Lessons of the Revolution/One of the Radical Questions of the Revolution

by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

One of the Radical Questions of the Revolution.

The most serious question of every revolution is plainly that of the governing power. Everything depends upon the question of what class holds that power. Now if the organ of the leading government party in Russia (Essers), the Dielo Naroda («Cause of the People»), recently complained (№ 147) that in the struggle for power the questions of bread and the Constituent Assembly are forgotten, the Essers may be answered: «Blame yourselves. It is the hesitancy, the irresolution of your party which is to blame for the continuous performance pf Ministerial leap-frog—for the repeated postponement of the Constituent Assembly, for the undermining by, the capitalists of the measures undertaken to monopolize bread, and thus supply the country with it.

The question of the governing power can be neither obviated nor dismissed, for it is just this fundamental question which determines the development of the revolution, both in its external and internal policy. It certainly cannot be disputed that our revolution has lost in vain halt a year squabbling over the establishment of power, but this is due to the vaccillating policy of the Essers and Mensheviks. And this policy was in the last instance determined by the class standard of the petty bourgeoisie, by its economic instability in the struggle between labor and capital.

The question now is, whether or mot the petty-bourgeois-democracy has learned a lesson during this great half-year, so unusually rich in historical content. If not, then the revolution is lost, and only the victorious uprising of the proletariat can save it. If so, then it is imperative to begin at once tho construction of a stable, unfaltering power. Now, during a popular revolution—a revolution that has aroused the masses, the majority of the workmen and peasants—only that power can be stable which avowedly and unconditionally rests upon the majority of the population. Hitherto the governing power in Russia has been de facto in the hands of the bourgeoisie, which is forced now and then, to make partial concessions (only to withdraw them at the first opportunity), to dish out promises (only to cheat the people with the complexion of an «honest» coalition), etc., etc. In word—a popular, democratic, revolutionary gevornment; in deed—an antipopular, antidemiocratic, counter-revolutionary, bourgeois government. This is the fatal contradiction that has heretofore been the source of the instability and fluctuation of power, of the «Ministerial leap-frog» so sedulously played by the Essers and Mensheviks to the detriment of the people.

Either rout the Soviets, let them die an ignominious death, or give all power to the Soviets—this I proclaimed before the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in June, 1917; and the history of July and August has incontrovertibly borne out the correctness of that utterance. The power to the Soviets—this power alone can claim stability, inasmuch as it truly rests upon the majority of the population, in spite of all the lies spread broadcast by the lackeys of the bourgeoisie, such as Potressov, Plekhanov, etc., who call it «widening the base» of the government when the power is actually surrendered to an insignificant minority of the people—the bourgeoisie and the exploiters.

Only the Soviet power could be firm, the only power which it would be impossible to overthrow, even in stormiest moments of the most tempestuous revolution; only such a power could ensure the steady, ever-spreading development of the revolution, the peaceable struggle of the parties within the Soviets. So long as such a power is lacking, the inevitable consequences will be irresolution, instability, vacillation, endless «crises of power», the futile comedy of «Ministerial leap-frog», and outbursts from both left and right.

But the slogan «All Power to the Soviets» is frequently, if not almost always, interpreted very incorrectly to mean: a Ministry recruited from the parties of the Soviet majority. We shall consider at length this highly-mistaken notion.

A Ministry of the Soviet majority would mean only a personal change in the composition of the Ministry, leaving intact the entire old apparatus of the governing power, an apparatus thoroughly bureaucratic, incapable of carrying out any, serious reforms, not even those found in the platforms of the Essers and the Mensheviks.

«All Power to the Soviets» means the thorough reconstruction of the old State apparatus, the apparatus of antiquated officialdom which thwarts everything democratic; it means the removal of this apparatus and the substitution of a new, popular, really democratic apparatus of the Soviets; that is today, the organized and fully armed majority. of the people—workers, soldiers and peasants. And finally, it means full independence for the majority of the nation, not only in choosing delegates, but also in administering the State, and carrying out all necessary reforms.

