Life of William, Earl of Shelburne/Volume 1/Chapter 10

by Edmond George Petty-Fitzmaurice

 

CHAPTER X

 

LORD SHELBURNE AND THE BEDFORD WHIGS

 

1768

 

While Shelburne was attempting to settle the affairs of Ireland, Choiseul, convinced that as the Bedford party were in the ascendant he had nothing to fear, and not deeming the moment favourable for a rupture, continued to distribute cheap protestations of friendship with even greater profusion than before, and at the same time took the opportunity of causing all naval preparations in the ports and arsenals of France to cease, in order to make economies which he hoped might restore some order in the finances of his country. He resolved at the same time to prosecute his schemes of aggrandisement in the South of Europe, where he had less reason to anticipate resistance than elsewhere.

The expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain and Naples had been followed by their expulsion from Parma. The Pope, roused by the bold step taken by the Sovereign of the latter petty principality, a blood relation of the Kings of France, Spain, and Naples, threatened his dominions with an interdict and his person with excommunication.^[1] Benevento was thereupon immediately seized by Naples; Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin by France. Neither in the days when Boniface VIII. was bearded at Anagni by Colonna and Nogaret, nor when Bourbon led his victorious legions to the walls of Rome, had the Papal See suffered such indignities. But the humiliation of the Sovereign Pontiff and the seizure of his dominions did not satisfy the ambition of Choiseul. The annexation of Corsica had long been a favourite idea of French policy, and the time was now come for putting the idea into execution.

Corsica had been in the possession of Genoa ever since 1481; but the rule of the Republic was oppressive, and the island became the scene of constant insurrections. The idea of selling their troublesome possession to France had in consequence been more than once entertained by the Genoese, but in 1743 England formally notified that she would not under any circumstances allow such a transaction. Gastaldi, the Genoese Minister, declared in reply that no such intention was entertained.^[2] During the war of the Austrian succession, England assisted the rebels, and even after the peace of Aachen clandestine support continued to reach the island, notwithstanding the issue of prohibitory Orders in Council in 1753 and 1763. When finally it became known that a fresh insurrection had been organised under the leadership of Pascal Paoli, the patriotic son of a patriotic father, and a man said to be as eminent for virtue and ability as the leader of the previous insurrection, Theodore Neuhof, a Westphalian adventurer, had been conspicuous for the opposite qualities, the enthusiasm for Corsican independence grew stronger than ever, especially after the publication of Boswell's account of his tour in the island. The material interests of England were also held by many to be at stake. Burke himself solemnly declared that "Corsica a French province was terrible to him."^[3] The advantages which as a naval station commanding the Mediterranean, it might give to any power desiring to interfere with the commerce and maritime supremacy of England, were insisted upon, and not without reason. On the other hand there were those who with Johnson "wished England to mind her own affairs, and to leave the Corsicans to mind theirs."^[4]

Whether the independence of Corsica from French control was an object worth contending for by arms may be doubted. The representatives of Chatham in the Ministry felt, however, that the friendship of France was only waiting for a convenient opportunity to be converted into overt hostility, and that any display of weakness on the part of England was likely to hasten the moment. It was desirable, therefore, to act with diplomatic vigour in a case in which not only were the sympathies of the nation strongly aroused, and the maritime interests of the country affected in a greater or less degree, but the course adopted by France was also a clear violation of existing treaties,^[5] and in direct contradiction with her own conduct in protesting against the occupation of the Falkland Islands by England as a violation of the status in quo. Again the moment was singularly favourable for the adoption by England of diplomatic action. The councils of the French ministry were as divided on the subject of Corsica as those of the English ministry on America,^[6] for the idea of occupying the island at this juncture was peculiarly Choiseul's own, and was therefore unpopular with his numerous enemies at court.^[7] Nor was their case weak, for Choiseul had traded on the party divisions in England to carry out his plan unmolested, and although the navy of France had been allowed to get out of repair with a view to economy, the finances of the country had not had time to recover sufficiently to bear the expense of hostilities.

The Genoese had for some time past been receiving assistance from France under a Convention made in 1764:^[8] the French undertaking to garrison several of the most important military positions in the island on behalf of the Genoese, who in return released a heavy debt owing to them by their allies. Before the end of 1767 France had become the creditor of the Genoese, and not expecting repayment entered for the second time into clandestine negotiations with Paoli, offering to recognise the independence of the island in exchange for the cession of the province of Capo Corso.^[9] The Genoese in alarm now fell back on the idea of selling the whole island to France, and after some preliminary negotiations signed a Treaty on May 15th, 1768, which practically carried out that object.^[10]

Notwithstanding the most sedulous efforts on the part of the High Contracting Powers to keep the Treaty secret, they were unable to prevent the rumour of its existence reaching England. Choiseul and du Chatelet, the latter of whom was now ambassador in London, made a bold but unsuccessful attempt to stifle discussion by solemnly declaring that they were "entirely ignorant of any such intention,"^[11] and that "they did not know what could occasion the rumour, and that no resolution was yet taken."^[12] Shelburne, however, knowing with whom he had to deal, refused to be deceived by the smooth assurances of the French Minister, and instructed Rochfort to demand an explanation from Choiseul in the most decided terms. At the same time desiring to have exact information as to the preparations of France and the resources of Corsica, he decided on sending a secret emissary on a tour of inspection through both countries, with instructions to report as soon as possible. With this object Mr. John Stewart an accomplished linguist was selected. He left England early in May, and began by traversing the whole of the north and east of France. He observed a complete absence of all naval preparations in the ports, great material distress in the large towns, and discontent in the German population of Alsace.^[13] He then proceeded to Italy.

Meanwhile differences of opinion were making themselves felt in the councils of the Ministry. "The Royal Cabinet," wrote Caracciolo, the Neapolitan Minister to Tanucci, "is not agreed. The Chancellor, the Duke of Grafton, and Lord Shelburne wish to support the Corsicans, these Lords retaining in their minds the manner of thinking of Lord Chatham, of whom they are the creatures; Lord Weymouth and all the Bedford party, on the contrary, are absolutely against taking any steps which may disturb the general tranquillity and peace. In fact Lord Weymouth has made no difficulty in discovering his sentiments, judging it not to interest this nation what may be the destiny of that island. Having, he says, as England has, the superiority at sea, the French will never be able either in war or peace to hinder their entrance into the ports of the Mediterranean; and in effect it was seen in the last war. France had troops in the maritime places of Corsica, and besides that Port Mahon, notwithstanding which the two fleets navigated that sea without any molestation or inconvenience. Lord Shelburne seems on the contrary to consider the affair as a thing of importance."^[14]

The affairs of America still further aggravated the position. Events had been marching with rapidity in the colonies, ever since the arrival of the news that Charles Townshend's taxes had received the consent of Parliament. Already on the 28th of October 1767, the inhabitants of Boston, in town meeting assembled, had entered into a non-importation agreement. The two succeeding months were spent in planning how to carry out the agreement. Opposition was determined upon first; the philosophy of opposition was invented afterwards. The distinction between internal and external taxation had been cunningly respected by Townshend, the taxes were port duties and therefore not internal taxation, and the old arguments clearly failed when used against them. It was necessary to look further. In the Farmer's Letters of John Dickenson of Pennsylvania the key-note of a new resistance was struck. "We," he argued, "being obliged to take commodities from Great Britain, special duties on their exportation to us are as much taxes upon us as those imposed by the Stamp Act. Great Britain claims and exercises the right to prohibit manufactures in America. Once admit that she may lay duties upon her exportations to us, for the purpose of levying money on us only, she then will have nothing to do but to lay those duties on the articles which she prohibits us to manufacture, and the catastrophe of American liberty is finished. We are in the situation of a besieged city surrounded in every part but one. If that is closed up no step can be taken but to surrender at discretion." The argument was the argument of Mansfield, stated in another shape and with an opposite object.^[15] Franklin acknowledged the force of the reasoning of the Farmer, and abandoned his previous opinions as to the essential difference of internal and external taxation—from a constitutional point of view.^[16]

