On the Road to Insurrection/The Aims of the Revolution

by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

The Aims of the Revolution

Published September 26 & 27, 1917.^[1]

RUSSIA is a country dominated by the petty bourgeoisie. The vast majority of the population belong to this class. It is inevitable that it fluctuates between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. It is only by this class joining the proletariat that the victory of the revolution, that is to say peace, freedom, the re-division of the land among the workers, can be peacefully brought about with ease and speed, and without hardship.

The whole course of our revolution reveals the hesitations of the petty bourgeois class. Let us have no illusion about the Social Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, but hold fast to our proletarian track. The poverty of the poor peasants, the horrors of the war and famine clearly reveal to the masses the rightness of our policy, and the necessity of supporting the proletarian revolution.

The progress of the revolution mercilessly destroys the "pacifist" petty bourgeois trust in any "coalition" with the bourgeoisie, or in any agreement with them, and in the possibility of waiting "quietly" for the "next" convocation of the Constituent Assembly, &c. Kornilov's insurrection was the last important and cruel lesson which completed the thousands and thousands of daily lessons given to the workers and peasants by the capitalists and the landed gentry, and to the soldiers by their officers.

Discontent, indignation, exasperation continued to grow in the army, and among the peasants and workers. The "coalition" of the Social Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks with the bourgeoisie, a coalition which makes ceaseless promises only to break them, irritates the masses, opens their eyes and urges them to insurrection.

Among the Social Revolutionaries of the Left (Spiridonova and others), as among the Mensheviks (Martov and his group), opposition is increasing. It has already reached 40 per cent. of the Council and the Congress of these parties. And below, in the proletarian and peasant class, particularly among the poor peasants, the majority of the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks are Left Wing.

The Kornilov regime instructs the masses. It has already taught them a great deal.

It is impossible to say if the Soviets will now be able to remove their Social Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders and thus insure the peaceful development of the revolution; or whether they will continue to mark time and thus render the insurrection of the proletariat inevitable.

We must do our best to insure an eleventh hour peaceful development to the revolution; and for this we must expound our programme, bring its popular character to light and prove that it corresponds entirely with the interests and demands of the vast majority of the population.

The following lines are an attempt to explain this programme.

Let us forge ahead with it; draw nearer to the masses. Let us go not only to the employés, the workers and peasants who are on our side, but to those who follow the Social Revolutionaries; to the Non-party people, and to the elements as yet unconscious. Let us endeavour to teach them to judge for themselves, to draw up their own resolution and send their own delegates to the Conference, to the Soviets and to the Government. Thus our labours will not be in vain whatever may be the result of the Conference. It will be useful both for the Conference, for the Constituent Assembly elections and also for all political action in general.

Experience proves for us the validity of the programme and tactics of the Bolsheviks. The time between April 20 and the Kornilov insurrection is very brief, but how full of incident.

The experience of the masses and the oppressed classes has given them, during this short lapse of time, an immense amount of instruction. Meanwhile the leaders of the Social Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks are completely detached from the masses whose interests they have not supported. It is the point of our practical programme that it will clearly show to the masses the measures by which we will secure their participation in its discussion.

 

1.—The Fatal Consequences of the Policy of Compromise with Capitalism

To have the power in the hands of the representatives of the bourgeoisie, however small the number, to leave it to the avowed Kornilovians like the generals Alexeiev, Klembovsky, Bragation, Gargarire and others, or to the men who have, like Kerensky, proved their complete impotence in the hands of the bourgeoisie and their tendency towards Bonapartist methods, is to throw open the gates to disaster of every kind. On the one hand you invite. famine and economic collapse, which the capitalists intentionally aggravate and accelerate, and on the other military collapse; for the army detests the G.H.Q. and only under force participates in the imperialist war.

