should even do the contrary if we will’d it. And another,[1] a power to do or forbear an action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either is preferr’d to the other. On all which definitions, if the Reader will be pleas’d to reflect, he will see ’em to be only definitions of liberty or freedom from outward impediments of action, and not a Freedom or Liberty from Necessity; as I also will shew them to be in the sequel of this Discourse, wherein I shall contend equally with them for such a power as they describe, tho’ I affirm, That there is no Liberty from Necessity.
Alexander the Aphrodisæan,[2] (a most acute philosopher of the IId Century, and the earliest commentator now extant upon Aristotle, and esteemed his best Defender and Interpreter) defines Liberty to be,[3] a power to chuse what to do after deliberation and consultation, and to chuse and do what is most eligible to our reason; whereas otherwise, we should follow our fancy. Now a choice after deliberation, is a no less necessary choice, than a choice by fancy. For tho’ a choice by fancy, or without deliberation, may be one way, and a choice with delibe-
