela.[23]

Villagran might have succeeded better with the aid of his mountaineers, but for a despotic administration which by no means tended to retain their adherence. At Zimapan his arbitrary disposal of life and property was prompted greatly by the royalist sentiment among the people, who had not only fought stoutly against annexation to his territory, but plotted more than once for liberation.[24] His strength was therefore much less imposing than it appeared on the surface.

The task of humbling him was intrusted to Colonel Cristobal Ordoñez, in charge of the troops stationed at Tula; but a rich convoy from Guanajuato to Mexico required at the time his personal attention. The escort duty was not without effect on the primary object, however, for insurgents were attracted in large force to the upper line of his march, with an eye to booty, only to be effectually repulsed.[25]

Meanwhile Ordoñez' second in command, Pedro Monsalve, assisted by troops from San Juan del Rio, Ixmiquilpan, and other parts, presented himself before Huichapan on May 3d. The whole besieging force not having yet arrived, Chito Villagran, who held control at this place, haughtily rejected the pardon offered, confident in being able to maintain himself till reinforcements should arrive, especially as he had more than once repulsed Monsalve. Strong barricades had been thrown up at the mouth of every street, the church-towers were occupied by armed men, and a few hundred feet south-east of the town rose a well fortified bastion. The assault was made from several directions, however, partly by scaling, partly through breaches, and by the close of the day fort as well as town had been captured, leaving only a remnant of the insurgents in possession of the church-towers till the following morning. Nearly 300 insurgents

HHBHM V4 D552 Campaign in the east.jpg

Campaign in the East.

perished, and 400 were taken prisoners, out of about 2,000, the besieging force reaching nearly the same total.[26] A larger proportion would have escaped, but retreat to the hills had been cut off, and the fugitives had to take a more open road, led by Villagran. Finding the pursuers gaining, the latter struck out for himself, scattering gold pieces to detain the troopers. The Colchian trick availed not, however, for the horse of the Chito had been drugged, and he was caught.[27] This success could be regarded only as a first step in the campaign, for the power of the Villagranes centred in Julian. An arduous fight was in prospect, and rather than sacrifice blood and time the royalists proposed to use their advantage so far toward negotiations, offering pardon and privileges to both if the father would submit. But Villagran the elder was too proud and ambitious to barter his position, even for the life of a son, and with patriotic declamation he declared himself prepared to sacrifice also his other children for his country, even to the unborn ones.[28] "Die with dignity," was the characteristic message to the son, who was thereupon shot in front of his late palace, the head being impaled on the walls.[29]

After due preparation, the royalists passed on toward Zimapan, on May 30th, this time with increased forces under Ordoñez himself. The same day they reached a strongly fortified height on the Rio de los Aljibes, which formed a turn at its foot within a deep ravine. The plan for attack was made with some care, for the place could not be readily assailed;

but after discharging a few shots the insurgents rolled the guns into the chasm and took to flight, amid the detonation of the fired ammunition. Monsalve pursued them, and entered the evacuated Zimapan amidst great rejoicing, for the inhabitants here had ever shown decided royalist sympathies. In this instance they greeted the comers as saviors, declaring that Villagran had threatened to butcher them all and burn the town. There was evidence enough of his ill-will in the desolate surroundings.[30]

Old Villagran, as he was usually known, had occupied a height a few hours' march beyond the town, and fortified it with the thirty pieces of artillery thence withdrawn. When Monsalve appeared in sight on June 1st he was met by a series of heavy volleys and stone showers; yet nothing daunted, the royalists rushed to the assault, inspired greatly by the conduct of Villagran's men so far, and the well known disaffection among them. Indeed, no vigorous resistance was offered, at closer quarters, and on approaching the summit they found the occupants already in full flight, abandoning guns, baggage, and provisions.[31]

Villagran hastened with a mere handful to the hacienda San Juan Amajaque, only to find further progress barred on all sides. In this strait, one of his colonels, named Maya, resolved to save himself by facilitating his capture, which was effected June 13th. A week later he was shot at Huichapan, and his head impaled close to that of his son, a hand being sent to Ixmiquilpan as a warning to his sympathizers.[32] Thus perished the ambitious sovereign of the Huasteca, less through the onslaught of a few hundred royalists than through his own waywardness, lack of skill and prudence in managing the defence, and alienating the devotion of his followers, whom he controlled greatly by fear, sustained by a passionate temperament and immense physical strength. The latter he was rather fond of displaying, both from vanity and a desire to impress people, and on the way to his place of execution he astonished the escort by knocking down a mule which had stepped on his foot.[33]

Few regretted his loss. Immediately after the death of the Chito a revulsion of feeling became manifest in the rapid flow of adherents to the royalists, even by the intimate officers of the Villagranes, such as Casimiro Gomez, who had been prominent in raiding expeditions and outrages on Spaniards. He prudently negotiated for pardon at the head of nearly two thousand Indians, many of them armed with hand grenades for want of muskets. Captain Trejo came in earlier with 400 persons and 27,000 head of animals, and was confirmed in his position, yet subject to José Andauro, an Indian of Zimapan, who had zealously supported the cura Salgado in opposing the revolution.[34] In less devoted districts the royalists are said to have acted with great severity to secure permanent submission.[35]