Moreover, if they maintain power the Kornilovian officers will certainly open the lines to the Germans; they will do this intentionally as they did in Galicia and at Riga. Nothing short of the creation of a new government, formed on a basis that will be explained later, will be able to prevent the imminent economic and military disaster. After all that has occurred since April 20 it will be not only a mistake on the part of the Social Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, but a direct betrayal of the people and the revolution, to continue an alliance with the bourgeoisie under any form whatever.

 

2.—Power to the Soviets

The whole undivided power of the State should be given over to the representatives of the Soviets of deputies, workers, soldiers and peasants on the basis of a pre-determined programme. This power should be entirely responsible to the Soviets.^[2] This action should be immediately followed by the re-election of the Soviets so that the experiences acquired by the people during the last and particularly instructive weeks of the revolution may be turned to account, and so that various appalling injustices can be suppressed, such as the ill-proportioned electoral districts, electoral inequality, &c., which still persist in certain places.

In the provinces where democratically elected institutions do not yet exist, as in the army, all power should be transferred exclusively to the local Soviets and to the commissars elected by them, or to other institutions, but only to the elective ones.

Everywhere it should be carried out with the complete support of the State, by the winning of the workers, of the revolutionary troops, that is to say the troops who have proved in action their will to crush the Kornilovians.

3.—Peace for the People

The Soviet Government must immediately formulate proposals to all the belligerent countries (that is simultaneously to their governments and to the masses of workers and peasants) to negotiate general peace on the spot on democratic terms, and to conclude an armistice at once, even if it is for only three months.^[3]

The principal condition of a democratic peace is the renunciation of claims to annexation. This must not be wrongly understood in the sense that all the powers should recover what they have lost, but according to the only true meaning, which is that every nationality without exception, in Europe and in the colonies, should obtain freedom and the opportunity to decide themselves if they will form a distinct State or enter as a constituent member of some other State.

The Soviet government in proposing peace conditions should immediately proceed itself to their realisation. That is to say, to publish and to break the peace treaties concluded by the Tsar, which bind us at present and which promise the spoils of Turkey, Austria, &c., to the Russian capitalists.

Further, we must do immediate justice to the claims of the Ukrainians and Finlanders, and to assure them, as well as all other nationalities in Russia, complete liberty including that of secession.

This ought, in the same way, to be our attitude towards the whole of Armenia, which we should agree to evacuate as well as the Turkish territories occupied by us, &c.

These peace conditions will not have the good fortune to please the capitalists, but they will receive such a warm welcome from the people, they will evoke such an explosion of enthusiasm in the whole world, such indignation against the interminable war of plunder waged by the bourgeoisie, that very probably we shall obtain at one stroke both an armistice and the opportunity to broach peace negotiations. For the workers' revolt against the war grows everywhere with undiminished vigour, and it is not by mere talk about peace (by means of which all the imperialist governments, including our Kerensky government, have deceived the workers and peasants for so long), it is only by a break with the capitalists and resolute peace proposals that can help on this revolt.

If the most unlikely thing were to happen, that is, if any of the belligerent States refuse even an armistice, then the war would be shown to have been one that was forced upon us—a just war, a war of defence. The proletariat and workers will realise this, and the mere knowledge of the justice of our cause will render Russia infinitely more powerful, even from the military point of view. Moreover, this war will bring about on our side a union with the oppressed classes in all countries, the oppressed peoples all over the world.

It is particularly necessary to warn the people against an assertion of the capitalists which has led astray from time to time the timid elements and the petty bourgeoisie; it is affirmed that in the eventuality of our breaking our alliance with them the English and other capitalists could deal a serious blow to the Russian revolution. This assertion is utterly false, because the "financial support of the allies," in that it enriches the bankers, "supports" the workers and peasants in exactly the same way as the gallows support its victim. Russia has enough corn, coal, oil, iron, and it will suffice to rid the people of the big proprietors and of the plundering capitalists to be able to assure the fair re-division of these products. As for the event of a military action being let lose against the Russian people by her present allies, it is manifestly absurd to suppose that the French and Italians could join forces with the Germans, and launch them against Russia, since it is she who has proposed a just peace. Then even if England, America and Japan declare war on Russia (which would be very difficult for them owing to the unpopularity of such a war as well as the divergence of interest which divides them on the question of the distribution of Asia, and particularly the plundering of China) they could only cause Russia the hundredth part of the affliction and distress caused by the war with Germany, Austria and Turkey.