On the 12th of January 1768 the assembly of Massachusetts solemnly passed an address to the English Ministry against the new taxation, and the appropriation of it. They also memorialised the King and the leading English statesmen—Shelburne in their number^[17]—and on the 4th of February resolved to inform the other Colonial Governments of their proceedings against the Acts "that if they thought fit they might join therein." Meanwhile Bernard, Hutchinson, and the Commissioners of Customs wrote to their official superiors exaggerating the disloyal feeling in the colonies, denouncing their liberties, and clamouring for troops. On the 15th of April the news of the circular letter of the 4th of February arrived in England. Hillsborough, now in high favour at Court, immediately ordered the Assembly in the harshest terms "to rescind the resolution which gave birth to it, and to declare their disapprobation of that rash and hasty proceeding." If the Assembly refused to comply they were to be dissolved. The other States were to be called upon to take no notice of the circular, and their Assemblies also were to be dissolved in the event of a refusal. Shelburne opposed this resolution, which recommended itself to the Bedford party and to the King.^[18]

"It is expected every day," wrote Whateley to Grenville, "that Lord Shelburne will be out. …^[19] About ten days ago Lord Chesterfield (who has always been remarkable for his intelligence) said to Irwin, 'I think I smell a change: I rather mean two changes; the first inconsiderable, introductory to a greater. During the interval I fancy Lord Barrington will be Secretary of State, but whatever is done, Mr. Grenville must be Minister before the meeting of Parliament.' Irwin thought by his manner that he spoke from some information which he did not explain, but it is certain that part of what his Lordship smelt ten days ago was become a general report just before I left London, where it was confidently said that Lord Shelburne was immediately to go out, and to be succeeded by Lord Barrington. … The present Solicitor-General seems even now in a doubtful situation; his principal connection I suppose to be Lord Shelburne, and the part he has taken in Wilkes' affair cannot recommend him."^[20]

Rigby at the same time was pushing Gower and Weymouth to unite with him in insisting with Grafton on the removal of Shelburne, who they said "betrayed them and opposed all their measures in Council." "The accusation," continues Walpole, "was not unwelcome either to the Duke or to the King. The former hated Shelburne for enjoying Lord Chatham's favour, and the King had not forgotten the tricks that Shelburne had played Lord Bute. To make the proposal still more palatable, the Cabal offered to His Majesty the choice of the Duke of Northumberland or Lord Egmont, his own creatures, of Lord Holdernesse anybody's creature, or of Lord Sandwich their own friend, to replace Lord Shelburne. Willing as he was to give up the last, the the King had adopted a rule of turning [out] no single man, both from pusillanimity, and from never being sorry to embarrass Ministers whom he had not taken from inclination."^[21]

The Bedfords next prevailed on the King through Grafton to name Mr. Lynch, one of their own friends, Minister to Turin.^[22] This was in Shelburne's department, but though he considered Lord Tankerville the "best man for the post," and resented the interference of Grafton, who had not even consulted him before recommending Mr. Lynch to the King, he accepted the explanations which were offered, and no immediate breach ensued.^[23]

Choiseul on receiving the protest of Shelburne against the annexation of Corsica, "declared to God that when he first thought of his plan he did not believe it could give the least umbrage to any Court in Europe, much less to that of England which was so far removed from the place of action. If, said he, we were not so far engaged in this business—for ten battalions are already landed in Corsica^[24]—seeing the alarm it gives your Court, I would give it up coûte que coûte, mais de le faire à présent nous serions déshonorés à jamais dans les yeux de tout le monde et la ruine tomberoit particulièrement sur mot. Ainsi que faire? Car pourtant il nest pas possible d'avoir la guerre pour la Corse. Cela seroit trop ridicule. Pourtant si on nous attaque il faudroit nous défendre. L'alternative est terrible."^[25] He at the same time declared his readiness to send the Treaty "when ratified" to the English Court,^[26] assuring them that they would find nothing objectionable in its clauses; that it was only a Treaty by which France took territorial security for the reimbursement of the expenses incurred and to be incurred on behalf of the Genoese; though he oddly enough confessed in conversation with Rochfort that he believed the Genoese would not only never be able to reimburse them, but never intended it, and that consequently France would always be in possession of the places ceded.^[27] The impression left on the mind of Rochfort was that France, alarmed at the unexpected display of vigour on the part of England, and being herself utterly unprepared, would yield. "Peace is certainly their present object," he wrote to Shelburne. "The very alarm the whole French nation is in at this moment is a strong voucher how much they dread a war, and it may be added that the Due de Choiseul is personally interested to prevent it."^[28] "I do not believe," he went on to say, "that in any other situation than that they are in at present, they would have taken so soft a tone, and your Lordship sees how apprehensive they are of what the King keeps to himself in reserve, when the contents of the Treaty shall be known."^[29]

On the 18th of June Shelburne received a copy of the definitive Treaty, which he at once submitted to the Cabinet.^[30]

It was their unanimous opinion that it served only to confirm the idea that an absolute cession of the Island of Corsica to the French was intended. "I had a long conversation after the Cabinet," Shelburne wrote to Rochfort, "with the Count du Châtelet, with a view to discover if possible the motives of such a step. But hitherto his instructions do not appear to go beyond the arguments which have been already used to your Excellency, such as the right both France and Genoa have to conclude a Treaty between themselves as independent States, without the intervention of any other Power; the little value of Corsica in itself, its importance to France alone from its vicinity, the openness of the whole proceeding on the part of France, and in fine the good intentions of France in general, as well as the particular disposition of the King, the interest of the present Ministers and the desire of the whole people to preserve the public tranquillity: the answers to which are so obvious and self-evident, that I have no doubt of your Excellency's having repeatedly urged them, it being clear that whatever right States may have to conclude Treaties amongst each other, it must be with a due regard to the obligations they have entered into by former Treaties, and if none of the powers concerned have claimed to exercise the guaranty of such Treaties, it furnishes still further ground of enquiry, what can the secret motives of Sovereigns be, who are apparently interested, and who on former occasions have been most forward in taking the alarm, to make them remain on the present occasion silent and indifferent.^[31]

"Next to that, as to the importance of Corsica itself, it does in truth appear in a light of defence so trifling an object and so little deserving the expense I may say already incurred, that that very consideration is sufficient to show that something more is meant, for it cannot be with any degree of credibility asserted that a power like France can really apprehend the enmity of a little island, which must feel itself too happy in its exemption from oppression to risk the heavy hand of a mighty kingdom like that of France, whose conduct in this whole affair has by no means been of a defensive nature, but carried on with that reserve and obscurity in the commencement of the design, and rapidity in its execution, which gives just reason to suspect further views than they even now profess; nor can we any more form a judgment at this time what this matter may end in, than we could at the end of March last foresee what has since happened, having only the same assurances to trust to.

"The experience of all ages shows us that facts alone are to be rested upon between nations, the professions of Ministers being in all times found dangerous and not to be relied upon. Your Excellency is sufficiently apprized of His Majesty's desire to maintain the public tranquillity, of the several proofs he has given of it upon different occasions, never declining to give the utmost satisfaction, where it has been desired with cordiality and with openness. If there is any instance which will bear a contrary surmise, your Excellency is aware that it has been owing not to His Majesty, but to others declining to come to that open and friendly adjustment of everything depending, which was professed to be their wish. On the other hand your Excellency must be sensible how different the conduct of the Court of France has been in this very instance. It is in vain for the French Minister to pretend that he was not apprized of the manner in which their getting possession of Corsica would be received here, for your Excellency warned him of it, at the time that he solemnly declared to you that no resolution whatever had been taken as to the Treaty in question. He afterwards assured your Excellency that the Convention would soon be made public even in the Paris Gazette, and that there was nothing but what had been done before by Vienna and France in furnishing the Genoese with auxiliaries to recover their own possessions; notwithstanding which a cession plainly appears on the face of the Treaty, and is so clearly the intention, that the Minister himself, in a subsequent conversation, did not scruple to avow, 'that he believed the Genoese would never be able to reimburse them, and even never intended it.' Add to this the alliances which France has since the late peace cultivated with the greatest assiduity, the several preparations which have been continually making both by France and Spain with a view to war sooner or later, the dry and unfriendly conduct of the latter, which is too well known to act under the influence of France, not to mention the several secret intelligences, to which your Excellency is no stranger, of the endeavours of France to keep alive in every part of His Majesty's dominions every principle of division.

