is a God. 2. That the ridiculousness off sundry Religions is not any proof that to be affected with Religion is no Innate faculty of the Soul of man.
Chap. X. 1. That though the Common might be the Seat of Common Sense, yet it cannot be the Common Percipient; 2. As being incapable of Sensation, 3. Of Memory, 4.Of Imagination, 5. Of Reason, 6. And of Spontaneous Motion. 7. That these Arguments do not equally prove an Incorporeal Substance in Brutes; nor, if they did, were their Souls straightway immortal. 8. That we cannot admit Perception in Matter as well as Divisibility, upon pretence the one is no more perplex'd then the other; because both Sense and Reason averres the one, but no faculty gives witness to the other. 9. In what sense the Soul is both divisible and extended. 10. A Symbolical representation how she may receive multitudes of distinct figurations into one indivisible Principle of perception. 11. That the manifest incapacity in the Matter for the Functions of a Soul assures us of the Existence hereof, be we never so much puzzled in the speculation of her Essence.
Chap. XI. 1. That Subtilty is not inconsistent with the strongest Truth. 2. That the subordinate serviceableness of things in the world is in the things themselves, not merely in our Phansy. 3. That the difficulty of obtaining such serviceable commodities is rather an Argument for Providence then against it. 4. That Beauty is no necessary Result from the mere Motion of the Matter. 5. That it is an intellectual Object, not taken notice of by Brutes. 6. That the preying of Animals one upon another is very well confident with the Goodness of the First Cause. 7. As also the Creation of offensive Animals, there being curbs & correctives to their increase. 8. That the immediate Matter of the Fœtus is homogental. 9. That the notion of the Archei or Seminal forms is no such intricate Speculation.
Chap. XII. 1. Objections against the Story of the Charmer of Saltzburg, 2. And of the betwitched Children at Amsterdam, with same others of that kinde; 3. As also against that of John of Hembach and John Michael Pipers to the Antick dancings of Devils. 4. Also against the disappearing of the Conventicle of Witches at the naming of God; 5. And against a certain passage of that Story of the Guardian Genius which Bodinus relates.
Chap. XIII. 1. That the Transformation of an humane body into another shape may be done without pain. 2. That there may be an actual separation of Soul and Body without Death properly so called. 3. That the Bodies of Spirits may be hot, or cold, or warm, and the manner how they become so. 4. In what sense we may acknowledge a First in an Infinite succession of generations. 5. That the story of Tree-Geese in Gerard is certainly true. 6. That God must be a Spirit properly so called. 7. That Spirits ordinarily so called are not Fire nor Aire, but Essences properly Spiritual, demonstrated from the solute Arenosity (as I may so speak) of Aire and Fire. 8. That this soluteness makes those Aereal Compages incapable of Personality, spontaneous Motion, and Sensation: 9. As also of transfiguring their vehicle into those complete shapes of Animals they appear in; 10. And of holding it together in winds and storms; 11. And lastly, of transporting Men and Cattel in the Aire. 12. That if Spirits or Dæmons be nothing but mere compilements of Aiery or Fiery Atoms, every Devil is many Millions of Devils. 13. The preeminence of Arguments fetched from the History of Spirits above those from the Operations of the Soul in the Body. for the proving of a Substance Immaterial.
