Intelligence and Security Committee Report: Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism/Annex A: Conclusions and Recommendations

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4595688Intelligence and Security Committee Report: Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism2022the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament

ANNEX A: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS


A. It is clearly difficult to delineate precisely the ideologies that might motivate Extreme Right-Wing Terrorists; however, we recognise that MI5 and Counter Terrorism Policing must be able to differentiate between them, not least because of the evidential thresholds.

B. Nevertheless, there is a risk that the varying terminologies used to categorise potential terrorists may cause confusion, including, most worryingly, to risk conflation of ideology with intent. It is important to be clear that there is no suggestion that all those who subscribe to these ideologies have terrorist intent; this is simply a means to establish what might be motivating potential terrorists.

C. More broadly, we welcome the recent addition of the word 'Extreme' to the previous term 'Right-Wing Terrorism'—it allays any possibility of the stigmatisation of those holding mainstream right-wing views.

D. It is not surprising that there are reports that Extreme Right-Wing Terrorist groups and individuals have sought to co-opt the Covid-19 pandemic, using conspiracy theories and exploiting community grievances to attempt to radicalise, recruit and inspire plots and attacks. The full impact of the Covid-19 pandemic has yet to be seen—but we are assured that the Intelligence Community and the police have recognised the impact that events such as the pandemic and the Black Lives Matter protests may have had on the extremist beliefs of individuals.

E. The terrorist threat—regardless of ideology—is increasingly posed by Self-Initiated Terrorists, those who are incited or inspired rather than directed. Self-Initiated Terrorists are difficult to identify, and pose a significant number of challenges in terms of detection and monitoring. Their motivation can be highly individualistic and determining how, why and when they may choose to attack is particularly difficult for MI5 and Counter Terrorism Policing. An innovative approach will be needed to counter the fragmented and complex threat posed by these disparate groups and individuals.

F. Without an agreed understanding of the links between Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism and the developmental disorders Asperger's and autism spectrum disorder (ASD), it is difficult to see how this problem can be tackled effectively. It is imperative that more is done to establish a cohesive and joined-up effort across the agencies, organisations and medical professionals involved in this area.

G. The fact that the Armed Forces do not provide clear direction to service personnel regarding membership of any organisation—let alone an extremist one—would appear to be something of an anomaly. It could be argued that this is a somewhat risky approach, given the sensitive roles of many service personnel.

H. There appears to be an issue around the current vetting processes for candidates applying to join the police—the lack of thorough background checks is a matter of concern. As the internet and the wider online sphere is the key driver of the Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism threat, it follows that online activity must be closely scrutinised when the police are assessing whether an individual is suitable to join its ranks.

I. There is no process in place to monitor those 'G***' individuals who have travelled overseas for Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism-related purposes and have returned to the UK—there is a strong possibility that these returning foreign fighters, some of whom may have fought ***, will have been further radicalised *** and developed connections with others who share their Extreme Right-Wing ideology.

J. The Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) is a popular activity enjoyed by many people across the UK. The fact that this is an area currently being targeted by the Far Right in other countries, and that a number of MMA instructors were previously found to have been involved in National Action, suggests that MI5 and Counter Terrorism Policing should be alert to the potential for links in the future.

K. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism online environment poses a new challenge for the Intelligence Community, and there is still a long way to go when it comes to tackling what is largely an ungoverned space. The Head of Counter Terrorism Policing told the Committee that "the single biggest thing that keeps me awake at night is the proliferation of online and its ability to radicalise and incite people". The Director General of MI5 pointed to the particular challenge of determining Extreme Right-Wing activity online which could translate into 'real-world' terrorist activity:

the activity itself is often just online espousal of violent views without any real world accompanying activity and so often we are monitoring something which is just online and nothing else, potentially for years on end, but it doesn't take much for an individual or a small group of individuals to change their direction and do something violent in the real world.