The advantage gained by Ordoñez was followed up from the coast side by Argüelles and Gonzalez de la Vega, successively commandants at Tuxpan, who in connection with Güitian, long stationed in Huasteca,[36] succeeded in establishing communication between the coast and the interior, and in asserting the supremacy of royalist arms from Tampico to Huauchinango. In the coast region, from Misantla northward, General Rincon figured as leading insurgent, assisted by Father Calderon, Arroyo, Lozano, the Indian Olarte, Bermudez, and others, who could together muster 3,000 followers or more; but with the judicious aid of gun-boats and minor craft the royalists obtained several advantages both by sea and river. The capture of Tecolutla served to cut off supplies for the opponents. Papantla fell in September, Rincon's attempt to recover it proved a failure, and several other discomfitures tended greatly to disorganize insurgent movements. for a time.[37] In the Jalpan districts Bocanegra, and others under orders from Arredondo of the Valle del Maiz, succeeded in enforcing royalist control in a more decided manner, assisted by a number of lately pardoned insurgents, who manifested no little zeal in the pursuit of their late comrades, and in breaking up their haunts and plans.[38]

Nevertheless, the Sierra Gorda and its southern extension presented too many natural advantages for guerrilla warfare, for sudden descents on roads, posts, and fields of supply, with ready and secure retreats, to allow anything like complete restoration of royalist control. José Antonio Villagran, Rafael Polo, Francisco Rayon, Cañas, Atilano, García, and Epitacio Sanchez were among the leaders who here sustained the revolutionary struggle, carrying their operations to the lake shore of Mexico. Anastasio Bustamante, the future president, figured in the ranks of their pursuers.[39]

The main reliance of the insurgents in this quarter was now Osorno, the last of the three central leaders, against whom Calleja directed his opening campaign, and the strongest of them all he proved himself. He occupied the territory south of the Villagranes, and was recognized as chief by nearly all the revolutionary bands scattered from the slopes above Papantla to the plains of Apam, and in irregular sections from below Huamantla northward. Unlike the stern Julian, he possessed admirable traits to sustain his popularity, but displayed the same lack of skill as organizer, and of tactics and prudence as commander-in-chief. When Bustamante, the fugitive elector from Mexico, took up his abode with him in the latter part of 1812, he observed the neglect to utilize the important elements at hand, and was permitted to introduce some order into the administration, to cast artillery, erect a mint, and to discipline the force of some 500 cavalry and infantry kept within call, out of a total of over 3,000 which could be united under Osorno's banner. This interference roused no little jealousy, especially on the part of Vicente Beristain, an artillery officer who wielded a great influence over the leader; and when Bustamante raised his voice against the excessive vandalism so alluring to the bands, it became easy to so direct feeling against him that he took his departure.[40] With him vanished also the lingering hope of Rayon to win Osorno to his side. In January 1813, a royalist party under Rubin de Célis proposed to surprise Zacatlan, which was understood to be poorly prepared for defence; but an intercepted despatch gave warning to Osorno and he hastened to anticipate the movement in reversed order. Although astonished to find their foe before their camp one morning at the hacienda of Mimiahuapam, the royalists boldly sallied to the attack. Osorno fell back as if in flight; but as soon as the cavalry of the pursuers had been separated from the main body he turned and succeeded in routing it. The infantry also could have been annihilated if Osorno had exerted himself. As it was, he allowed it to escape.[41]

Made confident by success, he now proposed to take the offensive and advanced in April against Zacapoaxtla with about two thousand men, chiefly cavalry. The natives of this place had roused his ire by their loud royalist demonstrations, and the expedition was prompted rather by ill feeling and a desire for spoil than by motives connected with the cause.[42] At first an advantage was obtained; but the death of a favorite officer created confusion among the foot-soldiers, the most effective part of the troops for this mountain region, and the opportunity being seized by the opponents, under direction of Valle, the wavering column was routed with loss of the siege artillery. Osorno thereupon retreated, his scattering forces attempting in vain to retaliate for their failure on some of the minor settlements.[43]

This reverse gave no little impulse to the preparations of Conde de Castro Terreño, the new commander in Puebla, to whom had been assigned, among other tasks, the subjugation of Osorno's strongholds. The importance of the undertaking was measured not alone by the opposing forces, but by their dangerous proximity to the Vera Cruz highway; and taught by the failure of Célis, the conde resolved to lead in person the carefully fitted out expedition. On presenting himself before Zacatlan,[44] May 19th, he found the place abandoned by Osorno, who, preferring prudence to glory, had buried his artillery, and retired to a safe distance. Pursuit seemed useless, and after sending out detachments to destroy the fortifications and factories at San Miguel, Tenango, Huamantla, and other places, Terreño returned to Puebla three days later, taking away the discovered guns.