"In this situation it is His Majesty's pleasure that your Excellency should use your utmost endeavours to learn the true motives of the Court of France taking a step in regard to Corsica, which for forty years past they have never ventured upon, though as far as regards Genoa it has been equally in their power; as well as to know the real object the Duke of Choiseul has in view: whether this has been upon a settled plan of the Court of France, or is a measure of the Duke of Choiseul's own, relying upon the reports he may have heard of party divisions, or the opinion he may have conceived of the unconnected state of England.

"In the meantime I am to acquaint your Excellency that nothing could surprise His Majesty more than the idea mentioned by your Excellency, 'que nous étions un peu adoucis sur cette affaire,'^[32] His Majesty's opinion having been always the same upon it."

Choiseul, on being informed of the tenour of the despatch, exclaimed, "Nous voilà à la guerre," but finding that this theatrical exhibition produced no effect he adopted a more serious tone. He told Rochfort that the king his master, as well as himself, was mortified beyond measure to find England had a mind to make Corsica a pretext for beginning a war, but that if England was really determined upon it, France could not possibly decline the challenge, for she could not retract what she had done in Corsica. He then endeavoured to defend himself against the accusation Shelburne had made against him of his conduct being contrary to his professions, as well as to the pacific principles supposed to be dear to his Court. To the first charge he answered, that when Rochfort first mentioned the affair of Corsica to him in March, the resolution to invade the island was indeed already taken, but the treaty not signed, and that as he had not the least idea it would give any alarm, the only motive for hurrying the affair was that Butofuoco, who had come to Paris as the emissary of Paoli, had assured him that Paoli would never consent to any French troops being sent thither; that at the same time the few French troops they had there were at Bastia, and in most of the other places they had none. He said he therefore hurried the transport of the troops before Paoli could get wind of the Treaty. With regard to the second accusation, of having acted contrary to those pacific principles which his Court had always professed, he said he would say nothing to that, but deny it and renew those professions, as he had orders from his master to do, in the strongest manner. "This is the substance of what he said to me," said Rochfort, "whether sincerely or no I will not pretend to determine, or make myself answerable for the asseverations of any minister whatever, especially a French one, but I will venture to declare, and that upon the strongest proofs, that there is nothing they dread so much at this moment as a war, and that there is scarce anything but they would do to avoid it."^[33]

Frederic the Great clearly saw the course which England now ought to pursue, but he was utterly distrustful of the Ministry. "Pour ce qui regarde l'Isle de Corse," he wrote to Maltzan, his Minister in London, "il pourroit m'être plutôt indifférent que la France tâche d'en faire l'acquisition en faveur d'un tiers, ou quelles autres vues elle pourroit avoir à cet égard. Je remarque seulement que le Gouvernement Anglois, manifestant si peu de vigueur dans ses mesures vis-à-vis de la France et de l'Espagne, rendra toujours plus entreprenantes ces deux couronnes, et's'imposera de la sorte à elle-même la necessite d'abandonner le système pacifique qu'il paroît avoir si fort à cœur au moment présent."^[34]

England could, had she chosen, have absolutely forbidden the passage of French troops, and those which were already landed would have been starved into surrender between the rebels on land and the fleet at sea. So obvious were these considerations, that it was believed in Paris that the English fleet had already received orders to sail.

"Everybody but those of the Duke of Choiseul's party were in the greatest alarm for fear of a war, and besides a notion prevailed of a general bankruptcy taking place. It was certain that the ordinary annual expenditure exceeded the receipts by 30,000,000 French livres. A war would increase the expenditure by 80,000,000 more, and by the best calculations the Revenue by doubling and tripling the vingtième would not be increased above 80,000,000."^[35] "A particular attention," said Rochfort, "to their public credit at this moment would give more light into their politics than any other observation."^[36] The passage of the French troops into Corsica went on but slowly, and active hostilities were not as yet begun. The departure of Chauvelin, the French Commander-in-chief, was put off till July 25th.^[37]

The temerity of the French Minister had placed his country in a difficult position. His enemies openly expressed their exultation; but he was extricated by the party divisions of English politics, on which with true prescience he had reckoned from the beginning.^[38]

The party of Bedford had been overruled in the Cabinet, but, unwilling to accept his defeat, Weymouth never ceased assuring the Ambassadors of the Great Powers that nothing would induce England to go to war for Corsica.^[39] These indiscreet utterances did not fail to reach the ears of the watchful du Châtelet. He left M. Frances in charge of the French Embassy, and himself hurried over to Paris to assure Choiseul that he could pursue his schemes in security. He received support from an unexpected quarter. "A great law-lord"—it was Mansfield—"being then in Paris declared at one of the Minister's tables that the English Ministry was too weak, and the nation too wise, to enter into a war for the sake of Corsica."^[40] In a moment everything was changed. "It is astonishing," wrote Rochfort to Shelburne, "how since Count Châtelet's arrival the language of everybody is changed, as he has made it his particular business to set it about that we shall not engage in war on account of their expedition."^[41] Chauvelin at once started for Corsica, followed by a formidable army.^[42]

Grafton now devised a scheme of his own. It was to send surreptitious assistance to the Corsicans. "Many thousand stand of arms were to be furnished from the stock in the Tower, yet so as to give no indication that they were sent from Government."^[43] The scheme combined every possible disadvantage. It excited and justified the hostility of the French, for secrecy in such a case was impossible. As a means of assisting the Corsicans it was ineffectual and ridiculous. Shelburne opposed it. He distrusted Paoli because of his previous intrigues with France,^[44] which he feared might be renewed if the help given by England were not open and real. If a modified help only was to be given it should be by the recognition of Corsica as a belligerent; but in reality the moment for a vigorous policy had gone by, as Grafton himself acknowledged.^[45] The Cabinet, "much vexed" at the opposition of Shelburne, took the scheme out of his hands,^[46] and without his consent they despatched Captain Dunant, a Genevese, on a mission to Corsica. Soon after this decision the report of Mr. Stewart arrived. Its picturesque description of the island, and of Paoli himself, may be compared with the contemporary description from the pen of Boswell.

 

Florence, 14th August, 1768.

We sailed the 1st August from Genoa, and on the 3rd came to anchor in St. Fiorenzo Bay. We fell in with a large vessel, a two-decker, and a chebec of twenty guns, but neither of them came near enough to speak with us. The first thing we spied ashore was a camp, which by the help of glasses we found consisted of Horse and Foot, and was well fortified towards the land. This gave us suspicions of hostilities being already begun, which, by return of the boat from shore, we found well grounded. She brought word that the French, the day before, had attacked and carried two villages with some loss, that the General's brother was within six or seven miles, with about 2000 men, and that Paoli himself was expected that night with about 3000 more from Corte. Upon this I determined to go ashore without loss of time, and endeavour to get up the country to where the General's brother lay.

