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Over the last 18 months, the PLA appears to have been engaged in a centralized, concerted campaign to perform these risky behaviors in order to coerce a change in lawful U.S. operational activity, and that of U.S. Allies and partners. Prior to the fall of 2021, the PLA routinely intercepted foreign air and maritime assets operating in the Indo-Pacific, but these earlier interactions rarely involved PLA employment of coercive and risky behavior. Between the fall of 2021 and fall of 2023, the United States has documented over 180 instances of PLA coercive and risky air intercepts against U.S. aircraft in the region—more in the past two years than in the previous decade. Over the same period, the PLA has conducted around 100 instances of coercive and risky operational behavior against U.S. Allies and partners, in an effort to deter both the United States and others from conducting lawful operations in the region. The PRC’s messaging regarding its forces’ operational behavior, such as claiming it is “justified to take forceful countermeasures” against activities that Beijing labels “provocative,” suggests centralized coordination, not the behavior of a few isolated PLA officers.

Some examples of the PRC’s coercive and risky behavior include the following:

  • In February 2022, a Chinese naval ship directed a laser at an Australian P-8A Poseidon aircraft operating in Australia’s exclusive economic zone, endangering the health of Australian airmen.
  • While flying a mission between April and May 2022, the Canadian CP-140 patrol aircraft were the subject of harassment by PLAAF fighter jets, which on several occasions, attempted to divert Canadian CP-140s. The PLAAF aircraft did this by conducting close approaches which forced the Canadian patrol craft to alter its flight path to avoid collision.
  • During a routine May 2022 maritime surveillance flight by an Australian P-8A in the South China Sea, a Chinese J-16 conducted a dangerous intercept maneuver which posed a safety threat to the P-8A and its aircrew. The Australian government issued a press release on this event.
  • In June 2022, a Chinese J-16 cut across the nose of another Australian P-8A Poseidon that was operating in international airspace over the South China Sea. The Chinese jet released a round of chaff, which was ingested into the Australian aircraft’s engine.
  • In December 2022, a PLA J-11 fighter came within 20 feet of the nose of a U.S. military aircraft operating lawfully in international airspace over the South China Sea.
  • In February 2023, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs issued a statement concerning an incident with a Chinese Coast Guard vessel, operating under PLA overwatch, engaged in dangerous maneuvers against a Philippine Coast Guard vessel operating within Manila’s own EEZ, including by deploying a military-grade laser that temporarily blinded Filipino crew members.
  • In May 2023, the DoD released cockpit video of a PLA J-16 “thumping” a U.S. RC-135 aircraft by forcing the U.S. RC-135 to fly directly behind it in its wake turbulence.
  • Less than one week later, in June, the DoD released video of the PLA’s unprofessional reaction to the USS CHUNG HOON during a U.S.-Canada bilateral Taiwan Strait Transit.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China