The only resistance met during this military promenade was offered by Arroyo at Huamantla and by the cura Ortega Moro, who with greater rashness than sense bore down upon the advancing expedition with less than a score of followers. The party was cut to pieces, and the cura fell captive, fatally wounded.[45]

No sooner was Zacatlan free from royalists than Osorno reëntered it, and his followers resumed their usual raids southward and into the valley of Mexico. During one of these incursions, Colonel Montaño was overtaken and killed near Calpulalpan by Captain Salceda, commanding some San Luis Potosí dragoons.[46] The colonel was not only a popular leader, but a friend of Osorno, and he resolved to avenge him. A considerable force under Inclan went in quest of Salceda, who was overtaken on the plains of Apam on August 7th, and after a severe conflict, slaughtered with nearly his entire company.[47]

Calleja in his turn burned to retaliate for this and other inflictions, and sent Llorente in the midst of the rainy season with several hundred men, to reënter Zacatlan. This was effected August 23d, with little more than a skirmish, and the fortifications at San Miguel were once more destroyed, the head of Salceda being removed from its impaled position. Llorente thereupon followed Osorno and attacked on the 29th his strong position at Las Mesas, but without decisive effect; for after a fight of seven hours he retired toward Tlasco, and thence back to Apam.[48] Osorno remained master of the situation. The order of Calleja[49] withdrawing from the control of Nueva Galicia both Guanajuato and Michoacan was apparently based on Cruz's former somewhat pretended objections to the responsibility, but rested really on the long-growing hostility between the two leaders, and the desire of the new viceroy to assume direct control wherever possible. Cruz understood the motive, and took it so much to heart as to tender his resignation of the Nueva Galicia command.[50] But the friendship of Venegas, leagued against Calleja, induced the government to retain a man of so recognized ability, partly as a check on the viceroy.[51]

Elated by the confidence expressed in him, Cruz assumed a more independent attitude. He erected a mint at Guadalajara, obtained larger commercial privileges for San Blas, and fostered trade with China, the West Indies, and in other directions, at the expense of Acapulco;[52] developed local manufactures, and formed for himself a long-enduring monument in the public buildings with which he embellished the capital of the kingdom. All this, however, had the effect also of opening the eyes of the people to their resources and strength, and to rouse a spirit of provincialism that failed not to bear fruit in due time. The latter feeling received, moreover, direct encouragement from the continued hostility between Cruz and Calleja.[53]

The energetic measures of Cruz had assisted to confine the revolution in Nueva Galicia to very narrow limits, notwithstanding the dangerous proximity of Miehoacan and Guanajuato. Along these frontiers there were movements of some importance, in the south mainly under the direction of Vargas, who figured as comandante general of the province for Rayon, but the counter-campaign fell rather to the share of Iturbide and Linares or his successor, and in the north a corps of observation served to restrict the incursions toward the Rio Grande from the fastnesses of Nayarit and Acaponeta.[54] Encounters were frequent enough, and for the greater part in favor of the royalists, with their superior arms and discipline, and their possession of nearly all the towns well fortified and provided;[55] but the insurgents aimed here less at winning battles than raiding and harassing; and if less glorious, such operations served at least to keep alive the spirit of resistance and provide means for more effective demonstrations elsewhere.[56]

The most important movement which occupied the province itself was the siege of Mescala rock in Lake Chapala, situated six miles from the northern shore. Roused by certain unjust exactions on the part of Cruz,[57] a number of Indians had taken refuge there to devote themselves to sweet revenge under a revolutionary banner, after having secured arms from surprised convoys, and inflicted some damage on the royalist parties which attempted to suppress their first demonstrations.[58] Protected by their distance from shore and by the precipitous sides of the rock, they felt secure in their retreat, and could devote their whole attention to descents upon the inimical settlements along the lake shore, choosing their own time and place and keeping them in constant alarm. These well planned operations were under the direction of the presbyter Marcos Castellanos, assisted by Encarnacion Rosas and José Santa Ana.[59]

HHBHM V4 D563 Chapala lake.jpg

Chapala Lake.

Cruz directed a considerable force to guard the shore, under Lieutenant-colonel Linares, while suit able vessels could be built at San Bias for a formal assault. During a reconnoitring tour in February, undertaken by Linares himself in seven large canoes, he came in conflict with the islanders, and succumbed with several officers and twenty-three men, three canoes only regaining the shore.[60] Equally unsuccessful was the main attack in June, under General Negrete with about five hundred men. For this the new large boats from San Blas were brought out, some lashed together to sustain cannon. Paralyzed by stone showers from the rock, the lumbering squadron became an easy target for the light active canoes. A large number of the assailants were killed, two boats were captured with cannon and ammunition, and Negrete had a narrow escape, with severe wounds.[61]

Royalist operations were after this reduced to little more than a defence of the shore line from the head quarters at Tlachichilco, supplemented by a blockade for cutting off supplies which was maintained by a cruising flotilla.[62] The occupants of the rock numbered at this time about a thousand, including 300 women and children.[63] In the adjoining annexed province of Zacatecas, Victor Rosales figured as the leading revolutionary spirit, maintaining himself very well with nearly three hundred men, despite the close watch kept by several cavalry divisions. Assured that the city of Zacatecas was ripe for revolt, he ventured in September to attack it, and penetrated to the very barracks, capturing two cannon; but the royalist commander, Brigadier Irizarri, had received warning in time to summon aid. Rosales' small force was soon obliged to retreat, and on reaching the open field it was intercepted and dispersed with considerable loss,[64] the remnants restricting themselves henceforth to minor raiding expeditions.