Two gentlemen from the frigate went along with me, and a Corsican, a man of some consideration in the country, whom we had brought from Genoa with us. We landed in a rocky bay near Mortella, and followed the sea shore about two miles till we came to Fornali, a small post opposite to the French camp, with a miserable tower and some broken cannon. The country presented a rude aspect, high mountains and barren rocks, and the appearance of the inhabitants was every way suitable. They were all in arms, every man with his gun, pistol, and stiletto stuck in his girdle. They are clothed in short jackets of coarse brown cloth with cap, breeches, and stockings of the same; this with their dark complexion and long black beards gives them a horrid and savage look. But those impressions soon wore off with us, when we found ourselves received with such expressions of joy and so greatly caressed by those poor creatures, and considered them as a small oppressed people, defending their liberties, unassisted, against the whole power of France. They never doubted, however, of our bringing immediate assistance to them. "Viva l'Inghilterra, viva," was our welcome everywhere, and the very women as we went along would cry, "Brave Englishmen, save us from the French." At Fornali we were furnished with mules to carry us on, with eight men well armed to escort us. We set out about their twenty-third hour, half an hour before sunset. We had to go behind St. Fiorenzo, and our guides by negligence led us under the cannon of the place, which, however, gave us an opportunity of viewing their batteries across the bay. The only one of any consequence seemed to be of twelve cannons à fleur d'eau. The French fired a gun as we went along: the Corsicans immediately fell flat on their faces, but it proved only the retreat, so we were quit for our fears.

The village we intended for (Oletta), as I have observed before, lies behind St. Fiorenzo. After crossing a pretty high mountain, we descended into a valley called the Plain of Nebbio, which traverses the island towards Isola Rossa, and may be about three miles wide. Night overtook us here, but the sides of the mountain were all in a flame from the fires at the different villages, to prevent a surprise in the night. We travelled on directed by those lights, not without apprehension of being fired upon by Corsicans as well as French. At length we arrived at the foot of the mountain on which Oletta stands, but the path we had hitherto followed became all at once impracticable, by stones, bushes, and trenches cut to obstruct an enemy's approach. Our guides, after consulting among themselves, told us it would be dangerous to attempt going any farther this way, but said they would carry us to a village on the right about four miles distant. They recommended to us the most profound silence, particularly to beware speaking a foreign language, that we might not be taken for French. We put ourselves entirely under their direction, and followed through steep and rugged paths, continually on the ascent, where ten men may keep off a hundred, and at last arrived about midnight at the village of Oletta. One of the poor fellows had kept in advance the whole way singing Corsican songs, as a notice to any of their parties who might be out. We found the village on the alert. They challenged us regularly and made us halt till they acquainted their commandant, but no sooner were we admitted and known to be "Inglesi," than they all crowded round us without distinction, men, women, children, priests, and monks, jumping upon our necks, kissing our hands, and making the strongest transports of joy. I own the scene affected me much. "The King of England," said an Abbé, resting on his piece, "is a generous prince; I always said he would not let the Corsicans be oppressed. How many ships are there at Mahon? and when do you expect the rest here?" My Lord will easily conceive that in our situation it neither would have been safe nor polite to contradict their expectations, so we replied with general professions of friendship, waiving answers to particular questions the best way we could. They told us we were lucky in not getting to Oletta, for it would certainly be attacked that night, and they further informed us that the General was come down and lay that night at Mureta about three miles off. He was immediately acquainted of our arrival, and next morning we had horses from him to bring us up. We found him at the convent of the Franciscans with several of his officers about him, and his guards in the Court. He received us with great kindness and affability. If the short time I stayed with him will entitle me to pronounce upon character, I should not scruple to say, he is indeed a very great man. His conversation was elegant, sensible, and discovered vast knowledge of men and things. But I shall confine myself to give my Lord Shelburne the substance of what passed between us relative to the affairs of Corsica, hoping his Lordship will excuse the preceding detail of the journey, which I give merely as affording a better idea of the people than I could perhaps convey in another method, not presuming that in any other light it could be interesting.

I had taken the precaution to carry along with me a letter from Mr. Holford,^[47] recommending me to the General's civilities, and assuring him that he might open himself to me in full confidence, as far as he judged proper. I begun with telling him that I had left England very lately, that the affairs of Corsica were then much the object of public attention; that the English nation in general were much disposed in his favour; that for my part I visited him from mere curiosity and from an earnest desire to serve him if it lay in my power; that I proposed soon to return to England, and should be able to convey safely and directly to the Ministry whatever he thought proper to impart. He said he was much obliged to the people of England; that he was conscious their own interest, jealousy of France, and even sympathy with a people struggling for their liberties, must operate strongly for him with the bulk of the nation, yet he had small hopes of the producing good effects till he had some indication of the sentiments of the Ministry upon their affairs. I told him that I could not take upon me to say with precision what their sentiments might be, but this I was sure, that they were too enlightened and too attentive to the interests of the nation, to let the affairs of Corsica pass over in indifference, and that I was even convinced they were disposed to interfere as far as the honour and safety of Great Britain would permit. As to the rest, he must know that in Governments like ours, the sentiments of the people must have no small influence upon the Councils of the State. He then seemed to hint, as if he suspected that I had some commission for him which I was only to open according as I found his situation to be. I protested to him in the strongest and most solemn manner that I had no commission of that sort, and repeated to him again, that as a private man he would find me a true and hearty friend ready to serve him; that I could find means to convey his wishes to the English Ministry, and begged he would open himself to me without reserve. He then said, he was now convinced there was no disguise on my part, and that he would no longer have any reserve for me. He began by telling me, that he looked upon his nation as ruined without foreign assistance; that he was destitute of money, ammunition, and provisions and other implements of war; that his people were already dispirited by the losses that happened two days ago; that the two villages taken by the French (Barbagio and Patrimonio) gave them the entire communication between Bastia and St. Fiorenzo and cut off from him the whole province of Capo Corso, with the island of Capraia. He said the manner the French took to possess themselves of these posts was mean and treacherous; that M. Marbœuf always declared he would not begin to act till the 6th of August, when the Convention of four years should be expired, but that on the 1st, he sent a line to his nephew who commanded at Patrimonio, telling him that he had orders from the King his master to open the communication between St. Fiorenzo and Bastia, and that if he was not disposed to grant it, he might prepare to defend himself, for that in the meantime he had put the troops in march: half an hour after this, the villages were attacked. He blamed his nephew very much for allowing himself to be surprised, and suspected some treachery on the part of an officer whom he did not name; but I own I think there was a negligence on his (Paoli's) part, to leave a post of that importance in the possibility of a surprise; as to the rest, I acquitted him altogether of collusion. I watched him exceeding narrowly when he spoke of it and could perceive him much agitated, in a manner that seemed natural and unaffected.^[48]