In order to make the contrast more clear-cut and definite, we shall recall a very important confession made some time ago by the organ of the Government party, the Essers, Dielo Naroda («Cause of the People»). «Even in the departments which are in the hands of the Socialist Ministers», writes this paper at the time of the notorious «Coalition Ministry»—«even in these departments the whole administrative apparatus is antiquated, and obstructs work».

hat geos without saying. The history of the bourgeois-parliamentary and the bourgeois-constitutional countries shows that a change of Ministers means very, little, for the real work of administration is lodged in the hands of a colossal army of officials, and this army is permeated with the antidemocratic spirit. By thousands and millions of threads it is connected with the landlords and the bourgeoisie, and dependent upon them in every way. This army breathes only the atmosphere of bourgeois relations with which it is surrounded; it is congealed, shrivelled with age, stiff and inert; it is powerless to escape from this atmosphere, unable to think, feel or act otherwise than it has always acted. This army is imbued with admiration for rank, for certain privileges of «State» service, and its upper strata are enslaved by stocks and bonds to Financial Capital, in a measure acting as its direct agents, the executors of its interests and influence.

To attempt by means of this administrative apparatus the carrying out of such reforms as the redeemed confiscation of landed estates, the monopolizing of bread, etc., is a huge illusion, a deception of the people.

This apparatus can well serve a republican bourgeoisie, creating a republic in the form. of a «monarchy without a monarch», after the fashion of the Third French Republic; but it is absolutely powerless to carry out reforms, not only ultra radical but even such as would limit the rights of capital, the rights of «sacred private property». Thus in all «coalition» Ministries which include Socialists, the inevitable consequence is that the Socialists, however conscientious and personally, irreprochable, remain in reality a mere screen for the bourgeois government, a lightning rod to divert the popular indignation from the government, a tool by, which to foil the masses. It was so with Louis Blane in 1848, it has been so since then time and time again in England and France when Socialists participated in the government; it was so too with Tchernov and Tseretelli in 1917—and so it will be as long as the capitalist order exists and is supported by an outworn, bourgeois, bureacratic administrative apparatus.

The Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates are invaluable for the very reason that they represent a new, incomparably higher, incomparably more democratic type of administrative apparatus. The Essers and Mensheviks did everything possible and impossible to convert the Soviets (particulary the Petrograd Soviet, and the All-Russian Central Executive Committe) into mere talking machines busy, under the pretext of «control», with formulating futile resolutions and humble petitions which the government disregarded in the most polite and affable manner. But the fresh breeze of the Kornilov adventure, pregnant with threatening tempest, forced the Soviet to cast off, for a time, all that was obnoxious, and the initiative of the revolutionary masses loomed up as something majestic, powerful, invincible.

Let those who are weak of faith learn by, this historic example. Shame upon those who say, «We have no apparatus with which to replace the old one, which invariably supports the bourgeoisie»; for we have such an apparatus—the Soviets. Fear not the initiative and independent action of the masses, have confidence in the revolutionary organizations of the masses, and in all departments of the State you will behold the force, the magnificence, the invincibility of the workmen and peasants, which they showed in their enthusiastic solidarity against the Kornilov attempt.

Distrust of the masses, fear of their initiative, fear of their independence, trembling at their revolutionary energy instead of enthusiastically and unreservedly supporting it—this was the greatest sin of the Essers and Mensheviks. Here can be found the very root of their irresolution, their vaccillation their endless and endlessly fruitless attempts to pour new wine into the bottles of the old bureaucratic apparatus.

Read the history of the democratization of the Russian army in the Russian revolution of 1917, the history of Tchernov’s Ministry, the history of the «ruling» Palchinsky, the history of Pechekhonov's resignation—you will find at every step the most instructive substantiation of this fact. The fact that there was no complete confidence in the elected soldiers' organizations, no full realization of the principle of election of officers by the soldiers themselves, enabled the Kornilovs, Kaledins and counter-revolutionary officers to be at the head of the army. This is a fact. And whoever does not wantonly, shut his eyes cannot help seeing that after the Kornilov affair the Kerensky, government left everything as it was,—that in reality it restored Kornilov rule. The appointment of Alexeiev, the «pact» with the Klembovskis, Gagarins, Bagrattions and other Kornilov followers, the kindly, treatment accorded to the Kornilovs and Kaledins—all this shows how Kerensky was restoring the Kornilov rule.