Nueva Galicia was not the only command that suffered disintegration with the elevation of Calleja. The provincias interims were divided into two comandancias generales, de Occidente and de Oriente, the former retaining the original provinces save Texas and Coahuila, which together with Nuevo Leon and Nuevo Santander, hitherto under the viceroyalty, formed the Oriente section. The command of the Occidente, with headquarters at Chihuahua, passed in course of the year from Salcedo to Alejo García Conde, whose brother Diego became intendente successively of Zacatecas and Durango.[65] That of the Oriente, for which Monterey became the seat, was bestowed on Simon de Herrera, late governor of Nuevo Leon, and a friend of Calleja. The change arose less from the increase of population and material development than from a military standpoint, in view of the need for energetic suppression of hostile movements. The north-west section suffered rather from the usual Indian hostilities,[66] but eastward the revolutionary spirit had again sprung into alarming prominence. After the suppression of the insurrection in Nuevo Santander, Bernardo Gutierrez de Lara, an inhabitant of the town of Revilla, and attached to the revolutionary cause, had sought an asylum in the United States, there to seek aid in behalf of his cause and to await developments. The attention accorded him by the government at Washington, and its known intentions regarding the Texan frontier, created no little alarm in New Spain,[67] and the insurgents grew correspondingly elated, loudly announcing in March that a large army was already marching to their assistance.[68]

Lara failed, however, to effect anything with the government, and the jubilation of his compatriots was founded merely on the march of some four hundred and fifty men, partly filibusters from the United States, with whom he had in the latter part of 1812 begun operations in Texas. He took possession successively of Nacogdoches, Trinidad, and Espíritu Santo, and with the coöperation of the Indians drove back the advancing forces of Governor Manuel Salcedo and Colonel Herrera, the proposed commander of the provincias internas de Oriente. In April following both these officers were captured and executed in retaliation for their share in the arrest of Hidalgo. A representative government was established at Béjar, which held undisputed sway over the province, and prepared even to extend it southward.

Warned of the danger Arredondo, stationed lately in the valley del Maiz, hastened of his own accord to counteract it, gathering troops and material on his way through Nuevo Santander. His independent action might not have pleased Venegas. Calleja, however, not only approved but appointed him to the comandancia general vacated by Herrera's death, and sent the newly arrived Estremadura regiment to Tampico to take the place of the departed forces. Colonel Elizondo was sent in advance to prepare the way, but allowed himself to be engaged in battle and routed. Two months later, in August, Arredondo himself approached Béjar with eighteen hundred men, whereof two thirds were mounted, and retaliated by inflicting a crushing defeat on Alvarez de Toledo, a Spanish naval officer who had managed to supplant Lara. Of the prisoners a large number were executed, especially people from the United States, who were outlawed and shot wherever encountered, for their so called perfidy against a confiding government. The later dictator Santa Anna won his earliest distinction in this field, where a score of years later humiliation overtook him.

The province was quickly cleared of insurgents, and after appointing as governor Cristóbal Dominguez, Arredondo returned to Monterey, there to establish the seat of his comandancia.[69] And so vanished also the hope of any aid from the United States, for the people there made no movement to interfere in behalf of the persecuted adventurers in Texas. The agent accredited by Rayon to Washington and other places for interesting foreign governments in the cause failed to obtain even means for departure.[70] The precaution of Calleja in sending a regiment to Tampico proved most opportune, for the insurgent Herrera was rousing the Indians of Nuevo Leon before Arredondo had crossed into Texas; and assisted by Marcelino García and others, with hordes of Lipanes and Comanches,[71] he overran the whole region from San Cárlos northward. Monterey was entered, and the commandant Sada would have had to surrender the last intrenchment but for the approach of the Spanish regiment under Armiñan, acting as governor of Nuevo Santander. The latter, in connection with Diez de Bustamante, governor of Nuevo Leon, Felipe de la Garza, sent by Arredondo, Perea and Melgares from the Occidente provinces, now pursued the insurgents hotly. García fell; Herrera among others was captured and shot; and the rest dispersed, leaving the revolution wholly suppressed throughout the Oriente.[72]

 

