Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (3rd ed., 1735).djvu/23

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Human Liberty.
19

to judging about some propositions, and willing or chusing with respect to some objects. And experiencing these things, they mistake them for the exercise of Freedom, or Liberty from Necessity. For ask them, whether they think themselves free? and they will immediately answer, Yes: and say some one or other of these foregoing things, and particularly think they prove themselves free, when they affirm, they can do as they will.

Nay, celebrat’d Philosophers and Theologers, both ancient and modern, who have meditated much on this matter, talk after the same manner, giving definitions of Liberty, that are consistent with Fate or Necessity; tho’ at the same time they would be thought to exempt some of the actions of man from the power of Fate, or to assert Liberty from Necessity.[1] Cicero defines Liberty to be, a power to do as we will. And therein several moderns follow him. One[2] defines Liberty to be, a power to act, or not to act, as we will. Another defines it in more words thus:[3] a power to do what we will, and because we will; so that if we did not will it, we should not do it; we

  1. Opera p. 3968. Ed. Gron.
  2. Placette Eclairciss. sur la Liberté, p. 2.
  3. Jaquelot, sur l’exist. de Dieu, p. 381.