Experience teaches that there is no middle course possible. Either all power tot he Soviets and complete democratization of the army, or Kornilov.

And the history; of Tchernov? Wasn't the greatest enthusiasm aroused among the peasants by any step, however small, toward the real satisfaction of their needs,—every step which attested confidence in them, and in their mass organizations and mass actions? But for four months Tchernov was compelled again and again to «bargain» with the Cadets and the bureaucrats, who with their everlasting protractions and underhanded tactics finally forced him to leave without having accomlished anything. The landlords and capitalists «having won the game» held back the Constituent Assembly and even started a series of repressive measures against the Land Committees.

Experience teaches that there is no middle course possible. Either all power to the Soviets, centrally and locally, all the land to the peasants at once, before the decision of the Constituent Assembly, or the landlords and capitalists will thwart everything, restore the rule of the landlords, arouse the resentment of the peasants, and so aggravate the situation as to cause a regrettably violent agrarian revolt.

It is the same story, with the capitalists, who with the aid of Palchinsky prevent any serious control over production, the merchants preventing monopolization of bread, and even Pechekhonov's attempt to establish the principle of a regulated democratic bread distribution.

In Russia now the question is not to invent new reforms, to undertake cherished transformations. Nothing of the kind. Yet that is how the question is put—and put knowingly, falsely by the capitalists, the Petressovs, the Plekhanovs who clamor against the «introduction of Socialism» and the «dictatorship of the proletariat». In reality the situation in Russia is such that the unequalled sufferings of the war, the unparalleled danger of imminent ruin and famine, have themselves dictated the way out, have themselves pointed out the imperative necessity, of these reforms: bread monopoly, control of production and distribution, the limitation of the issue of paper money, regular exchange of bread for commodities, etc.

Measures of this kind, in this direction, are universally acknowledged to be inevitable. They have been begun in many places and in widely different ways, and everywhere their realization is obstinately resisted by the landlords and capitalists, aided by the Kerensky government—a thoroughly bourgeois and Bonapartist government—as well as the direct and indirect pressure of Russian and «Allied» finance.

I. Prilajaiev recently, wrote in the Dielo Naroda («Cause of the People»—№ 147), lamenting the resignation of Pechekhonov, the failure of price-fixing, the collapse of the bread monopoly:

«Courage and resolution—that is what all our governments, of whatever complexion, have lacked… The revolutionary democracy need not hesitate; it should take the initiative itself, and intervene in the economic chaos… Here if anywhere at all a firm policy and a resolute power are indispensable».

Yes, what is true is certainly true! Golden words. It has not, however, occurred to the author that the question of a firm policy, of a daring spirit, of determination, is mot a question of personalities, but a question of the class that is capable of daring and decisive action. The only such class is the proletariat. With the daring and resoluteness of power, its unflinching policy is nothing less than the dictatorship of the proletariat, including the poorest peasants. I. Prilajaiev, without being conscious of it, craves that very dictatorship.

What would such dictatorship mean? Nothing less than that the resistance of the Kornilov followers would be overcome, and the complete democratization of the army accomplished. Ninety-nine per cent of the army, would declare themselves ardent adherents of this dictatorship two days after its realization. This dictatorship would give the land to the peasents and full power to the peasants' local committees; how can any, sane man doubt that the peasants would support such a dictatorship? What Pechekhonov only imagined, («the resistance of the capitalists is broken», he said before the Soviets), this dictatorship would convert into reality without the least harm to the inchoate democratic organizations for food supply, industrial control, etc.; on the contrary, it would support and develop them, while removing all obstacles in their way.

Only the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants is capable of breaking the resistance of the capitalists, of manifesting a truly majestic courage and resoluteness of power, of securing to itself the enthusiastic, loyal and heroic support of the army masses and the peasant masses.

All Power to the Soviets—the sole power which cam render further evolution gradual, peaceful and tranquil, proceeding in perfect accord with the level of consciousness and decision exhibited by the majority of the popular masses—in perfect accord with the level of their own experience. All power to the Soviets—this means a complete surrender of the administration of the country and of control over its economic resources to the workmen, and peasants, whom no one would dare to resist, and who would soon learn by experience, from their own practise, justly to distribute the bread, the land, and the necessities…

 

N. Lenin.