 
  1. Assisted notably by Captain Concha, former subdelegado for Jacualpan, who, after serving under Trujillo at Valladolid, confined himself to campaigning in the Toluca Valley, gaining the rank of lieutenant-general. Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 455.
  2. Burkart describes it at length as he saw it some years later. Aufenthalt, i. 141 et seq. The town itself had, at the end of the revolution, 4,000 inhabitants, and the dependent villages 8,000 more.
  3. The greatest loss was 'la petaca del dinero que llevaba 5,000 pesos en oro y plata, los sellos y algunos papeles.' Diario Rayon, 633.
  4. Bustamante places the besieging force at 2,000, with 8 cannon, the camps numbering 4. Cuad. Hist., ii. 279.
  5. The royalist report places it at 400 or 500 cavalry, which were put to flight with little effort.
  6. The 8th, according to the royalists.
  7. 'Esta accion general que duró hasta la oracion de la noche.' Castillo y Bustamante's Report, Gaz. de Mex., 1313, iv. 582.
  8. Three hundred, according to the Diario Rayon, 638-9. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 28, gives the Indian's warning as 'Te morirás, señor, si bebes el sangre del cachopin,' and adds that the soldiers, reduced to the shaft supply, lost courage in drinking the bloody water.
  9. 'Volando su parque de artilleria,' says the royalist account. Cárlos M. Bustamante alludes to the useful artillery inventions of Ramon Rayon, which greatly assisted the defence.
  10. The Cerro lay not far from Temascalcingo. See Filisola's report in Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 588, with inventory of arms.
  11. In the lengthy report of Castillo Captain García Revilla is praised for his success in finding the point for cutting off the water supply. Food was within the fortress in large quantities. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 579-84. Bustamante bases his account on a special diary, which does not appear very reliable, however. The royalists, for instance, are said to have appeared before the cerro on April 20th. The dates in Diario de Rayon appear safer.
  12. Marshal Saucedo, Inspector Izaguirre, and others were overtaken on the way and shot. Castillo reported from Maravatío June 17th. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 641-2. Ignacio Rayon had observed the operations against Cerro del Gallo from a distant summit.
  13. The wife is spoken of in the Diario, 644, as 'la Exma Sra ministra Dª Mariana Martinez,' the title referring to Rayon's ministerial office under Hidalgo. He himself is called the prince. The secretary is lavish with such terms. Even Alaman sneers at this taste for show and parade among these early revolutionists.
  14. He captured threescore horses and some arms, and claimed the slaughter of 'much more' than a score of men, to which he added by executing six out of eight prisoners. The artillery captain Ruelas distinguished himself for activity, and Echeverria and Colonel Lobato for bravery, the latter being rewarded with the rank of brigadier. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 362-4.
  15. In Diario de Rayon the bridge is called la Alberca. The pursuers are placed at 1,000 men. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 647; but Landázuri reports that he led 300 cavalry and 200 infantry, with four guns, from Pátzcuaro, where Robledo remained in charge with 160 men. The insurgents are placed at 800 for the main body, while Bustamante allows a less number for the total. Their loss is given at 100 dead and wounded, the royalists acknowledging only a few wounded. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 1167-70; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 364.
  16. Ortiz surprised one at San Bartolo in July, and in August he defeated a party under Ignacio Juarez, near Villela. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 298.
  17. From San Juan, of 100 dragoons. The eomandante at Galindo fell with 20 men, and 260 animals and some money were captured. Diario de Rayon, 646.
  18. At the hacienda San Antonio, which he captured in October in connection with the Indian chief Hilario Rodriguez, taking 500 animals and a quantity of supplies. Diario de Rayon, v. 649. Hilario is said to have tortured the comandante Gallardo before beheading him. He was overtaken and killed with four adherents soon after, his head being impaled as a warning. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 1178-9, 1190, 1196.
  19. Gaz. de Méj., 1813, iv. 962-3, 1196-8, etc.; Mendiíbil, Resúmen Hist., 161-9. Velasco, Ramirez, Vargas, Mendizábal, and others continued to reappear round Yurira or Cuitzeo, and so in other directions, with varying success, but the operations were comparatively insignificant. The towns-people exhibited henceforth greater eagerness than ever in aiding the royalist troops, offering at Celaya, for instance, to serve as volunteers, without the pay thus far granted them. Iturbide who had suggested the offer in view of the need for funds, insisted nevertheless on aiding the poorer men and invalids. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 1275-6.
  20. On Villagran 's future conduct would depend the pardon, was the lofty answer of the tottering president. Negrete, Méj. Siglo XIX., v. 420.
  21. As a boy he had found favor with Marcos Gutierrez, a Spaniard of Mexico who traded with this region, and who educated him to some extent while serving in his family. Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 465.
  22. This operation was performed by Captain Elosúa, who entered Jalpan on the 21st, after having with 240 men inflicted a severe lesson on Gomez's troops, which were estimated at no less than 3,000. A more signal rout would have resulted but for the warning of a woman. As it was, fully 300 Indians fell. Elosúa's report in Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 523, etc.