 

4.—The Land for the Workers

The Soviet Government must immediately proclaim the confiscation without compensation of private property in connection with the estates of the big landed proprietors. They must be transferred to agrarian committees. These will be responsible for the administration of this land, pending the decision of the Constituent Assembly.

In the same way the arrangements concerning the lease of cattle of the big landed proprietors must be handed over to the administration of these rural committees, so that they can be placed at once at the free disposal of the poor peasants.^[4]

These measures are urgently necessary. The vast majority of peasants have already demanded them for a long time, in the resolutions of their congresses and in the hundreds of their instructions to local delegates (it arose, amongst other things, from the examination of the 242 instructions published in the Isvestia of the Soviets of Peasant Representatives).^[5] None of those delays of payment from which the peasant class suffered so much during the "coalition" ministry can be allowed any more. Every government who puts off the realisation of these measures will be recognised as being against the people, and would deserve to be overthrown and crushed by the revolt of workers and peasants. And, on the contrary, every government that brings about these measures will be considered really popular.

 

5.—The Struggle Against Famine and Disorganisation

The Soviet government must immediately institute workers' control over production and consumption. Without this control, as has been shown by the course of events since May 6, all promises and attempts in connection with reform are powerless, and from one day to the next famine and disaster threaten to overwhelm the country.^[6]

It is essential to proceed immediately to the nationalisation of the banks,^[7] insurance companies and the most important branches of industry (oil, coal, metal, sugar, &c.).^[8] In the same way commercial secrets must be suppressed and a vigorous inspection instituted on the part of the workers and peasants over the tiny minority of capitalists who, enriching themselves by means of supplies made to the State, arrange so as to keep no accounts, and avoid all taxation of their profits and property.

These measures, which will not deprive the peasants of the least portion of their goods nor take away the means of the Cossacks and small artisans, are absolutely necessary for the equal division of the burden of the war and extremely urgent in the struggle against famine. It is only by curbing the appetite of the capitalists and by preventing them from intentionally hindering production^[9] that one can obtain the best return for labour, and that general obligation to work, the normal exchange of corn for indust products, and the return to the Treasury coffers of the thousands of paper money hidden by the rich.

Without these measures the confiscation without compensation of big estates is impossible, for most of these properties are mortgaged to the banks and the interests of the landed proprietors are linked up with those of the capitalists.

The last resolution of the economic section of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of workers' and soldiers' representatives (cf. Rabotchaia Gazeta, No. 152^[10]) recognises not only the uselessness of the Government's measures (such as the doubling of the tax on corn, destined to enrich the big landed proprietors and the Kulaks) as well as the "complete inaction of the central organs created by the government to regularise economic life," but also the "violation of the laws" by this Government. This confession from the parties in power, the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, proves once again how criminal is the policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie.

 

6.—The Struggle Against the Counter-Revolution of the Big Landed Proprietors and Capitalists

The insurrection of Kornilov and Kaledin was supported by the whole landlord class and the capitalists led by the Cadet Party ("Party of Popular Freedom"). This has been definitely proved already by the facts published in the Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee. But nothing of any importance has been, or can be, done towards a complete suppression of this counter-revolution or an effective inquiry without the transfer of power to the Soviets. A commission that had not power at its disposal could neither carry through a complete inquiry nor arrest the guilty.

