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Stockpile Size. In 2020, the DoD estimated China’s operational nuclear warhead stockpile was in the low-200s and expected to at least double by 2030. However, Beijing has accelerated its nuclear expansion, and DoD estimates China’s stockpile had more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023. By 2030, DoD estimates that the PRC will have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads, most of which will be fielded on systems capable of ranging the CONUS. Beijing has not declared an end goal nor acknowledged the scale of its expansion, has resisted calls in multilateral fora for increased transparency, and has declined to engage in substantive arms control discussions. We continue to assess the PRC is constructing the infrastructure necessary to support this force expansion, including increasing its capacity to produce and separate plutonium by constructing fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities. Though this is consistent with the PRC goal of closing the nuclear fuel cycle, the PRC likely intends to use some of this infrastructure to produce plutonium for its expanding nuclear weapons program.

The PRC’s long-term nuclear requirements—and the relationship between the PRC’s nuclear requirements and its national strategy and goal to field a “world-class” military by mid-century—remain unclear from public sources. Hawkish PRC state media outlets have asserted that the PRC needs 1,000 warheads, while retired PLA officers have suggested that the PRC should possesses a “mutually assured destruction” capability. While neither of those claims are official, China’s arming of hundreds of silos over the next decade, continued rapid growth in its road-mobile force and air and sea legs indicates that beyond 2030, China will probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels, and will continue growing its force to 2035 in line with previous estimates. These changes to the numbers, capability, and readiness of the PRC’s nuclear forces in the coming years are likely to outpace potential developments by the nuclear forces of any competitor.

Regardless of the ultimate number of nuclear weapons it makes, the PRC will probably continue to claim it is, like other nuclear powers, adhering to the minimum of nuclear weapons needed to protect its security interests.

Hypersonics and Fractional Orbital Bombardment. The PRC probably is developing advanced nuclear delivery systems such as a strategic hypersonic glide vehicle and a FOB system in part due to long-term concerns about United States missile defense capabilities as well as to attain qualitative parity with future worldwide missile capabilities. On July 27th, 2021, the PRC conducted a test of an ICBM-range hypersonic glide vehicle that travelled 40,000 kilometers. The test likely demonstrated the PRC’s technical ability to field a FOB system. The PRC does not appear to have tested a FOB system in 2022.

Lower-Yield Nuclear Weapons. The PRC probably seeks lower yield nuclear warhead capabilities to provide proportional response options that its high-yield warheads cannot deliver. PRC strategists have highlighted the need for lower-yield nuclear weapons in order to increase the deterrence value of the PRC’s nuclear force, though they have not defined specific nuclear yield values. A 2017 defense industry publication indicated a lower-yield weapon had been developed for use against campaign and tactical targets that would reduce collateral damage. By late 2018,


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China