  23. Peralta's force, including some of Cos' men, lost 45 in killed and 22 in prisoners. The colonel and his captain, Gallardo, were executed. The victory was achieved early in April by Bocanegra, the aid of Carbajal, commanding at Toliman, who himself drove off Valenzuela. At Xichú were found 31 royalist bodies hanging. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 564-5. Further northward the leader Camacho was defeated by Montes with Rio Verde troops. Id., 548.
  24. In several districts the religious care of the inhabitants was wholly neglected. Dorantes defends the Villagranes as both just and patriotic, and disputes the charge that the son José María inflicted the dagger-wound which killed his intended father-in-law, Chavez Nava, in 1810. He did not obtain the daughter's hand, and married instead Guadalupe Neve. See letter in Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., vi. 17-20. 'Fueron unas plagas tan funestas a la nacion como los mismos españoles,' exclaims Bustamante. Cuad. Hist., ii. 355-6.
  25. At Baltierrilla, near Salamanca. They were said to number over 4,000, under the Rayons, Salmeron, Torres, Hermosillo, Segura, Rosales, and Najar. Iturbide assisted Ordoñez, who reached Querétaro May 4th. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 472-3, 490-7. Arechederreta, in his Apuntes, adds that the convoy reached Mexico on May 10th, with 1,751 bars of silver, whereof 600 for royal account, much grain, tallow, and other effects.
  26. Fernandez of Tlahuelilpan captured the bastion, with 57 prisoners; 17 guns were obtained. Reports by subordinate leaders, Barradas, Casasola Torres y del Campo, etc., are attached. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 470-2, 492-6. Monsalve describes the bastion which rose nearly 30 feet in height. Bustamante claims that the defence was stupidly managed, for 'nadie de buena razon' would serve under such a leader. Cuad. Hist., ii. 354-5. Bocanegra of Toliman cut off retreat to the hills.
  27. A false servant had filled the ears of his steed with quicksilver, which caused it to act queerly. Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., vi. 79-81.
  28. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 355, followed by Alaman and others, intimates that mere pardon was offered, the son being induced to plead with the father in a letter. Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., vi. 19-20, following a narrative friendly to the Villagranes, states that a brother was sent to persuade Julian, offering 'todos los honores que tenian en las filas de los independientes.'
  29. On May 14th, Major Clavarino remained in command at Huichapan, which failed not to pay the customary tribute of being sacked. Torrente, Hist. Rev., i. 436, alludes to the success as 'un bálsamo consolador,' reflecting glory on Calleja.
  30. 'Robados hasta lo sumo, quemadas sus casas y haciendas,' says the report, leaving the impression that all save the centre of the town had been burned. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 577.
  31. Monsalve estimated them at 3,000, against 300 royalists. Id., 590-4.
  32. Alaman, following Bustamante, states that he suffered death at Gilitla hacienda, Hist. Méj., iii. 466; but reports by friends in Negrete are more reliable. Twenty-two fellow-captives fell on the same day, June 21st. His body was buried without honor; but within a few days, friends came to Huichapan and carried off the heads after a skirmish, entombing them at Zitácuaro with great solemnity. Méx. Siglo XIX., vi. 17-21. Thus was avenged on Villagran the blood of Sanchez, says Bustamante. Cuad. Hist., ii. 356.
  33. As related by Dorantes, in Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., vi. 20.
  34. Ordoñez praises these men highly in his report. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 614-17. Casasola was about to march against Gomez, known as comandante general of the region around Ixmiquilpan, when the former marshalled his forces to expedite the pardon. Among those executed was Captain Carpio, appointed inquisidor general under Villagran.
  35. In Huichapan prisoners were decimated and the people oppressed more than formerly. 'Un nuevo despotismo tanto ó mas feroz que el de los Villagranes,' declares the bitter Bustamante. Cuad. Hist., ii. 355. At Jilotepec over 800 persons were immolated. Negrete also gives instances of cruelty, especially at Huichapan. Mex. Siglo XIX., vi. 22-4. In the following year an epidemic, which he calls yellow fever, added to its aflliction.
  36. Güitian's report in Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 597-1214, passim, as comandante en gefe de la Huasteca. The inhabitants of Tamiahua had distinguished themselves for their obstinate defence against insurgents, women and children assisting in the trenches and bringing in the lead from their nets for bullets. Id., 689-90.
  37. See reports of Argüelles and Vega in Gaz. de Méx., 1813, iv. 663-1293, passim. These successes of the royalists frustrated Rayon's efforts to communicate with the U. S. and other parts, as will be seen, Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 347; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 181.
  38. General Rebollo of Querétaro and General Torres of San Luis Potosí coöperated, so that the force in this direction was especially large. Valdivia, Melo, and Landaverde were among captured leaders. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 597-8, 1049-51, etc.
  39. Sanchez surprised Quauhtitlan in Nov. and shot its comandante, Moreno, at Colhuacan. Ordoñez came down and retaliated by executing at Jilotepec and Ixtlahuaca several insurgents, including Teodoro Lopez, and a boy of twelve years. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 1136, 1238, et seq. Operations so near the capital receive frequent notice in the journals, although insignificant in themselves.
