Intelligence and Security Committee Report: Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism/International

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Tackling Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism Online
Intelligence and Security Committee Report: Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism (2022)
the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament
Annex A: Conclusions and Recommendations
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4595686Intelligence and Security Committee Report: Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism2022the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament

​INTERNATIONAL

293. Recent Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism (ERWT) incidents overseas, such as the attacks in Christchurch and El Paso, mean the issue is high on the agenda of the UK's closest counter-terrorism partners. MI5, Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) and GCHQ advised that they seek to work with international partners to increase and systematise data-sharing (in support of efforts such as ***) and to act in a joined-up way to combat right-wing material online and *** those communication service providers (CSPs) favoured by Extreme Right-Wing (XRW) actors. (For example, CTP's response to the emergence of National Action involved a collective effort with a number of countries to disrupt the spread of associated or similar groups. This included groups in Norway, the USA and Australia.)

Closer co-operation: International partners

294. MI5, CTP and GCHQ are working with international intelligence partners to share learning about the XRW threat. The priority has been to:

  • gain an understanding of how the threat is manifesting in other countries;
  • understand how partners are dealing with the threat; and
  • where appropriate, agree international strategies to develop a strategic response to what is a new and growing threat.

295. In July 2020, MI5 took part in a virtual meeting of the *** working group on ERWT and left-wing, anarchist and single-issue terrorism (LASIT). MI5 told the Committee that it is apparent that experience of ERWT and LASIT varies—for example, in the United States, Article 1 of the Bill of Rights (Freedom of Speech) legitimises some activity that would be considered criminal in the UK—however, they say that:

broadly speaking engagement has been productive and forward-leaning. In practice engagement has involved separate conferences [with international partners]; a number of bilateral exchanges with close intelligence partners (including, but not limited to, ***); and the sharing of intelligence assessments to ensure we build a common understanding and identify where links between [extreme] right-wing terrorists in different countries (or online) may be driving the threat.[1]

***—Liaison Collaboration[2]

296. Since 2019, MI5 has been part of an ERWT-focused liaison working group (codenamed ***), in which domestic security, police and signals intelligence (SIGINT) organisations from the UK and liaison partners collaborate to share experiences in countering the ERWT threat and to work to understand each other's approaches and thresholds. We are told that the liaison group has enabled greater cross-partner co-operation on UK Intelligence Community (UKIC) ERWT investigations with an international focus and enabled joint operational responses ​to countering the ERWT threat, particularly in the online space. MI5 and CTP advised the Committee that they had recently taken joint chairpersonship of the liaison group.[3]

297. The liaison working group has commissioned a series of formal papers from *** in order to explore *** of the ERWT threat, noting common drivers, such as:

  • ***;
  • ***;
  • ***;
  • ***.

The consensus across attendees is that the threat from this area is increasing, and all parties acknowledged that a successful attack anywhere would galvanise other potential actors ***.

298. The liaison working group have also identified common interventions that may benefit from a future joint approach, including:

  • increased counter-messaging and counter-violent extremism programmes;
  • education initiatives ***'
  • ***; and
  • ***.

299. However, there are some challenges to this working arrangement. Within liaison countries, investigative thresholds, terminology and even the nature of the problem vary greatly, with as already noted the USA being a particular outlier in terms of what is acceptable under the First Amendment guaranteeing US citizens freedom of speech, and phenomena such as armed militias and sovereign citizens (those who reject the authority of the Federal government, which do not exist in the other liaison countries. Nevertheless, MI5 has noted that "there is a clear commitment to learn from each other's experience, to work towards a common language to describe the problem, and to build, where possible and appropriate, common solutions to common problems".[4] These include exploring with liaison partners the possibility of ***[5] ***, and data sharing initiatives.[6]

Europol

300. CTP and MI5 are engaged with Europol[7] Member States on ERWT, which has increasingly become part of their agenda over the last two years, with a recognition of the need to balance the right to demonstrate alongside the need to investigate threats to national security. However the scope and scale of this response appears to be dependent on the necessary resources being available. The need for an EU-wide Internet Referral Unit (IRU) ​is broadly recognised. However, the scope and scale of the response would be dependent on competing priorities.

301. CTP worked with Europol following the Christchurch and Halle attacks, to support the development of a Protocol for On Line Crisis Management, with an emphasis on a co-ordinated pan-Europe response to take down material from the online space, whilst recognising the importance of capturing investigative opportunities and evidential proof. The Head of CTP told the Committee in April 2021 that they had "just got voted back unanimously as a third country on to the Europol CT working group".[8]

***

302. ***.[9]

303. ***.[10]

304. ***.[11]

T. International co-operation is key to tackling Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism, however the disparity in approach and legal thresholds for defining the threat makes this particularly challenging. MI5 and Counter Terrorism Policing are committed to exploring a possible joint approach with international liaison partners, although we note that the nature of the problem varies greatly across different countries.