The loss the Corsicans sustained was very trifling, only five men killed and forty prisoners. The French lost four officers and a great many men. I suggested to him that it was worth while to attempt the recovery of these posts, that it would be a coup d'éclat and greatly serve his cause with the people all over Europe. He said he had meditated a great stroke, when the Convention should be expired. He had formed a project to burn the magazines, and carry off the provisions from the neighbourhood of Bastia, but that M. Marbœuf had got the better of him by breaking the truce; that at present he could attempt nothing; that the French were too well fortified in their posts to dream of retaking them, and that a defeat would ruin him for ever; but he said, if he were assisted and St. Fiorenzo attacked by sea, he would engage to keep off all succours from Bastia and would even assault their camp behind; but with the assistance of England alone he could do everything, and it would be impossible for the French to succeed; but as it was at present, he looked upon the Corsicans as devoted to destruction, and with every nation in Europe wishing well to their cause, abandoned by them all. As to England in particular, he did not doubt but at this very moment she was deliberating on the part she ought to take, but while Rome deliberated Saguntum was lost. She would however find, when it was too late, that Corsica would give the French the dominion of the Mediterranean Sea. "The King of Sardinia," he said also, "whose interests are so nearly concerned, looks tamely on, but who knows but he may live to repent it? Should the Corsicans driven from their own country, as their last refuge in despair fell upon Sardinia, it would become an easy conquest to them, and all his power would not be able to tear it out of their hands, unless like the Genoese he called in his friends the French to retake the island, and gave it them for their pains." He complained much of the extreme backwardness he had always experienced in the English Ministry to treat with him directly; that he had not found the same delicacy in the nations most closely allied with the Genoese; that he had treated with the Ministers of Spain, Sardinia, Naples, and the Pope, and had been in close correspondence for four years with M. de Choiseul. I interrupted him and said, that perhaps this very correspondence had made the English Ministers more shy; that he must have heard that the French gave out that they acted in concert with him, and that it was even universally believed that he had great offers made him from the Court of Versailles. He replied that he knew too well that such reports were current, that they had even prevailed among his own people for some time, but he would show to the whole world that they were false and insidious. He protested he never had any such offers from France, that there had not been found a man hardy enough to propose them. "Besides," added he, "what temptation can France throw in my way equal to the loss of the reputation, small as it is, which I have acquired already? I covet neither riches nor pleasures, and have no children nor family to establish: I should live execrated by my own country and despised by France itself." He said that the only hint of that sort he ever received was three years ago, when on occasion of the vacancy of the Regiment of Royal Corse, he ventured to recommend Colonel Butofuoco to the Due de Choiseul. His answer was, that the King proposed to incorporate that Regiment with the Royal Italian, but that if he had views that way either for himself or his brother, His Majesty might take other arrangements, and would, he believed, listen to any further proposal on his part. But he declared that since the late Treaty with the Genoese he has had no correspondence directly nor indirectly with M. Choiseul, that before it was signed he sent Butofuoco to remonstrate against it; that the Duke affected to be much offended, saying, Paoli took too much the tone of equality with France, but since that, has often spoken to Butofuoco regretting his (Paoli's) obstinacy, saying that he is a ruined man; and has succeeded in frightening Butofuoco (whom he takes still to be an honest man) upon his account.

I ventured then to say that I perceived he had once been on a very good footing with M. Choiseul, and was surprised at the present change. He said he would make no scruple to inform me of the substance of all their negotiations together.

Soon after the close of the late war, when he found all application to England, the natural protector to Corsica, was in vain, having tried it by my Lord Bristol and others, he next thought of turning towards France. At this very time there came to him, with an offer of his service, an officer, whose name I forgot, who had killed his colonel in France. He was a man of parts and address, but Paoli soon found out that he had formerly been employed in Russia as a spy for the French, and was now sent in the same capacity to him. He let him know he was discovered and in his power, but proposed to him to save himself and serve both France and Corsica, by carrying proposals from him to the Due de Choiseul. He readily accepted the alternative, and Paoli says, executed his commission with fidelity and address, and that even by means of this agent he had almost concluded an alliance with Corsica, upon an independent footing, with France, when M. Praslin stepped in with his four years' Convention with the Genoese, which he (Paoli) says, the Duc de Choiseul always called the Traité Marchandé.^[49] By the Treaty which Paoli meditated at this time, Corsica was to be declared a free nation under the protection of France, attached perpetually and inseparably to her interests, the enemies of the one to be the enemies of the other and their . friendships mutual. The advantages which he held out to engage M. Choiseul were these: he showed the great resource it offered for recruiting the armies and navies of France, and how by its situation it would enable her to give the law to all the Italian states. The King of Sardinia would absolutely hold his island at their discretion, and Piémont itself would be open to her attacks; Genoa, Tuscany, the Pope, Naples and Sicily, would lay equally under the rod, and while these last were in danger, even Spain would be obliged more than ever to cultivate a union with France. As to the English they would no longer be able to domineer in those seas; their fleets might parade in vain at Gibraltar and Mahon, while their trade to Genoa, Leghorn, Civita Vecchia, Naples and all the Levant would lay totally at the mercy of the cruisers from Cape Corse; and their Newfoundland trade, their boasted nursery of seamen, would fail them of course. In the meantime, the French having command of the ports, timber, and seamen of Corsica, would raise her marine to a pitch it never reached before.

I have been particular as to the advantages held out by Paoli to the French at that time, because it is plain that they will equally arise from the possession they now aspire at, and by a parallel reasoning would equally accrue to the English, were they in the place of the French.

When Paoli mentioned the seamen of Corsica, I asked him what number he reckoned upon the island. He said, there were about 4000 in the province of Cape Corse, about 900 coral fishers at Ajaccio, and about 1000 seamen more in the rest of the island, but added he, "if the nation were once established in peace, their numbers would be doubled in a few years." I took notice that I saw few or no forests on the mountains where we were; he said they lay in the De la de Monte, that upon the occasion we were speaking of, they had been visited by two inspectors from France, who reported, that there was timber enough, easy to be transported to the sea-shore, capable to supply the royal arsenals for 100 years.

Paoli continued to relate the negotiations he had with France. After his project was broke off by the Convention with Genoa, he continued still to correspond with M. Choiseul, and still flattered himself, through his means to bring about something beneficial to his country. In fact there was at length a Treaty of mediation between them and the Genoese set on foot.^[50] My Lord Shelburne was duly and exactly informed of this Treaty at the time by Sir Horace Mann, which makes it needless for me to enlarge upon it here. I shall only observe, that the French played the part of a true mediator, wanting to reserve the substance to themselves and give to each party a shell. They asked improperly, Bastia, St. Fiorenzo and the whole province of Cape Corse. Paoli persisted obstinately in refusing this. Butofuoco was his agent, and he told me at last, that he gave secret orders to him (Butofuoco) to consent as a pis aller to receive French garrisons into the two towns; but M. Choiseul even rejected this, saying, "that the King was weary of garrisoning towns for other Powers," and so the Treaty broke off. Paoli says, he now knows, that M. Choiseul was never sincere, that he only used his name and the negotiation with him, as means to frighten the Genoese into the cessions which he has now obtained.

When Paoli had concluded this account, I returned to the present situation of affairs. I told him that if England should interfere and a war with France be the consequence, the English Ministry would no doubt be glad to know with what force he could act in the common cause. He said, he could arm between 30,000 and 40,000 men on the island, besides about 4000 at sea. I mentioned to him that I had seen a chart of Corsica taken from a Genoese survey in 1736, with a list annexed of the inhabitants in the different districts amounting in all to no more than 116,000, which according to the common computation of one-fifth, could not give more than 23,000 fit to bear arms. He replied, he believed the Genoese estimate to have been pretty exact at the time, but that since that, the population was greatly increased and many families returned to the country who were then scattered abroad. That there was no exemptions of rank in their militia, few men altogether useless from age, and that even their boys were of service by the time they were able to bear a gun, in fine, that he could undertake positively to act with 30,000 men. I then observed that, although it was never the spirit of the English nation to endeavour to bridle the people she came to protect, yet it was natural to suppose some towns would be expected to be put in her hand, as ports for fleets and markets for her trade; he said, in the way of absolute property, nothing of that sort could ever be granted, but as to garrisoning certain towns, that would offer no difficulty he believed. "But," says he, "there will be little occasion for this; England has a nobler part to play, she has only to declare herself the protector of the Corsican nation, and France must give way. When she sets forth new claims in America, she meets the jealousy of all Europe, whether her cause be just or no. But in this she would have all Europe to support her, even the Princes of the Bourbon family would wish her success.^[51] She has only to say, she asks nothing for herself, but since the Genoese keep Corsica, let it be free, let the fortifications be demolished, and the ports laid open to all nations. It is plain that Genoa cannot put France in possession of Corsica, so that the latter must trust to conquest alone. When England formerly had reduced Bastia and St. Fiorenzo, and abandoned them afterwards,^[52] she surely meant it in favour of the Genoese, not to be given away to the French." A language of this sort, Paoli said, would put England in a glorious point of view, and would certainly have its full effect. He assured me there is a secret Article in the Treaty which he heard from a noble Genoese, and which he affirms to be as certain as the Treaty itself, which stipulates that in case England should intermeddle seriously in the affair, so that it be prudent for France to draw back, that then they should put the Genoese once more in possession of Calvi, Ajaccio and Bonifacio, keeping Bastia, St. Fiorenzo and Cape Corse, as a security in their hands for the reimbursement of the sums they may have expended in the attempt.^[53]