  40. Bustamante, Not. Biog., 13-14. Nicolás Berazaluce had assisted in the reörganization. He estimates that Osorno could at this time raise 4,000 horsemen, in good condition. Cuad. Hist., ii. 258-9. His efforts were brought to the notice of Venegas, partly through his appeal for a warfare on international principles, not to the knife. An amnesty was offered to him, and to promote its acceptance his wife was to be arrested, but she obtained warning and joined him at Zacatlan.
  41. His maxim being to offer the foe 'la puente de plata,' or silver bridge, says Bustamante, who adds that a main object was to capture himself. Osorno had by this time over 1,000 horsemen round him, whom he dismissed on reaching Zacatlan January 9th. It had at first been proposed to send Lieut-col Cándano against Osorno, in the belief that Rayon was also to be met here. Cuad. Hist., ii. 259-60. The royalists gave no report of the encounter, as may be imagined. Bustamante writes Cœlis.
  42. Bustamante and others were strongly opposed to it, and the movement had at first been directed early in March against Tulancingo. When half way the expedition turned back. Id., 26O. Col. Bocardo instigated the present attack.
  43. Such as Tlatlanquitepec, Tenextepec, Huatepec, and Chignauta. The attack on Zacapoaxtla began on April 27th, the main assault and retreat occurring on the 28th. Royalist accounts estimate the assailants at 5,000, and claim the capture of four cannon with a sacrifice of only two killed. The officer whose death influenced the defeat was Lieut.-col Epitacio García. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 552-8. Bustamante places Osorno's force at over 1,000 men, four cannon, and two companies of infantry, but this may not include the troops added on the way under Arroyo, Espinosa, and others.
  44. He proposed to be guided in the campaign by Col J. de Dios Ramirez, lately an officer of Osorno, who had found it prudent to escape from the ill feeling roused by his excesses. At the last moment came letters from Osorno, enclosing notes by Ramirez on Terreño's projects, and charging the latter with secret adhesion to the insurgent cause. The charge, whether true or not, could not fail to incense the conde, and he had the double-faced colonel arraigned before a court-martial and executed, to stop further disclosures, according to some. Bustamante declares, however, that the only ground for suspicion was the courteous treatment of insurgents by Terreño. Correspondence on the subject is given in Bustamante's journal Correo del Sur, July 1, 1813. Terreño had additional trouble with the ayuntamiento of Puebla, which neglected to promptly furnish certain beasts for transport. The alcalde, Marqués de Monserrat, was actually placed under arrest for protesting against a curt summons to appear before the general. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 285, 287-9.
  45. Orders came from Calleja to shoot him; whereupon the compassionate Terreño gave him poison, says Bustamante. Id., 285. Terreño reports that the expedition cost not a drop of blood, but the large expenses of the preparation he does not dwell upon. The Guanajuato battalion under Samaniego destroyed San Miguel, and Colonel Águila marched against Huamantla. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 571-5; Mex. El Virey., 4.
  46. His horse failed him at a critical moment. Salceda claims that he put to flight with less than threescore men the forces of Montaño and Manilla, numbering some 600 cavalry. He had previously routed the lesser Gomez and shot Ortega. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 745-6. In Correo del Sur, Sept. 4, 1813, a tribute is paid to Montaño. His death is placed wrongly on July 23d instead of the 21st.
  47. The fight began on the 6th, near Mal Pais, and ended at the hacienda de Jala, whither Salceda retreated with 60 men, followed by about 800, according to the Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 855-6. His death was deeply regretted.
  48. Yet his report speaks of insurgents fleeing in all directions with innumerable wounded, while his own loss is reduced to two wounded during the last encounter. Gaz. de Mex., iv. 909-12, 927-30. Bustamante increases his casualties to eleven killed and many wounded. At Tlasco 'cometió la bajeza,’ he adds, of deluding a party by means of a false password and firing upon it, Cuad. Hist., ii. 366, 'quedando casi todos muertos y prisioneros.' Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., vi. 61; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 187.
  49. Dated April 21, 1813.
  50. As comandante general, governor, and gefe político, as well as president of the audiencia. The objections to Calleja are clearly indicated. The letter is dated May 10th. See Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 748-50. Calleja was notified by another letter of the 12th, which Bustamante wrongly assumes to be the resignation.
  51. The latter by letter of July 6th also remonstrates against the resignation and expresses warm regard. Id., 76.
  52. Effects were brought direct by way of Panamá, for instance.
  53. Armament not being well manufactured at Guadalajara, Cruz asked for a supply from Mexico. This was refused and a strong letter followed, which led to a reprimand from Calleja. Bustamante alludes to Cruz as 'feroz y sanguinario,' yet admits his talent and insight. Cuad. Hist., ii. 400-1. Alamani points to his wide influence in the kingdom, where he could direct elections at will. Hist. Méj., iii. 427.
  54. The royalist command in Nayarit was held by Colonel M. de Iturbe who died this year of apoplexy. To the eastward moved such leaders as Hermosillo, Segura, Carranza, Cabeza de Vaca, and Saturnino, with from 2,000 to 4,000 followers, and at times in conjunction with Torres and Caballero of Guanajuato. See extracts from Cruz's report in Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 402-3.
  55. And herein the inhabitants were kept busy to support the garrisons, as instanced by the order at Autlan obliging the people to build ramparts. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 47.