The impact of Brexit

305. Many of the UK's national security capabilities, including the sharing of data and intelligence, depend on a network of bilateral and multilateral partnerships with European equivalents in EU Member States. In January 2020, MI5 told the Committee that they were confident that:

UK cooperation with European partners on national security issues will remain as strong as it has ever been. Brexit should therefore have no direct impact on bilateral partnerships, or . . . non-EU based multilateral forums, such as the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) ***.[12]

306. MI5 has, nevertheless, identified some areas that have the potential to impact relationships with European partners and therefore its ability to share data and intelligence across the spectrum of threats, including ERWT. MI5 told the Committee that these three areas are:

  • Partnerships based on the premise that national security is a Member State responsibility only (where this is made clear under EU law). Maintaining strong Member State-based national security arrangements between sovereign states, supported by a wider UK/EU security partnership, has been critical ***.
    ​
  • Securing a Data Adequacy agreement with the EU. MIS's capabilities ***. Securing a Data Adequacy agreement that enables the UK and EU to freely share personal data is essential ***.
  • Access to important EU tools and measures. The UK is a significant contributor to the Schengen Information System II (SISII),[13] Passenger Names Records (PNR),[14] the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN),[15] and Europol.[16] These tools are of importance to law enforcement partners, and it is vital that any agreement secures future interoperability so that the UK can take advantage of developments in technology and approach over time for these and other tools. ***.[17]

307. As at 31 January 2020, MI5 advised that negotiations with respect to the UK's access were still continuing, and cautioned that:

***, the limitations placed on security cooperation will have a detrimental impact on ***. However, MI5 are committed to ensuring that the Brexit process will not compromise the close relationship they have built with European partners over a number of years and significantly increased over the last decade. Indeed, MI5 need to strengthen relationships as the UK leaves the EU to improve its effectiveness at tackling shared threats. MIS have done so by increasing bilateral and multilateral engagement since the Brexit referendum and will continue this trend into 2020.[18]

308. The Director General of MI5 updated the Committee on intelligence-sharing and co-operation with its European counterparts post-Brexit. He observed that there had been no discernible impact on practical relationships, although it was possible that there could be issues around ***:

The core answer is that the [practical] relationships that we enjoy with our European counterparts, both multilaterally and bilaterally, remain very strong. They really do. ***. It is embedded very strongly because the threats require it. So I do not have any particular concerns at that level.

Clearly alongside those operational relationships, which I am confident are in good health and are likely to remain in good health, there are some more technical things around some of the tools and measures that the UK previously enjoyed, not all of which have persisted into the new situation, but the ones that mattered most to us have. So *** for example, Europol, you know, *** remain available to us. ***

So there are some shifts, for most of which we have adequate mitigations ***. The other place we will need to continue to watch is around data flows.[19]

​309. When we asked the Home Secretary what progress was being made with regard to discussions on UK access to the Passenger Names Records and EU INTCEN, she confirmed that discussions were still ongoing, but suggested that it was very much a case of business as usual when it came to co-operation with the EU on operational issues:

tackling the day to day around serious and organised crime and terrorism and protecting the public and also bringing criminals to justice, that work continues along with the dialogue at a member state level as well. So not a commission level, I should emphasise this, at a member state level.[20]

So we have, you mentioned the Schengen Information Systems, we have to return to tried and tested mechanisms around cooperation, I've mentioned bilateral channels, I've mentioned Interpol, which were already in use, as you'll be well aware, around the rest of the world and used in member states up until 2015.

So these ways of working, circulation, diffusion notices, they're all there and we continue with that, I have to say, very strong and excellent working relationships that have, you know, really come together over a long period of time.[21]

U. It is encouraging that the strong operational relationships built up over the years by the Intelligence Community and police with their European counterparts continue to develop in the post-Brexit era. Whilst most capacity has not been affected, we remain concerned about possible loss of access to some important capabilities, such as Passenger Names Records. We emphasise the need for ongoing discussion on alternative arrangements to succeed.

  1. ↑ Written evidence - MI5 and CTP, 31 January 2020.
  2. ↑ Written evidence - MI5, 23 November 2020.
  3. ↑ Oral evidence - 29 April 2021.
  4. ↑ Written evidence - MI5, 23 November 2020.
  5. ↑ ***
  6. ↑ Written evidence - MI5, 26 May 2021.
  7. ↑ Europol is the EU's law enforcement agency, and supports Member States in preventing and combating all forms of serious international crime and terrorism.
  8. ↑ Oral evidence - CTP, 29 April 2021.
  9. ↑ ***
  10. ↑ Written evidence - MI5.
  11. ↑ Oral evidence - MI5, 29 April 2021.
  12. ↑ Written evidence - MI5, CTP, GCHQ and Home Office, 31 January 2020.
  13. ↑ SISII is a Schengen area-wide travel-zone watch-list which allows participating states to place alerts against Subjects of Interest (SOIS) which are accessible to police and border agencies across Europe.
  14. ↑ Passenger Names Records provide flight and booking data for individuals travelling in and out of the UK.
  15. ↑ EU INTCEN is the intelligence hub for the EU, and provides assessed intelligence to the EU institutions and Member States.
  16. ↑ Europol is the EU's law enforcement agency. Its mission is to support Member States in preventing and combating all forms of serious international crime and terrorism.
  17. ↑ Written evidence - MI5, 31 January 2021.
  18. ↑ Written evidence 31 January 2020.
  19. ↑ Oral evidence - MI5, 29 April 2021.
  20. ↑ Oral evidence – Home Secretary, 20 May 2021.
  21. ↑ Oral evidence – Home Secretary, 20 May 2021.
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