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

In the conversations which I held with Paoli, I found him clear and intelligent, seeming to understand perfectly the interests of the different nations of Europe, and even well informed of what passes at their Courts. He is no stranger to the nature of our constitution, and even of the different factions which prevail among us. He knows the names of our present Ministers and the different ranks in which they stand; he mentions particularly my Lord Shelburne in whose department (he said) the Corsican affairs lay. He appears thoroughly well acquainted with both ancient and modern history, speaks his own language with remarkable eloquence, and the foreign languages rather imperfectly, although he understands them all. He translates English currently from the book. As to his management with the Corsicans, he seems to have them in a tolerable degree of subjection, merely by that ascendant which a man of parts and knowledge is sure to acquire over weak and uncultivated minds, and I find that like Numa and Mahomet he does not scruple to employ even visions, revelations, and dreams to strengthen his power. Religion seems to sit easy upon him, and notwithstanding what his historian Boswell relates, I take him to be very free in his notions that way. This I suspect both from the strain of his conversation, and from what I have learnt of his conduct towards the clergy and monks. If after all, I may venture to pronounce wherein I think him deficient, I should say it is in personal courage. The manner in which he answered when I endeavoured to spur him on to some spirited action, gave me first this idea, and then his complaints of sickness and feverishness as an excuse for his inactivity, seems unsoldierlike and equivocal at best. I ventured to hint this suspicion to a gentleman at Florence, a man of penetration and sense, who knows Paoli well and admires him much; he owned, he always had the same suspicion, and says he never understood that Paoli ever exposed his person in any action with the Genoese. To make up for this defect, he has an elder brother whom he puts forward on all occasions, a true lion, and who joins to constitutional bravery a religious fanaticism, which often leads to great and noble deeds. A priest told me "Signor Clemente de Paoli was always with his hands lifted up before the altar, or with a sword in them in the field fighting the enemies of his country.^[54]

 

Grafton, on receiving Mr. Stewart's letter which those of Captain Dunant confirmed, could now only indulge in useless lamentations on the "unfortunate ignorance he had been in as to the disposition of the Corsicans, as well as their power to resist the attacks preparing against them by the French," as otherwise a more decided course of action would have been followed.^[55] But the moment for action was gone by. "Dum Romæ consulitur, Saguntum expugnatur,"^[56] exclaimed Paoli, as the enemies of his country closed around him. The islanders after a desperate struggle were forced to submit, and Paoli himself fled to England.

Grafton having failed to expel the French from Corsica, now betook himself to the easier task of expelling Shelburne from the Cabinet. To this he was perpetually urged by the Bedfords and by the King, from whom instigations to remove Shelburne fell daily.^[57] Wilkes had on May loth been elected for Middlesex and the King remembered the events of 1763.^[58] The Princess Dowager went about declaring that Shelburne was the only person in the world more guilty of habitual deception than Holland.^[59] Even Camden had for some time past looked askant at him,^[60] for the conduct of Shelburne on American questions was a perpetual commentary on the weakness of Camden, and it was the affairs of America which were now bringing matters to a crisis.

The riots which took place in Boston on the 10th June, in consequence of the seizure of the Romney sloop by the Custom House authorities, had raised excitement in that town to the highest pitch. In the midst of the excitement the circular letter of Hillsborough arrived. The Assembly refused to comply with the demands it contained, and was accordingly dissolved on the 21st of June; but not before it was known that Massachusetts would not lack the support of other Colonies. On the 19th July the riots became known in England. The news was closely followed by letters from the Crown officers announcing an insurrection and demanding troops. The Bedford party insisted on the necessity of using force, and did so with the greater acrimony, because they hoped that one result of such a course being adopted would be the resignation of Shelburne,^[61] who openly "declared that the difficulty was much exaggerated; that it was understood in its origin, its principles, and its consequences, that it would be absurd to wish to send to America a single additional soldier or vessel of war to reduce colonies which would return to the mother-country of themselves from affection and from interest, when once the form of their contributions should be agreed upon."^[62] His place was now offered to Egmont, but refused by the latter, who declared that he could not take office without Grenville.^[63]

The battle in the Cabinet raged all through August and September. It was decided to send troops, and troops were sent. Bernard clamoured for more troops, and more troops were sent.^[64] The Bedford party was not however satisfied.^[65] "The Administration," wrote Knox, the Under Secretary of State, to Grenville, "are all, except Lord Shelburne, agreed upon coercive measures. The Chancellor is wholly and absolutely of that opinion."^[66] At the same time Shelburne was the only member of the Cabinet opposed to moving for the expulsion of Wilkes from the House of Commons, which was now clamorously demanded by the King's friends.^[67]

On the 5th of October Grafton wrote to Hayes to inform Chatham that he insisted on the dismissal of Shelburne. Chatham had not seen Shelburne or written to him since the ride to Bromley, but he now roused himself to protest. "Lord Shelburne's removal," he said, "would never have his consent nor concurrence; he thought it quite contrary to the King's service. He had a great regard and friendship for him, and considered that his abilities made him necessary in the office he was in, to the carrying on of the King's business."^[68] He would think his removal most unhappy and very unfortunate for His Majesty's service,^[68] and he could not sufficiently lament it; and declared his own resolution of resigning the Privy Seal, in consequence of his dismissal from the Secretaryship of State, and that of Sir Jeffery Amherst from the Government of Virginia.^[69]

The dismissal, however, never took place. On October 19th Shelburne obtained an audience of the King. "He did not hint his design to any of the Ministers; he only desired Lord Weymouth would let him go in alone, as he had something particular to say to the King, and at coming out, told Lord Northington that he might, if he pleased, tell the Ministers a piece of news, for that he had just resigned the Seals."^[70] The Bedfords now remained masters of the field. They at once made their power felt. Led by the Duke himself, they proposed and carried an address to the Crown to bring over and prosecute in England all who had been engaged in treasonable practices in America. For this purpose an obsolete statute of Henry VIII. was to be revived, and the first speech which Shelburne made from the Opposition benches was against this proposal.^[71] At the same time the expulsion of Wilkes from the House of Commons was determined upon.

On the day preceding Shelburne's resignation, which was followed by that of Barré, a squib, popularly attributed to Wilkes,^[72] was published in the Public Advertiser, describing the leading characters of the Administration, and reproducing with a few changes a jeu d'esprit which had appeared about a year before in the same journal under the signature of Correggio.^[73] It purported to contain a vision of the masquerade given by the King of Denmark at the Opera House on the 10th of October. Grafton was Janus, Chatham was King Lear, Weymouth was the landlord of the Bedford Arms. "But no piece," so had said Correggio, "could be complete without a young man who will make a capital figure. His features are too happily marked to be mistaken. A single line of his face will be sufficient to give us the heir apparent of Loyola and all the College. A little more of the devil my lord if you please about the eye-brows; that's enough, a perfect Malagrida I protest! So much for his person, and as for his mind, a blinking bull-dog^[74] placed near him will form a very natural type of all his good qualities." Following in the steps of Correggio, the "Dreamer of Dreams" in the Public Advertiser placed Shelburne on his stage as a Jesuit.^[75] The sobriquet thus invented stuck to its object, and Shelburne for ever after appeared in every caricature of the day in the guise of the famous Portuguese ecclesiastic, who some years before had been strangled and burnt by orders of Pombal, for his real or supposed share in the conspiracy of the Duc d'Aveiro.^[76]

