PLA RESPONSE TO HIGH-PROFILE VISIT TO TAIWAN BY FOREIGN FIGURES
Throughout 2022, the PRC continued to respond to high-level foreign visits to Taiwan with low-level military drills near Taiwan, typically including Taiwan Strait centerline crossings, increased PLA Navy activity around Taiwan, and public statements condemning the visits. In stark contrast, the PLA responded in early August 2022 to the CODEL vist to Taiwan with significantly larger-scale military activities that included several unprecedented actions. The Eastern Theater Command conducted snap military drills that included PLA aviation flying more than 250 fighter aircraft into Taiwan’s self-declared ADIZ and 13 PLA Navy vessels operating around Taiwan. The PLARF fired multiple ballistic missiles into impacts zones in waters around Taiwan, including the first-seen instance of at least four missiles overflying Taiwan. These military drills also afforded the PLA an opportunity to train simulated joint blockade and simulated joint firepower strike operations.
PRC MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST TAIWAN
Although Beijing reaffirms that “peaceful reunification” is its preferred course of action, the PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could increasingly signal its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a range of cyberspace, blockade, and kinetic campaigns designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification or compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table on the PRC’s terms. In any case, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could offer Xi the following military options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying degrees of feasibilities associated risk. The PRC’s perception of domestic and international receptivity to military action, the expected impact on its economy of resulting sanctions, political trends in Taiwan, and its level of confidence in the PLA’s capability to conduct a successful invasion of Taiwan will determine which military option the PRC chooses during crises. The PLA practiced elements of each of these military options during its August 2022 large-scale military exercise aimed at pressuring Taiwan, and again in April 2023 in response to Taiwan president Tsai Ingwen’s transit of the United States.
Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of
140
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China
