- Plutonium Extraction. China could extract the WGPu at its 50 ton/year reprocessing plant at Jiuquan (Plant 404) or at one of the two 200 ton/year reprocessing plants under construction at the CNNC Gansu Nuclear Technology Industrial Park in Jinta, Gansu Province, the first of which is expected to be operational by 2025. China has reduced transparency in its nuclear program as its capabilities are increasing and has not reported its stockpile of separated plutonium to the IAEA since 2017, according to a Western think tank. China has, thus far, refused international calls to apply IAEA safeguards, under a Voluntary Offer Agreement on its civilian reactors.
- Uranium and Tritium. In the past several years, China’s organization traditionally associated with military uranium enrichment has expanded production capacity and likely will continue to do so. China is also working to expand and diversify its capability to produce tritium by methods such as using tritium production targets in reactors and extraction from tritiated heavy water, according to Chinese nuclear industry reporting.
Nuclear Testing. In recent years, the PRC expanded its nuclear warhead research, development, testing, and production capacity to support the size and pace of its nuclear stockpile expansion. The PRC’s possible preparation to operate its Lop Nur nuclear test site year-round and lack of transparency on its nuclear testing activities have raised concerns regarding its adherence to the U.S. “zero yield” standard adhered to by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in their respective nuclear weapons testing moratoria.
EVOLVING NUCLEAR POSTURE
Though it is often thought that the PRC maintains a “minimum deterrent,” the PRC’s evolving nuclear posture is more consistent with its own definition of “limited deterrent.” Rocket Force documents describe these terms as follows:
- “Minimum Deterrence” is achieving nuclear deterrence with only a small quantity of nuclear weapons to strike enemy urban targets.
- “Maximum Deterrence” is seeking overwhelming disarming strikes to minimize one’s own losses and maintain strategic freedom of action; employing overwhelming qualitative and quantitative superiority, a multi-function offensive system capable of hitting hard targets and a comprehensive defense system.
- “Limited Deterrence” is the wide space between minimum and maximum deterrence.
The PRC perceived national security requirements will grow as it transitions from a “large country” to a “powerful country” and its minimum number of military forces—to include nuclear—needed to defend those greater interests is also likely to grow. In 2022, the PRC rejected requests by the United States to discuss strategic stability or strategic risk reduction, and other impacts of the PRC’s rapid nuclear build up.
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