The circumstances of Shelburne's career had not rendered the imputations of insincerity embodied in the appellation unnatural in the eyes of those who were not behind the scenes of the political world. The country was constantly being reminded that "the Earl of Shelburne had initiated himself in business by carrying messages between the Earl of Bute and Mr. Fox, and was for some time a favourite with both,"^[77] and then the changes were rung on the eternal story of the "pious fraud." The ambiguous position he had for some time past occupied in a ministry, from the chief measures of which he was known to differ, could be justified by facts known only to a few persons; while the politicians best acquainted with the wheels within wheels of the recent negotiations, were also those most interested in making the character and conduct of Shelburne appear in an unfavourable light. His sudden rise to very high office when a young man increased the number of his enemies. Those who were ready to declare "that before he was an ensign he thought himself fit to be a general, and to be a leading minister before he ever saw a public office," were not unwilling to add that "his life was a satire on mankind," and, while telling the public, in the solemn tones of virtuous indignation, "that the treachery which deserts a friend might be a virtue compared to the fawning baseness which attaches itself to a declared enemy,"^[78] they pointed the moral with the story, how Chatham—who was congratulated that "Shelburne had not acted to him with greater insincerity than to his former connections"^[79]—having become the "idol" of Shelburne, "introduced him into the most difficult department of State, and left him there to shift for himself."^[80] "It was a masterpiece of revenge," said Atticus.^[81] "Unconnected, unsupported, he remains in office without interest or dignity, as if the income were an equivalent for all loss of reputation. Without spirit or judgment to take an advantageous moment for retiring, he submits to be insulted as long as he is paid for it. But even his abject conduct will avail him nothing. Like his great archetype, the vapour on which he rose deserts him, and now

Fluttering his pennons vain, plumb down he drops."^[82]

Shelburne himself frequently declared that he belonged to no party; and a great statesman of the previous century had recorded the opinion that even the best party is but a kind of conspiracy against the rest of the nation. But Sir George Savile, Marquis of Halifax, was rewarded by being called a Trimmer after his own book, but in no complimentary sense, by both the factions whose ill-will he had equally gained. The leader who leaves one party without frankly going over to the other may beckon to the people with his hand in the hope that they will listen; but his too frequent fate has been to be met, like the prophet of old, with the angry cry: "What is thy country, and of what people art thou."

After, however, making full allowance for the circumstances of his political position, it remains clear from the unanimity of contemporary testimony that certain faults of manner greatly contributed to injure Shelburne's reputation. While no man obtained more general recognition of his abilities in office, or was able to surround himself with a more devoted body of friends, an overstrained affectation of extreme courtesy, and a habit of using unnecessary compliments in conversation, gained him the reputation with the general public of saying more than he really meant. Even in France, where studied civility would, in those days at least, have met with greater acceptance, his style was not universally popular. An old blind lady of eighty-two writes: "Lord Shelburne has flattered me extremely; he assures me that he shall come again next year singly and solely for the pleasure of seeing me."^[83] Again, his fondness for foreign society and his Irish extraction made it possible for his political enemies to insinuate, with considerable effect in a time of national prejudices, that he was hardly an Englishman either by birth or in character. "Where," said one of the lampoon writers of the day addressing him:

 

"Where shall I then begin, where end?
But as I wish to be your friend,
⁠Your lineage first I'll trace.
Pray then which would you choose to be,
Since double is your family tree—
⁠Of Teague or Saxon race?

"Shall I to Maurice quite go back,
Who Scotchman-like erst bore a pack,
⁠A merchant in those days;
Or as I mean not here to fret ye,
Shall I commence with surgeon Petty,
⁠Well versed in land surveys?"^[84]

 

The same notion more delicately expressed may be read in the following letter from Lady Rockingham: "Lady Rockingham presents her compliments to Lord Shelburne. She is totally at a loss what to say for so elegant a requital, beyond all measure and bounds, for the miserable box of Vinigritto snuff which she sent him yesterday (in haste) to take to the House of Lords, imagining, from his message to Lord Rockingham, that he wanted some of that snuff to take with him there, which made her take the liberty of sending some ready-mixed in the first box she could find, and such a one as the sight of this he has done her the honour to send in return would make her ashamed to recollect, but that she only meant it just to convey the snuff to his own snuff-box. It is a serious distress to Lady Rockingham to rob Lord Shelburne of not only much too elegant a box, but also (being crystal) of one that is of all others the most proper for Vinigritto. At the same time she supposes she must not take the liberty of returning it; that would be too English: she is almost tempted to say that his Lordship's extreme politeness is too French."^[85]

The imputation of insincerity was, indeed, indignantly denied by those who had the most abundant opportunities of knowing Shelburne intimately. Franklin and Morellet repeatedly insisted on his perfect straightforwardness, and attributed the attacks made upon him to jealousy;^[86] Mlle. de l'Espinasse considered frankness to be one of the distinguishing characteristics of his nature;^[87] and it was of Shelburne that Sir W. Jones quoted the line of Shakespeare,

"He was my friend, faithful and just to me;"

but Burke, to whom Sir W. Jones quoted the line, and all the Rockingham Whigs, said Shelburne was insincere, and Burke and the Rockingham Whigs were very honourable men in the estimation of the world.

 

1. Coxe, Memoirs of the Bourbon Kings, iii. 336.
2. "Précis of previous History of the Relations of England and Corsica." Lansdowne House MS.
3. Cavendish Debates, i. 40.
4. Boswell's Johnson, ed. Birckbeck Hill, ii. 22.
5. The 15th Article of the Treaty of Aachen ran as follows: "It has been settled and agreed upon between the High contracting powers, that for the advantage and maintenance of the peace in general, and for the tranquillity of Italy in particular, all things shall remain there in the condition they were in before the war, saving and after the execution of the dispositions made by the present Treaty."
6. Rochfort to Shelburne, June 2nd, July 7th.
7. Rochfort to Shelburne, June 30th.
8. Martens, Recueil des Traités, i. 265.
9. Mann to Shelburne, May 14th, 1768. On the first negotiation between France and Paoli, see infra, p. 380.
10. Martens, Recueil des Traités, i. 591.
11. Shelburne to Rochfort, May 13th, 1768.
12. Rochfort to Shelburne, March 31st, 1768.
13. Stewart to Shelburne, June, July 1768.
14. Caracciolo to Tanucci, May 27th, June 3rd, 1768.
15. See supra, p. 265.
16. Franklin to Cooper, June 8th, 1770. Works, v. 259. Franklin republished his Farmer's Letters in London with a Preface signed N. N., v. 127.
17. The House of Representatives to Shelburne, January 15th, 1768.
18. Circular letter of Hillsborough, April 21st, 1768.
19. Whateley to Grenville, May 21st, 1768. Grenville Papers, iv. 296.
20. Whateley to Grenville, June 4th, 1768. Grenville Papers, iv. 300.
21. Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of George III., iii. 222, 223.
22. Ibid., iii. 244.
23. Grafton to Shelburne, June 10th; Shelburne to Grafton, June 11th, 1768.
24. Where they at once said publicly that the island was to be annexed.—Gazettino di Corsica, June 17th, 1768.
25. Rochfort to Shelburne, June 2nd, 1768.
26. Choiseul to Rochfort, June 5th, 1768.
27. Rochfort to Shelburne, June 2nd, 1768.
28. Rochfort to Shelburne, June 2nd, 1768.
29. Rochfort to Shelburne, June 6th, 1768.
30. The material clauses of the Treaty were the following (Martens, tome i. 591).

    "Article I. Le Roi de France fera occuper par ses troupes les places de Bastia, St. Florent, d'Algazala, Calvi, Ajaccio, Bonifacio, ainsi que les autres Places, Forts, Tours, ou Ports, situés dans l'Isle de Corse, et qui sont nécessaires à la sûreté des Troupes de Sa Majesté, et au but que se proposent le Roi et la Sérénissime République de Gênes, d'ôter tout moyen aux Corses de nuire aux sujets et aux possessions de la République.