The Soviet Government alone could and should do it. It alone could save Russia from the inevitable repetition of the Kornilovian attacks by arresting the Kornilovian generals and the leaders of the bourgeois counter-revolution (Goutchkov, Miliukov, Riabouchinsky, Maklakov and their associates), by dissolving the counter-revolutionary societies (Duma of the Empire, League of Officers, &c.), by submitting their members to the inspection of the local Soviets and by disbanding the counter-revolutionary units. It alone could create a commission capable of making a full public inquiry into the Kornilovian and other affairs, even those stirred up by the bourgeoisie. It is moreover to such a commission that the Bolshevik party from its side will ask the workers to submit completely and to lend their co-operation. The Soviet Government is the only one that could struggle successfully against such an appalling injustice as the seizure, by means of the millions stolen from the people, of the big printing presses and the majority of the newspapers perpetrated by the capitalists. The counter-revolutionary bourgeois papers (Rietch, Royskoye Slovo, &c.) must be closed down, their presses confiscated; advertisements must be declared a State monopoly and reserved for a governmental paper, published by the Soviets to offer truth to the peasants. This is the only way to snatch from the hands of the bourgeoisie the powerful weapon of the Press which they use to lie, slander and deceive the people, lead the peasants astray and to prepare the counter-revolution.

 

7.—The Peaceful Development of the Revolution

The Russian democracy, the Soviets, the Social Revolutionary and Menshevik parties have before them now an opportunity which is extremely rare in the history of revolution. They I can assure the convocation of the Constituent Assembly on the date fixed without further adjournment; they can preserve the country from military and economic disaster; they can safeguard the peaceful development of events.

If the Soviets seize power now in order to carry out the programme expounded above, they can be certain not only of the support of the working class and the great majority of peasants, but also of the revolutionary enthusiasm of the army and of the majority of the people; without which enthusiasm victory over famine and war is impossible.

There could be no longer any question of resistance to the Soviets, but for their hesitations. No class will dare provoke insurrection against them, and, enlightened by the Kornilov experience, the big proprietors and capitalists will peacefully surrender power before the Soviet ultimatum. In order to overcome the capitalists' resistance to the Soviet programme it will suffice to institute a vigilant supervision by the peasants and workers over the exploiters, and to inflict such punishments as total confiscation of their possessions and short time imprisonment upon the recalcitrants.

If the Soviets seized power they could still—and it is probably the last chance—assure the peaceful development of the revolution, the peaceful election by the people of their representatives, the peaceful competition of parties in the bosom of the Soviets, the experiments of the different party programmes, and the peaceful transference of power from one party to another.

If this opportunity is not taken, civil war in its most acute form between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is inevitable. The whole course of the revolution from April 20 down to Kornilov demonstrates this. The impending collapse of the country will accelerate the approach of this war. As far as one can judge from the facts accessible to human intelligence, this war will result in the complete victory of the working classes. It will be supported in the carrying out of the programme explained above by the poor ranks of the peasant class, but it may be extremely bitter and bloody, and cost the lives of tens of thousands of big proprietors and capitalists as well as of the officers who side with them. The proletariat will shrink from no sacrifice that will assure the safety of the revolution, a safety which can only be secured by the carrying out of the above programme. But it will sustain the Soviets by every means in its power if they grasp this last chance to secure the peaceful development of the revolution.

1. The text shows that this article was written before the end of the Democratic Conference, therefore before September 22.
2. Decree of October 26, 1917.
3. It was precisely in this form that the Decree on Peace of the Second Congress of the Soviets, of October 26, was issued.
4. This was practically the literal terms of the Decree on the Land of October 26, 1917.
5. "Instructions" added precisely to the Decree on the Land, under the title of unobligatory regulations.
6. The Regulations on Workers' Control was published on November 16, 1917.
7. The Decree on the Nationalisation of the Banks, December 17.
8. The sugar industry was nationalised on May 3, 1918; oil on June 30. In June also the principal mining and metal, textile, &c., concerns were nationalised en bloc. In all these branches nationalisation was prepared for by the existence of large trusts and syndicates of the owners.
9. On August 1, 1917, 568 concerns, employing 105,000 workers, were closed by their owners (206 of these in July alone) for various pretexts, lack of fuel, excessive demands of the workers, &c.
10. Menshevik journal.