  56. The Gaz. de Mex., Oct. 21 to 25, 1813, gives a report of operations mainly along the southern border, from Feb. till Aug. In the latter month Severiano was taken with nearly all his remnant of followers near Tepetilte. Id., 1813, iv. 1106-7.
  57. Bustamante is doubtful whether the reestablishment of the Indian tribute or interference with fishing on the lake claims prominence.
  58. Comandante Serrato in Nov. 1812 attacked Rosas at San Pedro Ixican, near Ocotlan, but reënforced by Santa Ana, the latter took a telling revenge on his assailant, and pursued the advantage by routing Hernandez at Poneitlan and the curate Alvarez.
  59. The latter governor of the adjoining shore village of Mescala. The account is from the report furnished by Castellanos in 1824 in response to Bustamante's appeal to the congress. Castellanos had burned all documents at the time of capitulation to prevent exposures, and testified from memory. Cuad. Hist., iii. 87 et seq., iv. 545, with plans.
  60. According to Cruz' report. Castellanos asserts that 'apenas' one canoe escaped with five men. Santa Ana, who commanded at the island, lost three men. This occurred on Feb. 27th. The islanders are given 70 canoes by the opponents. Soon after a division against San Pedro, under Lieut-col. Alvarez was routed by the valiant Indians, who also defeated another at Vigía. Castellanos' report is full of similar and less important skirmishes, always favorable to the islanders, who kill large numbers while suffering little them selves. Royalists of course report their own victories.
  61. The expedition is said by insurgents to have consisted of 600 men with 11 guns. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 641. Castellanos claims that the greater part of Negrete's force was lost, with one gun, etc., the leader leaving the fingers of one hand behind. Cuad. Hist., iii. 95.
  62. The leading vessel thereof was successfully assailed and captured one night by Santa Ana, who distinguished himself about the same time by almost annihilating the forces of Cuellar and Vallano, the former numbering 'nearly' 500 men.
  63. This from the report of a captured Indian, who is rather vague in his statement, for he knows the leader only as a Franciscan, with one Morillo 'apparently' as second. He states that they were poorly provided with armament and supplies. He enumerated 10 cannon and fully 100 canoes. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 204-6. For additional details on movements in Jalisco, see Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 15-20, 190, 839-40, 1085, 1107, 1294, etc.; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 216-17. At this period figured a woman, Paula Atienza by name, who was recommended to the córtes by the municipality of Gaudalajara for her devotion to the sick and wounded on both sides. Córtes, Diario, xx. 82-4. The reports from this city at the opening of the year are signed by J. L. J. Pinilla, as intendente. Id., xix. 357.
  64. That within the city amounted to 6 deaths, now increased by 17, besides 18 prisoners taken by Captain Pascua, who led the reënforcement. The insurgent party is placed at 250, a section of which was commanded by Magdaleno. Gaz. de Max., 1814, v. 664; 1813, iv. 1087. Bustamante relates that Rosales' son, eleven years of age, fell wounded into the hands of the victors, who first lashed and then shot him, to which end 'lo sacaron en una Camilla.' Cuad. Hist., ii. 405. Rosales' name was later inscribed in letters of gold among the national heroes. Matias Ortiz, Zamora, Rosalino Lopez, and Picazo made occasional entries on the south-east border. An attack by them on Ojuelos, at the close of August, with 460 men, was repulsed with a loss of 50. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 1175-8.
  65. Nemecio Salcedo returned to Spain. Some time later Bernardo Bonavía figures in Cedulario, MS., iv. 238, as commander.
  66. As alluded to in Escudero, Son. y Sin., 58, etc., and as fully related in Hist. North Mex. States, ii., this series, from original sources.
  67. Onis, the Spanish minister, sent accounts in 1812 of American designs on the whole of New Spain, or at best the northern provinces, and Venegas issued orders for the provincial commanders to be on their guard against agents from the States. Letters in Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. app. 45-9. See also Onis, Mem., Madrid, 1820, 1-60, with appendix.
  68. Correo del Sur, March 18, April 22, 1813. Lara, in a Manifiesto from Monterey, 1827, claims to have indignantly rejected every design on the national territory.
  69. Full account of these and connected events will be given in Hist. North Mex. States, ii., this series.
  70. The agent was Colonel Francisco Antonio Peredo, empowered to negotiate treaties, obtain armament, and confer with the papal legate. He had also to open communication with the coast for his own departure as well as for bringing in arms; but Bravo failing to assist him in the northern Vera Cruz districts, he turned back. Bustamante blames him for indiscretion, whereby the royalists were put on guard against his movements, and for spending time to collect vanilla to defray the expenses of his mission. Cuad. Hist., ii. 347. Alaman thinks he should have taken cochineal and sought exit from Tabasco. He reproduces his commission, etc., in Hist. Méj., iii. app. 49-52, and so does Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., vi. 73-8, who approves the mission; but the fullest record is in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 18 et seq., 96; vi. 1036-43; i. 872-3, with an anonymous document expressing fears of foreign designs. Arraugoiz, Méj., i. 218, declaims vaguely against privateers from the north.
  71. The latter coming this year for the first time south of Rio Bravo. Mex., Informe Comis. Pesquis., 1874, 121.
  72. These statements are from the reports of Arredondo and his aids, in Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 954-6, 970-1, 980, 992-4, 1081-2, 1229-30, 1245-6; 1814, v. 27 et seq.; to which Gonzalez adds details from the opposite side. Cuad. N. Leon, 248-327, passim.