Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder/Appendix 1

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APPENDIX

While the problem of publishing this brochure was being solved in our country—robbed as she was by the imperialists of the whole world, who are wreaking vengeance upon her because of the proletarian revolution, and who continued to rob and blockade her in spite of promises to their own workers—there came from abroad additional material. Not pretending to make in my brochure more than the general remarks of a publicist, I shall only briefly touch upon some points.

APPENDIX I.

THE SPLIT OF THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY.

The split of the German Communists has become an accomplished fact. The "Left" or "Opposition in principle" has established a separate "Communist Labor Party" in contradistinction to the "Communist Party." There is evidence that Italy is also approaching a similar split. I make this statement subject to correction, as I only possess the additional numbers—numbers 7 and 8—of the "Left" paper, Il Soviet, which openly deals with the possibility and the inevitably of a split. There are also discussions concerning a forthcoming conference of the "Abstentionist" group (in other words, of the group of boycottists or opponents of participation in Parliament) a group that was, hitherto, part of the Italian Socialist Party.

There is reason to apprehend that the split with the "Left" anti-parliamentarians, and partly also with the anti-politicals (who are in opposition to the political parties and Trade Union activity), will become an international phenomenon, similar to the split with the "Centrists" (i.e., Kautskians, the Longuetists, the Independents, and so forth.) Be it so. A split is, at all events, preferable to a muddle, which is a hindrance both to ideological, theoretical and revolutionary growth; a hindrance to the maturing of the party and to its organized work of practical preparation for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Let the "Left" make an attempt to prepare (and then to realize) on a national and international scale, the dictatorship of the proletariat; let them attempt to do this without a strictly centralized, disciplined, party, capable of leading and managing every branch, every sphere, every variety of political and cultural work. Practical experience will soon make them wiser.

Every effort must be made in order that the split with the "Left" shall impede or hinder as little as possible the amalgamation into one common party—inevitable in the near future—of all participators in the Labor Movement who are sincerely and whole-heartedly in favor of the Soviet system and proletarian dictatorship. It was a peculiar stroke of luck for the Russian Bolsheviks that they had fifteen years of systematic and decisive fighting, both against the Mensheviks (that is to say, the opportunists and "Centrists") as well as against the "Left," long before the direct mass struggle for proletarian dictatorship. The same work has to be performed now in Europe and in America by means of "forced marches." It may happen that individual personalities, especially those belonging to the category of unsuccessful pretenders to leadership, will, through the lack of proletarian discipline and "intellectual honesty," adhere for a long time to their mistakes. As far as the working masses are concerned, when the moment arrives they will amalgamate naturally, and unite all sincere Communists under a common banner into a common party, capable of realizing the Soviet system and the dictatorship of the proletariat.[1]

  1. I shall make the following remark with regard to the question of the future amalgamation of the "Left" Communists (anti-parliamentarians) and Communists generally. As far as I can judge by the acquaintance I have formed of the newspapers of the "Left," and those of the German Communists in general, the first have the advantage over the second in that they are better agitators among the masses. I have repeatedly observed something analogous in the history of the Bolshevik Party—though on a smaller scale, and in individual local organizations, never on a national scale. For instance, in 1907–1908 the "Left" Bolsheviks had, upon certain occasions and in many places, better success in propaganda among the masses than we had. In a revolutionary moment, or at a time when revolutionary recollections are still fresh, it is most easy to approach the masses with the tactics of mere negation. This, however, can hardly serve as an argument for the correctness of such tactics. At all events, there is not the least doubt that the Communist Party, which actually wishes to be the advance guard of the revolutionary class of the proletariat, and which, in addition wishes to lead the general masses (not only the wide proletarian masses, but also the non-proletarian toilers and exploited), must necessarily be capable of propaganda, of organization, and of agitation in the most accessible, most comprehensible form; must demonstrate clearly and graphically, not only for the town and factory man-in-the-street, but also for the whole of the village population.