    "Article II. Les Places et Forts occupés par les Troupes du Roi seront possédés par S. M., qui y exercera tous les droits de la Souveraineté, et lesdits Places et Forts, ainsi que lesdits droits, lui serveront de nantissement vis-à-vis de la République de la dépense que le Roi sera obligé de faire, soit pour occuper, soil pour conserver lesdits Places et Forts.

    "Article X. Toutes les concessions particulières, exemptions, franchises, ou priviléges dont jouissoient en terre ferme quelques peuples ou habitans de l'Isle seront abolis, et S. M. prendra en considération les dédommagements qu'elle pourra accorder spécialement aux habitans de St. Bonifacio, de Calvi et de Florent.

    "Article II. (séparé). Si par la suite l'intérieur de l'Isle se soumettoit à la domination du Roi, S. M. s'engage envers la République de Gênes à n'en point disposer sans son consentement en faveur d'un tiers."
31. In allusion to the conduct of the empire, which in 1737 had guaranteed the status in quo in Corsica. An alliance between Austria and France was now suspected.
32. "Choiseul read to me a great part of Count Châtelet's letter, which wa very long, in which he gave an account of the conference he had with your Lordship, and by the tenour of his despatch, it appeared that he thought our alarms with regard to Corsica were quieted. Some parts of the letter the Due de Choiseul read to himself, and after he had finished, he said: 'Je vois avec plaisir que vous êtes un peu adoucis sur cette affaire.'" Rochfort to Shelburne, June 23rd, 1768.
33. Rochfort to Shelburne, July 4th, 1768. Compare the despatch of July 11th, relating to a subsequent conversation which began and ended in a similar manner, quoted by Coxe, History of the Bourbon Kings, iii. ch. 66. Only half the conversation is there recorded. It was subsequently and not antecedently to this latter conversation that a change of front took place on the part of Choiseul.
34. Le Roi de Prusse au Comte de Maltzan, June 7th, 1768.
35. Rochfort to Shelburne, July 25th, 1768.
36. Rochfort to Shelburne, July 25th, 1768.
37. Rochfort to Shelburne, July 14th, 1768.
38. Rochfort to Shelburne, June 30th, 1768.
39. Caracciolo to Tanucci, May 27th, June 3rd, 1768.
40. The Duke of Grafton's Autobiography, 204.
41. Rochfort to Shelburne, July 14th and 21st, 1768.
42. Stewart to Shelburne, August 14th, 1768.
43. Autobiography of the Duke of Grafton, 207.
44. Shelburne to Mann, June 18th, 1768.
45. Grafton to Shelburne, September 15th, 1768, in answer to Shelburne.
46. Autobiography of the Duke of Grafton, 203-208. Parliamentary History, xviii. 1390. Speech of Shelburne. "I was left alone, and deserted by all my colleagues in office and brethren in the Cabinet."
47. English Consul at Genoa.
48. A letter from Rochfort to Shelburne, August 1768, represents every one at Paris—with the exception of the friends of Choiseul—as ashamed of this piece of treachery.
49. In 1764.
50. In 1767.
51. The Kings of Spain and Naples.
52. During the war of the Austrian succession.
53. Stewart to Shelburne, August 14th, 1768.
54. Stewart to Shelburne, August 20th, 1768.
55. Grafton to Shelburne, September 15th, 1768.
56. Paoli to Mann, July 1768.
57. Autobiography of the Duke of Grafton, 215.
58. Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of George III., iii. 222, 245.
59. Durand à Choiseul, February 1st, 1768.
60. Chatham Correspondence, iii. 333, note. The King to Chatham, May 30th, 1767.
61. Whateley to Grenville, July 26th, August 4th, 1768. Grenville Correspondence, iv. 321, 332.
62. Francés to Choiseul, July 29th, 1768, quoted by Bancroft, v. 123.
63. Chatham Correspondence, iii. 334.
64. Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of George III., iii. 231. General Gage to Commodore Hood, August 11th, 1768. Commodore Hood to Lord Temple, September 14th, 1768.
65. Autobiography of the Duke of Grafton, 215; Hillsborough to Bernard, July 30th, 1768.
66. Knox to Grenville, September 15th, 1768.
67. Whateley to Grenville, October 11th, 1768. Grenville Correspondence, iv. 371.
68. Chatham Correspondence, iii. 337, note.
69. Chatham to Grafton, October 12th, 1768. It is difficult to see any justification for Chatham in objecting to the removal of Sir Jeffery Amherst. He was the non-resident Governor of a colony which had been most forward in expressing sympathy with Massachusetts, and the Assembly had complained of his absence. Amherst was besides offered a pension equal to the value of his salary.
70. Walpole, iii. 247, 289. Whateley to Grenville, October 27th, 1768. Grenville Correspondence, iv. 390.
71. Parliamentary History, xvi. 476, 477.
72. Grenville Correspondence, iv. 383.
73. September 16th, 1767.
74. An allusion to Barré.
75. Grenville Correspondence, iv. 383.
76. Sir N. Wraxall, writing of his journey in Portugal, says: "In 1772, the State prisons were crowded with unfortunate victims. The tower of Belem, the Fort of the Bougie, situate at the mouth of the Tagus, and the Castle of St. Julien, placed at the northern entrance of that river, were all full of prisoners; among whom a great proportion had been Jesuits, arrested either in 1758 or 1763 by orders of the first Minister. The subterranean casemates of the Castle of St. Julien contained above a hundred individuals, who could be clearly discerned, by persons walking on the ramparts of the fortress, through the iron gratings which admitted some light to those gloomy abodes. I have myself beheld many of them at the depth of fifty or sixty feet below me, pacing to and fro—most of whom, being Jesuits, were habited in the dress of the order. They excited great commiseration. The famous Gabriel Malagrida,—an Italian Jesuit, who was accused of having, as confessor to the Marchioness of Tavora, known and encouraged her to make the attempt upon Joseph's life,—after being long imprisoned in that fortress, was strangled, and his body subsequently reduced to ashes at the stake in 1761. He appears to have been rather a visionary and an imbecile fanatic, than a man of dangerous parts. His public execution, when near seventy-five years of age, must be considered as a cruel and odious act, which reflects disgrace on Joseph and on his minister. Malagrida's name is become proverbial among us to express duplicity; and has been applied, perhaps unjustly, to one of our greatest modern statesmen by his political opponents. Many other persons of all ranks, either known or believed to have been implicated in the Duke d'Aveiro's conspiracy, remained in 1772 shut up in the various State prisons of Portugal. Most or all of these unhappy sufferers who survived have, I believe, been since liberated in 1777, on the accession of the present Queen."—Memoirs, i. 63.
77. Letters of Junius, October 19th, 1768, under the signature of "Atticus."
78. Ibid., October 19th, 1768, under the signature of "Atticus."
79. Ibid., October 19th, 1768.
80. Junius to Chatham, January 2nd, 1768; Chatham Correspondence, iii. 303.
81. Letters of Junius, October 19th, 1768.
82. Milton's Paradise Lost, book ii.
83. Lettres de Madame du Deffand, ii. 597, ed. 1810.
84. The remainder of the poem—which may be found in the Appendix to the Journals of Horace Walpole, edited by Dr. Doran—is an account of the "pious fraud." The allusion to Maurice, "who bore a pack," is apparently a confusion between Antony Petty, the Romsey clothier, father of Sir William Petty, and the Earls of Kerry. Sir William Petty was Physician-General to the Cromwellian army in Ireland, and author of the Down Survey.
85. Lady Rockingham to Lord Shelburne (undated).
86. Morellet, Mémoires, ii. xiv., Diary of Franklin, 1784.
87. Lettres de Mademoiselle de l'Espinasse, i. lxiii.