L. The Operational Improvement Review and its practical recommendations signalled a fundamental shift in the Government's approach to what was then termed 'Domestic Extremism'—the subsequent transfer of lead responsibility from Counter Terrorism Policing to MI5 regarding what was by then recognised as a terrorist threat was a pragmatic and logical move.

M. The continuing rise in the number of referrals to Prevent for concerns around Extreme Right-Wing activity does not necessarily signal a similar increase in the Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism threat, but rather indicates a greater awareness of the potential risk and the greater focus being placed on this issue. We consider that the Home Affairs Committee may wish to examine how and why people are being referred to Prevent—and who is making these referrals.

N. Advocacy groups can play an important role, however we recognise that MI5 and Counter Terrorism Policing may be constrained in the way in which they are able to interact with them at an operational level, and we would encourage the Home Office to develop constructive relationships at a strategic level instead.

O. MI5 have taken on responsibility for Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism (ERWT) without the commensurate resources. Taking the month of July 2020 as an example, ERWT and Left, Anarchist, Single-Issue Terrorism (LASIT) casework accounted for around under a fifth of all counter-terrorism investigations: that casework can only be undertaken at the expense of other MI5 work. The impact has been seen on *** casework, which is now progressed more slowly, and on MI5's inability to expand its work on other threat areas as it had intended. This situation is untenable. While MI5, rightly, allocates its resources on what it assesses to be the highest priority work based on its expert knowledge of the threat, we are concerned that MI5 has been expected simply to absorb this new responsibility. MI5 must be given additional funding to enable it to conduct these cases without other areas of work suffering as a consequence.

P. It is clear that the Behavioural Science Unit (BSU) is making a vital contribution to promoting an informed understanding of the complexities of the Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism (ERWT) threat. We are puzzled that MI5 does not appear to be taking active steps to ensure it has the capacity to be involved at the outset of all investigations. The BSU is clearly an essential capability, particularly when it comes to meeting the ERWT threat, and must be resourced appropriately.

Q. Proscription has, to date, been an important disruptive tool in countering the influence and activities of bodies and organisations that seek to carry out terrorist activity. However, the ideologies driving Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism are complex, and in the case of, for example, neo-Nazi groups such as Order of Nine Angles, do not meet the terrorism threshold. We note that Counter Terrorism Policing and the Home Office are considering a possible review of the current proscription process—this is a welcome development.

R. The Government will need a new approach to tackle the financing of Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism (ERWT). It is one thing to take an agnostic approach and use shared methodology in assessing the Islamist terror threat and ERWT, however when it comes to the financing of this activity the reality is that the two are very different. Moreover, whilst it would appear that at present the financing of ERWT is low level and ad hoc, the reality is that this could change rapidly as the threat evolves.

S. It appears that there are inherent difficulties with the voluntary Code of Practice, and indeed across the Online Safety Bill more widely. Whilst the major communication service providers—who are already on board with the Government's drive to promote responsible behaviour—are adhering to the principles, it is the smaller organisations (many of which are particularly influential in the Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism space) who appear reluctant to step up. The emergence of many 'free speech' unmoderated platforms specifically aimed at the Extreme Right Wing are also a problem. It will be essential for Ofcom to develop the expertise and technical know-how as a matter of urgency if it is to be able to properly enforce mandatory Codes of Practice across the industry.

T. International co-operation is key to tackling Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism, however the disparity in approach and legal thresholds for defining the threat makes this particularly challenging. MI5 and Counter Terrorism Policing are committed to exploring a possible joint approach with international liaison partners, although we note that the nature of the problem varies greatly across different countries.

U. It is encouraging that the strong operational relationships built up over the years by the Intelligence Community and police with their European counterparts continue to develop in the post-Brexit era. Whilst most capacity has not been affected, we remain concerned about possible loss of access to some important capabilities, such as Passenger Names Records. We emphasise the need for ongoing discussion on alternative arrangements to succeed.